The Identity of Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalysts

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Abstract

Psychoanalysis has been in a constant uninterrupted debate about its identity as a discipline and as a social institution. This paper considers the place of science in psychoanalysis, on the one hand, and the hermeneutic nature of our discipline, on the other. The aim is to articulate a typology of psychoanalytic knowledge that characterizes psychoanalysis as a form of therapy, an intellectual movement, and a theoretical system.

This typology considers psychoanalysis as a thought collective that influences its members by exchanging and maintaining ideas. To a well-rounded psychoanalytic thinker or practitioner one must be able to move easily among three realms of knowledge – the humanities, the social sciences and the natural sciences. Each realm has its own criteria of truth and the challenge is to know when to employ which criteria.

INTRODUCTION

Psychoanalysis since its inception has been engaged in an internal debate about its identity as a discipline. On the one hand, as is well known, Freud on many occasions made clear his view that psychoanalysis belongs among the natural sciences since "the intellect and the mind are objects for scientific research in exactly the same way as any non-human things" (1933/1964, p. 159). On the other hand, Freud elsewhere qualified this seemingly unambiguous declaration by pointing out the close connection between psychoanalysis and the historical or human sciences. As he wrote in one of his
encyclopedia articles, "Any estimate of psychoanalysis would be incomplete if it failed to make clear that, alone among the medical disciplines, it has the most extensive relations with the mental sciences, and that it is in a position to play a part of the same importance in the studies of religious and cultural history and in the sciences of mythology and literature as it is in psychiatry" (1923/1955, p. 252).

Allied to the controversy over the disciplinary status of psychoanalysis is the matter of the training and qualifications of those who would become its practitioners. In his most famous comments on this topic, in *The Question of Lay Analysis*, Freud emphasized that it is for the patient a "matter of indifference whether the analyst is a doctor or not," and "incomparably more important that the analyst should possess personal qualities that make him trustworthy" (1926/1959, p. 244). As far as the curriculum of an ideal "college of psychoanalysis" is concerned, moreover, he added that while much would have to be taught in it which is also taught by the medical faculty – there would be an introduction to biology, and familiarity with the symptomatology of psychiatry – (1926/1959, p. 246) it was equally vital that students of analysis should be instructed in "branches of knowledge which are remote from medicine and which the doctor does not come across in his practice: the history of civilization, mythology, the psychology of religion and the science of literature. Unless he is well at home in these subjects," Freud insisted, "an analyst can make nothing of a large amount of his material" (1926/1959, p. 246).

These passages from Freud provide a starting point for reflections on the question of the identity of psychoanalysis and the place of its past in its future, the role of history
in defining the identity of psychoanalysis, and on the history of psychoanalysis itself as a social institution. This will involve us also in considering on the one hand the place of science in psychoanalysis and on the other the claim that our discipline is fundamentally hermeneutic in nature. The tension between positivism and relativism will be among our concerns.

Our aim is to articulate a typology of psychoanalytic knowledge, a classification of the different modes of discourse that characterize psychoanalysis as a form of therapy, an intellectual movement, and a theoretical system. And along the way we will elaborate on Ludwik Fleck’s ideas on thought collectives and the contribution of Bildung to the making of the psychoanalytic identity theme (Erikson, 1956).

**Hermeneutics and Structural Linguistics**

Frank Kermode, the literary critic, observed that "Freud himself thought that the most important herald of a new era of interpretation, was formed under the old regime, at a time when it seemed right to give most things a historical explanation, and to be suspicious of explanations that did not appeal to objective historical truth" (1985, pp. 3-4). To illustrate the primacy of historical explanation in the nineteenth century, Kermode cites the rise of geology and botany as scientific disciplines that "enormously extended the past of the planet and its occupants" (p. 4), as well as the flowering of historical criticism of the Bible, no longer regarded by leading thinkers as a repository of unchanging truth but rather as "a collection of miscellaneous documents each with a prehistory of change and redaction and conflation over very long periods of time" (ibid, p. 5). Though psychoanalysis originated in an epoch that increasingly saw man and
nature in historical terms, and subsumed the study of history under the paradigm of scientific objectivity, Kermode reminds us that even during Freud's lifetime this degree of positivism was being called into question.

