

Reconciliation
The Continuing Role of Theory

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Abstract: The author regards this lecture-event as a symbol of the rapprochements currently in process, brought about by the need to close ranks due to a period of theoretical fragmentation and decline. Just as the original breakthrough of psychoanalysis a century ago was its theory of understanding, the fate of that theory is paramount in the process of consolidation and reconciliation during the present recovery phase. Splits are caused by ideas and people. Theory has grown by steady accretion, and by a parallel subjective process frequently based on flaws and fallacies. Comings together, often in the service of survival, can be on a base as flawed as the original separations, and miss the opportunities to correct previous irrational developments in theory. The author advocates a total composite psychoanalytic theory as the common ground to unify the field and restore its previous inspirational quality.

If there is one over-riding new idea that survives this century of psychoanalysis, it is that every human action has meaning. Following this thread, I will begin by asking “Why am I here, on this platform, today?”, “Why me?”, or “why not some 30 years ago?”, and “why now”? I do not mean me personally, but an individual with my composite titles¹, in the American and the International.

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Facing it squarely, it seems hardly conceivable that either of my immediate predecessors in the IPA, Anna Freud or Heinz Hartmann, could have expected to receive an invitation to speak to the Academy, or if they had, would have easily known what to do with it. Yet when I was called over half a year ago, I was not shocked, not even surprised, and thought immediately “of course”, and was pleased and grateful at the turn of events.

For the time had come. It was 2006, and a sea change had come about. We are at the present moment in a stage of recuperation and reconstruction, of rapprochements and refusions after a long period of fragmentation accompanied by diminution and decline. Some of the assessments in our recent history had become quite dire. As one contributor, in the Openline of the American Psychoanalytic Association, recently wrote, “We are dancing around the embers of a burning building”. Exaggerated or not, it is to examine the numerous present comings-together to counteract this downward plunge that is my central chosen topic today.

In doing so, I would stress that we continue to hue to the rational, that the criterion to be adhered to in this stage of reparative re-grouping be that which has always represented the central guiding principle of the psychoanalytic enterprise, the dominance of reality, consistency and the secondary process.

To effect reconciliations, we need to remember what brought about the original separations that led to the groups who wish to re-join today. However, turning to the data of modern rapprochements, empirically I submit that analysts have hardly led by example in this new current activity, the gathering wave of the re-merging of forces. Psychoanalysis has

disappointed an expectant and receptive public in many ways during the century of its reign. I dedicate this occasion to the aim of not allowing this new, current segment of our history to become another missed opportunity, another stimulus to cynicism.

The rational base of behavior, upon which our discipline bases its existence, is put to the test routinely in a variety of ways. Every analyst, in every hour, is challenged to utilize his instrument in a way that advances rather than betrays his craft. The process of analyzing strains every analyst every hour. "Good enough" has been a phrase that guides if not saves the day every day. And good enough is what we need to strive for today at this new phase as well.

At this point, in order to most effectively deliver the message I aim to convey, I will alter the chronologic sequence I had in mind. To present the case for the continued role of psychoanalytic theory with a bang, not with a whimper, as an afterthought and, I will turn to the present before the past, to be followed by the relevant segments of our chronologic history as a flashback, as is done with the poetic license granted in literary productions.

Since the new millennium, I believe in response to the declining status of our discipline, we have been in a general mood of closing ranks, witnessing attempts at rapprochement, comings together, and a reversal of the trends to disperse. While some of these reunions stand on a rational base of intellectual common ground, others are based on opportunistic motives, material concerns and reasoning hardly characteristic of analytic methods and goals.

Here again, at a stage of vital reparation, I would point out that the need for understanding is paramount, to be guided by explanatory theory of as much power and coherence as fueled the original interest in psychoanalysis. The field is in a constant state of corrective flux. Many major changes have indeed taken place in terms of adaptive and creative integrations. Yet vigilance and rational testing are continuously in order.

While “mModern Kleinians” and “contemporary Freudians” appear to close the gap between the erstwhile intense opponents, practice does not always bring this out as any more than in name only. Many individual contributions still hue affectively to the original lines of separation, as do their respective receptive audiences.

