IS ANTHROPOMORPHISM A PROBLEM IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY?

At a meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1906, there was a discussion of the merits and dangers of anthropomorphism in psychology. At the end of the discussion, Freud observed that "it is not at all necessary to outgrow it [anthropomorphism]. Our understanding reaches as far as our anthropomorphism" (see Nunberg and Federn, p. 136). This statement implies that there is an essential relationship between anthropomorphic formulation and psychoanalytic understanding. For some time, the necessity of anthropomorphism in psychoanalytic theory has been questioned. Attempts have been made to purge the theory of its presence, and opinion is evenly divided on the extent to which it is present at all. These issues are sharply drawn with respect to the structural theory. In the Vocabulaire de la Psychanalyse (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967, p. 488), we find the following statement:

Even in the choice of terms to designate the agencies, one sees that the model here is no longer one borrowed from the physical sciences, but is thoroughly marked by anthropomorphism. The intrasubjective field tends to be conceived on the model of intersubjective relationships. The systems are represented as relatively autonomous people within the person (one may say, for example, that the superego behaves sadistically toward the ego). To this extent, the scientific theory of the psychic apparatus tends to approach the manner in which the subject sees himself in fantasy and, perhaps, even has constructed himself [our translation].

By contrast, the American Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis (p. 418) quotes Hartmann (1959, p. 344) on this subject:

Still, some of these constructs seem particularly suspect to many critics of analysis. An occasional lack of caution in the formulation of its propositions, or Freud's liking for occasional striking metaphors, has led to the accusation against analysis of an anthropomorphization of its concepts. But in all those cases a more careful formulation can be substituted which will dispel this impression.
In general, modern sentiment, in accord with prevailing scientific values, accepts without hesitation the view that anthropomorphism is an impediment to the development of scientific psychology. An exception is Masserman (1946, p. 169) who states, "the allegation of 'anthropomorphism' is itself a tautology, since all data are derived from the personal experience and interpretations of the individual and all conceptual terms have reference to essentially human forms and meanings. In effect, then, all 'systems of thought' in all languages, whether applied to the conduct of electrons, cats, or theorists is basically 'anthropomorphic'—and the term itself becomes particularly redundant when applied to any theory of behavior whatsoever." Nash (1962) accepts anthropomorphic metaphor as a temporary necessity (ultimately to be abandoned):

Abandonment of the metaphor of intrapersonal persons in favor of a language of "tensions between [intrapersonal] organizations," suggested by Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein in order to clarify the confusion in Freud's formulation, becomes unnecessary once the relations between ego and self are disentangled. The correct relations between ego and self are indeed seen more clearly in terms of the play-within-a-play metaphor. Although primitive metaphors ought ultimately to be supplanted (or at least supplemented) by more accurate statements of relationship between observed phenomena, the present replacement of the vivid and fertile metaphor of intrapersonal persons by a technical language which is neither as vivid as the frank metaphor, nor firmly grounded in psychological experience by well-defined operations, would be premature [p. 28].

In their now classic paper on the formation of psychic structure, Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein (1946) briefly discussed the place of anthropomorphism in concept formation in psychoanalysis. These authors begin the relevant portion of their discussion by noting that Freud's subject matter was the study of psychic conflict. They point out that:

The concept of a psychic conflict is integral to many religious systems and many philosophical doctrines. Ever more frequently since the days of enlightenment had the great masters of intuitive psychology, had writers, poets, and philosophers described the life of man as torn between conflicting forces. Freud's contribution conquered this area for the rule of science. The study of psychic conflict in general, and more specifically that of the pathognomic nature of certain conflicts, suggested that the forces opposing each other in typical conflict situations were not grouped at random; rather that the groups of opposing forces possessed an inner cohesion or organization [p. 13].

They further elaborate by noting that the interest of French psychiatry in multiple personalities during the latter part of the nineteenth century "supported the idea that other less dramatic manifestations of mental illness could be understood in terms of 'man divided against himself'" (p. 13). They then discuss the development of the tripartite model, noting that:

These three psychic substructures or systems are not conceived of as independent parts of personality that invariably oppose each other, but as three centers of psychic functioning that can be characterized according to their developmental level, to the amount of energy vested in them, and to their demarcation and interdependence at a given time [p. 14].

Furthermore, they remark that the psychic systems are defined by the functions attributed to them, observing that "In adopting the functions exercised in mental processes as the decisive criterion for defining the psychic systems Freud used physiology as his model in concept formation" (p. 15).
In our opinion, this statement gives too much weight to the role of physiological models in Freud's thinking. What it neglects is the pervasive role of interpersonal and social analogies in providing process terms for theoretical formulations (e.g., the term *Instanz* in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, translated as "agency," is drawn from the legal sphere, certainly not from physiology). The importance of the interpersonal source of analogies will be developed over the course of the paper.

Having thus introduced the structural concepts for discussion, these authors proceed to consider the frequently raised objections that the structural terms are "dramatic in an anthropomorphic sense." They continue:

> Clearly, whenever dramatization is encountered, metaphorical language has crept into scientific discourse and that there is danger in the use of metaphor in science hardly needs to be demonstrated; danger, it should be added, to which Freud (1933) himself drew our attention. However, it remains a problem worth some further discussion, under what conditions the danger outweighs the advantage. The danger obviously begins if and when metaphor infringes upon meaning: in the case in point, when the structural concepts are anthropomorphized. Then the functional connotations may be lost and one of the psychic systems may be substituted for the total personality [p. 16].

They offer an illustration of how an anthropomorphic Freudian sentence may be reformulated in an effort to eliminate its anthropomorphic implications. In brief, they substitute "degrees of tension" between psychic agencies for terms of those agencies "loving" or "hating" each other. To that example, we shall return later to see whether or not such reformulations are, in fact, able to perform the function for which they are designed.

For the moment, however, the other portion of their discussion is of more interest. They point out that there is an impoverishment of the "plasticity of language" whenever such a reformulation is attempted.

> Thus the metaphorical expression comes closer to our immediate understanding, since the anthropomorphism it introduces corresponds to human experience. Our reformulation shows that not the concepts which Freud introduced are anthropomorphic, but that the clinical facts he studied and described led us to understand what part anthropomorphism plays in introspective thinking.

