AMERICAN PSYCHANALYSIS TODAY: 
A Plurality of Orthodoxies

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ABSTRACT

American psychoanalysis, Freudian in origin, has recently developed in multiple
directions among different groups in the current theoretical and clinical pluralistic
atmosphere. The history of the effort to exclude new ideas is briefly reviewed. A survey
of a group of leading analysts representing a variety of schools reveals a plethora of
newer ideas, some areas of consensus and broad areas of disagreement concerning the
meaning and value of the ideas that dominate our current discourse. While we welcome
the "pluralism" that has partially replaced the "rejectionist" policy of only a few decades
ago, our contemporary pluralism is, to a surprising degree, a multiplicity of authoritarian
orthodoxies, each derived from a particular thinker, rather than a scientific discourse.
After a discussion of some aspects of the philosophy of science, the author suggests a
controversial, but possible consensus view of American psychoanalysis today. The need
for the creation of a psychoanalytic research effort, focused on efficacy, is emphasized.

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This paper addresses a very old topic -- change in psychoanalysis. I am not referring to how patients change in analysis; rather, I will discuss how psychoanalysis itself changes -- both the theory and its technique. Psychoanalysis throughout most of the world today, but most conspicuously in the US, marches under the banner of psychoanalytic pluralism, a term intended to acknowledge the legitimacy of many different threads of psychoanalytic thought, some old, some new, many of which were not tolerated in mainstream psychoanalysis during Freud’s lifetime, or in some circles even now. This contemporary view of psychoanalysis as composed of many strands, more concerned with innovative new ideas and less concerned with the former unquestioning acceptance of Freudian orthodoxy, is now a fact of psychoanalytic life, applauded by many as evidence of fresh thinking and research, and abhorred by many others as representing the degradation and abandonment of true psychoanalysis.

Châteaubriand famously said, "If I compare the two terrestrial globes, the one I knew at the beginning of my life and the one I now behold at the end of it, I no longer recognize the one in the other." (Kermode, 2004) Many of us are having the same experience about our psychoanalytic globe. The psychoanalysis that we perceive today was almost nonexistent for most of us only a few decades ago. At one end of the spectrum is so-called classical analysis. At the other end are a variety of focused therapies that derive some of their technique or theory from psychoanalysis. Occupying the middle ground is pluralism, for some but a polite word for "muddled" or “befuddled” -- a necessary stage, one hopes, on the way to eventually testing, clarifying and winnowing our newer ideas.
For many, the identity of psychoanalysis, an old problem once considered of enormous importance and recently regarded more dubiously, is at stake in how these issues are decided.

Freud's attitude toward his great discoveries invites a psychoanalytic perspective. I shall not attempt that. However, I will suggest that our profession’s having for so long clung to an orthodoxy that has significantly handicapped our development is a part of the same unfortunate concern that led Freud to declare psychoanalysis a "movement", i.e. a unified group of believers rather than a heterodox group of scientific explorers. He was willing to lose followers over this issue; even someone as important as Bleuler, who told Freud how much he admired and believed in his work, but that he was unable to join a movement that stifled scientific creativity. (Alexander, 1966). On the other hand, Freud himself never hesitated to make radical changes in his thinking -- e.g., the structural scheme, the death instinct, the second theory of anxiety, etc. His interest was in some ways more proprietary than scientific. In 1914 Freud said, "Even today, no one can know better than I do what psychoanalysis is, how it is different from other ways of investigating the life of the mind, and precisely what should be called psychoanalysis and what would better be described by some other name." (Freud, 1914) Undoubtedly, he was right at that time, but I believe he never altered that opinion. At his most generous, he declared that anyone who believed in the unconscious was in the psychoanalytic camp. At other times he required an agreement on three shibboleths that defined psychoanalysis: the centrality of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1905), the theory of dreams (Freud, 1933) the unconscious as the essence of what is psychical, (Freud, 1937) as well as on the
centrality of psychosexuality, transference and resistance. Only transference and perhaps resistance, hold the same significance today.

In the history of psychoanalysis even Freud’s less restrictive definitions of the field have not prevented endless struggles over whether various psychoanalytic innovators have properly retained membership in the psychoanalytic club. As is usually the case, followers have been far more orthodox than the leader, who declared that his metapsychology was merely a useful tool and was subject to change at any moment.

