

“Cultural History and Psychoanalysis”

Peter Loewenberg, Los Angeles

You don't see what you are seeing until
you see it, but when you do see it, it lets
you see many other things.

- William Thurston (2006)

-

Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Culture

Psychoanalysis is now inseparable from Western culture. Today a psychoanalytic sensibility has a central place in the humanities, theater, film, literature, art, the media. A typical nineteenth century two volume “Life and Times...” biography, as John Morley wrote of William E. Gladstone (1903), from which you would never know that he was a flagellant; or Monypenny and Buckle wrote of Benjamin Disraeli (1910); or in America Dumas Malone’s Thomas Jefferson (1948-1981), with no reference to the body, sexuality, dreams, or expressed private fantasies, is unacceptable and virtually unthinkable today -- the reading public and the reviewers justifiably expect what the twenty-first century has to offer in grappling with the conflicts and multi-determination of motivation. This is in response to the richness and complexity opened up by psychoanalysis. The existence of unconscious thought and fantasies, the “Freudian” slip, the unrecognized, conflicted, ambivalent, and unacknowledged motive, the psycho-sexual phases of development, are a part of the everyday discourse of the media and of ordinary people -- this too is the triumph and generalization of psychoanalysis in our culture. Freud is indeed, as W.H. Auden said, “a whole climate of opinion.” (1976, p. 217) In our twenty-first century psychoanalysis has become a hermeneutic science of interpretation, a quest for meanings in the thoughts, fantasies, and aspirations of individuals and cultures. After a brief general survey of the terrain I wish to focus on a celebrated case of an historian’s counter-transference self-reflections and a case study of psychoanalytic perceptions applied to a creative institution.

Psychoanalysis is a discipline of a new kind, a Twenty-First Century discipline, by which I mean a humanistic discipline that offers tentative multi-causal conclusions, combining in its method both self-reflection and empiricism, but basing itself on a unique and different process of inquiry from either the natural or the cultural sciences. "The psychoanalytic mode of thought," said Freud, "acts like a new instrument of research." (Freud, 1913, p. 185). Psychoanalysis is a humanistic science, a hermeneutic science of meanings, in which two people together create a secure field for the exploration of the latent and least-understood meanings of fantasies, dreams, interactions (including their dialogic encounter), behaviors, and life itself (Loewenberg, 2000). Freud was a hermeneutician of dreams, patterning the interpretation of dreams after the hermeneutic model: "'Interpreting' a dream implies assigning a 'meaning' to it" (Freud, 1900, 96).

Freud was much more than a natural scientist--he always wished to be, and was, also a humanist. He pioneered modes of comprehending life and texts on several levels at once. Freud created a general psychology which is based on the humanistic method -- the study of a single case in all its richness, complexity, and ambiguity. What we know of Freud's view of the interpretation of texts is from the foundational document of psychoanalysis, the *Traumdeutung*, and his six case histories. Freud believed in the heuristic power of the single case history, arguing: "It might teach us everything, if we were only in a position to make everything out, and if we were not compelled by the inexperience of our own perception to content ourselves with a little." (Freud, 1918, p. 10) Psychoanalysis both limits, or decodes the power of the irrational meaning of dreams, fantasies and symptoms, and at the same time expands and develops their meanings by relating them to the themes and conflicts of a life in an open-ended hermeneutic, much as a humanist does with a text.

The psychoanalyst makes himself the instrument of knowledge, not by suppressing his subjectivity, but by utilizing it in self-reflection. Freud made the point explicitly in contrast to the medical model: "A doctor suffering from disease of the lung or heart is not handicapped either in diagnosing or treating internal complaints; whereas the special conditions of analytic work do actually cause the analyst's own defects to interfere with his making a correct assessment of the state of things in his patient and reacting to them in a useful way." (Freud, 1937, p. 248) The clinical art of interpreting the preconscious and unconscious levels of the analysand's messages and productions is analogous to the literary critic's reading of the multiple levels of a text or the historian's interpretation of new meanings and new conjunctures of theory and evidence in previously familiar facts and data. The psychoanalyst's perception of these stimuli must employ his/her self-reflective function. Just as an historical event or movement, a poem or a fictional text, may be understood from many different points of view, a symptom, a dream, an action, or a fantasy may have more than one meaning. The psychoanalyst, as does the historian and humanist, seeks meanings at multiple levels of consciousness and in cultural, intellectual, political, gender, ethnic, and familial contexts.

For psychoanalysis the concept of "overdetermination" suggests multiple causes. In contrast to mathematics or physics, which seek "unique" causes that alone are sufficient, in psychoanalysis as well as in history, more causes or explanations are not superfluous or irrelevant. Freud said of this relationship: "Thus it appears that affects in dreams are fed from a confluence of several sources and are over-determined in their reference to the material of the dream-thoughts....As in the case of dreams, there are no limits to the further determinants that may be present—to the 'overdetermination' of the symptoms." (Freud,

Psychoanalysis and History: Dilthey, Collingwood, and Bloch

Psychoanalysis *is* history, and the professional and cultural goals of the historian and the psychoanalyst are the same: to liberate us from the burden of the conscious and unconscious past by helping us to understand that past. The historian's personality and preconceptions affect the way in which he/she searches for and assembles evidence – thus any history is a product of interaction and compromise of the historian's inner life and the socio-political outer world. Cultural historians, as do psychoanalysts, unfold *Gestalten* of the art, literature, theater, films, architecture, and other artifacts with which they reconstitute a past. They are particularly interested in temporal transformations, or what analysts call adaptations and adjustments to the *traumata* of war, defeat, revolution, famine, disease, migration, exile, and death, as well as long term political, social, and cultural patterns of development (*la longue durée*). Whether they acknowledge it or not, historians use their subjective empathic functions to understand the past. Our way of reading documents necessarily derives primarily from who we are, our psychodynamic past, our present counter-transferences to the material, and our current emotional and theoretical surround. As in so much else, including our clinical work, we exist in a space of tension and ambiguity between our subjectivity and what we choose to define as outside “reality.”