[However, while offering their appreciation of the descriptions of the nineteenth century French psychiatrists, they remark:] But the metaphorical language of descriptive psychiatry did not permit in the nineteenth century, and no reformulations in terms of existential psychology will permit in the twentieth century, the step from empathy to causal explanation. This step became possible only after conceptual tools had been adopted which permitted a more generalized penetration of the phenomena; a penetration that becomes possible only at some distance from immediate experience. This was the function of Freud's structural concepts. If we use these concepts in a strict sense, the distance from experience grows. Freud's metaphorical usage of his own terms was clearly intended to bridge this gap. It might thus be said that Freud's usage bears the imprint of the clinical source from which the concepts were originally derived, the imprint of the communication with the patients. Requirements of communication may ever again suggest richness of metaphor, but metaphors should not obscure the nature of the
concepts and their function in psychoanalysis as a science. That function is to facilitate explanatory constructs. Briefly, the structural concepts are amongst our most valuable tools, since they stand in a genetic context [p. 17].

In summary, then, we might say that the argument is as follows: first, that the structural concepts are derived from the study of conflict and the grouping of the forces in conflict; second, function defines the structural agencies and these agencies are readily anthropomorphized; and third, this tendency is dangerous for theory. Fourth, they feel that it is not necessary to anthropomorphize these concepts and that appropriate formulation alone may avoid the dangers of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is not without some value, however, since it is close to immediate experience, and we have been led through Freud's study of clinical facts to an understanding of the part played by anthropomorphism in introspective thinking. The fifth point is that "Freud's metaphorical usage of his own terms" was intended to bridge that gap from empathy to causal explanation, that this was the function of Freud's structural concepts, and that their strict use enables us to remove ourselves further from immediate experience in developing our concepts.

The preceding quotations appear to imply that the problem of anthropomorphism in theory is related to the anthropomorphism of introspective thinking, the core of our clinical data. The additional claim seems to be made that the anthropomorphic coloring of theoretical propositions is due to an excessively great closeness between theoretical propositions and clinical observations. It would be useful to consider the kinds of theoretical propositions which are most often rendered in anthropomorphic terms. These are by no means limited to clinical propositions.

The relevant questions at issue in this discussion are: (1) How is the anthropomorphism of introspective thinking related to the anthropomorphism of clinical propositions? (2) Does more careful formulation dispel the anthropomorphism? That is, is it really less anthropomorphic to speak of "tension" between ego and superego than to speak of love and hate? (3) Have the more abstract aspects of psychoanalytic theory succeeded in taking "the step from empathy to causal explanation?" The metaphors, as Freud implies (see above), may not simply "infringe on meaning" (Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, quoted above) but perhaps supply it. To explore these possibilities, we shall examine the ways in which anthropomorphic metaphors (direct and implied) have served psychoanalytic theory.

**THE ANTHROPOMORPHISM OF INTROSPECTION**

The anthropomorphism of introspection refers to our tendency to talk about ourselves in terms of inner people. For example, we commonly speak of ourselves as having an "inner voice of conscience," or of our "struggles with ourselves." We also speak in terms such as "the idea came to me," "self-control," "be overcome with emotion," etc. In these latter expressions, the anthropomorphism is less explicit, but nevertheless evident. For example, the phrase, "an idea came to me," involves reification or personification of a psychological process.

The phrase, "a struggle with oneself," highlights how the experience of inner turmoil is converted by anthropomorphism to the language of warring parties within the person, i.e., language of conflict. Such popular expressions already imply divisions within the mind and conflicts of motives and interests. Expressions such as "the better part of me" not only imply a division, but begin to group motives and interests within the mind. These groupings tend to be modeled on the conflicting demands made by the parents, and other people, on the individual throughout his development.

In its most general definition, "anthropomorphism" means ascribing any human attribute to something other than man. These attributes include feelings, appetites, actions, physical structure,
and biological properties, as well as motives and intentions. Anthropomorphism often implies the notion of "animism," the attributing of life, or a living soul, to inanimate structures or forces. In general, animism is a variant of anthropomorphism since the "anima" or "soul" turns out to be a human soul. We use the term "sociomorphism" to refer to social process and structures as analogies or metaphors. The term "theriomorphism," rendering something in the form of an animal, belongs here, too. This usage can also be seen as closely related to anthropomorphism. One could speak of the experience of a sexual urge as "as if I'm chained to a madman" or as if "there is a wild animal inside me." The addict's phrase, "a monkey on my back," personifies, so to speak, the inner compulsion to continue taking the drug. "Animal passion" is a still more familiar phrase of this type.

Such rich language also illustrates what should come as no surprise: that the language of inner experience is first and foremost metaphorical. The metaphors are drawn primarily, perhaps even exclusively, from social interaction and from the person experiencing certain physical events and situations. C. S. Lewis's (1967) study of the word "conscience" illustrates several points about the metaphorical description of inner life. He demonstrates that the term originally referred to a shared knowledge of a guilty secret. Changing usage gradually internalized the secret and those who shared it. Thus, the term describing the inner function is already, historically speaking, a sociomorphic metaphor. What this example further illustrates is that even a term which we would think of as denoting a particular inner function, "conscience," is one that is already richly metaphorical. Even terms which appear solely denotative of inner experience have their origin in interpersonal situations and experiences. We may mention, in passing, the other major source of the metaphors for describing mental life, i.e., certain bodily sensations. In particular, terms denoting affective states, such as anxiety, elation, and depression, are in part concretizations of a bodily experience or the experiences a person might have in a particular physical situation (cf. Sarbin, 1964), (1968).

The capacity for introspection develops in the child pari passu with the acquisition of the vocabulary for the conceptualization and description of inner life. It is the adult world which provides the child, in a variety of situations, with the tools for labeling his inner states. Prominent are terms by which we help the child establish the distinction between the inner and outer world. The labeling of affective states is also very prominent in our "instruction" to children. The language that we have to offer the child to denote his inner experience is of necessity anthropomorphic. The child's view of all reality, both outer and inner, certainly inclines toward the anthropomorphic. When we speak to him about his inner experience and use anthropomorphic language, we are using terminology which is quite suited to the level of development of cognition in the child, as well as using the language which we adults have to describe these states.

This point of view is by no means only a recent one and is already sketched out in the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Vol. I, p. 122). There Moebius says, and Freud agrees, that our sense organs are equipped only for the perception of the external world, and not for self-observation. "It is only late and by means of a trick [Kunstgriff], as it were, that we learn to direct our attention to certain inner processes. These enter our consciousness by associating themselves with verbal representations. The perception of our thought processes occurs only with the help of words." We have spoken of the anthropomorphisms of introspection that appear in common speech and that are imbedded in common language, as well as the learning of these terms by the developing child.