One of the strong challenges to positivism came from the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857, 1913). He approached the study of language not diachronically, not in terms of its history (i.e., reconstructionistic and deterministic) but rather in terms of its rules as a synchronic system. This shift in perspective was concerned with tacit structures present at a single time in the history of language rather than being concerned with historical change. Kermode notes that the distinction between the synchronic and diachronic is owed to Saussure's posthumously published *Course in General Linguistics* (1915), and finds its way into psychoanalysis only with the advent of Lacan. Freud started out with the conviction that something did happen and he could find out what it was through the psychoanalytic method. For Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language rather than structured by past events, traumatic or other wise. The post-Lacan world is perhaps less historicist and less positivist.

The other strong challenge to positivism came from the hermeneutic theory of Wilhelm Dilthey (1831-1911), the German historian and sociologist. Dilthey emphasized that any understanding of the past is colored by the present perspective of the observer, and thus can never escape the horizon of subjectivity. Ricoeur (1965) described psychoanalysis as a hermeneutics, an interpretive discipline akin to literary criticism but also later on grappled with the hermeneutic objectivist dialectic as well. Friedman (1976,
2000a, 2000b) has pointed out that this approach presumes that conscious phenomena reflects an understandable underlying pattern. From Ricoeur's early contribution, advocates emerged who promoted that psychoanalysis should abandon its claim to scientific status and concede that it is hermeneutic; an interpretive discipline that assigns meanings and creates life narratives outside the realm of any detectable causality. These advocates include: Rycroft, 1966; Habermas, 1968; Ricoeur, 1970, 1977; Chabot, 1978; Steele, 1979. Ricoeur emphasizing this shift to an interpretive discipline recommended the shift of analytic goals from insight through reconstruction to a full understanding of the individual’s narrative. Interestingly enough, Friedman does not see Ricoeur in this group. He notes: “Ricoeur is one (and greatest) hermeneuticist who insisted that hermeneutics had to take account of the “hard” sciences, or else it was just talking to itself. His (Ricoeur) account of Freud’s theory famously concluded that it is the only system that combines force and meaning. … Ricoeur […] wrestled realistically with the same problems that psychoanalytic theorists are wrestling with, never losing sight of the hard facts of brutal, inflicted reality, underlying the spiritual and meaning-making sense that makes us human.” (personal communication).

Gill (1994) took this understanding a step further defining hermeneutics as “an interpretation of human meanings” (p. 3), which includes the general psychic reality (distinguished from material reality) and the affective realm of personal meaning. Hermeneutics fit as “a subordinate level of abstraction” within the broader concept of “constructivism,” (a.k.a., “perspectivism” or “relativism,” that suggests that "all human perception and thinking is a construction (personal perceptions) rather than a direct
reflection of external reality" (1994, page 1). Gill’s work, in this area, leans heavily on Schafer's (1983) hermeneutic approach to psychoanalysis:

"What has been presented here amounts to a hermeneutic version of psychoanalysis for – psychoanalysis is an interpretive discipline rather than a natural science. It deals in language and equivalents of language. Interpretations are re-descriptions or retellings of action along the lines particular to psychoanalytic interests. The facts are what the analyst makes them out to be; they are a function of the specifically psychoanalytic questions that guide this narrational project, and these questions implement the narrative strategies that are favored by the analyst's own presuppositions, however unsystematized these might be" (Schafer, 1983, p. 255-256).

From this, Gill argues for psychoanalysis as a “hermeneutic science” (1994, p. 4). “Facts (whether material or experiential) are soaked in theory” (ibid, p. 1), but remain affected by the limitations of reality even when reality cannot be defined. Facts are only contextually meaningful. There are material contexts, as well as “a context of psychic reality” (p. 5). Gill prefers to say "that the facts are what the analyst and analysand come to agree are facts" (1994, p. 10). While all sciences are constructions interpretations in natural sciences differ from interpretations in the human sciences. In psychoanalysis, constructivism helps the analyst to dispel certainty in arriving at facts, while hermeneutics provides enhanced clarity and comprehension.

Goldberg (2004) addresses this issue in a similar way. He differentiates what is
presented to the experience (i.e., phenomenology) from how it is interpreted (e.g.,
hermeneutics) while stressing the plurality of differing views of the same phenomena
(e.g., privileging). Since our observations are interpretations the scientific method and
hermeneutics disciplines are not opposites. Like Gill (1994) and Hartmann (1927), he
notes that the vital distinction is between the interpretation of human experience and the
interpretation of experience that falls outside of experiential or conscious experience.
For Goldberg psychoanalysis is an ‘understanding psychology’; (Kohut) with a special
technique that works within a circle of understanding. The technique follows the
sequence of understanding, misunderstanding, interpretation, and further understanding,
formed against the background of transference and countertransference, which
facilitates our own understanding and in turn leads to patients feeling understood.

