as to cut the link of patronage between the analysis and the patient and between the Training Analyst and the institute, to preclude anointment and privileged succession.”

Conclusions

There is little question that the Training Analysis process and the manner of selection of the Training Analyst, through the years, has engendered varied intense reactions, such that it has even raised the question as to whether the Training Analysis should be completely eliminated from the training process. An extreme position, but one which might enhance the educational process, bringing dignity to training. A less extreme direction might be to alter the selection process so that political process and privileged succession are no longer controlling factors.

Finally, there are those who would remove the analysis from the training process so that it is indeed a personal analysis. This would allow candidates the option to select any analyst who meets the criteria of the specific institute where the candidate is training. These latter considerations are, indeed, a central focus of psychoanalytic educational issues for future consideration.

The Heraclitus fragment uses the word “ethos” in a sense that has been largely lost to modern readers, at least until Heidegger’s attempt to re-think its nature in his “Letter on ‘Humanism.’” What has been translated as “character,” or what came eventually to be associated with “values,” had, for the ancient Greeks, the meaning of “abode” or “dwelling.” Thus, to think about “ethos” is to specify that place or that space in which human beings come into being and continue to exist in their true nature. So, the abode of humans as such is in the presence of the “unfamiliar” god. Heraclitus identified the presence of a god by the word “daimon.” That presence, and the awareness of it, is what constitutes the proper abode of human beings. (Heidegger, 269-271.)

The Aristotle quotation was taken from a story about Heraclitus, who was being visited by some strangers who wanted to meet the famous thinker. When they reached his house, he was warming himself at the stove. Seeing some disappointment in their faces, and also an inclination to leave his presence, Heraclitus encouraged them to come in, “for even here gods are present.” Thus, to think about “ethos” is to specify that place or that space in which human beings come into being and continue to exist in their true nature. So, the abode of humans as such is in the presence of the “unfamiliar” god. Heraclitus identified the presence of a god by the word “daimon.” That presence, and the awareness of it, is what constitutes the proper abode of human beings. (Heidegger, 269-271.)

The Aristotel quotation was taken from a story about Heraclitus, who was being visited by some strangers who wanted to meet the famous thinker. When they reached his house, he was warming himself at the stove. Seeing some disappointment in their faces, and also an inclination to leave his presence, Heraclitus encouraged them to come in, “for even here gods are present.” Thus, the most familiar and ordinary setting of a thinker warming himself at the stove is also a place where gods are present. It is the peculiar feature of a human being to dwell in the presence of the unfamiliar and extraordinary, i.e., in nearness to the demonic. (Heidegger, 269-271.)

These two reflections sum up my take on the very thought-provoking panel: “What Do We Educate For? The Role of Psychoanalysis in the Age of Psychotherapy.” In his introduction to the speakers, and in his capacity as chair of...
this panel, Lewis Aron commented on several of the morning’s presentations, so as to create a conceptual bridge between the perspectives enunciated there and this panel’s papers.

Aron thought the concept of “ethos” was an important one to develop within psychoanalysis, and one that might in itself help us find a broader context in which to understand where we stand and what we do, in spite of the pluralism and diversity that characterize our field today, both with respect to theory and to clinical practice. He cautioned, however, that “ethos” might have the unfortunate effect of setting us off in a conservative or perhaps preservative direction, and prevent us from exploring new possibilities of thought and clinical practice. We might become too inclined, I take it, to attempt to preserve our “values” at a cost to the development of psychoanalysis as it responds to new and previously unexpected or unprepared-for features of our culture and society, thereby rendering us less capable of responding to those features.

On the other hand, if we take Arlene Kramer Richard’s recommendation, derived from her Kindergarten teacher; that we live by the wisdom that enjoins us to call people what they wish to be called, we run the risk of simply collapsing whatever genuine bases for difference might exist in favor of some vague value of the “common ground.” As psychoanalysts, if not simply as human beings, we consider it important to have the freedom to “speak our minds.” Thus, we are not constrained to consider a practice or a theory to be psychoanalytic simply because it is called that by someone or by some group. We have the freedom to disagree and to debate.

Aron argued that psychoanalysis, as theory, practice, and experience, is unique, and irreducible either to science or to hermeneutics. He cited Jennifer Harper’s reference to the defining characteristic of psychoanalysis as “monstrous,” and as always embodying the archetype “misfit.” It simply does not fit in anywhere. That is at it should be. We make a mistake if we attempt to define it according to the demands of some other discipline, whether in the arts, the sciences, or the humanities.

To my way of thinking, Harper and Aron have simply made the Heraclitean and Heideggerian point that the proper abode of man is in the presence of the unfamiliar; i.e., as “monstrous,” or as “misfit.” Such an abode or a dwelling might be difficult at times to sustain, and we might be tempted to put ourselves somewhere else. Certainly this difficulty emerges sometimes in the transference when we are “ethically” bound to preserve the analytic space within the analytic frame, whatever the pull might be to place ourselves in a much more “familiar” social context, in which our dwelling so near the demonic might be modified. Maintaining a psychoanalytic attitude within a psychoanalytic space became a focus of interest for other speakers on the panel. Attempting to define the elements of the attitude and of the technique that emerges from it was also a significant focus of consideration.