An obvious question is why it is so difficult for us to change how we think or act as analysts. I have in an earlier article (Cooper, 1984) discussed some aspects of this issue that I will not repeat here. One piece of the answer surely lies with Freud who, as I have said, was protective of his clinical discoveries. The couch and free association were more important to him than his metapsychology and when a patient didn't change it was easier for him to invent a new theory -- the repetition compulsion, death instinct, etc. -- than to question his technique. Ferenczi and Rank, who tried to change the technique in directions that today seem almost mainstream, ran into serious difficulty. Of course, it is also true, as many have pointed out, that Freud's actual technique bore little resemblance to his written prescriptions. Abram Kardiner (1977) has described Freud's liveliness with him, in contrast to Freud's silence with another patient whom Freud said he found rather boring. Samuel Lipton (1977) has described the now famous incident of Freud's going into the kitchen to get the Rat Man a herring when he said he was hungry, and my analyst, Leonard Blumgart, who was an analysand of Freud’s, told me of a session in which he was boasting of his capacity to guess people's ages, whereupon Freud got up, went into the next room, came back with the family photograph album, and sat down on
the couch beside him to quiz him on how old he thought various family members were in those photographs. Freud, unlike the rest of us, was never concerned that what he was doing might not be considered psychoanalysis by some of his colleagues.

We can easily understand Freud's deep concern that psychoanalytic concepts were in constant danger of contamination and dilution. However, generations of less creative individuals, riding Freud's coattails, decided that "orthodox" or "classical" meant good, and "dissident" or "deviant", meant bad. How the members of a healing profession came to regard the term "orthodox" -- a term with inevitable religious connotations -- or "classical", a term referring to cultural achievements -- as a desirable badge of merit is itself a fascinating story that deserves more investigation than it has yet received. As best I can discover, Freud first used the term "orthodox" in a letter to CG Jung, March 1, 1911, referring to Adler's "heresy" and to Hitschmann as "orthodox". In a letter to Karl Abraham (February 15, 1914) Freud referred to Ferenczi's use of the term "classical technique." Bergmann (1997) has recently written an authoritative and rather shocking account of the origins and some of the problems arising from psychoanalytic orthodoxy.

Yosef Yerushalmi’s volume “Freud’s Moses” (1991) offers an interesting view into one aspect of Freud’s mind. Yerushalmi says, “…incredibly and outrageously, Freud was thoroughly convinced that once the Jewish character was created in ancient times it had remained constant, immutable, its quintessential qualities indelible.” In “Moses and Monotheism,” (1939) Freud makes clear his deeply held belief in Lamarckian transmission of the special character of the Jews as “having long ago internalized the ethical, spiritual, and intellectual qualities of Mosaic monotheism.” (Yerushalmi, 1991) i.e., their devotion to the book, to ideas, and to ethical principles.
Freud said, “According to trustworthy accounts, they behaved in Hellenistic times as they
do today. The Jew was, therefore, already complete, even then.” (Yerushalmi, 1991, p. 52) It stretches the imagination, but perhaps not too far, to think that Freud, brilliant scientist and amazing scholar, might transfer some of his deep personal belief in the basic immutability of Jewish character, an underappreciated and enormously important part of his own identity, into a wish for and an effort to do all that he could to assure the constancy and immutability of his personal creation – psychoanalysis. A speculation such as this one does not, of course, shed any light on the need for conformity among so many of Freud's followers.

To emphasize how little capacity we seem to have for deciding in advance which ideas are better or worse, I shall review a few of the many instances in which something was declared to be not psychoanalysis:

1. Harry Stack Sullivan, today acknowledged as a founder not only of the interpersonal point of view, but as a precursor of the relational and intersubjective viewpoints that are prominent in contemporary psychoanalysis was, at best, quietly ignored and effectively ousted from the mainstream of American psychoanalysis.

2. When Bowlby in “The Nature of the Child’s Tie to His Mother” (1958) advanced attachment theory as basic to psychoanalytic concepts, Anna Freud (1960) and others opposed his position as not being psychoanalysis, since it dealt with actual happenings in the external world rather than with their mental representations.

3. When Sandor Rado, Karen Horney, Clara Thompson and others spoke out against libido theory, among their other apostasies, they were declared beyond the
boundaries of psychoanalysis, ousted from their positions at the New York Psychoanalytic Society and formed their own institutions.

4. When Kardiner, Karush, and Ovesey tried to publish their in-depth critique of libido theory, no psychoanalytic journal at that time would accept it. It was finally published in a psychiatric journal. (1959)

5. When Karen Horney began to describe female sexuality and its development as distinct from the single line of male sexuality that Freud described, Otto Fenichel pronounced that she was no longer considered a psychoanalyst (Hale, 1995). She added to her sins by considering aggression a response to frustration rather than an instinct, and by insisting on the role of culture in psychological development.

