Freud and Horney: A Study of Psychoanalytic Models via the Analysis of a Controversy

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It has been said (Kris, 1947) that the subject matter of psychoanalysis is "human behavior viewed as conflict." The conflicts are mental conflicts, and the theories of psychoanalysis deal with their nature, origins, and resolutions.

Although controversies about psychoanalytic theory differ in important respects from the intrapsychic conflicts that are its subject, there are close links between the two types of "conflict," as well as some significant similarities. The unconscious conflicts of individual theorists and the latent psychological content of their theories may be the subject of applied analysis, and in some cases, of clinical analysis as well (Abend, 1979; Arlow, 1981). However, the conflicts between theoreticians promote the development of theories and are useful for exploring that development and the properties of the theories.

Contradictions, inconsistencies, vagueness, blatant errors, and prejudice are indicators of unconscious conflict in individuals. The same phenomena in theoretical discourse may also point to unresolved but fundamental problems in the theory (see also Freud, 1971). However, as in any disagreement between people, the acknowledged points of disagreement may not be the only, or most important, conceptual basis of the controversy. In such cases, it is useful to distinguish between manifest and latent theoretical issues, instead of considering the clinically interesting psychological issues. In the controversy between Horney and Freud, female sexuality was the manifest issue through which more fundamental but latent differences of broad theoretical outlook were argued.

Latent theoretical content can vary in its scope and complexity. In a broad sense, there are philosophical conceptions of human beings — assumptions about biological and social aspects of human functioning, about what the theory is supposed to explain, about psychoanalytic treatment as a method of observation, to mention only a few latent issues. In this paper, the "latent contents" under consideration include aspects of those issues and are conveniently discussed as basic models underlying the clinical and developmental theories of psychoanalysis.

The same point may be put in a somewhat different way. If there is a controversy about an aspect of psychoanalytic theory, as there was concerning female sexuality over fifty years ago and again recently, the disagreements can be looked at in a number of different ways. We may ask whether different observations have been made that contradict one theory or are more consistent with another. We may try to discover whether something that was missing before has been added. Sometimes we find that over a period of years, perspectives begin to change, some new ideas emerge, observations are formulated differently. This happened recently in relation to ego psychology and clinical problems of narcissism. The question then arises whether major revision of theory is required, or merely some reorganization and reformulation.

One assumption here is that in Freud's own work there were different kinds of changes: new observations, new ideas, and more elaborate changes from one theory of anxiety to another, one theory of drives to another, and one theory of structure to another. However, given the importance of these changes in both structure and
content, there were more fundamental models — that is, the frameworks or formats for explanation — that did not change.

On the other hand, where major controversies led to schisms, as they did between Freud and Adler, Jung, Horney, and W. Reich, mere modification of content was not the issue. Instead, the basic explanatory structure of the theory was changed. Where this is not the case, the theory can accommodate modification, even when individuals cannot.

This way of looking at theory and at controversy opens the way to a method for examining controversies in psychoanalysis, while clarifying problems in formulating theory. The exploration of the explanatory models in alternative theoretical formulations helps us to see whether the issues involve data or minor modifications in conceptualization, or whether essential assumptions are being altered and matters of fundamental principle discarded. At the same time, the careful exploration of the controversy helps to clarify what is essential to psychoanalytic explanation. In this way, conflicts about psychoanalytic theory during its development reveal how the theory is constructed, just as mental conflict reveals the structure of mind.

The disagreement between Freud and Horney about female sexuality provides a case study in which the topic of female sexuality was the manifest issue. A blend of theoretical, methodological, and emotional differences (Fliegel, 1973), the disagreements appeared to involve matters of fact and interpretation at the clinical and developmental level. However, fundamental principles and explanatory models were the real theoretical issues, initially obscured and "latent." Horney (1939) was eventually explicitly aware of this. She wrote that she had her "first active doubts" about Freud's concepts of psychoanalysis in relation to female sexuality, came to recognize the debatable premises on which this system was built, and arrived at the conviction "that psychoanalysis should outgrow the limitations set by its being an instinctivistic and a genetic psychology" (p. 8). We cannot discard the possibility that an emotional issue about female sexuality initiated a revision of the underlying concepts. That interesting possibility awaits careful historical investigation.