In clinical work, certain conditions are prominently associated with the anthropomorphism of introspection. Thus, an obsessional patient with complaints of depression, work inhibition, and some sexual difficulties speaks habitually of one part of himself mistreating the other part, or how
he uses his "neurosis" to punish himself, or of his endless arguments with himself. He then has a sequence of dreams, which in the manifest content represent thugs, criminals, and police in conflict, with each treating the other brutally. In associating to the dream, the patient was now in the role of policeman, and now in the role of the criminal, as in acts of petty thievery. The manifest content, then, is in fact an even more anthropomorphic rendering of his conscious experience of inner conflict. For this man, to paraphrase Flaubert, his inner life is the perpetual wheedling of the man who acts by the man who criticizes. States of heightened self-observation, such as depersonalization, of course, present an extreme case of the experienced split between the observer and the observed, both parts of the self. Here, however, defenses have blotted out the experience of conflict.

In paranoid states, although there is no explicit experience of inner conflict, we can recognize that the patient's thoughts and feelings are divided between those ascribed to him and those ascribed to outside agents.

In all of these states, then, the person either experiences an inner division, or split, or this split is revealed by low-level inference from the associations. Both kinds of splits may be seen in dreams. In some dreams, "we" are observing what is going on, even in scenes in which "we" are participating in the ongoing activity. Along another plane of cleavage, we can, with the aid of associations, see another split, i.e., the characters in the dream may represent parts of one's self.

It was in close relationship to these states, obsessions, delusions of observation, dream life, and depressions, that Freud developed the notion of the superego. The activities of this agency, as has often been noted (e.g., Spiegel, 1966), are most frequently experienced anthropomorphically, and given theoretical statement in anthropomorphic language. Consideration of these clinical conditions also led Freud to take up the relationship between self-observation, self-criticism, self-reproach, and the capacity for theoretical speculation. The notion of splits within the mind, typically rendered anthropomorphically, is also intimately related to the activity of introspection (Grossman, 1967).

To summarize: The clinical data are anthropomorphic to the extent that introspectable mental life is anthropomorphic. Inner mental life is commonly, though not exclusively, reflected on and reported in anthropomorphic and sociomorphic terms. Inner experience must be described metaphorically, and these are the metaphors most readily at hand. Anthropomorphic terms import into the description of mental life the notion of conflicting motives and interests within the person, and in some instances, conflicting persons within the person. At times, these metaphors also group and organize the warring interests and wishes. In certain clinical states, anthropomorphisms are more in evidence and more pervasive. Undoubtedly there is marked interindividual variation in this respect. Common language provides the developing child with the terms, including the anthropomorphic terms, which allow him to label inner states, and these anthropomorphisms are eminently well suited to the thinking of the developing child. The animism of childhood thinking may be the matrix out of which the anthropomorphism of introspection arises.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN THEORY

In attempting to explain the puzzling data that emerged in the course of his therapeutic work with patients, Freud evolved a variety of theories. In his early papers, we find an admixture of different types of explanation. Some of these are etiological theories, which account for the symptoms of an illness in terms of specific constitutional elements. For instance, syphilis in a parent was suggested as a predisposition to hysteria. Other etiological factors were specific early sexual seduction or harmful current practices such as coitus interruptus and masturbation. The efforts further to define the ways in which these agents were effective led to a consideration of their
influences on the mind. One kind of postulated effect was either a depletion of energy, or an undischarged painful excess. In these cases, the mind was affected by some sort of toxic process, and the complaints of the patient that he was nervous, weak and so on, could be so understood.

The hypnoid state concept, which Freud disavowed after his break with Breuer, was an attempt to account for the impact of experience by means of a concept of a susceptible state. With the concepts of defense hysteria and counterwill, he began to deal with splits within the mind itself. In his paper on "The Neuro-psychoses of Defence" (1894), the idea that one part of the mind is unacceptable to the other is further developed in relation to obsessions and paranoid ideas.

As Stewart (1967) has observed, Freud did not first propose organic or somatic theories and then replace them by psychological ones. Quite the contrary, he was often at pains to combine the two. Here we should like to distinguish between three kinds of theories. One type attributes psychic illness or phenomena to the effects of somatic substances on the mind and brain. The second is a "state of mind or brain" theory. The third is the conflict model. In his early papers, drafts, and the "Project," Freud tried to integrate these approaches. In the "Project" (1895), he attempted to design a brain which would accommodate all of them and explain their interdependencies. He was well aware of the different kinds of mental-somatic relations implied by these different models. The actual neuroses were directly due to somatic effects and no conflict could be found which could be said to be expressed by the symptoms. When intrapsychic conflict was a cause of symptoms, the organic was just as surely present, but, as it were, behind the scenes. Therefore, the state of fatigue could account only for the conditions favoring a slip of the tongue. It was the psychic steps interposed between the organic substrate and the symptomatic act which provided the explanation (1916-1917, p. 60f.).

For the purposes of this discussion, an especially interesting feature of the "Project" is Freud's attempt to grapple with consciousness and brain. Even earlier (1891, pp. 54-57) he had proposed an explicitly parallelistic relationship between mind and brain. In the "Project," he attempted to account for the qualities and conflicts of experience in terms of quantities of excitation and organization of neurones. Thus, the elements and properties of the explanatory model were different from the elements and properties of that which was to be explained. Although a certain parallelism was retained (1895, p. 311), it was invested in a particular set of neurones.

The abandonment of the "Project" was the abandonment of an attempt at explanation in terms of postulated elements having special quantitative properties. The subsequent models relied on a particular type of parallelism between the form of the mental apparatus and the "elements" of experience. In part, this was accomplished through "bridge concepts" and analogies between somatic and mental functions; in part, by the "person-within-the-person" model.

Of the "bridge concepts" we shall say more later. At this point, we wish to show their role in parallelistic or isomorphic theory construction. Thus, "damming up of affect" and consequent failure to "discharge" are analogous to somatic sexual processes as Freud conceived them. At the same time, "damming up of affect" is a theoretical metaphor for "not expressing feelings." The choice of these terms places in the mental model a construction having the same form as the experience. Stated crudely, something dammed up in experience has its counterpart in something dammed up in the model. Another example would be Freud's efforts to represent pleasure and unpleasure in experience (at whatever level) as a direct function of a level of excitation in the model.

While the anthropomorphic and parallelistic aspects of the model may be covert in the foregoing instances, they are readily evident in the "person-within-the-person" formulations. This type of
theory subdivides human experience into larger segments, and in psychoanalysis, at least, has focused on the grouping and vicissitudes of motives. To subdivide experience and to construct a model of mind in this way has certain immediate consequences. First, where it is a question of subdivision into the person's motives and other functions, the theory has a functional character. Second, the categories and functions are usually observer-oriented and often adult-oriented. Third, if each separate group of functions and motives is assigned to its own part of the mind, each part of the mind has become a homunculus. These three factors make this type of mental model anthropomorphic. This model is fundamentally different from one which starts from some basic property of organisms, or of systems, or of nervous tissue, and so on, and proceeds to elaborate the complex behavior from the simpler elements and their properties. In the latter, as in Freud's neuronal model or in reflex models, the properties of the elements are intrinsically different from the results of their organization. In the "person-within-the-person" model of psychoanalysis, both the integrated person and the parts of his mind have motives, interests, and so on. Consequently, it is the meanings and values dominating integrated behavior which dominate the interrelationships of the parts of the mind. In its pure form, such a model then studies the interrelationships and organizations of the multiple meanings of behavior and experience. It will be readily appreciated that what we have been summarizing here is a set of models ranging from those dominated by some sort of biophysical causality to those dealing with the organization of meaning in experience. Freud began his career with a mixture of such theories, and modern psychoanalysis continues in this tradition.