6. When Franz Alexander, following the lead of Ferenczi and Rank, advocated the corrective emotional experience as an integral part of psychoanalysis, taking precedence over insight, he was reproached for having abandoned psychoanalytic technique for purely therapeutic aims. (Bader, 1994)

7. When Abram Kardiner (1939) described the role of culture in personality formation, and the vast differences in Oedipal configurations across cultures, he was labeled a “culturalist” and declared beyond the boundaries of psychoanalysis. Kardiner had been preceded in this distinction by, among others, Erich Fromm and Eric Erikson whom Anna Freud, his analyst, sharply criticized on this basis.

8. When Winnicott gave a talk on "The Use of an Object" at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute his reception was so antagonistic that he left saying he now understood "why America was in Vietnam".(Berman, 1996) Allegedly, he
attributed the heart attack he suffered on the way home to the hostile reaction to his ideas.

9. When Ted Jacobs, one of the first to describe the workings of an intersubjective point of view in clinical psychoanalysis and the significance of enactment, was asked in an interview in TAP whether he was still being called a dissident, he answered, “No longer as much as I used to be.”

10. The William Alanson White Institute was barred from admission either to the IPA or to the American Psychoanalytic Association because it conducted analysis at a frequency of three times a week. This is now accepted among some groups within the IPA.

11. At the time that Columbia began teaching psychotherapy to analytic candidates, it was regarded as serious educational malfeasance by site visitors of the Board of Professional Standards, diluting the core psychoanalytic identity of the student. Today, analytic institutes have revived their interest in teaching dynamic psychotherapy, recognizing that this will be the major professional activity of the graduates.

12. A generation of psychoanalysts eschewed the use of medication as incompatible with the maintenance of psychoanalytic process, insisting on a philosophy of mind-body dualism rather than attempting to construct an integrated scheme. (Bluestone 1986).

13. Mimicking Freud, but profoundly misunderstanding him, most psychoanalytic training programs have failed to provide an adequate education in the basics of research—how to do it, how to read and evaluate a research paper. This has
contributed enormously to the loss of intellectual and scientific status of psychoanalysis today. At the 2007 winter meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Irwin Z. Hoffman, one of the more original and productive minds in psychoanalysis, gave an impassioned, intelligent, evangelical talk on the perils of empirical research in psychoanalysis, implying that it carried with it an inherent dehumanization. (Hoffman, 2007) To make his point, he conflated classification of disorders with classification of human beings. What was most striking about his talk, however, was the audience response. He was greeted with a wildly enthusiastic standing ovation that outdid anything I had previously seen or heard at the American. I would suggest that the audience was reassured in their ignorance.

One could add to this list. For much of our history in America, we have existed under a virtual intellectual reign of terror, which is now collapsing. Most of these developments that I have just listed, once declared non-psychoanalytic, are today at the core of our pluralistic dilemma; some feel that these ideas refresh our field and bring us closer to related disciplines, while others feel they are disastrous intrusions into the development of psychoanalysis.

However, these almost automatic knee-jerk rejectionist responses that I have described were not only over issues of protecting the guild. They were also honest attempts to maintain the boundaries of something called psychoanalysis. The orthodox rejection of attachment, empathy, enactment, relational, intersubjective, etc., as well as the rejection of any variation of technique -- sitting up, three times a week, abandonment
of anonymity and neutrality, etc. -- all represented, among other things, an effort to retain an identity and legitimacy for psychoanalysis, regarded as so fragile that any porosity of its intellectual or technical boundaries would lead to its dissolution. From the viewpoint of orthodoxy, it seemed as if changing any piece of the complex and often disorderly structure of psychoanalysis threatened the entire edifice; a change of technique threatened the underlying theory, and a change of theory threatened the legitimacy of the technique.

The terms "orthodox" or “classical Freudian psychoanalyst" were for many years a nomination of pride and exclusivity. It identified one as being directly in Freud's lineage and even more importantly, it identified one as being a "true believer". This desire not only to remain in the direct lineage of the father but to uphold every one of his beliefs is a necessity in religions and monarchies. That is why so much of the Bible is taken up with “begats.” Within an orthodox system, the only test for truth is adherence to authority, not experiment or experience. In contrast, as Harold Bloom has written in "The Anxiety of Influence", (1973) the task of the creative mind, whether in literature or science, is to place oneself within the rich heritage of an intellectual or scientific tradition, but then to distinguish oneself by going beyond and overthrowing the father. That generations of psychoanalysts were willing to label themselves as “orthodox", meaning that they would not overturn any of Freud's basic ideas but would at most provide addenda to his thoughts, seems an extraordinary admission of mistrust concerning the scientific power of his theories and the identity of our profession.