There is a striking congruence between Freud and the methods of the cultural historian. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) espoused the idea that the historian is himself the primary instrument of research, that he uses himself as the perceptor and interpreter of data. Dilthey understood that the historian relives the past in his own mind. What makes Dilthey so

strikingly modern to us is the stress he laid on historical knowledge as an inner experience of the historian. Dilthey argued that the historian's understanding [*Verständnis*] is based on his inner relationship [*innere Verhältnis*] to his subject of research, and this relationship is possible through recreation [*Nacherzeugen*] and re-experience [*Nacherleben*]. Historians face the practical task “of the inner reliving of the development of individuation” [*innerlich . . . diesen Aufgang zur Individuation zu durchleben*]. He called on historians to place themselves mentally in the historical situation [*Sichhineinversetzen*]. “On the basis of this placing of oneself in the situation, this transposition, the highest form in which the totality of mental life can be effective in understanding, arises—imitation or identification.” Dilthey was the earliest conceptualizer of the use of sympathy [*Mitfühlers*] and empathy [*Einfühlung*] as tools of cognition in historical research. (Dilthey, 1958, pp. 213-15) R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943) was Dilthey’s prophet in the Anglo-Saxon world. His work and method is particularly congenial to the psychoanalytic mode of experience because it highlights the tools of emotional empathy and mental identification which lead to intellectual insight as to “how it really was.” He wrote:

All history is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind....It is not a passive surrender...it is a labour of active and therefore critical thinking. The historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it criticizes it, forms his own judgement of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it.
(Collingwood, 1943, p. 215)

Collingwood was psychoanalyzed for “the full fifty-session process.” (Mabbott, 1986, p. 76) He regarded “Freud as one of the greatest men of our age, and his works as almost perfect

examples of scientific method and dispassionate analysis.” (Connelly and Costall, p. 153) In 1938 he saluted Freud as “the greatest psychologist of our age,” (Collingwood, 1938, p. 64). and said in 1941, “I congratulate myself that I have trained myself, all my life, to keep on good terms with my own unconscious.” (Connelly and Costall, pp. 153-4) Collingwood was aware of, and illustrated, the psychodynamics of projection and what today would we call projective identification: “We learn to bolster . . . self-deceit by attributing the disowned experience to other people. Coming down to breakfast out of temper, but refusing to allow that ill humour so evident in the atmosphere is our own, we are distressed to find the whole family suffering agonies of crossness.” (Collingwood, 1938, p. 218)

To theorize elegantly about history is one thing. To apply a theory intelligently so that it yields solid results is quite another. With Collingwood we may see, not only a philosopher of history conceptualize what happens when an historian works, but we may also observe a first-rate historian doing his research and making his discoveries. It is instructive to see how Collingwood operationalized his empathic theory of historical research. He tried to reason as the Roman strategists did, then reconstruct the past in his own mind and test his fantasy by empirical research. His research was concerned with the purpose and function of Hadrian's Wall, a 73-mile-long structure built across the narrowest part of England on a line from the River Tyne on the North Sea to the Solway Firth on the Irish Sea and maintained by the Romans between 122 and 383 A.D. Collingwood reversed earlier scholarship by first creating a problem where there was previously only accepted dictum—that this wall, as other *limes* at the extremities of the Roman Empire, was a military fortification designed to keep out barbarian invaders. Collingwood asserted that, because this particular Wall was narrow, he could not imagine this. We see Collingwood, the empathic historian, at work, using his powers of identification based on an immersion in the life problems and problem-solving thought of Roman strategists in the time of Hadrian:

[The Wall] lacks the essential characteristic of a fortification. It cannot be

defended. In order to defend a wall you must be able to bring reinforcements to a threatened point; but the top of the Wall was reached only by stairways at forts and mile-castles, and by ladders (it would appear) at the turrets; and ladders 500 yards apart are a very poor means of bringing reinforcements to the top of a narrow wall. Nor was the Wall broad enough to march reinforcements along it, behind the "firing line," even if (as was not the case) the Roman soldier had been provided with *armes de jet* adequate for dealing with an attack on such a work. The walls of a fort of this period are rendered defensible by the earth bank behind them, giving access to every point, and by the frequent gates, which enable the garrison to sally out and take assailants in the rear; both these features are absent from the Wall. (Collingwood, 1930, p. 78)

His subjective fantasies and feelings led him to his problem:

When disturbance ripened into war, when large forces from the north advanced upon the Wall and attempted (as no doubt they did, not always unsuccessfully) to penetrate it, *we cannot imagine* that the Roman cohorts actually lined up on the rampart-walk to repel them, still less that Hadrian's engineers *ever contemplated* such a proceeding [italics mine] (Collingwood, 1921, p. 9)

He tells us that he is employing his empathy in making a reconstruction. He explicitly says that his tool of cognition is his power of imagination, his ability to get into the mind of Hadrian's engineers and, if a given pattern of thought is 'unthinkable' for them in his mind, this fantasied implausibility is for him an important historical datum. Collingwood is using his educated and disciplined fantasy as a primary instrument of historical research. He placed

himself in the mental and emotional position of the Roman generals and engineers who designed and built the wall. He immersed himself in their situation, seeking the 'inward experience' of making the past object alive in him. He maintained that the historian makes discoveries by rethinking the thoughts of his subjects in his own mind:

The historian of politics or warfare, presented with an account of certain actions done by Julius Caesar, tries to understand these actions, that is, to discover what thoughts in Caesar's mind determined him to do them. This implies envisaging for himself the situation in which Caesar stood, and thinking for himself what Caesar thought about the situation and the possible ways of dealing with it. The history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind. (Collingwood, 1946, p. 215)

Collingwood pointed out that those persons who had appropriate business in the Roman province would cross the wall at one of the forts. In addition to its function as a boundary, the wall was intended as:

an obstacle to smugglers, or robbers, or other undesirables. A man from beyond the frontier, found on the Roman side of the line, could not plead ignorance or innocent intentions if the line was clearly marked; and if, in addition, it was a slight obstacle, crossing it otherwise than at the authorized and controlled gateways was proof of a sinister purpose. (Collingwood, 1921, pp. 7-8)

What then was the purpose of this large Roman work in the north of England? Making his brilliant original formulation, Collingwood tells us:

The Wall, in spite of appearances, was not strictly a fortification. It was an elevated sentry-walk, where men patrolling the frontier were secure against sudden attack and could command a good view of the country which it was their business to watch. It was also a very effective obstacle against raiding, not because raiding parties could not get across it—for a few men with a ladder could easily overpower a sentry or two and get across before help could arrive—but because, once they were across and the alarm given, it would be almost impossible for

them to get back, especially if they were laden with plunder. (Collingwood, 1959, p. 32)

The wall was a frontier *limes* or boundary, not a military work. It was not a fortification, a work designed to resist attack by armed forces. It was a police work, designed to keep out Caledonian raiders who would be seriously impeded by such a wall. In Collingwood's research and interpretation on the problem of the Wall, extending over two decades, we see the historian's procedure of reconstruction of the past by inferring the thoughts and feelings of particular men in the past from the historical evidence of the present. It is a process of immersion in their problems and identification with their solutions, a practice analogous to puzzle solving. Collingwood sought confirmatory evidence from residues in the present, much as an analyst would. His archeological research established that there was no trench in front of the Wall. Indeed, the Wall top was only 15 feet from the ground. (Collingwood, 1921, p. 5) And how do we know that Collingwood is right? Of course, we cannot know for a certainty, only a probability. Indeed we may be certain that in due course his view will be revised as successor historians re-analyze and reconfigure the evidence. But our conviction is based on the fact that for now the pieces fit. Puzzle solving, incidentally, is a methodological simile used by Freud:

If one succeeds in arranging the confused heap of fragments, each of which bears upon it an unintelligible piece of drawing, so that the picture acquires a meaning, so that there is no gap anywhere in the design and so that the whole fits into the frame—if all these conditions are fulfilled, then one knows that one has solved the puzzle and that there is no alternative solution. (Freud, 1923, 116)

Historians use the present as an entry to the past, as do psychoanalysts who begin with the presenting complaint. The historical method of the great medievalist Marc Bloch was to pursue a “prudently retrogressive method of research,” to move backward retrospectively from the consummation to origins. He taught: “The knowledge of the present bears...immediately upon the understanding of the past....For the natural progression of all research is from the best (or least badly) understood to the most obscure.” (Bloch, 1953, pp. 45-6) Bloch critiqued the medievalist Fustel de Coulanges, who said the open field system of

England did not exist in France, for not looking at the present fields of France and noting “the characteristic pattern of the plowlands visible all over northern and eastern France which so irresistibly call to mind the open fields of England,” and for ignoring “the debates on grazing on the arable which were engaging both Chambers at the very moment” he expressed his judgment. (Bloch, 1966, p. xxvii) Bloch was a methodological innovator who in 1930 introduced aerial photography as historical evidence of field arrangements. (Bloch, 1966, pp. 142-3) Bloch’s injunction to historians is that the key to the past is “to understand the living,” much as a contemporary psychoanalyst would engage with the here and now to comprehend the past. Bloch urged historians to “keep in constant touch with the present day.” (Bloch, 1953, pp. 43-4) For Bloch “historical facts are, in essence, psychological facts...they find their antecedents in other psychological facts.” (Bloch, 1953, p. 194)

Historians work with multiple interpretations. It is axiomatic that each age and social turn calls for a reinterpretation of the past. In psychoanalysis free association makes explicit a multiplicity of meanings. In both disciplines any interpretation can be reversed and certainly improved upon. There is no exegesis without contesting. Both history and psychoanalysis presume a series of mutual interpretations, each of which is both completed and corrected by the following ones. There is a progressive creation of meaning through successive encounters and interpretations where the meaning of each interpretation is dependent on the working through of the previous ones. The initial meaning must be seen as provisional, and is not suppressed or abandoned: it is retained, supplemented, and finally surpassed in the on-going work of analysis.

Cultural Pessimism: Burckhardt and Freud

Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) and his Basel colleague Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) were, with Freud, isolated dissenters from the nineteenth century ideology of progress -- the idea implicit in linear time as progression, that the human condition and our civilization is getting ever better. Peter Burke has observed that while Burckhardt's *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860) has serious flaws, including a weakness in exploring the material and social setting of cultural life, it remains "the best introduction to Renaissance Italy," (Burke, 1979) an extraordinary accolade considering the depth of intensive research on the subject in the past century and a half. Rather than engage with Burckhardt's work on the Renaissance, I wish to focus on the cultural pessimism expressed in his letters, lectures, and essays and the resonance Sigmund Freud found in him. A patrician citizen of Basel, a small Swiss republican cantonal democracy at the juncture of France and Germany, Burckhardt was a skeptic regarding the "progressive" virtues of nationalism, the state, and modern industrialism. Burckhardt expressed his pessimism about the Enlightenment fantasy of a perfectible human nature: "The great harm was begun in the last century, mainly through Rousseau, with his doctrine of the goodness of human nature." (Burckhardt to von Preen, July 2, 1871, in *Letters*, 1955, p. 147).

For a time, the "present" was literally synonymous with progress, and the result was the most ridiculous vanity, as if the world were marching toward a perfection of mind or even morality....as to "moral progress"... there is none to be found,... it is relevant to the life of the individual and not to whole epochs. If, even in bygone times, men gave their lives for each other, we have not progressed since. (Burckhardt, 1979, pp. 323-4).

In his correspondence with his Prussian *Beamter* friend, Freiherr von Preen (1823-1894), Burckhardt displayed an uncanny foresight into the drab totalitarian police states of the twentieth century. He envisioned:

high purposefulness of the military machine worked out to the last details....The latter is bound to become the model of existence. It will be most interesting for you, my dear Sir, to observe how the machinery of State and administration is

transformed and militarized; for me -- how schools and education are put through the cure....I have a suspicion that, for the time being, sounds completely mad, and yet I cannot rid myself of it: that the military state will have to turn 'industrialist'. The accumulations of beings, the mounds of men in the yards and factories, cannot be left for all eternity in their need and thirst for riches; a planned and controlled degree of poverty, with promotion and uniforms, starting and ending daily to the roll of drums....(Burckhardt to von Preen, April 26,1872, *Letters*, pp. 151-2) The picture I have formed of the *terribles simplificateurs* who are going to descend upon poor old Europe is not an agreeable one; and here and there in imagination I can already see the fellows visibly before me. (Burckhardt to von Preen, July 24,1889, in *Letters*, p. 220)