The following discussion concerns, first, a description of some of Freud's models; second, Horney's ideas on female sexuality, and third, the significance of the modifications introduced by Horney, with some aspects of Freud's concepts highlighted.

**FREUD'S MODELS**

The word "model" has been used with varying degrees of precision and concreteness in formulating theories about observable phenomena. I shall use "model" rather loosely to indicate the form or framework of theoretical explanation, a conceptual analogue. In this sense, models indicate possible relationships between observations or elements of a theory. "Models" are here distinguished from "theories," which are bodies of explanation (see Wilson, 1973, for an excellent discussion). On the other hand, models are usefully distinguished from imagery and metaphor, which may be made to serve as models. As Langer (1967) says, "The use of a model belongs to a higher level of conception [than imagery], the level of discursive thought and deliberate analogical reasoning" (p. 63). Langer adds that in illustrating "a principle of construction or functions, quite apart from any semblance" (p. 68), models provide scientific concepts such as psychological research requires.

Looking at psychoanalytic theory construction in terms of how models are used brings us very close to Freud's comments about his own theory building. He described (1915, p. 117) how one needed to use concepts and abstractions taken from outside the field of observation and apply them to the data. (See also Maguire, 1983, on metatheoretical assumptions.) Later Freud said his theories consisted of "analogies, correlations and connections" (1920, p. 60). Analogies are models, often of a simple and concrete kind. For example, Freud used the mystic writing pad to illustrate with a concrete model the problems of consciousness and memory.
Psychoanalysis is a complex theory, which is probably why it has never received an adequate systematic statement. It contains, in fact, a number of models of different range and complexity, some explicit and some implicit. Freud may not have been aware that the models I discuss later, and others, were used at many different levels of theory.

A number of very basic psychoanalytic models were discussed by Rapaport (1951). In keeping with his interest in having psychoanalysis solve the problems of psychology in general, he specified the psychoanalytic models of thinking, motivation, and affects. He showed how a drive-discharge model encompassed both primary and secondary models of all three functions. To these models he added models of psychic structure, hierarchies of motivation, of action, and of relative functional autonomy.

These abstract models of mental functions appear to have held little interest for clinicians. The clinical usefulness of the models, like the usefulness of other abstract metapsychological generalizations, has been widely regarded as doubtful.

In search of a general, clinically applicable model, Gedo and Goldberg (1973) offered an examination of the models for representing psychic structure at different stages of psychological development. They presented a hierarchical, epigenetic model of their own. The clinical application of the new formulation was demonstrated by using it to discuss Freud's published cases.

My interest in Freud's models is not to find an abstract model from which predictions may be made, that is, Rapaport's interest. Nor is it to construct a new model for psychoanalysis, the aim of Gedo and Goldberg. I hope to show that Freud took his models of mental organization from biology and applied the same models both to his more abstract and general theories and to discussions of clinical problems. This contrasts with the usual assumption that Freud used biology only in a reductionistic way.

The Adaptation Model

The most general model that Freud borrowed from biology was an epigenetic-adaptation model (Hartmann, 1939). "Epigenesis," an embryological term, refers to stepwise development and progressive organization, such that the sequence and timing of one stage determines the way the next stage of the embryo develops (see Erikson, 1945; Gedo & Goldberg, 1973; and Maguire, 1983, for discussion). The adaptational aspect of the model was derived from the theory of natural selection in evolution. Its sources were Darwin, Spencer and Jackson (see Ritvo, 1974). The power of this model derives from its being an organismic model of interaction and progressive change in response to inner developments and external forces. Such a model is readily extended to meaningful and purposeful human interaction, as well as to components of mental function. This concept of "interaction" is complex since in it the organism both acts on and is acted on by its environment. Different emphases in the use of the model are possible, depending on whether the organism, mind, ego, or drive is considered to be active or passive in relation to the environment.

This biologically derived framework was the basis for Freud's organizing theoretical principles. He applied it to both phylogenetic and individual development (Rapaport, 1960; Schur & Ritvo, 1970). The importance of conflict in psychoanalytic theory probably stems from this basic model, on which are built the explanations of normal and pathological development, dream formation, and the onset of neurosis. Thus, the idea of interaction, perceived as a "struggle for survival, is reborn as a struggle between repressed and repressing forces when transposed to the mind.