At every step of the way, formal educational and political structures have been established to maintain psychoanalytic orthodoxy and the power of authority needed to maintain it. The abandonment of orthodoxy threatens the personal, social and scientific
status of those who have made it their identity. "Rejectionism" -- the automatic dismissal
or denunciation of new ideas -- is a necessary counterpart of orthodoxy. Psychoanalytic
thinking until now has been in sharp contrast, for example, to the statement of a
schizophrenia researcher in a recent issue of the Archives of General Psychiatry.
"Researchers like to be surprised by the data. When new data challenge old beliefs, the
field becomes primed for discovery.... If we are lucky, these surprises will challenge our
preconceptions. As Niels Bohr noted, ‘No paradox, no progress.’" (McGrath, 2007).
Among many psychoanalysts an innovative idea is more likely to be regarded as an
assault rather than as an interesting opportunity.

Since psychoanalysis is not a religion, then it must like every other scholarly or
scientific discipline provide its practitioners the pleasures of newness, change, discovery
and surprise, in addition to the pleasures of familiarity, conformation, confirmation, and
group belonging. We psychoanalysts, rather uniquely, can have the pleasure of
discovery every time we make an interpretation, or help the patient to discover aspects of
himself of which he was unaware, without having to disturb ourselves over whether our
way of thinking, our fundamental knowledge, reflects or even considers the newer and
changing ideas in our field. It is as if, in our enjoyment of a piece of music, being able to
hear a new theme or nuance every time we listen to a familiar piece leads to the claim
that we have made a discovery about music, rather than simply enriching ourselves. In
fact, many music lovers, like many psychoanalysts, cannot bear to listen to something
that is outside the tradition in which they were educated. However, there is a difference.
You don't have to know musicology or even be acquainted with new music in order to
enjoy music, but as therapists concerned with the welfare of patients, we have a
responsibility to know what alternative understandings may be more helpful than the ones to which we are accustomed. There is a fine line in our business between pleasure and complacency.

The bit of history that I have related could be understood as the progress of "normal science" as described by Thomas Kuhn (1996). In his view, it is the nature of scientific innovation to be perceived as transgressive, and it is the task of "normal science" to ward off the possibilities of erosion of its core beliefs until they have been proved barren of the possibility of generating new ideas, or incontestably wrong, and a "paradigm shift" is required. However, maintenance of authoritarian orthodoxy differs from the scientific attempt to stick with productive ideas until they have run their course. New knowledge does not influence the beliefs of the orthodox -- a fact that can be confirmed by any reading of the daily newspapers; authority is the only source of knowledge and belief for the true believers. In the face of new and contradictory ideas the orthodox, feeling embattled, become more entrenched. A study of Millenarian movements-- those religious groups predicting the end of the world -- demonstrated that when it turned out that the world did not end on the appointed date they did not admit error or disband; they simply set a new date, gathered new adherents, and grew stronger. (Festinger, L., Reickler, H.W., Schacter, S. 1956)

In an attempt to discover where we are today, I sent the following letter to 20 eminent psychoanalysts of varying schools.

“I am conducting a small, nonscientific survey among a few friends whose opinions I specially value. I am writing another paper on a topic of continuing interest to me, the changes in psychoanalytic ideas. As you are well aware, with some notable
exceptions, new ideas in psychoanalysis have initially been treated as errors or deviations or dilutions of genuine psychoanalysis. I will be very grateful to you if you would indicate to me which theoretical or technical innovations during the last 50 years or so seem to you to have been genuinely new ideas in psychoanalysis that actually have enriched and changed the way we think or practice. To whom do you attribute these ideas? Don't hesitate to include yourself. It is your personal opinions I value -- not whether or not you believe the field has responded appropriately to the ideas. I don't want to take up a lot of your time -- feel free to answer off the cuff.

Should you still have the interest and energy, I would also be interested in your list of ideas and authors that you believe have been influential, or at least popularized, but have failed to make a significant contribution to analytic thought or technique. Perhaps their influence has even been negative.”

The responses varied from very brief and general to very detailed and precise. At least 20 different items were mentioned as significant alterations of theory or technique, but none was agreed on by a majority of respondents.

One respondent makes the point that "most progress in psychoanalytic thinking, whether generally accepted or not, has consisted of recognizing the error of received wisdom -- i.e., pointing out what should be discarded. Positive contributions have been scarce." He may be right, but we have no agreed-upon ways to decide what is an error. Another mentions that in recent years, Freudian theory has been whittled down to the practice of constructing unconscious fantasies and that theory altogether has taken a back seat to technical recommendations. We are, perhaps, still recovering from the Hartmann –Kris-Loewenstein era of pseudoscientific energetic quantifications.
Topics that came in for frequent mention included:

A. Critical developments in mental life occur both before and after the Oedipal stage, and the Oedipus complex no longer holds the central developmental position that has been accorded it in the past.