Many present compromises and new allegiances contain inconsistencies and distortions of history at their centers. Fonagy (2003), a prominent dissenter and innovator, staunchly opposes the current fragmentation, which many of his own divergent positions have helped bring about. In one such revision, he and Target (1997) deny the usefulness of uncovering repressed memories, a central pillar of psychoanalytic theory and technique.

Schafer (1999), one of the most prominent converted Kleinians, explicating his theoretical journey from Rapaport to Betty Joseph,, gives credit to Joseph and Kleinians in general for a “focus on the immediate clinical situation” (p.280), or for “the total-orientation viewpoint”, both of which stretch the imagination and a sense of history.

Attempting to remain close to Hartmann, whom he has conspicuously left behind as he moved from a structural (and mechanistic) to a hermeneutic position, Schafer credits Kleinians for “facilitating adaptation” or stressing action, both of which stem directly from Hartmann. As a point in fact, Kleinians, at least old Kleinians, characteristically, and with some pride, downplayed the role of external reality.

Greenberg (201) has separated himself from his relational partner, Mitchell, in now espousing drives as on a par with objects. Closer attention, however, reveals that Greenberg’s preferred concept of drives, of safety and effectance, by no means coincide with the instincts of traditional theory. Yet Greenberg’s new renditions can easily find a place, if not in the drives, within the total Freudian motivational system. Both of his new emphases reside comfortably and from the beginning within the classical structural system ego.

Mitchell (2002a, 2002b), on the other hand, it is now freshly pointed out, in his early writings linked himself to Hartmann’s ego psychology, and to Hartmann and Rapaport on ego autonomy. Yet other relationists today, along with theorists of other schools, view this link with suspicion if not derision.

Inconsistencies persist. A candidate from the local Kleinian group in my city came to see me for a consultation-supervision because she could not in good faith continue to make exclusively transference interpretations as the training model in her Institute insisted. She could not, however, make a break from that group, for it would disrupt her career, and had to discontinue the supervision.

Two of the four pairs of 1950 splits have recently been reversed by official mergers. While motives of housing, real estate and finance overtly play a part, any move toward theoretical fusion is more difficult to observe. It is indeed a question as to whether the average member of the merged groups knows why the two groups in each instance are apart. Personal allegiances developed over the half-century have been determinant and remain primary motivational forces in maintaining separation. Scientific meetings still draw predominantly one side or the other.

These are the sorts of re-joining to be noted in which I would recommend caution and further introspection before a coherent and reliable re-building can take place. The criteria and common beliefs that serve as the affective glue that hold scientific groups together need open exposure and careful study.

I will now come to the flashback history, a personal historical account, from direct participation, of how we came to this point, of rise, decline, and now reconstruction. It takes an overall and close inspection of the major phases of the original chronologic developmental history of the field to render our present predicament and challenges intelligible and to open the path to a rational further approach.

I (2004) have documented in a recent book the course of our science-discipline during the first century of its existence. For the last 6 decades of that hundred-year history, my description was as a direct participant-observer, at the apex of the swirl of events during that entire span. Before that, my account and views were from secondary sources and by

extrapolation in retrospect. My personal account was a blend of two streams, one a description of the consistent growth of a cumulative theory, the second a history of interpersonal factors and subjective, affective elements that I felt deflected and impeded this steady theoretical development.

To begin with a broad, overall view, the first third of the Century of Freud was the period of buildup of theory, by Freud, his colleagues and successors. The second and middle phase saw “the golden years” of expansion, and a wide application of the theory as it evolved. The third, to the end of the century, was a mixture of expansion and dilution, of theoretical proliferation and fragmentation, and of increasing cynicism, disillusion and disarray.

The present stage, from about the nineties, has been one of reconciliation, of comings together, attempts at restitution and a retrieval of rational discourse. Since the beginning of the new millennium, psychoanalysis has been in a period of stock-taking, of a major assessment, rethinking and possible regrouping, to establish rational control of its future history.

It is to the problems attendant to this phase that I wish to direct the remainder of this presentation. In this, I am addressing not only the immediate participants, but the wide related audience, to which the impact of psychoanalytic thinking has always had a deep resonance. I believe that the entire intellectual quest of man is affected by the status and fate of psychoanalytic understanding. Its embrace and strength exude promise; its decline bespeaks a missed opportunity.