For both physical and mental characteristics, the basic model is of a developing organism with its hereditary traits and its impulses, changing as a result of interaction with its environment. The outcome is a change in constitution, so that the organism and environment interact with one another in a new way, leading to further
change. The essential schema is: internal constitution interacts with external stimulus to produce a new constitution.

For Freud's work, this schema is characteristic of the "vital processes" of civilization and of individual development, as well as of evolution. On the phylogenetic level, the origin of species, including the human species, was the result of such interactions and changes. On the level of civilization, the resolution of primal conflicts led to the origin of the sense of guilt and the superego (Freud, 1930). These two processes in the biological and cultural evolution of mankind constitute the "primaeval period which is comprised in the life of the individual's ancestors" (Freud, 1905, p. 173). They provide the hereditary background for what Freud called "the other primaeval period," childhood. Individual development thus provides another example of this model, in which innate constitution and maturational factors interact with experience. New organizations result, producing new interactions.

An example on the level of intrapsychic processes is dream formation. Schematically simplified, the dream is the product of an unconscious wish interacting with a day residue, an unsolved problem of the dream day. In this example, we can begin to see how the dynamic organism-environment conflict —Darwin's struggle for survival — becomes a conflict between the Unconscious and the Preconscious. The former is the repository of the archaic inheritance, the latter the inner representative of the claims of the environment. The dream content is a compromise formed from the interaction between an infantile wish ("constitution") and the day residue ("environment").

These examples show that for Freud the same dynamic model of Progressive organizations operated from phylogeny to the mental life. In keeping with the evolutionary views he held, there is an implication that the repetitive resolution of such conflicts led to a successive development and complexity in organization.

These broad applications of the basic interaction model to phylogeny and ontogeny are found, in another version, in Freud's views on the etiology of neurosis. Throughout the early writings on hysteria and neurasthenia, Freud was preoccupied with the relative importance of trauma and disposition, accidental factors and heredity, precipitating factors and constitution. For both of the paired polarities of heredity — accidental factors — and disposition — precipitating factors — a "complemental series" could be set up. With a greater internal tendency to neurosis, a less significant trauma would produce illness. With a severe trauma, stronger constitutions with lesser predispositions would succumb. When the hereditary factors were seen as playing the part of disposition to childhood experience, and childhood experience the disposition to neurosis (Freud, 1916–1917), the general models for development in phylogeny, ontogenesis, and psychopathology became identical. As a further consequence of Freud's repeated use of the same model, he could insist that the "normal" and the "neurotic" were similar, rather than absolutely different in kind. He rejected in principle a false antithesis between heredity and environment. With the interaction model, constitution can be expressed only through response to environmental factors and through selecting aspects of environment for response. Environmental factors can operate only through a responsive constitution, selecting the aspects of constitution to be called into play. In this view, behavior, in the broadest sense, is a phenotype generated by the interaction of genotype and environment.

The preceding examples indicate in outline the use of the adaptive interaction model in providing the broad developmental framework of psychoanalysis. In the following discussion, specific developmental concepts illustrate Freud's application of the same model, the same format of explanation, to more restricted aspects of the theory having differing degrees of abstractness, and specificity.

In the libido theory, the component instinctual drives were conceptualized as special kinds of impetus of somatic origin, based on special chemistry and special bodily sensitivities to environmental objects and
satisfactions. Interaction with the caretakers modified the intensity and course of drive satisfaction and frustration, leaving alterations in the drive system in the form of fixations and mental elaborations of infantile experience. The drives were one force, the environment another. The outcome of their conflict in childhood was an altered direction of drive development and a disposition to some version of "normality," to neurosis, or to perversion.

Freud's views on the *latency period* illustrate the wide latitude he allowed for variations and overlapping of phases in an innately organized program of maturation responding to environmental forces. Characteristically, Freud's remarks on latency sometimes emphasized the innate program and sometimes the environmentally produced alterations. Simply stated, latency was a programmed tendency, subject to culture and seduction. It might be partially or totally omitted, with sexual activity continuing until puberty (1916–1917). In this context, seduction meant early stimulation of a drive, interfering with repression and latency.