B. Various versions of two-person psychology or intersubjectivity.

C. Gender is seen as social construction, as well as biologically determined. Our conceptions of gender role, gender identity and sexual development have been radically altered. Homosexuality has been removed from the list of pathologies. The recognition of multiple developmental pathways, the differences of male and female development, the social and cultural influences on sexual development, and the powerful influence of feminism on psychoanalytic thought were mentioned.

D. Some respondents mentioned the increased interest in the role of culture in determining unconscious mental life.

E. Some emphasized the widening scope of analytic interest -- narcissism, borderline personality, vertical splits, etc. -- the changing analytic population and the shrinking of psychoanalytic prestige and privilege that have changed both analytic thought and practice. In this view, "parameters" are standard, the "pure gold" of psychoanalysis has given way to multiple interventions, the notion of "analyzability" has largely disappeared and theory tends to become a source for humility and imaginative spontaneity rather than a basis for rules.
F. Implicit relational nonverbal affective knowing and its use in analytic practice, 
was regarded as highly significant by a few.

G. There is increasing interest in research

H. The work of Ogden and his emphasis on reverie and the analytic third received a
number of nominations, although some respondents felt this to be an artificial
construction that put a layer of mystification into analytic technique.

I. One writer reported "the power of human consciousness is a major great
discovery of the last decade. Psychoanalysts are knowledgeable about human
subjectivity ultimately not because they understand the unconscious (that too) but
because they are so in touch with human subjectivity which has consciousness as
its sharpest edge".

J. Also mentioned as interesting ideas were “splitting, dissociation, and
multiplicity;” attachment theory and description of loss; the studies of
mentalization; the shift of major technical focus to transference allusions;
Kernberg's technical operationalization of theoretical personality description as
well as the introduction of object relations theory into American ego psychology.

Surprisingly, most respondents did not mention neuroscience, but of the
significant number who did, most felt it had little to contribute. This may be sample bias,
or an indication that psychoanalysis is now more purely psychic than it was for Freud.
One person, however, felt that in Freud's view the mutually lowered level of alertness of
free association and evenly hovering attention was his great discovery because it was a
methodology for exploring the unconscious mind-brain, his ultimate goal, now on the threshold of achievement.

A brief list of some of the names that came in for frequent mention included. Kohut, Loewald, Ricoeur, Schafer, Bowlby, Fonagy, Mitchell, Chodorow, Levenson, Sandler, Greenberg, Renik, Stern, Bucci, Target, Wallerstein, Gill, Gray, Stone, Erickson, Kernberg.

What was most striking to me in the responses were both the broad scope of newer ideas, and the magnitude of the disagreements concerning their validity or meaning. Even when naming the same person or term it turned out that analysts of different groups meant very different things. I shall use Kohut as one example.

In discussing Kohut, some emphasized his explanation of selfobject transferences and the importance of selfobject functions, the vertical splits and the corresponding countertransferences elicited. Others rejected these notions, and cited his work on narcissism and his bringing back into psychoanalytic interest a group of patients previously regarded as unworthy and unanalyzable. Still others emphasized that Kohut was important because he had opened the way for analysts to adopt a warmer and more empathic attitude towards their patients. A number of respondents specifically disavowed Kohut's construction of a new core developmental mode, while others felt that assignment of centrality to the role of the development of self and the significance of selfobjects, rather than maturation of drives, was critically important. A few respondents saw self psychology as a passing wave that had left significant artifacts behind.

Similarly, as further examples, the apparent agreement on acceptance of a two-person psychology, or the concept of enactment or the role of implicit memory, turns out
to be illusory, with very different meaning assigned by analysts of different backgrounds. Differences outweigh agreement in almost every area. In an effort to understand why these differences are so profound and persistent I will speak a bit about the epistemology and philosophy of science, quite aware that I am unqualified to do so. I will suggest that a significant portion of the differences dividing us are a consequence of analysts belonging to different thought networks with different thought styles, and we have great difficulty deciphering the validity or significance of our differences. Charles Hanly, in The Concept of Truth in Psychoanalysis (1990), has very clearly described correspondence and coherence theories of truth. Correspondence assumes that an assertion is true if it accurately describes something that is actually "out there". Coherence assumes that a statement is as close as we can get to truth if it fits within a general scheme of how one sees the world. Psychoanalysts are at the moment sharply split on this issue. Some, like Schafer and Ricouer, would say that an idea is good, and as close as we can get to true, if it helps to make a coherent and enlightening story -- a hermeneutical point of view. Others, like Hanly, maintain the correspondence viewpoint -- that what is true can be confirmed by the perceptions of others and actually exists in reality.