At this phase of its history, psychoanalysis is in a position to once again utilize and demonstrate the advantage of reason. Processes of reconciliation and rapprochement are confronted by similar conflicts in all relationships and in contiguous fields up to relationships between nations. The psychoanalytic contribution to the understanding of conflict, by exposing defensive processes, and the compromises and complex nature of resulting outcomes, can again present an example of the voice of reason and intellect *in statu nascendi*.

However, turning to the data and experiences of modern re-fusions, empirically it must be faced that analysts have hardly led by example in this new current activity, the gathering wave of the re-grouping of forces. Psychoanalysis has disappointed an expectant and receptive public in many ways during the century of its reign. I would like to dedicate this occasion of togetherness between us to the aim of not allowing this latest segment of our history to become another instance of a missed opportunity. There is still much to be mined from the theory of psychoanalysis.

After having at least glimpsed some of the current confusions and inconsistencies in modern attempts to iron out past difficulties, we should now re-examine or, for most analysts in practice today probably examine for the first time, the contents of the original divisions we are setting out to restore to unity and coherence.

Before we come to the modern versions of the dissensions that currently divide us, I would have us look backward for a brief moment at the beginnings, the unified view with which we began and the arrival of the first splits.

Freud started the path toward unification at the initial breakthrough of his discoveries. His earliest insights involved the confluence of phenomena heretofore disparate. Symptoms were seen to arise from the same base as dreams. Both were tied to character traits. Slips (1901) and jokes (1905) came from the same source as more serious outcomes. Freud's self-analysis was in the same genre and stemmed from the same origins as his patients. The normal fused with the pathological. Findings from these specific discoveries all bridged to the psychology of mankind. Unity was the theme.

With the advent of colleagues and supporters came the group, and with that group psychology and group process were added to the mix. These altered the method of theoretical progression, the scientific method of observation and theory formation, which from then on needed to take into account the inevitable accompaniments of group processes, group hierarchies, horizontal alliances, and vertical transference effects. The concept of transference was not yet known, but its operation was not thereby delayed. Moreover, the mechanism of transference displaced to theory, which I (1982) was to describe and add to the brew many years later, was operative from the start. Freud was at once a towering transference figure.

Freud found and usefully interacted with his early collaborators, and had the same spectrum of experiences with them as we all come to have with our professional and social peers, which range from helpful to neutral to disturbing or destructive. Freud's early work was soon collaboratively assisted by the likes of Abraham, Jones, Sachs, Ferenczi, Eitingon, and others in and out of his "Secret Ring". But not unlike groups in other endeavors, throughout history to the present day, there were fallings-out along the way, for myriad reasons. The

attempt to establish an objective, experimental, scientific method to investigate a subjective, humanistic field, first by a single individual, moving to a dyad, then to larger groups as the science advanced, can hardly be unaffected by the need to achieve consensus in any group of 3 or more, without adding significantly incremental complications due to the interpersonal interactions. Such influences during the course of psychoanalysis affected the course of further development in both a direction both confirmatory and oppositional to Freud's initial efforts at formulating a body of theory.

Freud's role with his colleagues has become a veritable biographical industry. But what he left with us to use and develop was a science about people, not one contaminated by them. Some of the early dissidents were models for what were to become known as splits. Jung, Adler, Rank were the best examples. In each case, some segment of theory considered central and indispensable was contested or eliminated, and something less or non-acceptable was substituted. Jung focused on the mystical, did not hew to the rational. Adler preferred mastery and power as central issues, frowned on drives, such as sexuality. Rank pin-pointed a new etiologic origin, at birth, but tended to downplay all that followed.

Moving rapidly to the modern era, to lead to the area of group psychopathology and introduce the types of controversies I am pointing to, I will recall as a first example or datum the nature of the split that affected my own path most personally at an early phase of my psychoanalytic journey and career.