These different aspects of Freud's theory-making are well exemplified in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. In dealing with the problem of interpreting dreams, he deals mainly with the person in conflict. There are wishes that cannot be gratified and motives that must be disguised or deflected. The model of mind that emerges from this view of things is one in which the mind is split or is divided between a part that wishes to discharge and gratify impulses and a part that forbids, controls, and censors. Dream life allows us to get a clearer picture of, or to infer, this conflict and this split, but of course many waking behaviors and even conscious mental experience provide examples of the mind as divided. Needless to say, this is a paradigmatic summary of what is involved both in the interpretation of dreams and the construction of theory. It does not represent a historical or actual clinical statement as to the relationship between the data of dream life, the process of interpretation, and the model of mind that emerges. In brief, it is well recognized that these three, namely, the dream itself, the theory of interpretation, and the theory or the model of mind, are intimately connected.

We can then see the mind as divided. One part is taken to be the mental representative of the claims of the "animal" or "the bodily parts" within us, or the child who is driven by organic demands; the other is the representative of the claims of reality, of the social world, of reason and of morality. Such a division is already implicit in *The Interpretation of Dreams* in the separation between the Conscious and the Unconscious, controlled by censorship and the mechanism of repression. It comes to fruition and is made explicit in *The Ego and the Id* (1923).

What we can see at this point is that the model has posited corresponding portions of the mental apparatus for each of the terms of the conflict. The divisions of the mind that are posited, namely, an impulsive, wish-dominated portion versus a morally and socially responsible portion of the mind, correspond to a number of popular and widely held views as to the nature of human behavior and the nature of the human mind. It should be pointed out that at one level what is described in this model of mind is that man has several different functions, such as the function of gratifying bodily wishes and impulses, and the function of fulfilling the demands of the social and moral realm. These different functions of the man in action are then carried over to a theory of mind that says that the mind has two different kinds of functions that frequently are in conflict.
with each other. Or, the clinical data show that the person is in conflict; the "model" says the parts or functions of the mind are in conflict.

We can see then that the model has become anthropomorphic by virtue of introducing into the mind different parts that have different interests, claims, and wishes, just as does the person himself. We have been tending to stress those divisions which became most important in the structural theory. One should not, however, overlook the anthropomorphism in the topographical theory. Freud seems to allude to this in his justification of concept Ucs. In writing of the nature of unconscious mental processes, he compares them with conscious ones: "all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions and so on, can be applied to them" (1915, p. 168). In the same paper, Freud compares the assumption of unconscious mental processes with the inference that other people possess consciousness. He suggests that the manifestations of the unconscious are to be explained as though they belonged to the mental life of another person. Finally, he states that the "assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us … as a further expansion of the primitive animism which caused us to see copies of our own consciousness all around us" (p. 171).

The anthropomorphism of the model is further highlighted by the various anthropomorphic and sociomorphic analogies that Freud uses in The Interpretation of Dreams. For example, Freud cited the story of the poor married couple who were granted three wishes to describe the dreamer in his relation to his dream wishes. He says, "a dreamer in his relation to his dream-wishes can only be compared to an amalgamation of two separate people who are linked by some important common element" (p. 581n.). It is clear that this is not only an analogy but is another statement of the idea that the different parts of the mind or the different agencies represent different and often conflicting interests, claims, and wishes. This analogy of the three wishes and others, such as the entrepreneur, and analogies of electorate and political divisions within the state and numerous others, are not merely analogies or ways of speaking. It should be recognized that they not only carry with them the ideas of conflicting intentions, but are a way of describing the process of conflicting intentions.

Perhaps a word of clarification would be useful at this point. In referring to these metaphors, we are not assuming that individual metaphors are to be taken in some concrete or literal sense as explanations of conflict in themselves. We believe that the aggregate of such anthropomorphic metaphors, which appear in profusion in Freud's writing, implies a fundamentally anthropomorphic model of mind. These anthropomorphic metaphors thus reveal the actual use that anthropomorphism has in the theory. This use is that it imports process terms, terms of conflict and motive, into a model of mind. Furthermore, we can also see in these anthropomorphic metaphors, as well as in sociomorphic metaphors, the way in which ordinary usage is served by the same sorts of process terms. Thus, we commonly refer to motives and conflict in both the inner life and the social life.

Another important feature of these analogies is that they cast the form of the mind into the form of social interaction. We shall return to this point later when we discuss how Freud discovers once more in the forms of social life the forms of the mind and mental life. We shall argue that what appears to be a finding of mental process in social process is in a sense only a refinding. Moreover, the ultimate fate of these anthropomorphisms in the model of mind depends on how else the systems or agencies or parts of the mind can be characterized and defined. If they can be analyzed into terms and propositions that are not anthropomorphic, then it would be fair to say that the anthropomorphisms are introduced only by way of first approximation. However, it is our impression that the attempts to date to resolve these systems into constituent parts have, by and large, only further subdivided these systems of intention and wishing and have not necessarily
contributed a new level of analysis. Abstract terms which have been substituted for language of intention have, it emerges, no other definition than the terms of intentionality for which they are supposed to substitute.

We have now seen how a particular early model of mind, the topographic model, is constructed in large measure by making the parts of the mind congruent with grouping of motives in experience. The form of the mental apparatus corresponds with the alignment of conflicting interests and wishes. The model appears to retain this basic form, even though psychoanalytic theory recognizes multiple conflicts and multiple levels of conflict of which we see only derivatives in awareness. The principle of congruence, or parallelism, is retained in the structural formulations, as well as in topographic models. In addition, this principle of congruence between the products of mind, or the form of experience, and the "actual structure" of mind finds its expression in certain concepts in psychoanalytic theory that have not ordinarily been looked at in this manner.