The development of the *seduction concept* in Freud's work illustrates the conservation of a basic model with changes in the role played by a single concept in the explanation of neurosis. At first, the idea of seduction referred to concrete sexual acts. Freud believed that hysterics invariably had been seduced. Later, he realized that children often had fantasies of being seduced without acts of seduction taking place. Finally, realizing that a mother inevitably stimulated her child in the ordinary course of child care, he recognized the mother as every child's first seducer. The fantasies of seduction were based on universal experiences. The idea of seduction had thus become, in a sense, a general principle of development, as well as referring to concrete acts of molestation.

Even the awakening of the "spontaneous" and "universal" Oedipus complex could be determined by the attraction of the parent to the child (Freud, 1916–1917). It is biological In a special sense: it depends on the early awakening of sexual impulses and the long period of dependence on the parents. Thus, it is biosocial — the social structure meets the biological need; the biological need is awakened by the social structure. The "universality" depends on the "universal" conjunction of the two sets of factors. It follows naturally, for Freud, that the Oedipus complex is the form given by the human family to the conflict between Eros and Thanatos (Freud, 1930, p. 132).

The examples presented — the drive concept, latency, seduction and the Oedipus complex — show that the balanced, interactive, adaptive model entered into psychoanalytic theory in a variety of ways, and at a number of levels, at least in principle. This last qualification is necessary because Freud, at times, would emphasize one side of the constitution-environment pair, and underplay the other. At other-times, he might not mention the adapting agent (ego or person) either. In any case, the four preceding illustrations are also components of Freud's account or a conflict-theory of psychosexual development. A brief discussion of a model, as applied to psychosexual development, will serve as a background against which Horney's ideas may be considered.

Psychosexual development, according to Freud, proceeds as a series of interactions between dispositions and environment, mediated by a developing "ego," the meaning of this term varying during the course of Freud's work. Maturation, physical and mental, contributes to the changing dispositions, but its place in the model was somewhat ambiguous. Since maturation, although influenced by environmental factors, is not determined by them, Hartmann and Kris (1945) introduced the clarifying distinction between maturation and development. In any case, mental conflict was at various times a regulator of the organism-environment conflict, and also its consequence. In other words, within the larger organism/environment-adaptation/conflict model, mental development also proceeds via conflict resolution. The processes of conflict resolution, both interactive and intrapsychic, are for Freud the motor of mental development. Intrapsychic conflict as a broad principle is thus a manifestation of adaptation internalized, and the normal progression from one psychosexual stage to the next is promoted by conflict.
Freud's conception of heterosexual development was built on these ideas. In deriving femininity and female sexuality from a prior series of conflict-determined steps, he was merely following his model, as he did for masculinity. The derivation of vaginal cathexis from the oral and the anal was one part of this process. In the development of the male, there was a parallel in the derivation of the cathexis of the penis from the cathexis of the stool. The clitoral-vaginal transfer concept was another expression of the same developmental conflict model.

Since both masculine and feminine heterosexuality were the outcome of developmental processes, Freud rejected ideas of innate or "primary" masculinity and femininity. The ubiquitous, variegated, polymorphous disposition had been one of the first cornerstones of his sexual theories. He believed, therefore, that both male and female sexuality started with an undifferentiated, bisexual stage and developed out of transformations of orality and anality. Because of Freud's unfortunate manner of expressing himself (as when speaking of the libido as masculine), it often sounds as though he believed in what is often called primary masculinity and secondary femininity. In principle, however, both male and female genital sexuality are endpoints in complex development, based on intrapsychic conflict. The fact that normal psychosexual development takes place in this way in Freud's model accounts, on one hand for the ease with which disorders may occur, and on the other hand, for the close affiliation between normal and pathological phenomena. This basic model of Freud's was unacceptable to Karen Horney, who objected to the idea that normal femininity arose from conflict. Her approach to this problem is the subject of the next section.

HORNEY'S CONTRIBUTION

Karen Horney's (1967) contributions to the psychoanalytic study of feminine psychology have gained increasing favor in psychoanalytic circles. While certainly not neglected by so-called neo-Freudian schools, her elaboration of a culturally oriented viewpoint and her break with the New York Psychoanalytic Society in the early 1940s led many analysts subsequently to ignore her work. At the present time, her work is often either exploited or rejected (Blum, 1976) as culturalist. At the same time, some psychoanalytic authors (Barnett, 1968; Kestenberg, 1968; Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1976) are returning to her ideas about the discovery and denial of the vagina in childhood, the boy's feeling of inferiority with his mother, and her critique of Freud's phallocentric bias.