Both hermeneutics and structural linguistics have made profound contributions to
contemporary psychoanalytic thinking, and have complicated the way we look at the
place not only of history but also of science in psychoanalysis. Currently we have only to
consider the various epistemological positions theorists have taken. Each of these
positions can be seen as falling on a spectrum. At one end, we have those advocating a
hermeneutic discipline replacing science. This position is most clearly represented by
Stern (1997), Schafer (1976, 1983), Ricoeur (1977). In the mid range we see another
group claiming the need for a hermeneutic science, differentiating constructivism from
hermeneutics. This group includes Holt (1989), Gill (1994), Goldberg (2004). Other

1 Parent hesi is added.
contributors promote a broad and relativistic definition of science. We have in mind Brenner (1980, 2006), Eagle (1998), Eagle, M. N., et al. (2001) and Rangell (2004, 2007); to be discussed later. And at another end of a spectrum are those advocating for a strict form of empiricism Fonagy (1982), Solms (1986) and Edelson (1988, 1989). The challenge is to the ideal of what Kermode terms "objective historical truth" and ultimately whether it is possible to preserve any remnant of Freud's own more classical epistemology in our postmodern era, or whether the triumph of the new linguistic and hermeneutic paradigm is complete.

**Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (“SSK”)**

As John Donne wrote of the Copernican revolution in the seventeenth century, the "new philosophy calls all in doubt" (1610, p. 276), and the same kind of doubt is reflected in the radical skepticism that has re-emerged with such tenacity in our own time. Steven Shapin, a Harvard historian of science, exemplifies this skepticism in his critique of traditional notions of history and science in his book *A Social History of Truth* (1994).\(^2\) Shapin argues that the general acceptance of factual knowledge as truth emerged in the context of cultural practices in seventeenth-century England, when the ideal of the trustworthy gentleman held sway and deeply influenced the emerging ideology of empirical science. More generally, by suggesting that truth *has* a social history, Shapin

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\(^2\) Shapin's work is part of an approach to the philosophy of science called "SSK" - the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, which includes among its adherents Mannheim in the 20's, Fleck in the 30's and more recently Kuhn, Barnes, Bloor, Hacking, Galison, Kettner-Knorr, Latour and others.
brings it down from the realm of Platonic forms and defines it instead as a pragmatic human construct influenced by culture, social factors, history, and individual psychology.

Wen-ji Wang, the Taiwanese scholar, extended this notion to Vienna and Psychoanalysis in "Bildung or The Formation of the Psychoanalyst" (2003). In this article he attempts to demonstrate the social history of the truths of psychoanalysis. Wang cites Richard Sterba's Reminiscences (1982) to document that the early members of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society shared a common ideal of Bildung, which required the ability to speak at least two living languages besides German, knowledge of Greek and Latin, and familiarity with the history of Western culture and its artistic and literary masterpieces. Sterba acknowledges that his description of the gebildete Mensch "was an ideal." But, he adds, "most of the society members attained some degree of this Bildung. A few of them, like Bernfeld, Hartmann, Kris, and Waelder, even attained an unusual degree. Sigmund Freud was above all of us; his Bildung was of the highest level" (quoted in Wang 2003, p. 91). In a tribute to Freud on his sixtieth birthday, Eduard Hitschmann (1956) praised him in similar terms as "a magnificent model of the great free spirit, the upright independent man, the unprejudiced investigator, the truly complete scholar and the all-understanding, all-forgiving individual" (quoted in Wang 2003, p. 91). Freud makes clear in many places his opinion that belonging to this educated class was a prerequisite not only for practicing psychoanalysis, but also for being a patient. As early as 1898, he wrote in "Sexuality and the Aetiology of Neurosis" that "a certain degree of maturity and understanding" was required to undergo analysis, and this method of treatment was accordingly "not suitable for the young or for adults who are
feeble-minded or uneducated" (1898/1962, p. 282). At the end of his career, he affirmed in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" that the analyst "must possess some kind of superiority, so that in certain situations he can act as a model for his patient and in others as a teacher" (1937/1964, p. 248).