A. The concept of endopsychic perception[1] is found in Freud's early writings and soon disappears without any special notice of rejection. This concept supposes that the working and contents of the mind are somehow perceived, but not recognized as such. Instead, they are found again projected into the external world as animistic or delusional explanations of natural events and social experience. In this conception, the assumption of parallelism takes the form of a finding of the structure, processes, and contents of the mind, displaced into a new location, accounting for the structure of experience. Thus, in one of the passages in which Freud spells out his conception of endopsychic perception, we find (1913, p. 92):

> Spirits and demons ... are only projections of man's own emotional impulses. He turns his emotional cathexes into persons, he peoples the world with them and meets his internal mental processes again outside himself.

That the study of man's perceptions of the external world is, in fact, a direct route to learning about the actual structure of mind, is stated quite explicitly by Freud. He states that it is the task of scientific psychology to translate back into intrapsychic terms the language of events found in myths, delusions, and religions, and "to transform metaphysics into metapsychology" (1901, p. 259).

B. A counterpart conception embodying this assumption of parallelism is that of internalization in the development of the mind. According to one meaning of this conception, the "actual structure of mind" is built up of replicas of experiences of object relations and their attendant impulses and conflicts. This genetic concept already reflects the assumption that the mental apparatus, as it develops, shall resemble its experiences. This assumption, it should be noted, is the basis for a psychoanalytic approach to explaining the fact of the anthropomorphism of introspection.

C. The "picket-fence" model of the mind that Freud develops in *The Interpretation of Dreams* embodies the assumption of a correspondence or congruence between the form and structure of experience and the form of the mental apparatus. The model states that the direction of impulses in the mental apparatus is tied to the sequence of structures. Memories are laid down in the sequence in which they were experienced. This means that the earliest memories are registered in primarily the visual mode, and the visual mode, by definition in this framework, corresponds to the more impulsive bodily-need-driven parts of the mind. The other end of the apparatus represents the executive, controlling, verbal portion of the mind, which is late in developing. It should be noted that even though the censor is not explicitly
localized within the structures, the model, nevertheless, presents the mind as split or divided into parts which function in terms of conflicts of wishes or conflicts of interests. In this light, we can further understand Freud's statement that at the bottom, the three types of regression, namely, temporal, topographical, and formal, are identical (1900, p. 548). This discovery is, in fact, a making explicit of an assumption built into the model.

D. Freud's interest in history, society, and biology was oriented primarily toward an understanding of how these forces mold and influence the mental apparatus and how they are registered and represented in the mind. He did not seek to understand these areas in their own terms. In *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), he explained that he was "not an ethnographer but a psycho-analyst." It appears to us that, in order to discuss these questions, Freud constructed a system of equivalent structures and forces unifying the study of history, society, biology, and the mind of the individual. In some instances, this series of equations, which we term constructing an isomorphism, is stated rather explicitly. In other instances, particularly in his statements about biology, the equations are more implicit. For example, in speaking of the history of the human race, or the history of the Jews, he can speak of the "infancy" of a group or of its "latency period" and quite explicitly compare them to developmental stages of the individual. In his treatment of society, as in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), he uses a preformed model of the mob, that provided by Le Bon, which treats the mob as an organization, or an organism, with purposes, intentions, motives, and a particular psychology of its own. The mob is equated with an individual, and the properties and functions of an individual person are ascribed to the mob.

His treatment of biology has two aspects. The first, in the earliest writings on instincts, is the effort to utilize certain forms of biological thinking to help formulate the notion of instincts. The second treatment of biology, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), is somewhat more formidable. There he states explicitly that the universe as a whole is dominated by the same two principles that dominate and regulate the mental life of the individual person (life and death instincts). However, even in his discussion of the division of instincts for the purposes of clarifying instinct theory, we find that he subtly equates instincts with intentions or motives.

*However jealously we usually defend the independence of psychology from every other science, here we stood in the shadow of the unshakable biological fact that the living individual organism is at the command of two intentions, self-preservation and the preservation of the species, which seem to be independent of each other, which, so far as we know at present, have no common origin and whose interests are often in conflict in animal life* [1933, p. 95].

Note that these two terms, *intentions* and *interests*, are applied to instincts, thus ascribing human purposes to biological forces. Another example of this kind of isomorphic reduction of the world of nature and of the mind can be seen in one of his last statements about instincts in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937). There he cites the early Greek philosopher, Empedocles, who developed a viewpoint about the role of strife versus love as a major cosmic conflict. Freud compares the similarities and differences between this notion and his own theory of life and death instincts:

*But the theory of Empedocles which especially deserves our interest is one which approximates so closely to the psycho-analytic theory of the instincts that we should be tempted to maintain that the two are identical, if it were not for the difference that the Greek philosopher's theory is a cosmic phantasy while ours is content to claim biological validity. At the same time, the fact that Empedocles ascribes to the*
universe the same animate nature as to individual organisms robs this difference of much of its importance [p. 245f.; our italics].

We take this to mean that Freud sees in the writings of the philosopher that he is talking about mind or the individual even though he uses the terminology of the cosmos and of cosmic principles. In this same passage, we also see that Freud utilizes as a buttress for his own theory a viewpoint which makes biology, the cosmos, and the mind isomorphic and anthropomorphic.

These four examples of isomorphism (A, B, C, D) demonstrate how the mind and the world at large are anthropomorphized and considered to be organized in the same formal pattern. Such an equation of these different structures permits the same process terms of conflict, motive, and intention to be used in describing processes in each of the domains. Effectively then, each of these areas is modeled on conscious, anthropomorphized experience and the models that are derived are empathically meaningful.

To return then to the focal questions: how does anthropomorphism get into psychoanalytic models of mind, and what functions does it serve there?

1. Introspectable experience is rendered anthropomorphically and sociomorphically. The anthropomorphic language portrays conflicts and groups the terms of the conflicts.

2. The experience of conflicting intentions is rendered in anthropomorphic language and is intimately connected with certain commonly accepted and popularly held views about the division of the mind, such as the division of the mind into a moral part, a reality-oriented part, and an animal-impulsive or a childish part.

3. Psychoanalytic theory, then, does in fact what various common and popular divisions of mind do. The psychoanalytic models of the mental apparatus posit an apparatus that has a part corresponding to each of the terms of the conflict. The language of the relationships among these parts and of the functions ascribed to these parts is primarily anthropomorphic and sociomorphic.

4. The individual functions of parts of the mind are described along the model of conscious introspectable experience.

What we are here describing, then, is a basic approach to, or a certain style of, building a model of the mind and its relations to the environment. What we term the assumption of isomorphism is, in effect, Freud's working hypothesis about how the forces of culture and biology are registered and represented in the mental life of the individual. With this hypothesis, Freud claims that we can "read out" from the products of mental life, both introspectable and unconscious, the experience of the individual of the past life of his race, of his own past life, and of the structure of his own mind (endopsychic perception). Of course, proper translation (e.g., 1915, p. 167) is indispensable. One must learn the mode of translating the manifest content into latent content. Thus, from the data provided by an individual patient, or a few patients, Freud attempted to make statements about past and present events or forces in the inner and outer world of the person.