Newer studies on the history, sociology and epistemology of science may be relevant to our understanding of these issues. Ludwig Fleck, a Polish physician writing in German in 1935, is the author of “Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact” (1979), a volume that has recently excited considerable interest. In it he discusses "thought collectives" as essential to understanding how science works. He defined a thought collective as "a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction" and developing a "thought style" concerning a particular field of
knowledge. This seems an accurate description of our current psychoanalytic schools of thought. Fleck says, "The statement ‘someone recognizes something,’ demands some such supplement as, ‘on the basis of a certain fund of knowledge,’ or, better, ‘as a member of a certain cultural environment,’ and, best, ‘in a particular thought style, in a particular thought collective’." I suggest that, like it or not, each of us belongs to and is bound by a “thought collective.” To quote from the preface to Fleck’s volume (XIII).

"An older way of looking at things may become incomprehensible under a new thought style, and the process of transformation from one to the other may be a rapid gestalt switch or a slow process of differentiation."

I shall cite two recent examples of how psychoanalysts of different thought networks cannot communicate. In a recent exchange in the British Psychoanalytical Society an eminent Kleinian psychoanalyst maintained that the concept of projective identification, created by Melanie Klein, could really only be understood within its "home theory"; that is within the Kleinian perspective, and other groups within the British society failed to understand the proper meaning or use of the concept. (O’Shaughnessy, 2006) Needless to say, the Anna Freud group took vigorous exception to this.

Similarly, Gabbard recently published a paper on the significance of non-symbolized, implicit, unconscious knowledge in psychoanalysis, and he described the alterations of technique, with a new emphasis on consciousness, required to analyze these behaviors. (Gabbard, 2007). Almost simultaneously, an article in JAPA claimed that an interest in early nonverbal learning leads us to "risk ignoring important verbal and
nonverbal contributions of talking” (Vivona, 2006) and is therefore a threat to the conduct of psychoanalysis.

Our contemporary pluralism marks the breakdown of a classic epistemic community. What is at stake is not simply the judgment of new ideas, but the identity and status of individuals, as well as the meanings that have been assigned to familiar ideas upon which their intellectual coherence depends. The current conflicts concerning psychoanalytic theory and technique may be viewed at one level as a battle between those attempting to maintain a traditional thought collective versus those of various newer thought collectives attempting to establish different sets of thought styles and “facts” that will, in turn, establish different hierarchies of individuals. At this juncture, each of us, try as we will, cannot avoid personal bias. We are all, to a degree, intellectual prisoners of our social networks and thought styles.

There have been serious questions raised over whether psychoanalysis should claim a place among the sciences. Psychoanalysis is clearly a discipline with multiple aims. We have added enormously to the sum of human knowledge in almost every area of mental, cultural and social studies. But if we are making claims as healers, charging for our services and claiming that we can enable people to alter their lives in more positive directions, then we must, sooner or later, demonstrate that our ideas are in accord with findings from neighboring disciplines, and we must submit to scientific tests of efficacy. Without such testing, on the basis of clinical experience alone, doctors would still be using leeches. In claiming to be a healing profession we should also recognize that technical procedures always change. The stethoscope is now a minor part of the armamentarium of a cardiologist. It seems highly unlikely that our current technical
procedures should survive intact, and arguments over frequency or posture will seem quaint in the not distant future. Unfortunately, at this time we lack both the process and outcome research that could help us to make the necessary intellectual and clinical decisions to separate good ideas from bad.

Psychoanalysis, still in its early stages of development, may not yet be in a position to adopt highly positivist attitudes about truth and must pay extremely close attention to the nature and influence of our various "thought collectives" and how they determine our individual thought style. In contrast to the rather hard science views of Popper and Grunbaum, I think we must recognize that in this still youthful phase of psychoanalysis we will remain powerfully influenced by interpersonal networks -- thought collectives -- and will have to do our best with unsatisfactory equations of truth as related to usefulness, vigor, elegance and generativity while striving towards objective observations of efficacy. For different psychoanalysts in different analytic environments there will be different truths. Fleck and, more recently, Barbara Herrnstein Smith in an interesting book called “Scandalous Knowledge” (2006) maintain that even under optimal conditions a correspondence theory of truth is heavily subject to social influence. Bearing this in mind might help to temper a bit of the fury aroused in most analysts by a new or contradictory idea.