Burckhardt. was one of Freud's favorite authors -- he had six of Burckhardt.'s books in his personal library, and he often refers to the pleasure they give him. Freud's view of time was that the prehistoric is alive and instrumentally effective in both individuals and civilizations. Significantly, during the most lonely and depressed period of his self-analysis, when his sole transference object and mirroring comfort was the Berlin ear, nose, and throat specialist Wilhelm Fliess, Freud was reading Burckhardt: "For relaxation I am reading Burckhardt's *History of Greek Civilization* which is providing me with unexpected parallels. My predilection for the prehistoric in all its human forms has remained the same." (Freud to Fliess, January 30,1899 in *Letters toFliess*, p. 374) A week later he writes Fliess, "I am deep in Burckhardt's *History of Greek Civilization*," (Freud to Fliess, February 6, 1899 in *Letters toFliess*, p. 344; Freud, *Briefe an Fliess*, p. 377) Freud cited Burckhardt on da Vinci's

universal genius “whose outlines can only be surmised, -- never defined.” (Freud, 1910, p. 63, n. 2.) Freud did not subscribe to ideas of human moral progress or development, neither in individuals nor in epochs.¹ He always admired antiquity, indeed he considered the ancient Greeks as our cultural betters. Freud made an explicit comparison of our society to ancient Hellas with reference to the toleration and educational function of homosexuality: “We surely ought not to forget that the perversion which is most repellent to us, the sensual love of a man for a man, was not only tolerated by a people so far our superiors in civilization as were the Greeks [*einem uns so sehr kulturüberlegenen Volke wie den Griechen*], but was actually entrusted by them with important social functions.” (Freud, 1905, p. 50 and *Stud.*, VI, 124.) For Freud we are enveloped in time – the past is always integral to the present. Time at this moment is the sum total of all time past. Moral time, psychological time, is not linear. Can any of us who have witnessed the carnage and atrocities, Holocausts and genocides of the twentieth century and what our new century is already delivering, doubt that Burckhardt and Freud were correct about the lack of moral progress in our selves and our civilization?

The assimilation of psychoanalytic culture into the humanities and social sciences.

In 1957 William Langer (1896-1977) issued a call for historians to train in psychoanalysis and to use psychoanalysis in their research in his Presidential Address to the American Historical Association. He argued that:

¹ Jonathan Lear argues *contra* to this interpretation, that Freud believed: “History is assumed to be progressive, inevitable and truth-revealing. This is a triumphal story of human progress....” *Freud* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 211. I think Lear under values the

Psychoanalysis would seem to have much to contribute to the solution of historical problems...viewed in the light of modern depth psychology, the homespun, commonsense psychological interpretations of past historians, even some of the greatest, seem woefully inadequate, not to say naive. Clearly the time has come for us to reckon with a doctrine that strikes so close to the heart of our own discipline. (Langer, 1958, pp. 286-7)

I was at the time a beginning graduate student at Berkeley. Many of us were hopeful that Langer's Address would usher in a new period of integration of psychoanalysis into humanistic and social science training and method.² Some of us wished to establish a separate field of psychohistory in university graduate training. However, although much good work was done and refereed scholarly journals have developed, including *Clio's Psyche* in America and *Psychoanalysis and History* in Britain, the flourishing of an autonomous field of psycho-historical studies did not happen. In fact, something much better happened -- instead of becoming a distinct field, separate from other allied disciplines, psychoanalysis, often without being directly invoked, became seamlessly integrated into historical assumptions, method, and narrative.

I wish to demonstrate this with a exposition in current American scholarship of an application to research of principles of self-reflection -- what psychoanalysts term counter-transference -- on issues of the relationship of racism, violence, gender, and sexuality,

skeptical conservatism of Freud regarding human beings and human nature.

² I have explored why this accomplished diplomatic historian was the one to advance a psychoanalytic program for historians. The reason is that he had a painful symptom -- a public speaking inhibition, no small matter for a university teacher. He knew psychoanalysis from within -- he had periods of psychoanalysis with Hanns Sachs and Jenny Waelder Hall.

problems which American historians and psychoanalysts have not fully nor adequately grappled with at this scholarly level. Professor Joel Williamson of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, a distinguished scholar of American Post Civil War Reconstruction (1865-1877) and the origins of racial segregation, in 1997 published "Wounds Not Scars: Lynching, the National Conscience, and the American Historian" in the *Journal of American History*, a publication of the Organization of American Historians. Williamson shares his self-reflections on why he, as a southern white historian, was able to see and intensively research slavery and segregation, but had a blind spot, was unable to see, the phenomenon of lynching for the central issue in United States history that he now recognizes:

I discovered that a horrendous wave of lynching had occurred in the South beginning in 1889 and running strong for a generation. It was white people lynching black people ritualistically, one after another, sometimes at the rate of one every other day, as reported widely in the newspapers....Nothing in my living experience as a southerner and an American, nothing in my training and practice as a historian and professor, had prepared me for this. (p. 1235)

"I...passed over the ground without seeing it." (p. 1246) "I was the prisoner of my birth and rearing." (p. 1249) This was, says this leading American historian, "as close as America has ever come to experiencing our own holocaust." (p. 1232) Williamson refers to psychodynamics, gender, and sexuality in striving for explanation: "Lynching was done by all classes of whites; it was done as a public ritual; and it was a tool to control not only blacks but whites as well, and especially white women and, most especially, white women in

(Loewenberg, 1996, pp. 81-95).

relation to sexual matters." (p. 1247) He is candid and modest in discussing his blind spots in relating race to rape and sexuality: "This nexus of sex and gender is the thing in southern culture that I feel I understand least....Is it outrageous to say that the real war, the essence of the conflict, concerned gender, not race, and that lynching and even disenfranchisement, segregation, and proscription had more to do with relations between white men and white women than with relations between blacks and whites?" (p. 1253, *passim*)

The referees were among the most distinguished historians of the American South. Edward Ayers of the University of Virginia opened his evaluation with an admission:

I am embarrassed to admit how much I like this essay. It seems to me just the sort of thing historians, especially senior historians, should be writing, both for our leading professional journals and for a general readership. It is elegant, revealing without being self-indulgent, engaged in current debates without being strident. Although I am a specialist in the field with which this piece deals and thus familiar with the literature, I found myself pulled along by this essay's momentum, by its revelations and emotional power. (*JAH*, 1254)

Professor David W. Blight of Amherst College, and a member of the *JAH* Editorial Board, recommended publication because this "provocative and extremely interesting piece" raised the issues of "avoidance, erasure, and silence in American historiography....Williamson's aim: to show in retrospect how American historians didn't or couldn't see lynching in their developing visions of the past....makes this piece important." (*JAH*, 1255-6)

Editorial reviewer Professor George M. Fredrickson of Stanford University wrote:

It is a highly personal, partially autobiographical statement....It is, however,

intelligent, incisive, and full of interest for anyone concerned with southern history....Should the *JAH* publish this kind of piece?....My view is that essays of this kind, if they possess the authority and quality found here, deserve a place in the *Journal*. In this postmodern age, it is becoming increasingly acceptable for historians to adopt a “reflexive” mode of presentation....the personalized, confessional mode does not seem to me objectionable when used in historiographic essays that involve the author’s own work. In fact, a good argument could be made that such disclosure is not only appropriate but highly desirable. (*JAH*, 1257-8, *passim*)

Robin D. G. Kelley, an Afro-American historian at New York University, also a member of the *JAH* Editorial Board, argued that Williamson says nothing new; he ignores African American historians who have researched and written about lynching for half a century, such as W.E.B. Du Bois and John Hope Franklin. (This is, among southern historians, a gratuitous insult. It is inconceivable that Williamson is not intimately familiar with Du Bois and Franklin. It is equivalent to questioning whether a British historian knows the work of Macaulay or Namier.) Kelley concludes: “there is no self-critical reflection and no new statement. Reject.” (*JAH*, 1260-1)

Professor David Levering Lewis of Rutgers University, is an Afro-American historian who voted for rejection because “it had not come to my attention that the *JAH* was in the business of opening its pages to memoirs of distinguished historians.” He confesses: “my own decided prejudices about the work of Professor Williamson.” He also emphasizes that in his view there is nothing new here:

The situation here is rather analogous to the familiar plaint of a generation of Germans about knowing nothing of the Holocaust. Repression, conspiracy of silence, genteel protocols among WASP scholars...is a more authentic way of assaying what wasn't being talked about. Finally, of course, there is no 'silence' about lynching in the press, white and black, during the first three decades of this century (a point that Williamson acknowledged and emphasized).

Lewis closes by addressing the editor, David Thelen, personally: "David,...I believe this to be a weak and wholly inappropriate essay for the *JAH*." (*JAH*, 1263)

Professor Steven M. Stowe of Indiana University voted acceptance of the article because he sees the essay as:

both a historiographical moment and a moment of self-realization....the most powerful parts of this paper are when the author speaks most personally of his own struggle to understand. I am moved by what he has learned: when we ask certain questions we lose sight of the questions we aren't asking....Learning how we run away from, as well as make, our histories our research and writing and thinking seems to be the central (and autobiographical) message of this paper. (*JAH*, 1264-7, *passim*)

How do we know and publish what these reviewers wrote? Editorial evaluations are always strictly confidential and intended for the eyes of the editor and his Editorial Board alone. We can share this fascinating clash of judgments because in an unprecedented decision the Board of Editors of the *JAH* requested consent to publish the original and unaltered referee's reports from all six referees of this paper, four white scholars who

fulsomely praised it, and two Afro-American scholars who voted rejection, and a seventh feminist scholar who was brought in later. Notwithstanding the time-honored policy of anonymous and confidential review, this permission was granted by all editorial readers. Williamson also agreed to publication of his essay as submitted, waiving the author's right to revise his manuscript.

Well you may ask: "Why couldn't the Editor follow normal practice? Why publish all six reports, both positive and negative? Why not just ask the author to revise his paper in the light of the reports?" The answer is that due to this sharp and decided racial division among the evaluating Readers (the Editor does not refer to race but, not only are the evaluators well known, should there be any doubt, each contribution is accompanied by the author's photograph). The Editor and Board of the *Journal* decided to seize this "serendipitous circumstance" of Williamson's article to engage in an "unusual experiment" in editorial transparency and openness. *JAH* Editor David Thelen wrote:

I saw an opportunity not only to publish good conversation about why history matters but also to answer another common request from our readers: to demystify our own practice, to open it up for scrutiny by readers....We froze the documents...in the form we received them. None of the participants imagined that he was writing in a form that would appear in print. Ordinarily referees' reports remain unpublished in order to preserve the confidentiality of the reviewing process (*JAH*, pp. 1217-8, *passim*)

Thelen's courage as an editor gave us an invaluable pedagogical tool. Having introduced this *JAH* roundtable on Williamson to seminars of graduate students in History,

both at UCLA and the University of Vienna, I can testify to the impact made on aspiring historians who will soon themselves be submitting manuscripts to professional journals of this disclosure of referees' reports. This is a unique, once in a scholarly lifetime opportunity; nowhere else can readers see so clearly exposed the subjective nature of the internal workings of the review process and have the opportunity to study the personal and biographical elements of scholarly judgment. Here is evidence, if more were needed, of E. H. Carr's dictum: "When we take up a work of history, our first concern should be not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it." (Carr, 1963, p. 24)

In a brief introductory essay Thelen issues a clarion call to our profession to vacate the vestiges of nineteenth century positivist "objectivity" that abound in historical reviews and professional institutional decision making. He elevates the value and recognition of self-reflection in scholarship:

We live in an age when historians are as interested in the doing of history as in the products of that doing. We want to find out why author's say what they say and why they shun what they shun....In the best autobiographical accounts personal experience becomes a threshold, not a destination, as authors transcend themselves and speak to us....Joel Williamson wrote about how he came to see some things while failing to see others, and his essay invited referees to respond in equally intimate and candid ways, comparing what they see as they go about their work with what Williamson saw and revealing why history matters to them....Williamson challenges us to think about what we see and do not see, to reflect on what in our experience we avoid, erase, or

deny, as well as what we focus on....He insists that the subjects of history live inside us and that we as a culture can talk ourselves into not recognizing and confronting dark emotional sides of our past, preferring to leave them silent in the shadows....What looks like specialization may be avoidance and erasure....The challenge for history is to face squarely the things that are so horrible that we try not to see or remember them, not to rest until we have reached the heart of darkness, especially when that heart beats within us....Beside psychological and cultural issues of avoidance and denial lie fragmenting and isolating rhythms in the contemporary craft of historical scholarship that make it hard for us to find and converse with what we each do." (*JAH*, pp. 1217-20, *passim*)

Thelen does not cite Freud or psychoanalysis; he does not need to -- a psychodynamic level of understanding is clearly built into his perspective, assumptions, and argument. Character defenses including avoidance, intellectualization, denial, displacement, and obviation as expressed in scholarship, are referenced and high lighted. This kind of respectful consideration of subjectivities would not have been imaginable before Freud. In this articulate editorial introduction, the paper by Williamson, and in the reader's reports, we have an eloquent demonstration of contemporary American historians addressing, their emotions, their dynamic pasts, and their current subjective perceptions of their work, research and writing in their professional method, publications and institutions. There is no longer a need to build bridges between history and psychoanalysis -- common assumptions of the subjective nature of perception exist on both sides.

Creative Institutions, Cultural History, and Psychoanalysis

I wish to engage with the potential contribution of psychoanalysis to the deepening of our understanding of the functioning of creative groups in cultural history, which could include George Braque, Pablo Picasso and the artists of the *Bateau Lavoir*, or scientists such as the Fermi Group in Roma, or early groups of psychoanalysts in Vienna and Zurich.

The *Bauhaus*, in Weimar and Dessau, 1919-1933, was a pre-eminent creative cultural institution of the modern world which decisively shaped much of twentieth century architecture, such as the “international school,” furniture, ceramics, textiles, metalwork, weaving, glass, and interior design, graphics and typography, expressionist painting, and world-wide art education. (Loewenberg, 2005) The *Bauhaus* masters constituted several clusters of creative geniuses in various fields: Walter Gropius, Georg Muche and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe in architecture; the artists Wassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, Lionel Feininger; Johannes Itten and Josef Alpers in art education; Marcel Breuer in design; Oskar Schlemmer in theater; Lucia Moholy-Nagy in photography; Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilbersheimer in city planning. The student body was also international, drawn from 16 countries. I say, without qualification, that if I were a young person looking for an education in any form of art, architecture, design, or self creative expression in the early twentieth century, the *Bauhaus* is where I would wish to be. A psychodynamic group process achievement worth studying is how these exceptionally talented and strong-willed people successfully lived and worked together in an institution. The psychodynamic - historical research question is how did these teachers and students manage the feat of productively

functioning collaboratively in an institution under the adverse unsettled social-political circumstances of the Weimar Republic?

All was not invariably peaceful within the *Bauhaus*. Transferences were enacted, competitive rivalries and jealousies were accentuated, as in the ideological struggle for dominance and control between Gropius and Itten. There was always vituperative opposition from outside. The Thuringian government expelled the *Bauhaus* from Weimar in 1924, which could have amounted to an annihilation of the institution. The city of Dessau provided a new home, agreeing to finance a new building designed by Gropius for the school. He wished to build a showpiece and working exemplar of his concept that “to build is to shape the patterns of life.” (Droste, 1993, 1998, p. 121) He designed a three winged building: A workshop wing with a stunning curtain wall glass facade held the studios, classrooms, and exhibition space; an arts and crafts wing including an auditorium, theater, foyer, and canteen which could be opened up to create a “festival level;” a six story student wing with 28 double occupancy live-in studios, baths, laundry, gymnasium, and a cafeteria. A three floor bridge over a street with an administrative section, including faculty offices and Gropius’ private atelier, connected the wings. Thus, the various functions were differentiated to parts of the building and then brought back into harmony as an inter-related secure whole, a bounded “container” for work, living, eating, parties, recreation, sports, and theater functions integrated under one roof in what was one of the most influential buildings of the twentieth century.

The social group process constituted creative play, particularly the frequent *Bauhaus* festivals [*Feste*] which were extensions of the curriculum. These are especially significant

because the psychoanalytic object relational understanding of creativity stresses the playful component of the creative process. Said Gropius: “the spirit was simply excellent, and some of the informal activities, like our celebrations—the *Feste*—when someone would set a theme, like ‘black and white,’ or ‘square,’ were splendid occasions.” (Gropius to Peter Gay, 1976, p. 126; and 1968, p. 100) The *Feste* constituted a structured creative space, a play space, that included Masters and students which complemented the play of design in the drafting studios and workshops. In the original 1919 Bauhaus Program Gropius wrote: "We wish to encourage friendly relations between masters and students outside of the work; thus theater, lectures, poetry, music, costume balls. Creation of festive ceremonies at these gatherings." [*Pflege freundschaftlichen Verkehrs zwischen Meistern und Studierenden ausserhalb der Arbeit; dabei Theater, Vorträge, Dichtkunst, Musik, Kostümfeste. Aufbau eines heiteren Zeremoniells bei diesen Zusammenkünften.*] (“Programm des Staatlichen Bauhauses in Weimar” in Wingler, 1969, p. 31)

There were four main festivals in the course of the year: the lantern party in which students made original lanterns; summer solstice; a kite festival in the fall in which the students went out to the fields to fly their unique self-constructed kites; and the Christmas party. A white festival and a metallic festival were later added. Some of the postcard invitations to these parties were executed as lithographs in the graphic print workshop with pupils and masters equally involved in their production. Paul Klee did the postcard for the Lantern Festival in 1921; Oskar Schlemmer created the one for 1922. This regressive group phenomenon was exciting and exhilarating in providing intense emotional closeness coupled with aesthetic and cultural cross-fertilization and stimulation. The *Bauhäusler*, both Masters

and students, were still attached to their *Bauhaus* experience and mourned it decades after it was over. (Neumann, 1985)

The essential pre-condition of creativity is the protection of an intermediate area of experience between the inner life and the external shared reality. The *Bauhaus* provided such a secure place for its masters and students where the realization of their fantasies was nurtured and inspired by interdisciplinary exchanges and taking “inside-me” ideas and making them “not-me” was encouraged. The institution of the *Bauhaus* protected creative fantasy from immediate repression through inner inhibition or suppression by outer criticism. The intense group process of creative interaction in the *Bauhaus* was one of personal and functional interpenetration. Boundaries between individuals, between masters and students, were partially dissolved in significant ways, in an on-going group process of regressive fusion and creativity. (Bion, 1959, pp. 152-3)

The institutional limits set by the Directors Gropius and Mies, such as insistence on attendance and performance, were an important antidote to institutional dissolution and disintegration. The personal boundary in many important aspects came to be the group boundary of innovators who stood in creative competition to the cultural message, style, methods, and content of the tradition oriented outside world, but was enthusiastically received by *avant garde* modernists.