That was the division, one of four city splits around 1950 (the four were L.A/Southern California, the Philadelphia Society and the Philadelphia Association, the New York Psychoanalytic and Columbia, the Baltimore and Washington Societies) that resulted in two Society-Institutes in Los Angeles, LAPSI and SCIPIE, both remaining within the embrace of the American Psychoanalytic Association. The theoretical debates spurring this division-about which most current members are vague if they have any formed any opinion at all- centered around the theories and concepts of two icons, Otto Fenichel and Franz Alexander. Was it to be the neutral, i.e., objective analytic attitude, or the “corrective emotional experience”?

I know it well, the issues, the dramatis personae, and the atmosphere. I (1952) gave the last paper before the split, the last time the contestants sat together. The paper was my graduation thesis, “The Analysis of a Doll Phobia”, which happened to go on to its own place in the lexicon of scientific and educational literature. It was also the first American winner of the International Clinical Essay Prize of the British Society; which could well have played a role toward my later active and wide organizational life. I spoke in a broad, horizontal room, in the Beverly Wilshire Hotel, with the two splitting groups separated down the middle. My head bobbed from left to right like a referee in a tennis match. Neither side knew where I was going, which side I would join. Both wooed me.

Splits are made by ideas and people, not either one alone. Were it theory alone, the two factions could have easily lived together. Were there no affective lines of separation, theoretical differences would not have divided the group into two. But no one recognized, or wished to see, in 1950, that the analytic attitude was itself a corrective emotional experience, in

every sense of those three little words. The necessary fine-tuning could not be made. Arrogance and suspicion, and scorn, did not make for creative ideational fusion. One side took the label of “liberal”, the other was called “conservative”. Appropriated from the surrounding political background at the time, the labels were misused and immiscible. Other names were also applied carelessly and with little rational debate, the “good” group, the Freudian, the “bad”, the “other” group, the neo-Freudian, the side for change. To Francis Deri, a staid European émigré analyst on the “good’ side, May Romm, a playful and active member on the other, was “the May Company”. This was not the way to deep friendship. In each city, there were analogues: in New York there was Rado for Alexander, in Philadelphia English and Saul, in Washington Clara Thompson, and lesser lights in Fenichel’s role in every dichotomized area. Both motivational streams, the roles of theory and of people, were operative in each of the four loci of division, but in each only one was acknowledged.

At the end, in my city, I joined the group other than my training analyst’s. This is no comment, pro or con, about either my analysis or my analyst. From the choices given me, my decisions all along my professional journey--there were to be a series of them--hued to principles, to theory and understanding, to what I believed over whom I liked. Personal alliances took second place to intellectual conviction. This did not lead to nirvana. I had friends on the other side, and some on my side were less than friends. This hardly made for a joyous beginning.

In this group of post-war splits around 1950, the two organizations resulting from each pair remained within the parent American. There were other disputes, however, before and

after this cluster of divisions, both in the etiology that caused them and their subsequent group solutions, where remaining united within the American did not come to pass.

When I entered psychoanalytic training in 1940, Karen Horney had just left the American following her difficulties there, and was to form her own American Institute for Psychoanalysis in 1941. Before that, in the mid-thirties, Harry Stack Sullivan was promulgating his interpersonal theories, casting doubt on the intrapsychic. In 1936, he formed the influential Washington School of Psychiatry, which was to lead to the Wm. Allston White Psychoanalytic Institute, not organized until after the War in 1946. Sullivan died in 1949 at age 57. The White Society was formed in 1951.

In all of these instances, however specific and definitive their differing paths, I feel that the theoretical base in each case was not based on logic, but owed their separate courses to subjective affective investments. About the splits and separations around the 50's, I speak from personal presence and interchanges, but not in the 40's and earlier. I went from the Army to Los Angeles in 1946, graduated as a psychoanalyst in 1950, became President of the American in 1961, and President of the International in 1969, and have been at the apex of the swirl of theoretical and organizational events since then. Only from the mid-50's are my accounts and views from direct oral history.

From an ideational standpoint, as with the Alexander-Fenichel separation, I feel that the nexus of division in each case was spurious from a logical standpoint, but affectively fueled. There is no justification to eliminate the interpersonal from Freudian mainstream theory.