In this era of putative pluralism it is important that we continue to battle with each other while we take care that we do not separate ourselves into isolated thought collectives that cannot communicate with each other. Most psychoanalytic groups currently maintain their own Journal, and only a few of them publish outside their own arena of belief. We desperately need process and effectiveness research-- what works for
what purpose? How to bring ideas from different thought networks into a more coherent whole remains an unsolved problem.

Although I have spoken at length about our "rejectionist" history, I believe that our current task has shifted from battling orthodoxy to battling chaos, as no one any longer has the authority to claim what is or is not analysis. David Tuckett (2005) in his paper “Does Anything Go?” says "It has been difficult to know what does and does not constitute competent psychoanalytic work and so equally difficult to assess when it is being practiced and when it is not.” He suggests, that "the psychoanalytic task could be seen as requiring three specific capacities: (1) to create an external and internal setting in which to sense the relevant data (affects and unconscious meanings); (2) to conceive what is sensed; and (3) to offer interpretations based on these, as well as to sense and to conceive their effects.” By the setting Tuckett refers to "maintaining a participant - observational frame". How this is done will differ among schools. Tuckett suggests that these three capacities apply across schools, and can be used to judge analytic competence. Interestingly, Tuckett’s judgments of competence do not include whether or not the patient "gets better.” In another paper from this group, the authors, attempting to establish criteria for analytic competence, say "an underlying assumption is that we have consistent ideas of what makes a good analyst." They then describe the literature on the topic of analytic competence as meager and the group discussions they conducted as surprisingly heated, tendentious and unsatisfying. (Junkers, Tuckett, Zachrisson)

Similarly, the IJP series on The Analyst at Work demonstrates that those of different schools -- different thought collectives or thought styles, if you wish -- not only disagree
as to whether certain interventions represent good analysis, but cannot agree on whether they represent psychoanalysis at all. To make matters even more complex, we know from the work of Joseph Sandler that the “official” theories that analysts hold may bear little resemblance to the “implicit” private theories that actually determine their work with patients. (Sandler, 1983) There may be a certain resemblance between psychoanalysis and pornography; as the judge famously said, "I can't tell you what it is but I know it when I see it".

At the risk of incurring the wrath of every group I mention, and quite aware that the members of each of the thought collectives to which I refer will be certain that I have totally misunderstood them and am being unconscionably superficial and artificial, and admitting in advance that they could be right, I am going to suggest that, in spite of the profound differences expressed in my survey, there is a beginning common ground in the United States that is vigorously resisted out of our need to maintain the individuality of our thought styles. Grouping together responses that approvingly mentioned enactment, or countertransference, or intersubjectivity, or two-person psychology, or co-creation, or constructivism, or attachment theory, or object relations theory, or relational psychoanalysis, or implicit, procedural memory, or narrative construction, or parallel process of transference and countertransference, or some relaxation of the rigidity of the setting and the role of novelty, spontaneity and creativity on the part of the analyst, or the loss of analytic authority, or the provision of a new and corrective emotional experience for the patient, provides the possibility of a newer overall view of psychoanalysis. I will make the further controversial assumption that attachment theory is a necessary substratum of this point of view.
Despite the many individual differences reported in my survey, in the United States a two person psychology and some version of a comprehensive intersubjective or relational point of view, have superseded traditional resistance analysis as the core theoretical and technical viewpoint for most of our profession in the United States. The representational world, conceived as internalized object relations, has superseded drive-defense configurations as primary determinants of mental life. The intrapsychic focus on the patient has to a great degree given way to or at least been supplemented by scrutiny of the interpersonal-intersubjective-relational transactions between patient and analyst.

The concept of intersubjectivity erodes the stance of the analyst as neutral investigator of his patient’s psyche. The change from the concept of neutrality towards the emphasis on mutual enactment, viewing transference and countertransference as a total situation describes a new form of psychoanalysis--new, at least for most of us-- with a sharp reduction of analytic authority. Levenson, Jacobs, Sandler, Greenberg, Sullivan, Searles, Loewald, Jacobs, Smith, Renik, among others, have all contributed to this view. In this view, transference is less a guide to the past than to current object relations and the analyst is an emotionally involved participant-observer. Interpretation is only one of the available therapeutic responses.