What emerges as of crucial importance in Freud's approach to the study of biology, history, and society in their relation to the mind is the notion of experience, though Freud does not emphasize this particular term. What the psychoanalyst sees is that which the mind, or the person, has experienced of the structure and forces of these different realms, i.e., the meaning of the events to the person. For Freud, in certain respects, it is indeed of secondary interest whether the patient
was actually seduced or experienced (i.e., fantasied) a particular relationship as a seduction. In dealing with reconstructions, particularly on the part of the individual, but even for the past of the race, or the ethnic group, the data with which analyst and patient deal concern the past event as experienced. As for other purposes, however, it is more important to know the "actuality," as well as the way in which it was experienced.

We should like to add that the utility or lack of utility of the isomorphic assumption, and the entailed anthropomorphism, for the understanding of history, anthropology, biology, etc., cannot be ascertained by psychoanalysis. It must be decided by the methodologies appropriate to those several disciplines. However, within psychoanalysis, one must recognize that there is another approach to the study of these realms, in relation to the mind. Thus, we speak, for example, as Erikson (1964) and Hartmann (1947) have, of the different possibilities that historical process and historical change may provide for the mental life of a particular individual. Or one could consider the range of potentialities, capacities, and limitations that biological processes provide for human mental life. It is our conviction that this kind of model is not to be taken either as contradictory or as supplementary to the isomorphic model, but rather that the two models are addressed to different issues.

The isomorphic approach, as seen in Freud, seems to imply causal connections between these other forces, e.g., those of biology and the forces of the mind, via the transferring of similar forms. Thus, the duality of life and death as biological forces "brings about" the duality of instinct in the mental life. It is not the criticism that this approach is teleological that we wish to stress. Rather, we point to its underlying assumption; namely, that these forces have meaning. They exert their influence through their meaning, just as the events of childhood exert their influence through their meaning, that is, as they are experienced by the child.

This model does not account for the mechanism by which actuality acquires meaning. It assumes the equation of repeating and remembering. The model ignores the possibility that the finding of similar forms is a function of the synthetic and creative capacities of the subject or of the observer, who can find personal meanings writ large in the world around him.

In contrast, the kinds of evolutionary and adaptive models proposed by Hartmann and Erikson aim at a causal framework. There one can begin to examine how actuality and impersonal forces enter into the development of the capacities for constructing personal meanings. The assumption of primary autonomous functions as independent variables in experience is one example. These functions account for the way in which the limits of innate psychological capacity may help shape the nature of psychological experience, without their being represented in the content of that experience. Similarly, Erikson's conception of the role of culture stresses the ways in which cultures promote conflicts and offer paths of resolution. This is in contrast to those views emphasizing the transmission of forms and contents from culture to individual.

**MEANING AND CAUSALITY**

We have now examined something of the role of anthropomorphism in theory and indicated, in broad outline, the way in which anthropomorphism comes into a theoretical model of mind. The question then becomes: can we remove the anthropomorphism from psychoanalytic theory either by more careful formulation of psychoanalytic propositions or by a change in terminology? We must be certain that what looks like a more careful formulation is not merely a thinly disguised change of terminology. The most prominent examples in psychoanalytic theory, in fact dating from Freud's earliest writings, of efforts at systematization have invoked physical models. These are couched mainly in hydraulic or electrical or magnetic terminology.
The physical metaphor implies a physical model. It is not empathically evocative in its main intent, so that this lends an impersonal quality to the formulation. The abstractness and utility of formulations will only be illusory, however, unless these formulations can be systematically interrelated and shown to have referents other than the observation metaphorically represented. One such referent, for instance, might be hypotheses regarding the correlation of mental events with neurophysiological organizations. Rubinstein (1965), (1967) discusses in detail the possible referents of psychoanalytic theoretical terms, speaking, however, not of neurophysiological terms, but of "protoneurophysiological" terms. The referents of theoretical concepts need not be only neurophysiological, however. Our search for more basic mechanisms might lead us instead to psychological concepts derivable from psychological research other than psychoanalytic observation, but nonetheless useful in an explanatory way. In addition, other biological and developmental concepts would be very likely necessary to enlarge our view of how meanings are established, elaborated, and maintained.

If a physical model is indeed to be a vehicle for a systematic exploration and exposition in an enlarging of the theory, then it must be more than another evocative metaphor. In discussions of the use of physical models in psychoanalysis the point is often missed that renditions of physical theories in ordinary language represent a rather limited sense of the full force of the physical conception, which is of course to be found in one or more mathematically formulated relationships. It is possible to speak of energy as the "ability to do work." It would then appear that physical energy and psychic energy would have a great deal in common, or be strictly analogous. However, to speak of energy in this sense as "ability" to do work represents an anthropomorphization of the physical concepts, or an attempt to give a simplified and empathically meaningful exposition of a physical notion. The full weight of the physical proposition is carried in mathematical statement. Still another problem, too often neglected, is that any model entails logical consequences in the relationship of its components. In the case of physical models of psychoanalysis, e.g., energy, they do not lead to resolvable or testable hypotheses. In fact, efforts to define further the logical consequences of the acknowledged properties of energy are usually dismissed as taking the model too literally.

Let us now examine the example offered by Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein (1946, p. 16) as a kind of reformulation that removes the impression of anthropomorphism in the theory.

In order to illustrate the vicissitudes of meaning in this area, we select as an example the Freudian sentence: "The Ego presents itself to the Superego as love object." The metaphor expresses the relations of two psychic organizations by comparing it to a love relation between individuals, in which the one is the lover and the other the beloved. However, the sentence expresses an important clinical finding: self-love can easily and does, under certain conditions, substitute for love of another person. Self-love in this formulation indicates that approval of the self by the superego concerns the self in lieu of another person.

We replace the word "ego" in Freud's text by the word "self." We do so since the ego is defined as part of the personality, and since Freud's use of the word is ambiguous. He uses "ego" in reference to a psychic organization and to the whole person. Before we can attempt to reformulate Freud's proposition, it is essential to go one step further. In a more rigorous sense, we find it advisable not to speak of "approval" or "disapproval" by the superego, but simply to speak of different kinds and degrees of tension between the two psychic organizations, according to the presence or absence of conflict between their functions. Approval would be characterized by a diminution of tension; disapproval by its increase.
This reformulation consists of translating the notion of self-approval and self-love, one part of the self approving or loving another part, into the language of degrees of tension between two psychic systems, ego and superego. In a later revision of the paper (1964) the authors substituted a different sentence from Freud for their reformulation in which the ego offers itself to the \textit{id} as a libidinal object. We have not used that latter version because the sentence marking the transition from self-approval to "tension" has been there omitted. That omission makes their argument somewhat less clear.