Wang argues that the Middle-European ideal of Bildung that was in the ascendancy during Freud’s formative years and beyond was of great benefit to those who did not come from economically or socially privileged backgrounds, in that it gave them an entrée that birth and wealth did not into a moral elite. Bildung did for this group in Europe mostly Jews who lived in the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy what their medical degrees did for Brill and his group in the United States.

Wang links his concept of Bildung as an analytic ideal to the idea of a "thought style," "thought collective," or "thought community" offered by the historian and philosopher of science Ludwig Fleck. In Fleck's (1927) definition, a thought collective is "a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction," and it "provides the special 'carrier' for the historical development of any field of thought, as well as for the given stock of knowledge and level of culture" (qtd. in Wang 2003, p. 94). What is more, Fleck (1935) continues, the mind of an individual who operates within a given thought collective "is structured, and necessarily so, under the influence of the ever-present social environment, and he cannot think in any other way" (quoted in Wang 2003, p. 94; emphasis original). Because the thought styles that take hold in different groups are often incompatible, "the principles of an alien collective are, if noticed at all, felt to be arbitrary and their possible legitimacy" is dismissed out of hand.
As seen throughout the history of psychoanalysis, these alien thought collectives (when they survive) often grow and carry "rejected" or marginalized theoretical concepts from the larger thought collective.

**The Role of Thought Collectives**

The notion of thought collectives is applicable to the history of psychoanalysis as a social institution, and specifically to what Richards has termed the "politics of exclusion" (1999a), which remains one of its most characteristic features. The politics of exclusion originated in the schisms of Adler and Jung that gave rise to the Secret Committee of ring-bearers (Grosskurth 1991), and extends through the splits within the New York Psychoanalytic Society and later in Baltimore-Washington, Philadelphia and Los Angeles (Rangell, 2004). In New York in the 1940s the split led to the founding of Rado's Columbia Institute and Horney's American Institute of Psychoanalysis (AIP). In a further set of ripples, the William Alanson White Institute was formed by Erich Fromm and others in response to the revocation of From’s status as a training analyst by the AIP; since the early 1950s the White Institute, like the AIP, has remained an "alien collective" outside the framework of the American Psychoanalytic Association.

The politics of exclusion applies to the exclusion (until recently) of non medical analysts and gay and lesbian analysts and there are exclusionary practices within psychoanalytic organizations that persist to this day. The social history of psychoanalysis has so deeply informed its theory -- and continues to do so --so that we recommend that mandatory courses in the social and political history of psychoanalysis should be part of the educational curriculum of psychoanalytic training centers.
Scientific Thought Collectives and the Need for a Professional Identity

Although the history of psychoanalysis as a social and political institution is important, it is only the beginning of an effort to formulate a typology of psychoanalytic knowledge. Science in general, and psychoanalysis in particular, cannot be reduced to sociological or pragmatic disputes. Was Freud right to align psychoanalysis as a theory of mind with a scientific Weltanschauung, even though he himself often failed to live up to this ideal in practice?

In On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement (1914/1957), Freud describes the founding of the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1910 and his ill-fated decision to name Jung as its leader. As Freud explains, he felt "oppressed" by his advancing age--he was all of fifty-four at the time--but he also "felt that there must be someone at the head" (p. 43). He hoped that many of the "pitfalls" that awaited those who aspired to become analysts "might be avoided if an authority could be set up who would be prepared to instruct and admonish." Freud goes on to rue his choice of Jung, saying with hindsight that he "had no inkling" that he had "lighted upon a person who was incapable of tolerating the authority of another, but was still less capable of wielding it himself."

Freud's charge that Jung "was incapable of tolerating the authority of another" is the reciprocal of Jung's notorious accusation against Freud, leveled in December 1912 as their relationship fell apart, that Freud (during their 1909 journey to America) had refused to permit the analysis of one of his dreams because, in Freud's words as quoted by Jung, "you 'could not submit to analysis without losing your authority'" (McGuire 1974,
Thus although Jung had privately reproached Freud with valuing authority above truth, Freud in his public narrative of their break-up indicted Jung's inability to "tolerate the authority of another" as the fatal character flaw that disqualified him from replacing Freud as the "head" of the International Psychoanalytic Association.