Even a casual review of Horney's papers on *Feminine Psychology* reveals her gifts as a clinician and theoretician. Her feminist critique of psychoanalysis and of the influence of male-oriented culture on feminine mental life is the source, often unacknowledged, of some of today's most cogent feminist writings. Her early papers are especially impressive in this respect, since Horney knew, as well, how to defend psychoanalysis against trivial and ill-informed criticism. It is important, therefore, to be precise about the real theoretical differences between Freud and Horney, and whether accepting her observations necessitates accepting her theory.

A number of Horney's clinical ideas fit comfortably into our current perspective. She emphasized the need for a careful analysis of the patient's current conflicts and their context, as we expect in an ego-psychological clinical approach. Avoiding reductionism of the clinical data to primitive impulses, she emphasized the object-related aspects of instinctual conflict. It was this orientation to penis envy and the castration complex that produced her derivation of clinically observed penis envy from Oedipal disappointment. She believed that the penis envy observed in analysis arose from the disappointment of the girl's intense attachment to her father. Freud, however, had suggested a preoedipal beginning in the girl's first genital comparison. Horney recognized, as well, that the mother's attitude toward femininity would act as a bridge between social views of women and the young girl's "wounded womanhood." Realizing that reconstructions of normal childhood from psychoanalytic data might be uncertain, she advocated the psychoanalytically oriented observation of normal children and the children of other cultures. Horney's clinical and theoretical analysis of masochism, as well as of
Horney's essay on the castration complex in women (1967[1922]) noted the prevalent axiom that females feel at a disadvantage because of their genitals. This fact, she suggested, had not seemed to require an explanation because, to masculine narcissism, the reason is self-evident. She found questionable the idea that one half of the human race can overcome its discontent with its assigned sex only in favorable circumstances. This was "unsatisfying" to female narcissism and to biological science, she said.

Horney went on to explain why penis envy seemed to be a typical occurrence. She stated that the little girl's sense of inferiority is not "primary" — a term that seems to mean something like "spontaneous," "innate," or "without a cause." The girl is suffering from a real disadvantage in the gratification of her pregenital impulses. The little boy can handle, look at, and exhibit his penis. Owing to the high narcissistic value placed on urination, penis envy is an "almost inevitable phenomenon" in the life of girls and "one that cannot but complicate female development (1967, p. 42)." She added that the prospect of motherhood could be no real consolation at the time of such pregenital issues.

The next question was whether penis envy was the "ultimate force" behind the castration complex. To be considered were the factors determining whether penis envy was "more or less successfully overcome or whether it becomes regressively reinforced so that fixation occurs (1967, p. 42)." This led Horney to examine the girl's object relations, particularly her Oedipus complex, more closely. She concluded that the girl could overcome penis envy without detriment by passing from the autoerotic desire for a penis to the desire for a man, her father, via identification with her mother. She referred to these as spontaneously occurring "womanly and maternal" developments. On the basis of either a hostile or a loving identification with her mother, the girl's fantasy of sexual possession by the father emerged. The inevitable disappointment of this wishful fantasy gave rise to the clinical manifestations of the castration complex. The intense love relationship with the father would give way to an identification with him and to a rejection of femininity- The girl's earlier envy of her mother's possession of children now reinforced with its own intensity the reactivated wish for a penis.

Whereas feelings of guilt were aroused by the incestuous attachment, angry and vengeful fantasies resulted from the disappointment. Rape fantasies and fantasies of damage and castration then represented the love relationship with the father. In short, according to Horney, the castration complex and the clinically observed penis envy were the product of "wounded womanhood." Penis envy is more easily exposed, she believed, because it is without the guilt that is attached to the more deeply repressed fantasy of castration in a sexual act with the father.