It is clear that we psychoanalysts live with a lot of uncertainty, in our work, and perhaps also in our lives, as a result of the work and of the personal depths it reaches. We place ourselves, to the extent that we are able on any given day, in that space that is perhaps best characterized as “unfamiliar.” We “dwell” in proximity to or in the nearness of the unconscious. We cannot rely on the objective assurances of ordinary knowledge or even of an ordinary experience of time. The space that we inhabit, that space of the unfamiliar (Freud’s “unheimlich,” or the “uncanny”), is also one in which there are no clear objective-time referents. André Green has written about “shattered time” (“le temps éclaté) as an experience that seems to unfold in the transference, and that deprives us of any of the familiar assurances of linearity and ordinary “development” (Green, 1-8).

Perhaps it is this unfamiliar experience of human temporality that characterizes most specifically what we can refer to, although in no detached or objective way, as the “psychoanalytic experience.”

In his paper, James Fossaghe discussed the traditional criteria of psychoanalysis, which were, I believe, developed at conferences of the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1952 and 1953. Published in a single issue of the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association (1954, 2:4), the papers from that conference laid the foundation for the debates that would continue concerning the definitions and boundaries of what Wallerstein has referred to as “the psychoanalyses” and “the psychotherapies” (Wallerstein, 50ff). The debates at that time developed from the challenges to “traditional” psychoanalysis from the innovations in theory and practice coming from such people as Franz Alexander and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. Alexander and Fromm-Reichmann took one side of the debate while the other was taken by such people as Merton Gill, Anna Freud, Leo Stone, Edward Biebring, and Leo Rangell.

In his presentation at this December conference, Fossaghe referred to the Gill criteria, which, I assume, are the ones created in those debates of the early 1950’s. It has become clear that the theoretical and clinical situation has changed in many essential ways since those years. The “consensus” of 1954 has not held, even in the most conservative quar-
ters. The new emphasis on the non-linearity of psychic experience, which I mentioned with respect to Green's account of temporality, has significantly modified, for instance, the traditional concept of "regression" in the transference. Studies of the relational field have also led to modifications in the traditional concept of "interpretation," which is understood by many psychoanalysts today as co-created by analyst and analysand. Modifications in treatment modalities that have been developed to enhance the psychoanalytic treatment of borderline patients, for instance, have led to technical changes that do not place an emphasis on the curative value of insight, but focus more on a new relational experience, leading to new, but often implicit, knowing, and thence to psychic change.

So, what counts as psychoanalysis and what must be considered to be supportive psychotherapy – which was the issue leading to the debates of the early 1950’s – is still a topic for discussion, and for many psychoanalysts it is important not to blur the distinctions. Most recently, there has been considerable controversy regarding the minimum frequency of sessions for a genuine psychoanalysis. Fossaghe argued that there is no doubt that frequency affects the treatment, but it is not always the case that greater frequency insures a more profound exploration of the psyche. Sometimes, fewer sessions, even once a week or less, are optimal for a given patient. Fossaghe pointed out that, according to Gill, for instance, there are instances in which too frequent contact between analyst and analysand could impede the treatment.

In terms of the relationship of these ideas to the education of student-analysts, Fossaghe argued that just as the curriculum of institutes present a range of theoretical models, the clinical experience provided should also represent a range. Most analysts see patients at a frequency of less than the four times a week, or even three times a week, as advocated by the consortium. Supervision of student-analysts should be for current practice, not for some hypothetical or theoretical idea of practice.

Our situation as psychoanalysts today is clearly a pluralistic one, both with respect to theory and to practice. Just as psychoanalysts have been employing Peircean semiotics to study the theoretical vagaries of psychoanalytic discourse, it’s my view that a Peircean criterion of meaning might also be of use to psychoanalysts in our attempts to resolve the disputes about definition and boundary that have plagued us for decades. To do so would involve us in some serious empirical research, and that is the topic addressed specifically by another presenter, Joe Schachter.

Before considering Schacter’s remarks, I’ll look at Joann Turo’s paper, which was the second one presented at the panel. Turo considered a number of features of psychoanalysis as particularly distinguishing ones, creatively and thoughtfully grounding her ideas in the work of Freud. Her basic view regarding institute training is that study should focus on psychoanalytic process. She pointed out that the free-association process is a reciprocal one. The analyst’s listening and state of mind are particularly important in understanding the full nature of the psychoanalytic process. Freud wrote about the analyst’s work with symptoms, and the analyst’s listening to the patient’s productions, as similar to the work of listening to dreams. The free-association of the patient and the analyst’s reciprocal free-associations create a space that very closely resembles dreaming, a dreaming that takes place in the analytic space that is unfolding.