As much as an interpersonal power struggle, this incident portrays the pressure exerted by the thought collective. From its inception, the institutional structure of psychoanalysis has been founded on a principle of imposing and submitting to authority. Max Graf's description of the Wednesday Evening Study Group in 1904, for example, depicts an atmosphere more religious in nature, disciples and all, than a place of unfettered inquiry.

The gatherings followed a definite ritual. First, one of the members would present a paper. Then, black coffee and cakes were served; cigars and cigarettes were on the table and were consumed in great quantities. After a social quarter of an hour, the discussion would begin. The last and the decisive word was always spoken by Freud himself. There was an atmosphere of the foundation of a religion in that room. Freud himself was its new prophet who made the theretofore prevailing methods of psychological investigation appear superficial. Freud's pupils—all inspired and convinced—were his apostles. Despite the fact that the contrast among the personalities of this circle of pupils was great, at that early period of freudian investigation all of them were united in their respect for and inspiration with Freud (pgs. 470 - 471).
The matter of lay analysis is another example of this issue.

The consequences of this institutionalizing of a reverence for authority stemming from Freud's personality as well as his status as a physician which gave him standing with his patients in his consulting room have been felt not only in the "politics of exclusion" of non medical analysts that has divided psychoanalysis from within, but also in the isolation of psychoanalysis from the broader scientific community. Although admirable in many respects, the ideal of Bildung shared by the early Viennese analysts mutated over time into a less flexible "thought collective" that allowed analysts to exchange ideas with one another, but not with those who did not share their allegiance to Freud's teachings. According to Fleck thought collectives always tend to become more convinced as time goes on that the members of alien collectives are incompetent. While investigating the sociology of knowledge Merton (1945) makes a similar point in discussing conflicts that develop between social groups.

To illustrate this aspect of the argument, we shall borrow an example that draws on the work of Shapin (see Shapin and Schaffer 1985), but which has also been effectively deployed by one of the leading critics of psychoanalysis. In an essay reassessing Freud's case histories, Frank Sulloway (1992) cites the seventeenth-century dispute between Boyle and Hobbes. In Sulloway's words, "The essence of science does not lie merely in replicating one's theories and praxis. Rather, it lies in replicating them outside of one's own immediate social group" (p. 171).
Sulloway is not only a critic but an outright opponent of psychoanalysis, and analysts will find much to dispute in his work—for example, his dismissal of free association as a therapeutic and investigative method. Still, we need to try to learn from the reproaches of those outside our own thought community who take the trouble to take us to task; especially as the substance of Sulloway's indictment of the scientific shortcomings of psychoanalysis has been independently echoed by many of its most thoughtful advocates. For example, neurobiologist Eric Kandel (1999) observes that although psychoanalysts could legitimately claim for many years that "psychotherapeutic encounters between patient and analyst provided the best context for scientific inquiry," and that important contributions to understanding the mind were generated by the methods of free association and interpretation, now, over a century after their introduction, "there is little new in the way of theory that can be learned merely by listening carefully to individual patients" (p. 506). Although psychoanalysis "has historically been scientific in its aim," he continues, "it has rarely been scientific in its methods; it has failed over the years to submit its assumptions to testable experimentation." Kandel cites the judgment passed by Edward Boring as long ago as 1950: "We can say, without any lack of appreciation for what has been accomplished, that psychoanalysis has been pre-scientific. It has lacked experiments, having developed no techniques for control" (quoted in Kandel 1999, p. 506). The failure of psychoanalysis to arrive at "methods for testing the exciting ideas it has formulated earlier," Kandel considers, is responsible for the fact that it "enters the twenty-first century with its influence in decline" (1999, p. 505).
There are others who maintain the view that the future of psychoanalysis hinges on whether it will be able to establish its theory on a firm scientific foundation. David Rapaport is cited in a recent review by Howard Shevrin as having argued in 1959, the year before his death, that the only way to break out of the circularity inherent in conceiving of psychoanalysis as first and last a clinical theory is to seek to build up a more general theory that "should be testable by methods other than those by which the initial evidence for it was obtained" (qtd. in Shevrin 2003, p. 1006). Benjamin Rubinstein (1975) noted that within the framework of their own assumptions, all purely clinical theories--Freudian, Jungian, or any other--can always find support for their interpretations, so that every such theory is in essence simply "a system of rules of interpretation, a hermeneutic system, . . . which, like all other such systems, is for all practical purposes purely conventional and thus neither falsifiable nor confirmable as such" (quoted in Shevrin 2003, p. 1015; emphasis original).