Horney's formulations had a number of virtues. Based on clinical evidence, her explanation undercut the temptation to explain the adult symptom as simply the persistence or reactivation of its earliest infantile counterpart. That is, the clinical evidence of the castration complex was to be understood instead as a reaction to the failure of feminine strivings. In keeping with the best psychoanalytic tradition, she said that the reactivated infantile representation bore the marks of the stages from which regression had occurred. Second, this formulation took cognizance of the role of the preoedipal relation to the mother, albeit in rudimentary form. Moreover, it provided an explanation for the girl's change of objects from mother to father. One further virtue of Horney's approach did much to enhance its appeal without adding to its clinical or theoretical value: it offered a "naturally" feminine line of development, in contrast to those views that seemed to regard feminine development principally as failed masculinity. This seemed like a desirable way to correct a male bias in developmental theory. Later, basing her thoughts on the work of the philosopher Georg Simmel, Horney elaborated the thesis that the male view of women permeates our theories of development and that social devaluation of women leads to the rejection of womanhood. As a further consequence, she said, we tend to
regard the boy's development as straightforward and the girl's as a divergent one. *The contrast of straightforward and divergent developments is a distortion in the interpretation of theory, although a frequent one.*

Horney's illuminating and provocative work was influential in forming the background for Jones' (1927, 1933, 1935) later criticism of the theory of the phallic phase. The idea of a "phallic phase" in girls had been tied to the problem of penis envy and the castration complex. The sense of these concepts seemed contaminated by bias. Although Horney's first paper on the castration complex had been presented prior to Deutsch's (1925) contribution and Freud's "Infantile Genital Organization" (1923) and "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" (1925), Horney's work was not directly discussed by either Deutsch or Freud. As Fliegel (1973) suggests, Freud's (1925) paper seems so closely related that it may well have been an answer to Horney.

For instance, Horney (1967, p. 43) insisted that a girl's intense attachment to her father precedes penis envy. Freud begins his discussions with the observation that in women with strong attachments to their fathers there is a long prehistory to the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1925) and an earlier intense attachment to their mothers (Freud, 1931). Where Horney derived penis envy from the Oedipus complex, Freud derived the Oedipus complex from penis envy. Where Horney emphasized the girl's early identification with her mother, Freud stressed the early object libidinal impulses. A case might be made as well for the idea that Freud's paper on the phallic phase in 1923 was prompted by Horney's paper on the castration complex, too.

In respect to its descriptive content, Horney's paper on the castration complex is no longer remarkable. Penis envy, elaborately described Oedipal fantasies, regressive derivatives, such as rape fantasies, inhibition of masturbation, wish for a child based on identification with the mother, all are long familiar to any clinician. However, her formulations of specific clinical propositions, or the findings of particular fantasies, or even developmental sequences are not the concern of my presentation. In themselves, these ideas were never seriously challenged. They can be fitted into a variety of frameworks and models. Even the developmental sequence that Horney suggested was not contested. As Fliegel (1973) said, both Freud and Horney agreed on the sequence penis envy/Oedipus complex/regression to castration complex. The critical difference, the fulcrum of the disagreement between Freud and Horney, and subsequently between Freud and Jones, was the relative importance of the *first* observation of the genital difference as a causal factor in later developments.

The outline and criticisms of Freud's schema of feminine development are so well known that I shall not repeat them. The essential point was that for Freud the discovery of the genital difference initiated the psychological differentiation into masculinity and femininity. The reaction of children to this discovery had a special significance. Penis *envy* and penis *wish* were motivating forces in development that could *promote* femininity by turning the girl away from her libidinal attachments to her mother. This would initiate her Oedipus complex. As Freud was to say later, the castration complex promotes femininity in both males and females. It was an economical explanation and retained a certain consistency in its formulation of masculine and feminine development.

For Horney, the essential elements of Freud's formulations that were biased and unacceptable were bisexuality, "primary penis envy" as a motive, the "secondary" derivation of the Oedipus Complex, that is, of heterosexuality, and the idea that the vagina was unknown to both sexes. An associated disagreement seemed to be the weight given to narcissistic injury in feminine development. In her subsequent papers on women, Horney also described some aspects of male development. She offered a different viewpoint, owing to her recognition that the feminine wishes of boys had been examined in relation to their fathers, but not as an expression of their attitudes towards women.
Although it would be useful to examine the details of various formulations in her papers on female sexuality, I shall discuss only what Horney modified, her methods of analysis, and some of her assumptions. By doing so, we can see how an apparent difference of emphasis contains the seeds of a different theory. Although the modifications themselves need not necessarily have produced new theory, historically they did so.