Interpersonal relations live in and constitute its very essence. And the cultural dimension, embraced by Karen Horney, is similarly intrinsic to the total, traditional Freudian ideational tree; the external world is in fact the fourth structural system.

But in the 30's and 40's, the focus on the outer world was fortified by an ominous cloud hovering over world events. A dark force was rolling, and exerted its priority on all fronts. Yet in our world of ideas, the external world should not have been allowed to replace the internal, nor culture the individual, or the interpersonal the intrapsychic. One could easily have felt, and many did, that in some of these changes of accent, conflict was being limited to the conscious again, as in pre-psychoanalytic days. This was a period that illustrated my later thesis, that it was not the new contribution that was unacceptable to the evolving main theory but in each case what was omitted. In these movements to focus on the cultural, external, interpersonal, it was the role of internal psychic life, the world of unconscious intrapsychic conflicts that was effectually bypassed.

This fallacious trend of the group process, which resulted in replacing rather than adding findings, was not in every case unopposed. Clara Thompson, one of the official leaders of the new interpersonal group, delivered a series of lectures (1950) to the Washington School of Psychiatry and the freshly-formed Wm. Allison White Society, in which she pointed out the areas in common between the new theory and previous ones, the continued role of the latter, and that both old and new applied. But this had little effect on the course of history.

This mechanism, of deflecting from an established discovery to a new one used to downplay the first, did not arise *de novo* but had taken root in earlier years as well, within the original pioneer group. In that early milieu, no central way of thinking of sufficient credibility or credential had yet been established to exert a dominant influence over others. It was for this reason that each gain could at first be shed rather than added to. Had Adler's contribution of the role of power and mastery come later, this could have been seen in its affinity to the later-added ego, rather than as substituting for the already-discovered and useful, but not yet considered indispensable instincts. Jung's emphasis on spirituality could have been fused with the ambiguity and obscurity of primary process and with what became known at later phases about the distorting role of affects. And Rank was vastly premature with his focus on birth trauma at that stage, which later would have been more hospitable and syntonically with Klein's early postnatal focus. Ferenczi's flexibility and experimentation was able to become fashionable only much later, after the objective scientific attitude had established a secure position. Even more playfulness could then be better tolerated and employed.

I will turn next to a large group secession, this one not before but after those I have referred to around 1950, which I believe will be of more immediate interest to this audience.

I was but a face in the meeting rooms of the American during the early 50's when the Academy was being born, an impressionable young analyst listening to the seniors debate. What I noted was the constant tension approaching rancor. Roy Grinker had been my neurology Professor in medical school. Besides my immediate interest in the nervous system, as the executive of the holistic organism, I, and my class, heard that Grinker had recently

returned from Vienna after a short stint with Sigmund Freud. The few words about Freud that trickled down to us about that experience were not complimentary. Nor were they anti-; they were what I later learned was meant by “ambivalent”. Grinker had been to me a respected eminence, one of the few Jewish faculty members in the midst of a cold environment. Now he was at the American Psychoanalytic, prominent on the side of every issue that was to lead to the formation of the Academy.

At the American shortly afterwards, I was also hearing much debate as to whether psychoanalysis should become a sub-specialty of the American Board of Neurology and Psychiatry, securely under medicine. Here I remember Bernard Bandler and Ives Hendricks, both of Boston, to be the most prominent advocates. They were opposed by Max Gitelson, backed with much affect by Anna Freud and many of the new European emigres.

I can still experience my feeling about the culmination of these conflicting passions-I say this not to exclude strongly held cognitive differences, but to point to the area in which I felt the emphasis lay-when out of these embers, the Academy rose like a phoenix in 1956, the first open split within the American itself. There were from that point two national organizations. But what I also came away with, for my interest in theory, was that there was no distinguishing theory in connection with the new Association, no focus opposing the Freudian system, only a vague amalgam of all those who had left it. I remember being aware of gaps and discrepancies; that they had taken on contradictions; biological-medical, yet social-interpersonal-cultural, all having in common something anti-straight-Freudian. Yet all were psychoanalytic. How did it add up?