In psychoanalysis the question of “what is psychoanalysis?” as posed by Rangell (2004, 2007) with it corollary “who gets to practice?” is really a question of “where does psychoanalysis fit: in the family of sciences, or among the social disciplines?” If it is a science, is it a natural science or not?3 Earlier we had viewed the advocates of psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic discipline. Freud envisioned the field as an overall science of man. The mind develops and is cultivated by its physical and social environment and is studied accordingly. A scientific view of the world was crucial to

3 Hartmann (1964), for example, concluded that it belonged not to the physical but to the social sciences, which have their own methodologies, criteria, and means of validation.
Freud’s psychoanalysis. Rangell (1999) and Brenner (1999) represent two of the leading advocates for psychoanalysis as a natural science. They agree in their separate views that the mind is derivative of the brain which ceases to exist when the brain dies. Yet the mind is seen as much more than the brain. In tackling the question of science, Brenner (2006) notes: “The concept, ‘science,’ is only definable as a way of looking at the world and, more importantly, of trying to understand it” (p. 4). Those guided by scientific belief are guided by facts. Facts do not represent an “immutable truth” (p. 4) but reflect the best understanding of phenomena of observation available. As such, in science “facts reign supreme” (p. 5). Our understanding of the facts and the facts themselves, however, remain relative and are replaced by better understanding or newly discovered facts. This, in turn, changes the explanation of the phenomena or the theory. The scientific point of view, then, requires that the theory be the best explanation that one can give to these facts. In psychoanalysis “the subject matter is thoughts and feelings that have meaning and whose meanings are connected with one another sequentially in accordance with the idea of cause and effect” (p. 95).


Rangel (2007)
has a long list of viable theoretical contributions. Regarding how one decides what is accepted and what is not, Rangell proposes that the collective consensus should decide the generally held theoretical system, while each practitioner decides for his individual preferences.

Brenner, on the other hand, notes that the scientific perspective has no genuine room for pluralism in psychoanalytic theory. He notes that analytic theory or the analytic evidence can be questioned and replaced by more compelling evidence. “Any theoretical conclusion is either acceptable as valid in the light of present knowledge or it isn’t” (p. iv).

Brenner finds no need for a unitary theory. Following the rules of science, when the most compelling answers are achieved they are retained and integrated into the theory while the rest are discarded completely or conditionally.

There are also those who see psychoanalysis as based on sound neurological principles and seek the integration of psychoanalysis with neurosciences to attain greater connection to the broader sciences (Solms & Saling, 1986, Solms & Nersessian, 1999). The jury is still out on whether psychoanalysis can be integrated with neurobiology and achieve a status as a more "exact" science. We would maintain that psychoanalysis is not an exact science -- but also that science per se is not "exact." We may develop a neuroscience of dreaming, but not of dreams. Through neuroscience we will achieve a better understanding of mechanism, but not of meaning.

**In Search of a Professional Identity**

As Goldberg points out (2004), today's bifurcation confronting psychoanalysis (hermeneutic vs. scientific) has on one side the conscious experience or empathy with
the relative neglect of the unconscious and on the other, the explanation of mental phenomena in terms of their derivation from one or another non-mental and neurophysiological source or sources. Both forms play a critical role in the understanding and misunderstanding in the psychoanalytic experience. Goldberg adds that this broader view informs us that the clinical process is a two way street and that this cyclical nature may be distorted to some degree in both directions, e.g., transference phenomena. This “double hermeneutic” reminds us that each participant brings a personal history, set of beliefs, and theory to comprehend the other.

Can we view psychoanalysis through the lenses of both social and natural science? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that psychoanalysis requires both lenses because it is both an intellectual movement and a theoretical system. We need, as Kandel has called for, a "new curriculum for the analytic clinician" (1999, p. 520) that will allow the next generation of practitioners to help build the bridges between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.