The advantage of the "tension" formulation is that a proposition of this form can refer to a conflict between two agencies without that conflict necessarily being introspectable. "Tension" becomes a useful low-order explanatory term for phenomena such as self-destructive behavior, where neither conflict nor painful affects (e.g., guilt) are experienced consciously. The language of "tension" provides some "distance" from the data of observation. "Tension" is not simply equated with the affective experience of self-approval or disapproval or any particular affect such as guilt or shame. "Tension" might be equated with a term such as unconscious guilt.

However, the substitution of tension for the clearly anthropomorphic terms of self-love, self-approval, and of the ego being love object of the superego does not seem to be entirely successful. "Tension" in this setting appears to be evocative and not strictly denotative. It is a subtle form of evocation, however, since its use depends on the fact that it refers both to the \textit{experience of} psychological tension and to tension as a physical concept. Note that tension as a physical concept is defined mathematically and that its use otherwise is to a great extent anthropomorphic. Hence, "tension" serves merely as a restatement of the proposition that there is a conflict between two psychic agencies. As such, it is no more or no less metaphorical than the term "conflict." The criteria for "tension" are, as far as can be seen, the same as the criteria for conflict; "degree of tension" cannot be described in terms different from "intensity of conflict." Furthermore, in what terms other than in reference to certain specific clinical observations can we speak of "different kinds and degrees of tension" between the two psychic organizations?

"Tension" along with terms such as "unconscious affects" have their value in organizing the clinical data. Yet they introduce a certain ambiguity. That ambiguity resides in the fact that the theoretical term is modeled upon the conscious experience. Thus, when we refer to "conscious guilt" we make a descriptive statement. "Unconscious guilt" postulates a theoretical entity whose precise relationship to its model in consciousness is not entirely specified. Furthermore, the "tension" formulation does not sufficiently characterize either conscious or unconscious guilt, or differentiate them from one another.

Perhaps another statement of this point of view will be of help. When we substitute terms of superego and ego tensions for terms of love, hate, and guilt, we have specified agents and their interactions. The question now is: can we specify either the nature of the actions or of the agents? When we say that the superego loves the ego, we cannot specify the nature of the love which gives it force as an agent, nor can we specify the nature of that force or tension. We cannot specify the nature of the agents except by their definition in the behavior from which they are inferred in the first place. In contrast, let us take an example of an anthropomorphic expression in chemistry. One commonly says that "acids attack bases" or "acids and bases react with each other and neutralize each other." In these instances, the anthropomorphic expression is a colloquial way of referring to processes which can be specified and characterized at several different levels. The reaction results in a change in readily observable physical properties, by which one could, in fact, define such a term as neutralization. The final mixture is neither sour nor soapy, but may in fact taste salty. In short, it has none of the outstanding physical properties of its antecedents. More
important, from the point of view of building a theory of chemistry, is the fact that we have mathematical expressions to describe the reaction in a conceptual framework of terms such as ions and electrical charges into which this concept of neutralization fits. The quantitative expressions and the concepts of ions are derived from a number of sources other than this one experiment. Further, the "ionic hypothesis" is testable and has implications which lead to entirely new areas of observation beyond the simple class of reactions we have described, namely, neutralization. It is abundantly clear that psychoanalytic theoretical terms such as "neutralization" or "energy" or "cathexis" serve the function of bringing together seemingly diverse clinical phenomena. It is also clear, however, that their function ends when this grouping and classification is complete. One use of these economic terms, as we have suggested, resides in their bridging the gap from experienced intensities of thought and feeling to system language, but one can go no further. This use of terms in both descriptive and theoretical senses has been discussed by Rubinstein (1965). Schafer (1967), in a similar vein, points to the difficulty in distinguishing between the use of terms in a phenomenological versus a systematic sense, e.g., in discussions of the superego. Our discussion would seem to illustrate the way in which theoretical usage may carry over the anthropomorphism in descriptions of experienced conflict by treating the unconscious conflict in the same terms, without giving these terms any other theoretical referent.

The double usage of analytic terms, a usage in fact to which Freud himself pointed in speaking of the descriptive and systemic and dynamic senses of the term "unconscious," corresponds to a number of similar, though not identical, pairs of dichotomous concepts, i.e.,

1. intention and causality
2. phenomenologic and systemic
3. empathy and causality
4. subjective language and objective language
5. person and organism
6. wish and biological need.

In all of these pairs, the left-hand term corresponds to the view from within, i.e., the subjective experience of an agent. The righthand terms correspond to the objective orientation of an observer (cf. Grossman, 1967).

A formulation in phenomenological or subjective terms orders subjective experience, but is logically independent of formulations in which subjective experience is treated objectively. The use of subjective terms in an objective way creates a bridge between two logically independent orders. It then uses the language of subjective experience in two ways. It allows the observer to speak about the subjective experience of the subject as though it were observable. It is a verbal link which attempts to remove the logical separation by definition. The use of the same term in both ways makes this effort an implicit one rather than an explicit one. Furthermore, substituting abstract terms does not accomplish the leap across this logical gap. The only way the abstraction process works is via such bridge concepts which link causal and empathic by definition, and by means of parallelistic assumptions about the nature of the apparatus and the nature of experience, such as we have described in the earlier portion of this paper.
There are several varieties of concepts which speak of subjective experience in objective terms. One group gives a theoretical, or systematic, status to the terms of commonplace experience. "Tension" (see above) is one such example. Others are: libidinal investment, the wish, the system Conscious, narcissism, and the self. Another group of terms such as "depression" and "anxiety" are commonly used both to denote clinical states and subjective experience. These terms create entities by reifying the terms designating the subjective states and their observable concomitants (Sarbin, 1964), (1968). The third type is seen in the concept of "drive," which brings together a quality of subjective experience and a concept of biological functioning. It is clear that the use of any of these bridge terms always requires further specification of the sense in which it is being used. In all of these cases, diverse models of observation, experience, and conceptualization are amalgamated by means of a linguistic device.