I did not know, but I had no problem; conflicting identifications were way above me, and far away. My early identification had been with Otto Fenichel, of whom I had become aware during my 1941 residency at Columbia (the precursor of his major book (1945) had just appeared). I have described elsewhere how my life journey led me to a brief meeting with Fenichel at an Army post a few years later. Shortly afterward, a few months before I left the Army to re-settle in Los Angeles in 1946, Otto Fenichel suddenly died in that city at the age of 49. While plans we had made to continue my analytic training with him were shattered, my affinity for the essence of his scientific views did not abate.

A decade after that event, as the new major division was born and separated from the American, my professional decision-making, still in an early phase, was already being guided by principles that had begun to take hold. As the American was sculpting its outlines and shape, I felt instinctively that its overall compass coincided with my own. From my beginnings in the thirties, caught in a conflict between psychological and social explanations of mental disorders, I sought and was receptive to a superordinate explanatory system. As an aside, I might reflect that in the zeitgeist of the times, this conflict was superimposed on a wider dichotomy for many at my stage of training and development, that between Freud and Marx.

Remember it was the end of the thirties. Was the etiology of the mental problems that were beginning to occupy our attention and to demand understanding economic and political, or due to unconscious conflicts? My leaning here was the same: Freud could explain Marx, but .Marx could not explain Freud. While the mental could throw light on the social, the reverse

did not hold. Class conflict made for many problems, but not for the hysterias and neuroses we were preparing to treat. For me, it was to be Freud, but Fenichel (1945) brought to me this composite of thought within the covers of one tight and complete book.

I stayed with the American. Five years later I was chosen its President. This, I believe, was on the basis of papers I had begun to write in a rather continuous stream, on the substance of the science, not its administration. I mention this as a comment on the opposite that we see in leadership today. I spent the rest of my life examining, expanding, preserving and continually putting to the test this to me brilliant and epically relevant product of the human mind—about the human mind.

Fast forward. From here, I will condense decades, and arrive at my final points. The 50's and 60' saw the discipline flourish and its practitioners prosper. Rewards were there, not only in material comfort but in intellectual satisfaction and emotional fulfillment. This success resulted from the presence and perception that at its core, the central theory stood on a rational base. “Ego psychology”, associated with the American Psychoanalytic, was shorthand for total psychoanalytic theory. The interpersonal and cultural were as intrinsic to the whole as the intrapsychic and its repressed contents.

Ironically, in retrospect, I believe that this was as true for the Academy as for the American, but it was the latter that lived and overtly stood for this multi-faceted totality of theory. It was under this scientific and administrative umbrella that American psychoanalysis was the leading edge of psychiatry at mid-century. At its intellectual center was the mainstream

Freudian psychoanalytic theory of the mind. This conceptualization was simultaneously perfused by the confidence of the public. All psychoanalytic organizations implicitly shared it. Empirical evidence, cause and effects, outcomes and results, could by no means be neatly quantified nor put to graphs to fulfill the standards of the physical sciences, but the quality and direction of the advancing edge, and the fit between clinical experience and its cognitive base, fuelled confidence and an optimistic expectation.

But the forward march was irregular, as history followed its non-linear course. Twists and regressions were as common as progression, demonstrating and confirming Waelder's (1957) observation that progress has victims as well as beneficiaries. Some changes and adjustments were made on a quiet basis, without verbal attribution, and not always on a scientific base. Not long after the splits of 1950, as the social milieu began to change as to who were to be trained, two of the resulting Societies, one on each coast, quietly dropped the name of "Psychoanalytic Medicine" that they had assumed at the times of the splits on the basis of theoretical and scientific principles.

In the late 60's and the transition to the 70's a peak was reached and a decline began. It was in 1970 and just beyond that a series of storms struck that altered the climate of American psychoanalysis in a dramatic way that has lasted to the present. I can be very specific as I lived, observed and participated through the apex of these storms. While I defer for details to the historical account I (2004) documented in "My Life in Theory", skimming over the next range of mountain tops from a more distant view, to name some main markers, there were in succession: George Klein, in Topeka, and his (1973) "Two Theories or One?", in the late 60's,

separating abstract from clinical theory,; Melanie Klein, Bion, and a procession from Britain landing at their Plymouth Rock in Los Angeles, '69, '70 and later- the mechanism at work behind this movement that fits best comes from one of the few Kleinian contributions I easily accept, "Envy and (to paraphrase Klein, 1957, Lack of) Gratitude; Heinz Kohut becoming a Kohutian, on July 30, 1969, at about 10 a.m., at the 1969 IPA Congress in Rome; and the Presidential Address that added a quasi-official stamp to this new direction of theory, Wallerstein's (21988) "One Psychoanalysis or Many?", at the Montreal IPA Congress in 1987, and his answer: "many".