From the very beginning, especially, Freud recognized the power of memory, and the ways in which memories intrude on the present, and also, to some extent, the ways in which the present can work to “re-write” history. The concept of “deferred action” (Nachträglichkeit, après-coup, “afterwardness”) was an important ingredient of Freud’s theory of trauma, and it has come to occupy a very significant place in present-day psychoanalytic theory and practice. Turo gave considerable emphasis to this concept and to the kind of temporal experience the analysand undergoes. Such an experience is a result in part of the attitude assumed by the analyst, an attitude that allows time to flow in various directions, and also allows for genuine surprise to occur in the course of the treatment. For the latter to emerge in the treatment, the analyst must have a negative capability, i.e., the capability of tolerating a good deal of uncertainty.

Joe Schachter’s paper was a lucid and well-argued appeal for more serious, empirical psychoanalytic research. Psychoanalytic theory has not been validated. The profession is in danger due to the lack of such research. The effectiveness of psychoanalysis as a treatment, rather than as a theory employed by literary critics and philosophers of mind, needs to be validated through research. The talk about ethos might be interesting, but the profession cannot stand on ethos alone, since the scientific ethos of our culture will surely doom psychoanalysis as a profession if psychoanalysts do not concern themselves with the findings of other related disciplines, such as neurobiological studies, and discover links between those findings and those of psychoanalytic research.

In a recent article in The New York Times on dream research, it was evident that Freud’s theories were of no concern or...
relevance. In a survey Schachter conducted of the American Psychoanalytic Association, it was clear that only a few members of the Association are actively engaged in research. Research is simply not an important item on the agenda of individual analysts. It is also, apparently, not an important ingredient in the curricula of institutes within the American Psychoanalytic Association. This needs to be changed, for the sake of the future existence of the profession.

Schachter had a few more criticisms for the profession, especially with respect to the Training Analyst and Supervisor systems that are employed by most institutes of the APsaA. There are too many overlaps, with too few analysts for students to choose from. Ideological purity, institute affiliation, power politics, and economic interests seem to take priority over the good of student-analysts, who need to have the kind of experience that would prepare them most effectively for the field.

There was some discussion of these last points in which a number of analysts in the audience, members of institutes not affiliated with the APsaA, claimed that serious empirical research had been an important part of their curricula for many years, and that there was a significant body of research results published by student-members of these institutes.

At the end, the pluralism of the field of psychoanalysis was plainly evident. The consensus of 1954 is long gone. The apparent consensus of the consortium with respect to frequency, which had been a major point of contention, is certainly open to question. The nature of psychoanalytic treatment and practice, and that of psychoanalytic research, remain serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science nor psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, remains serious topics for discussion and debate. Whether psychoanalysis, as a form of treatment, can survive as a unique form of discourse, reducible neither to science

George Bernard Shaw wrote that love doesn’t make the world go around, it just makes people dizzy. The line gets a laugh, but it is a cynical pose. Most philosophers, poets, and ordinary citizens see love as a transforming experience that educates the mind and heart. Freud called love “the great educator;” yet taught that the patient’s love for the analyst is a regressive delusion, his love for his patient a danger to them both. To this day, many analysts deny the erotic in treatment, minimize it, or flat out lie about it to colleagues and supervisors – and fail in turn to prepare their students and supervisees for dealing and working with it. Our purpose in discussing erotic transference and counter-transference is to join the rest of humanity in taking Eros seriously in analysis as well as outside it.

When love and desire do arise in treatment, the analyst may feel anxious and at a loss. A common counter-transference defense is to fall back on cautionary or reassuring general talk about transference – love which is “just transference.” The patient is humiliated and/or enraged and tries to drive the erotic feelings underground. When the analyst thus falters in dealing with conscious and unconscious erotic dynamics, the result can be therapeutic deadlock, acting out, or premature termination.

By Eros and the erotic, I mean the full spectrum of loving and sexual feelings, from affection to devotion to lust. The erotic can, of course, reenact old conflicts and become a gateway to self-discovery and growth. It is ironic that the science which dared to call Eros the mainspring of normal development should treat it so gingerly. This ambivalence began with Freud, who called analysis a cure through love, yet saw erotic transference as a resistance to be subdued, and erotic counter-transference a peril – one which he confessed he had often just “narrowly escaped.” Later generations hardened his ambivalence into dogma. Even today, many of them see the erotic as both a gold mine and a minefield – central to their theory but an embarrassment in the reality of treatment.

In the past two decades, however, many analysts have rethought the erotic in treatment and tried new ways of working with it. Their approach has its oldest roots in Ferenczi and Sullivan, and later ones in Balint, Winnicott, Racker, Kernberg, Kohut, and Stolorow. Today these theorists and clinicians – many of whom call themselves inter-