The term *Spielraum*, play space, has meanings related to flexible and receptive attitudes toward ideas and concepts, things and people, fantasies and objects. It refers to the idea of “play” in instruments and mechanics, as in “the play of the wheel.” In both literal and figurative terms it represents an ability to come close, handle, touch, feel, “play with” new,

different, strange, unusual, unexpected, the unsanctioned and the forbidden, concepts and objects. (Dorn, 1974, 108) Our ability to create depends upon our capacity to "play," which Hutter defined as, "to experiment with and interact with an object outside of the self and to use this interaction to expand the boundaries of the ego and of the cultural space which each of us creates and inhabits." (Hutter, 1982, p. 314) Albert Solnit refers to creative play states,³ which is appropriate to what we observe in the *Bauhaus*.

D. W. Winnicott, coming from pediatrics and psychoanalysis rather than art education, after the Second World War and in another country, in the 1950s gave us conceptual tools with which to understand the interdisciplinary success of the *Bauhaus*. In the *Bauhaus* the masters and students could allow the most intimate of their preconscious and unconscious processes to be realized in an intermediate area of experience. which Winnicott defined as the sphere of transitional space: "This intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner or external (shared) reality, constitutes the greater part of the infant's experience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work." (Winnicott, 1971, p. 14) The original space of symbolization, the initial creative space, is the transitional play

3 Solnit defines a "play state" as: "play [that] not only involves physical activity and pretending, it also has a symbolizing capacity and usually has the characteristics of a synthesizing exercise or practicing to adapt or to resolve conflicts in an exploratory, make-believe manner...Functionally, the play is exploring, trying out, and pretending another approach than that which would be realistically consequential...Play allows thinking and acting (or behaving) to flow into each other with a looser connection, developmentally and experientially, than non-play thinking and acting usually permit." (Solnit, 1987, pp. 211, 214, and 218, *passim*)

space between mother and child. This is a space that we carry the rest of our lives and which becomes the model for all later spontaneous creative activity. Transitional space is the beginning of the capacity for symbol formation and representational thought. This is the place of play and of the first phase of cultural, artistic, architectural and planning creativity. (Winnicott, 1971, pp. 1-30, 76-100, 112-121) The *Bauhaus* was a holding environment in Winnicott's sense of being a secure space in which the artists and craftsmen could be playful and safely try out ideas. All works are created with some fantasied recipient in mind. For architects, designers, and artists it is the community of their peers and colleagues and the commercial world of patrons and clients who confer external validation. The point where a new idea is launched, when the manuscript is given over to its first reader, when the artist shows his painting or sculpture for the first time, is absolutely critical because until that moment the creation was still a part of the self. Now, it has become a transitional object in a transitional space. The idea, text, or creation stands between the observer and the creator's self. It is a me--extension, occupying an in-between space between inner and external reality; the artifact is placed from the inner world of nothing-but-me into a world of people and objects outside of omnipotent control. The use of this space happens only when there is a feeling of confidence in the relationship that the fragile new parts of the self will be sheltered. As Winnicott aptly put it: "We experience life in the area of transitional phenomena, in the exciting interweave of subjectivity and objective observation, and in an area that is intermediate between the inner reality of the individual and the shared reality of the world that is external to individuals." (Winnicott, 1971, p. 64)

The *Bauhaus* was a cultural play space which was safe, a good holding environment for

the first finding, leaking, spilling, and reflection of pedagogical methods and radical design ideas which the structured, protected institution as work *and* play space permitted. In the group "play space" of the *Bauhaus* we see the interplay between separateness and union, between regressive fusion among masters and students. This was, to paraphrase Ernst Kris, a regression in the service of creativity. (Kris, 1952, pp. 303-18) The creativity occurred in the institutional space where the individuals could comfortably allow themselves the freedom to regress to sharing their nascent work, projects, sketches, and their regressive fantasies, play, and behavior in the service of individual growth and group creativity in their mutual enterprise of furthering the *Bauhaus* "idea" of clarity, regularity, and simplicity in design, functionalism in building, and community in creativity.

Conclusion

There is a congruence of hermeneutic method between cultural history and psychoanalysis which includes a recognition of the subjectivity and self-reflexivity of interpretation; a quest for the latent meanings of manifest artifacts, symbols, and conduct; a recognition of the centrality of emotions in the structuring of motivation and action; the present condition, presenting complaint, pain, or symptom as a key to the past, if only one knows how to read or decode the message; an empathic method of understanding that includes the ability to engage with the cultural, social, and historical assumptions and background of the analysand or the subject; an attention to mini-narratives and the small telling detail that unfolds a larger level of meaning and interpretation.

The purpose of psychoanalysis and the study of cultural history is the same – the

expansion of one's own self narrative and that of our analysands, as in the narratives of our collective historical past from Thucydides and Burckhardt, from slavery and the *Bauhaus*, to the present. The public benefits from cultural history -- from cogent accounts of how humans who lived earlier faced, were shaped by, and sometimes mastered or failed to face, their personal and social conflicts. By recognizing ourselves in the cultural symbols of struggles, triumphs, and defeats of the past, as well as the history of admirable creative efforts, we may derive, as did Freud, encouragement and hope for ourselves and our groups in the present and in the future. Cultural history and psychoanalysis are both quests for personal and cultural meanings and identifications with the experiences of humans in the past, including the non-rational aspects of human existence, as we pursue personal and group creativity.