Not everyone shares the view that research in neurobiology provides the most promising avenue for adjudicating the competing claims of rival psychoanalysts, a position Richards (1980) espoused. Now things are different. A fundamental area of disagreement in our field today is between those who believe that the future of psychoanalysis depends on its integration with other disciplines, especially in the natural sciences, those who seek to preserve psychoanalysis as a domain answerable only to itself, and others who think that integration with the social sciences the humanities and linguistics is where the future lies. We might think about the multidisciplinary
components of a 21st Century Bildung ideal even broader than the 19th century edition. Proponents of these different approaches cut across theoretical schools and geographic areas. The French support psychoanalysis as *sui generis* more than many do in the United States. Andre Green (1999) is a good exemplar of the French position. In the United States, Steven Mitchell took one side of the argument, and his colleague Morris Eagle, (1984) the other. Many contemporary Freudians agree that only through rededicating itself to the ideal of becoming a general psychology will psychoanalysis survive and prosper in the twenty-first century.

These conflicting domain/disciplinary commitments complicate our search for a common ground for the identity of psychoanalysis. Wallerstein (1988,1990) feels that the basis for consensus among competing schools of psychoanalysis lies in clinical practice, while Shevrin (2003) contends that how analysts work clinically depends on "presuppositions that require independent confirmation" (p. 1017). Consequently, according to Shevrin, Wallerstein's effort "falls short under Rubinstein's stricture" that all such interpretive frameworks "are simply language games being played according to rules that are basically arbitrary conventions." Our task now is to subject the theory to examination that allows its various components to stand or fall on their own merits. Rangell (2007), points out that these commitments are problematic, from another dimension, because they represent to some degree the “prevalence of identification with the products of one’s mind (“I am what I think”) which (like all elements of identity)4 which then needs to be protected as one preserves the self” (p. 94). The investment of one’s

4 parenthesis added
identity leads to what Bergmann identified as the “ferocity of the emotions involved in the controversies” (2004, p. 263).

Having considered psychoanalysis first as a social and political institution and then as a potentially and problematically scientific theory. What about psychoanalysis as a mode of therapy, which, after all, remains the heart and soul of our professional identity? Here we do not agree with Kandel, who opposes "the hermeneutic" with "the scientific" view of psychoanalysis, and brands the former "a position that has hindered psychoanalysis from continuing to grow intellectually" (1999, p. 507). Although it may be both possible and necessary to reconcile psychoanalysis as a metapsychological theory with propositions supported by neuroscience, psychoanalysis is a clinical practice. And as a clinical practice it is a hermeneutic enterprise a kind of textual interpretation the texts are the nuances of the language of their patients which are polyvalent words which mean more than one thing and include what is not clear or obvious. (Ricouer) But psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic enterprise is more relevant to psychoanalysis as a mode of treatment than it is to psychoanalysis as a theory of development, a theory of inhibition and symptom formation and a theory about how the mind works including the operation of defensive functions.

William Grossman has remarked that Heinz Hartmann, often criticized for his devotion to a scientific conception of psychoanalysis, in fact rejected "the dichotomy of scientific and hermeneutic-phenomenological," and his view "was, therefore, inclusive in a special way" (2002, p. 277). Hartmann’s program was to make psychoanalysis a general and scientific psychology and would not concede any turf to any other discipline
Gill (1994) agreed with Hartmann in his advocacy for a “hermeneutic science” that treats hermeneutic phenomena scientifically. What seems to be overlooked here, however, is to learn to distinguish between those questions that can be answered with scientific precision and those that cannot. Seymore Ketty’s bon mot that we can have a neuroscience of dreaming and not of dreams is relevant here. Certainly the complexity of the analytic interactions in consulting rooms can not be categorized or measured with precision even when verbal transcripts are augmented by audio or video recordings. To complicate matters Orange, et al. (1998) note:

“Science, since the rise of relativity and quantum theories, has been seen as an interpretive discipline in which there is no escape from the mutual influence of observer and observed. Metaphor is everywhere in science – in the processes of discovery and of framing models for testing, for example. Conversely, hermeneutics, or the study of interpretation, functions within dialogical communities devoted, like “scientific” communities, to exploration and understanding. Each discipline has its own subject matter, of course, but philosophers of science generally – empiricists like Grünbaum are now exceptions – no longer adhere to a strong line drawn between the Naturwissenschaften (natural or hard sciences) and the Geisteswissenschaften (humanities). Psychoanalysis, therefore, need not decide in which camp it belongs” (p. 568-569).
So where does clinical evidence turn into scientific evidence? We suggest that psychoanalysis and the collection of clinical information may fall on a continuum from discovery through a hermeneutic practice to the continuous repetition and validation of these findings to the ultimate creation of testable hypotheses from internal and external sources. For the practitioner, this is not an easy or singularly rigorous means of data collection. On the contrary, often times it comes from material in the session, sometimes it comes about after reflection on hours of clinical work, at still other times it becomes clear only after hearing a colleague or reading material that facilitates an integration waiting for the stimulus.