Since every interaction of patient and analyst is co-constructed to one or another degree, it follows that the patient with analyst A would not be quite the same patient with analyst B. Kantrowitz (2002) has found that the single most important indicator of analytic success is the “fit” of patient and analyst. Fit is a complex notion that attempts to account for differences in the patient’s comfort to free-associate, confide, fantasize, trust, etc. with the particular analyst. In fact, it turns out that an analyst whose style is
best suited for one stage of an analysis may be a poor fit for other phases of the analysis with that same patient. Recent researches by Fonagy (In press) as well as earlier work by Strupp (1986) consistently demonstrate that the therapist’s personal characteristics and a sense of mutual understanding outweigh specialized training and theoretical allegiance in determining therapeutic effectiveness -- a rather disturbing idea.

I am quite aware of the ferocious objections to lumping together some of these themes on the part of many of the respondents. I am, in effect, making up a "common ground" where in reality, at least at this time, it does not exist. I am urging that each of us step outside our comfort zone of what we think psychoanalysis is and try very hard to understand what some of our impossible and wrongheaded colleagues are thinking. It’s not easy. Each of us brings to psychoanalysis his or her own set of social, moral and aesthetic interests. Our aesthetics is important in determining how we think analytically. Some of us are more interested in storytelling -- a hermeneutic view; some of us are more interested in archaeology -- reconstructing the past; some of us are more interested in architecture -- providing a structure to human life. Our aesthetic preferences—our ‘taste’ and sensibilities-- are very difficult to change, even in the face of "facts". Yet another problem of analysts of one persuasion trying to understand analysts of another, is that it is extremely difficult to use an idea or method in analysis in which you do not already have deep inner conviction. Our patients quickly know when we are adrift, or trying out a technique in which we do not already believe, and we have no reliable testing procedures.

Whereas in the past we had to deal with a culture of rejectionism in opposition to new ideas, we now have a surplus of ideas, and an inability to sort out which ideas are
valuable and which are not, and whether some of our better ideas are best considered under a heading other than psychoanalysis. The current conflicts concerning psychoanalytic theory are, at one level, a battle between those attempting to maintain a thought collective that had a tradition of established “facts” versus those of various newer thought collectives attempting to establish newer sets of “facts.” Psychoanalysis brought a revolutionary new perspective into the world, much of which is still not acceptable outside of our own field, and we must protect it while we try to advance our knowledge. The boundaries of psychoanalysis, once sharp, are now blurred. I assume that the change of name from the Academy of Psychoanalysis to the Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychotherapy represents the membership’s acknowledgment of this dilemma.

Unfortunately, plurality in itself does not assure an open competition of ideas. In fact, what we have is a growing plurality of orthodoxies that are responsive to authority rather than to data. Kleinians, Kohutians, Bionians, Sullivanians, Lacanians, Relationalists, even Freidians—each group sheltered under its own guru, tending to be self-enclosed, self-satisfied, and fighting off all the others. Thought collectives can be amazingly powerful.

It is an obligation of our pluralistic phase to be doing our best to discover which ideas are better and which are wrong. The welcome mat is not itself sufficient, and significant portions of our so-called common ground are, on closer inspection, still a battlefield. A plurality of authoritarian orthodoxies does not help us very much. It is critical at this point that we develop and apply scientific criteria for treatment assessment. Which of our theories or techniques works better? For whom? Which concepts or techniques are more generative of newer ideas? If we think that physics is at least 400
years old, and we are 100 years old, perhaps we should not dream that we can now do
science in its more sophisticated sense, but surely we should be gathering data. We are
paying dearly for our intellectual isolation in freestanding institutes and our separation
from the University. I submit that unless in the next half-century we can establish our
own cadre of full time basic and clinical researchers, university supported, we will
become a footnote to other intellectual disciplines.

We hear frequent cries that psychoanalysis is moribund. I think the opposite is
ture. We have never been more exciting, as well as more endangered. Psychoanalysis
has changed from a single rigid authoritarian orthodoxy to a pluralistic array of
alternatives. However, pluralism alone is chaos and a plurality of authoritarian
orthodoxies provides no means for selecting among them. It is crucial that we abandon
our old isolation from each other and try, often against our grain and common sense, to
enter into the minds of other analysts of different networks, collectives and styles.
Comparative scientific studies ultimately provide the only way for pluralism to lead to
progress.

So where is Freud in this account of contemporary American psychoanalysis?
Intellectually alive and well and a continuing wellspring of ideas and observations. After
the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of Freud’s birth, his genius continues to generate
new ideas and techniques. Freud and his epochal discoveries concerning unconscious
mental life remain the bedrock of psychoanalysis, as Darwin remains the basis of
evolutionary theory. However, with time and good luck, bedrock becomes covered over
with a layer of fertile soil nourishing all sorts of young saplings, flowers and, 
undoubtedly, lots of weeds. Unfortunately, at the moment, we can't tell which are which.

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