Acknowledgements:

An earlier version of this essay was written for presentation to the conference *Freud Yesterday, Freud Today*, honoring the 150th anniversary of Sigmund Freud's birth, sponsored by the British Psychoanalytical Society and the Freud Museum, London, 27-29 January 2006. I am indebted to John Forrester and Maximillian Novak for their useful critiques of earlier drafts.

References:

Auden, W.H. (1939) "In Memory of Sigmund Freud" *Collected Poems*. New York:

Random House, 1976., pp. 215-18.

Bion, W. (1959) *Experiences in Groups and Other Papers*. New York: Basic Books.

Bloch, M (1953) *The Historian's Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam. New York: Knopf.

Bloch, M. (1966) *French Rural History: An Essay on its Basic Characteristics*, trans. Janet Sondheimer. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. The first two volumes were published in 1898.

Burckhardt, J. (1898-1902) *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*, hrsg. Jakob Oeri. 4 vols. Berlin: Spemann. The first two volumes were published in 1898.

Burckhardt, J. (1908) *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien: Ein Versuch*, 2 vols. Leipzig: E.A. Seemann. Trans. S. G. C. Middlemore. (1929) as *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, New York: Harper & Brothers.

Burckhardt, J. (1955) *Letters of Jacob Burckhardt*, Alexander Dru, ed. New York: Pantheon.

Burckhardt, J. (1979) "On Fortune and Misfortune in History" (1871) in Gottfried Dietze, ed. *Reflections on History*. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.

Burke, P. (1979) "Back to Burckhardt," *New York Review of Books*, 26:15.

Carr, E.H. (1963) *What is History?* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Collingwood, R. G. (1921) "The Purpose of the Roman Wall," *Vasculum*, Vol. 8: 4-9.

Collingwood, R. G. (1930) *The Archeology of Roman Britain*. New York: Dial Press.

Collingwood, R. G. (1938) *The Principles of Art*. London: Oxford University Press.

- Collingwood, R. G. (1946) *The Idea of History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Collingwood, R. G. (1959) *Roman Britain*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Connelly, J. and Costall, A. (2000) "R.G. Collingwood and the Idea of a Historical Psychology," *Theory and Psychology*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Vol. 10:2, 147-170.
- Dilthey, W. (1958) "*Das Verstehen anderer Personen und ihrer Lebensäußerungen*," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, vol. 7.
- Dorn, R. (1974) "The Geography of Play, Child Analysis and the Psychoanalysis of the Adult," *International Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy* 3:1, 90-115.
- Droste, M. (1993) *Bauhaus: 1919-1933*. Köln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag; German edition, 1998.
- Freud, S. (1900) *The Interpretation of Dreams, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works*, ed. James Strachey et al, (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74) [Cited as *S.E.*], IV.
- Freud, S. (1905) *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, S.E.*, VII, 50; *Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse*, in *Studienausgabe* (S. Fischer Verlag, 1969), [Cited as *Stud.*], VI, 3-123.
- Freud, S. (1910) *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood. S.E.* XI, 59-137.
- Freud, S. (1913) "The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest", *S.E.*, XIII, 161-90.

- Freud, S. (1918) "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis", *S.E.*, XVII, 3-122.
- Freud, S. (1923) "Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream Interpretation," *S.E.*, XIX, 107-21.
- Freud, S. (1937) "Analysis Terminable and Interminable", *SE*, XXIII, 209-53.
- Freud, S. (1985) *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess. 1887-1904*. Trans. and ed. J. M. Masson Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; (1986) *Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess*. Hrg. J. M. Masson. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer.
- Gay, P. (1968) *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Gay, P. (1976) *Art and Act: On Causes in History—Manet, Gropius, Mondrian*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Hutter, A. D. (1982) "Poetry in Psychoanalysis: Hopkins, Rossetti, Winnicott," *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 9: 303-16.
- Kris, E. (1952) *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Langer, W. (1958) "The Next Assignment," *American Historical Review*, 63:2 (January) 283-304. Presidential address delivered at the annual dinner of the American Historical Association, December 29, 1957 http://www.historians.org/info/AHA_History/wllanger.htm, accessed 4.9.2006

- Loewenberg, P. (1996), "The Langer Family and the Dynamics of Shame and Success," in *Decoding the Past*. New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction, pp. 81-95.
- Loewenberg, P. (2000) "Psychoanalysis as a Hermeneutic Science," in Peter Brooks and Alex Woloch, eds., *Whose Freud: The Place of Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 96-115; 130-37.
- Loewenberg, P. (2005) "The Bauhaus as a Creative Play Space: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin, 1919-1933," in *Psychoanalysis and Architecture: The Annual of Psychoanalysis XXXIII*. Catskill, New York: Mental Health Resources, pp. 209-226.
- Mabbott, J. D (1986) *Oxford Memories*, Oxford: Thorntons.
- Malone, D. (1948-81) *Jefferson and his time*. 6 vols. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Monypenny, W. and Buckle, G. (1910) *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli: Earl of Beaconsfield*. 6 vols. London: J. Murray.
- Morley, J. (1903) *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*. London: Macmillan.
- Neumann, E. (1985) *Bauhaus und Bauhäusler: Erinnerungen und Bekenntnisse*. Köln: DuMont Buchverlag.
- Albert J. Solnit, A. (1987) "A Psychoanalytic View of Play," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*. 42: 205-19.
- Thelen, D. (1997) "What We See and Can't See in the Past: An Introduction," *JAH*, 83:4 pp. 1217-20.

Thurston, W. (2006) in Dennis Overbye, "An Elusive Proof and Its Elusive Power," *New York Times*, August 15, 2006, Sec. F, p. 1.

Williamson, J. (1997) "Wounds Not Scars: Lynching, the National Conscience, and the American Historian," *The Journal of American History* [Cited as *JAH*], 83:4, 1221-1272. See also the follow-up correspondence in *JAH*, 84:2, 748-765.

Wingler, H. (1969) *The Bauhaus: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin, Chicago*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Winnicott, D. W. (1971) *Playing and Reality*. London: Tavistock Publications.