We should not continue to employ concepts that have been discredited. Even the most rigorous theoretical armamentarium, however, can take us only so far when we are confronted by the complexity of a single human being the patient who comes to us for treatment by another complex human being the analyst. Analytic tact is one example of those skills demanded of a psychoanalytic clinician that can be honed with practice but are not part of an exact methodology. Empathy is another. Broadly speaking, everything that has to do with the task of interpretation, which we perform every day when we offer patients the services of our third ear, makes psychoanalytic therapy more hermeneutic than rigorously scientific. And although we have the responsibility of treating real people, unlike literary critics who are confronted only by a text, the qualities that make an astute clinician are very similar to those that make a gifted critic, and indeed to the ideal of the "gebildete Mensch" that was so prized by Freud and his early circle. As John Bowlby has put it, there are "two very different aspects of our discipline--the art of psychoanalytic
therapy and the science of psychoanalytic psychology." It is imperative, he went on, "to emphasize, on the one hand, the distinctive value of each and, on the other, the gulf that divides them--in regard both to the contrasting criteria by which each should be judged and the very different mental outlook that each demands" (1979, p. 39).

**An Integrated Point Of View**

Unlike Bowlby, we have proposed a threefold typology that considers psychoanalysis as a collective intellectual and political movement that needs to be studied with the tools of social science. The challenge is to develop a sociology of psychoanalytic studies which is part of the broader field of the sociology (and the psychology) of scientific studies. To be a well-rounded psychoanalytic thinker or practitioner, therefore, one must be able to move easily among these three realms of knowledge--the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. Each realm has its own criteria of truth, and even the truth of the natural sciences has a social history. The better part of wisdom is having the discretion to know when to employ which criteria, and to avoid the confusion that inevitably results when these categories of disciplinary knowledge are confounded.

It is impossible to define the place of the human sciences in psychoanalysis without at the same time elucidating the place of the natural sciences. We need to be able to tolerate enough ambiguity to promote a vision of psychoanalysis as a truly interdisciplinary Weltanschauung that will lead the way in what E. O. Wilson (1998) has

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5 add references in the footnote.
termed the Enlightenment project of seeking "consilience" among the various branches of knowledge that can ultimately be subsumed under the sciences and the humanities.

We have to accept the pluralistic state of affairs. It is from this state, a disparate group of thought collectives, aligned with one another in various and tentative ways, that discoveries are made. Sometimes these discoveries or contributions are made from the very heart and safety of our thought collective, sometimes they are molded from the heat of the debate between thought collectives. The recent books by Rangell (2007) and Brenner (2006) may convince some that pluralism should be replaced by a unitary composite theory, but many will remain unpersuaded. We believe that their notion of science is an ideal for psychoanalysis. It is an ideal that we should continue to nurture and contribute to. However, we will continue to have separate advocacy groups with their own organizations, their own journals, and their own meetings. These groups will continue making important contributions. How we welcome and assess these contributions will have a large impact on the future course of psychoanalysis. From our perspective, this aspect is the organization of theory. It is never finished and hopefully always growing. Growing in a composite sense but only after the facts have been best explained. The challenge for us is to accept that this is the current reality of our psychoanalytic landscape, and to develop ways and means, places and platforms, so that we can all talk to each other. Productive communication and discourse -- and any chance at increasing integration requires that every advocate be able to present his or her position as clearly and forcefully as possible, to the widest possible audience.
In his 1958 presidential address to the American Historical Association, William Langer famously "called on his colleagues to employ psychoanalytic ideas in historical inquiry" (Gay 1985, p. 14; see Langer 1958). The next assignment for a psychoanalysis fellow is to employ the insights and methods of the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences as rigorously as possible in the three interconnected realms of psychoanalytic theory and practice: as a form of therapy, a method of investigation, and a theory of the human mind (Freud 1923/1955). It is a plea for the psychoanalytic gebildite mensch who will pursue this program. This effort will enable us to have a better sense of the identity of the discipline of psychoanalysis, what it is, what it has been and how it will evolve.

REFERENCES