The result was a new look for psychoanalysis. In theory, it was pluralism; in technique, intersubjectivity, the relational; the banner of every Institute became eclecticism, pluralism. "We teach all theories. The candidate chooses". Accompanying and intrinsic to this evolving ambience were burgeoning competitive systems: in explanatory theory, here was neuroscience, increasingly dominant in providing causes; in the therapeutic realm, it was psychopharmacology, more and more automatically the partner in treatment. . Psychoanalysis as it had been was heavily outweighed. The American public moved in the direction one would expect. Depth insight psychology receded.

Contrary to Fenichel's dictum, "The subject matter, not the method, of psychoanalysis is irrational", the subject under study gradually invaded the instrument of exploration. The psychoanalytic method itself became irrational, as a succession of flaws and fallacies overtook it afresh. Replacing rather than adding, pars pro toto, and the others, reigned freely. The result has been not diversity but fragmentation. Many see a field in chaos.

An example of what is commonly omitted or downplayed is the oedipal, and its accompaniments. Castration anxiety (Rangell, 1991) is rarely mentionable, or strangely no longer seen in the clinical situation. With this, unconscious conflict is also diminished and diluted. Several of the important “liberal” Societies that emerged from the 1950 splits, having favored post-oedipal and cultural factors at their nascence, became eager homes of preoedipal Kleinian theory at the time of the new revolution in the 70’s. The etiologic center moved easily from latency back to the first year, leap-frogging the oedipal in both directions.

I first encountered this same specific lacuna in 1953, the squeezing out of the Oedipal by overemphasizing the latency period on one side of it and the preoedipal on the other, in the first panel I participated in at the American (Rangell, 1954a, 1954b). This was the first and later historic panel discussion on the similarities and differences between psychoanalysis and dynamic psychotherapy. In both theory and therapy, there was less resistance on either side, the post-oedipal cultural or the neo-natal and constitutional, than in the dynamic, conflictful anxiety peak between the two, the crucial and decisive oedipal period in the developing young child.

My own counter method of theoretical progression (1988, 1990, 1997, 2002a, 2004, 2007) has always been the opposite, the cumulative addition of new insights upon the old, to make for a total, composite psychoanalytic theory. Gradually, this theory of steady development separated me from what became the new mainstream to what was now the minority opinion. Strikingly, my disagreement here is equally with the American as with the

Academy. The American is as much the locus of contradictions as any other psychoanalytic entity. Both national organizations “progressed” in the same direction. My position of a unified field has much support from individuals, but not from institutions.

Yet the apparent change is actually more complex. While I do not feel that many have openly joined me, at least in this shorthand conclusion, I contrast two opposite views of current psychoanalytic theories as indicators of basic, latent, operative conceptions. Sandler (1983), in defense of divergent theories, writes that there is a discrepancy between public and private statements about the practice of analysis -- that analysts commonly profess to be Freudian in public, while in private they find other theories more useful. While granting that this may be true, I (1988, 1990, 1997,) have pointed out an opposite (and perhaps coexisting) inconsistency. Analysts commonly speak publicly about major divergences, while privately finding long-standing Freudian concepts comfortably compatible with their practice of analysis. These would include objectivity, the use of transference in the original sense (as displacements from the past), the uncovering of unconscious conflicts, interpretation and reconstruction. Empirically, almost all dynamic psychotherapies borrow segments of basic psychoanalytic theory, even those that centrally stress the intersubjective and co-constructive.