Using different terminologies, the issue of these two logically independent realms has been discussed by a number of authors, including Brierley (1951), Grossman (1967), G. S. Klein (1966), (1968), Kohut (1959), Mischel (1964), Meissner (1966), Rycroft (1968), and Sutherland (1963). With still a somewhat different focus, but quite germane to the present issues, Schafer (1968) outlined what he considers two types of theory within psychoanalysis, which he calls the "adaptational" and "dynamic" types of conceptualization. He states that Freud attempted both types of conceptualization, but did not always differentiate and coordinate the two approaches: "Roughly speaking, his evolutionary, adaptational formulations of the psychic apparatus are the ones that tend to be quasi-neurophysiological and mechanistic, and it is his dynamic psychological formulations that tend to be anthropomorphic." Schafer does not necessarily hold to their being logically incompatible, and in fact he argues that each has its value, but "distinguishing one from the other helps one to understand what these authors [Hartmann and Rapaport] and Freud are doing in one context or another" (p. 51). We speak with Schafer of coordinating two types of approach in dealing with two logically independent models of explanation. The only way to use them simultaneously is by coordinating them in their application to the empirical unity of the phenomena under study. For example, in psychophysiological research we work with a notion of covariants, such as the physiological concomitants of a reported experience. The coordination is an empirical activity, which is not equivalent to providing a unitary explanation for experience and physiology. We may try to establish a concordance, or parallelism, which will tell something about correlations. Only some superordinate framework, yet to be discovered, could provide one logical system in which both aspects could be encompassed (cf. Langer, 1967). In current dream research, for example, there is a high correlation between dreaming and rapid eye movement sleep (REMS). However, no greater understanding of the meaning of dreams is derived from the clarification of the REM mechanism. Even the question of the precise nature of the correlation between dreaming and REM sleep remains a matter of controversy. In the psychophysiology of affect, too, perfect correlations are not found between an affective state, as defined physiologically, and the same state as defined experientially.

The question of how to deal with these various contrasting pairs of terms is one which was taken up in the very earliest of Freud's psychoanalytic writings, and even in his neurological writings (1891). In the "Project" (1895), he attempted to conceptualize the transformation of qualities into quantities. In The Interpretation of Dreams he took up the same issue again in relation to the question of how the wish or the intention (psychological functions) arises from the basic biological organization of the infant. In Studies on Hysteria (1893-1895) one can see throughout the work, particularly in the contrast between Breuer's section and Freud's section, the attempt to conceptualize clinical phenomena in both causal and motivational terms. Freud's discussion of the organization of memories and their role in pathogenesis, for example, represents an early formulation of the relationship between causal factors and motivational factors in pathogenesis. In
general, in these early writings, one finds a constant interplay between dynamic, i.e., conflict-defense, formulations of psychological states and physiological, mechanical, and neurological expositions.

The problem of the distinction between the two types of formulation, one in causal terms and the other in intentional terms, permeates virtually every level of the theory, in every stage of its development. It goes beyond questions of whether or not experience can be reduced to neurophysiological terms. We encounter this difficulty whenever we try to distinguish descriptive from systematic usage of terms, or experiential usage from systematic. For example, in 1912, Freud said (p. 264):

*It is by no means impossible for the product of unconscious activity to pierce into consciousness, but a certain amount of exertion is needed for this task. When we try to do it in ourselves, we become aware of a distinct feeling of repulsion which must be overcome, and when we produce it in a patient we get the most unquestionable signs of what we call his resistance to it.*

Thus, there is an experienced feeling of the resistance to making the unconscious conscious. Resistance has an introspectable referent and a theoretical sense as well. This statement quite clearly also implies an introspectable aspect to energy. In fact, the systematic and experiential uses of "energy" and "libido" are not consistently distinguished in Freud's writings. He may speak of "libido" or "cathexis" as equivalent to investment or interest (e.g., 1911, p. 70); (1917, p. 224).

**SUMMARY**

Thus, we have come full circle in our investigation of the role of anthropomorphism in psychoanalytic theory. We began with Freud's assertion that our understanding reaches only as far as our anthropomorphism. We have tried to ascertain in what sense this might be true. Our conclusions are:

1. There is an anthropomorphism in our clinical psychoanalytic theory, which serves a real function in organizing the introspective and experiential clinical data.

2. Those clinical psychoanalytic propositions which are most immediately related to the experiential data of inner conflict are especially dependent on anthropomorphic language. Certain structural propositions are particularly prominent in this respect. However, to the extent that any proposition is modeled on the experience of inner conflict or an inner division, it will tend to be anthropomorphic.

3. It is not necessary to "purge" the clinical theory of anthropomorphic language. Anthropomorphic language is in no way incompatible with systematic study of individual cases, or of groups of cases, or with any number of ways of grouping and organizing clinical observations. Anthropomorphism per se is not "unscientific." It serves a number of useful purposes, including that of inviting empathic participation by the analyst. Its value lies in providing process terms for explanation according to motives. So long as the only processes of which we speak are wishing, intending, and needing, and their defensive counterparts, there is no other language available.

4. The place of anthropomorphic language in higher-order explanatory propositions constitutes a different problem. We expect of such propositions that they begin to explain and place in a larger framework the clinical findings that are stated in the language of wish, intention, and need. From this viewpoint, attempts to eliminate or minimize the anthropomorphism of
metapsychological propositions have not been successful. The various terms intended to replace anthropomorphic terms are deficient in one of several respects, the outstanding ones being:

a. They represent a model based on physical systems, for instance, which has no other set of referents than the clinical data from which they are derived and which they are intended to explain.

b. Some suggested terms, such as "tension," are in fact a kind of hybrid. They still bear the essential characteristics of their anthropomorphic lineage.

5. The major route by which the language of metapsychological propositions has been developed is by the use of "bridge concepts." These are terms which by definition bridge the gap between experience and theory but do not per se solve problems inherent in using two logically different realms of discourse.

6. A study of the place of anthropomorphism in psychoanalytic propositions, then, is of value both clinically and theoretically because it highlights the need to keep separate issues relating to meaning and motive from issues relating to causation.

7. Our approach to anthropomorphism is of assistance in appreciating certain other facets of Freud's thinking, especially his particular use of the study of history, of biology, and of the nature of society. Using anthropomorphic formulations, he constructs a framework in which theories about the nature of history, biology, and society become "isomorphic." Behind the anthropomorphism and "isomorphism" is Freud's aim of expounding how these realms are represented in the mental life of the individual, and particularly how they influence the nexus of meaning and motive, rather than of causality.

8. The distinction between discourse in terms of "meaning and motive" and discourse in terms of "causality" is only partly explained by regarding them as two different languages that describe the same phenomena. Far more important is that each describes fundamentally different sets of data and their related concepts, as exemplified in the distinction between "subjective" and "objective."

9. The contrast between "meaning" and "causality" also points to a major difficulty in developing psychoanalysis as a general psychology. The same problem, however, besets any one psychological approach that attempts to become a general psychology. If psychoanalysis, or any other psychological approach, is to become a comprehensive psychology, there must be some superordinate conception which could encompass both kinds of discourse. Such a schema has yet to be formulated.

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