Democracy is not the guiding principle in science. Contrary to the concerns of many, theory can be unitary without being monolithic. Complexity and diversity are intrinsic to the human condition. Within a total composite theory, there are many principles of multiplicity, Waelder’s (1946) principle of multiple functions, Freud’s (1900) concept of

overdetermination, and Freud's 1915) metapsychological points of view, multiple streams of etiology and determination that converge upon any single psychological phenomenon.

At this reparative phase of its history, psychoanalysis is in a position to once again demonstrate the place of reason. Revisiting Rapaport's (1952) "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt" and its apparent demise, Shevrin (2003), writing on the consequences of abandoning a comprehensive psychoanalytic theory, states, "Psychoanalysis as a science and practice is in grave danger of conceptual rootlessness... The development of a cumulative body of evidence once well underway has essentially come to a halt" (p.1019). To the fate of Rapaport, I can add Hartmann, Freud, Fenichel, and Anna Freud.

Only a fusion of the major contributions that captured the imagination at its peak can restore the inspirational quality the field enjoyed in the past. The ill-fated "Controversial Discussions" of the British Society in the early 40's (King and Steiner, 1991) which became controversial in themselves, were never followed by a rational and sustained "Discussion of Controversies" at any subsequent time or place. Theoretical reparation at the core requires nothing less. Perhaps it is not irrelevant that a prominent film (*Love Story*, 1970), during the same years as the breakup of our theory, made familiar the slogan "Being in love means never having to say 'I'm sorry'". The lesson here probably applies to all schools.

Even as unity is being sought, lines of separation continue to be drawn. Richards (2003), while agreeing with unification, extends separations further. "Contemporary Freudians", he writes, consists of "ego psychologists, conflict theorists, defense analysts, and

separation-individuation analysts.” He lists me as “a conflict theorist”. In fact, contrary to general opinion, I do not even consider myself a “contemporary Freudian”. I look at myself more as a “developed Freudian”, i.e., one who has retained insights and formulations that to me have endured over time, and added such new ones as I feel have earned inclusion.

My emergent formulation is of one cumulative, unified “total composite psychoanalytic theory” that has grown by accretion as well as modification. I am not an "ego psychologist," although I am often automatically considered that, shorthand that sets up a straw-man to be destroyed. I am an id-ego-superego-internal-external-psychoanalyst-psycho-synthesist. “Synthesist” because the aim of psychoanalysis is not only to tease apart but also to put together again.

As a final consideration at a time of an attempted consolidation of what has grown to be an uncontrolled diversity, are the questions, “where does psychoanalysis belong?”, and “whose psychoanalysis is it?” These are frequent topics today in academia, as at a recent panel at Yale, discussing “where does psychoanalysis fit in to the family of science?”

The recent burgeoning field of neuroscience, while adding a dimension of understanding, was not the necessary proof to establish psychoanalysis as science. Psychoanalysis is already the science of the mind, following as it does the scientific method, of observations, explanatory theory, application of the theory, and its own brand of validation of its theory. Visualization of the brain demonstrates the vehicle through which the mind operates,

not the initiator of behavior, which cannot be visually demonstrated. Without the brain, there is no mind; without the mind, there is no human agency.

While I (2002b) agreed with Brenner (1999) that psychoanalysis is a natural science-is human nature not part of nature?-, the mind is more than the brain, although it cannot exist without it. While psychoanalysis added the “soul” to the brain and body, the soul does not exist without its material moorings. Where the brain, without giving due place to the mind, was incomplete, the same would be the case in reverse, were the mind now focused upon to the neglect of the brain or body. The ego, as we have known throughout the psychoanalytic century, is at bottom a body ego.

The Academy properly emphasizes the roots of psychoanalysis in medicine. While failure to include the role of culture would omit a necessary essence, the opposite, to downplay the role of the soma, would be equally partial and regrettable. The medical *and* the social are both intrinsic to its scope. The same applies to clinical and applied. Psychoanalysis belongs neither to culture nor to therapy alone. Without culture, it loses a vast area of its applied value. Without therapy, it loses its roots. As with internal/external, mind/body or nature/nurture, only total inclusion of both poles of each dichotomy constitutes the whole.

Psychoanalysis is a holistic science of the mind of man.

I am happy and appreciative to have had the privilege of addressing the Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychotherapy.

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