In Horney's formulations, bisexuality was replaced by a concept of "primary heterosexuality" leading to the girl's oedipal orientation. Horney could still say, in 1967 (p. 43) that one origin of this "womanly and maternal development" was narcissistic in character, the goal being possession of the father or a child from him. This formulation retained the elements of Freud's (1917) account of these events, but decisively subordinated them to the maternal identification.

Discarding the concept of bisexuality was a most important step for Horney. It had two effects: It introduced a concept of primary biological femininity, and it initiated her rejection of the genetic point of view. Bisexuality, as Freud and others wrote of it, was often treated as though it really meant "primary masculinity." Those associated with Freud's formulations wrote that the girl gives up her "masculinity" and acquires passive aims.

The idea that acquiring passive aims is to be equated with giving up "masculinity" reflects the tendency to regard clitoral masturbation and the active aims of the early phallic phase as "masculine." Freud did not consistently avoid this pitfall, despite his recognition that activity and passivity could not simply be equated with masculinity and femininity, respectively, nor could passive aims be equated with passivity. However, these confusions are a part of childhood fantasy. The confusions of childhood became the problems of theory. Since "bisexuality" was the conceptual means for treating the girl's early development as masculine, it was contaminated for Horney, who discarded it.

In place of bisexuality, Horney suggested that the attraction between the sexes was an "elementary principle of nature" and a "primal, biological principle" (1967, p. 68). She also spoke of an "innate instinctual wish to receive from the man" (p. 111, also p. 142). This biological perspective was expressed, as well, in the belief that the boy "instinctively divines the existence" of the vagina, while "the girl's incestuous wishes are referred to the vagina with the unerring accuracy of the unconscious" (pp. 65–66).

Having argued for the primal nature of heterosexual attraction, Horney proceeded to base penis envy on this attraction. It is the attraction to the opposite sex that draws attention to the penis, she said. The interest is libidinal, autoerotic, and narcissistic, and is the first manifestation of the "mysterious attraction." She spoke of it as "partial love" and added that the libidinal desire for the penis and the narcissistic wish to possess it are often difficult to distinguish clinically in the associations of women. In this way, both primary penis envy and the castration complex were derived from primary feminine heterosexuality. The other side of this biological determinism of feminine impulses is the social determinism of male society as the antagonistic generator of neurosis. Freud (1937) was to say, "The repudiation of femininity can be nothing else than a biological fact" (p.252). Horney might have said instead, "The repudiation of natural femininity is a masculine social fact."

Following Freud's implied rebuttal to her first paper, Horney offered a more deliberate critique and reversal of Freud's views. Throughout, she used Freud's own phrases, ironically reversing their application. Where he attributed an attitude to one sex, Horney attributed it to the other. Examples of this technique will be recognized in the following discussion.

Since primary heterosexuality, not penis envy, turned the girl to her father, the castration complex was a "secondary formation" — the same expression Freud (1925) had used in describing the Oedipus complex. Although Horney later argued that the Oedipus complex was a culturally determined phenomenon, she accepted as
instinctive (based on tensions and organ sensations) the boy's knowledge that "his penis is much too small for his mother's genital" (1967, p. 142).

The postulation of heterosexual impulses, and of the unconscious knowledge of both the vagina and of sexual relations, now led Horney to two other reversals of the Freudian position. The first was that neither the sight of the father's penis and of the mother's genitals nor the intellectual knowledge of their existence is necessary for the "psychological consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes" to take effect. In this respect, the environmentalist discounts the importance of experience for the acquisition of knowledge.

For her next reversal of Freud, however, the actuality of the small genitals of the boy and the girl is the essence. The girl's knowledge that "her genital is too small for her father's penis . . . makes her react to her own genital wishes with direct anxiety . . . [The boy, knowing that] . . . his penis is much too small for his mother's genital . . . reacts with the dread of his own inadequacy . . ." (Horney, 1967, p. 142). In consequence, genital anxiety is primary in the girl and genital inadequacy is primary in the boy, the reverse of Freud's view. The "wound to his self-regard" may lead to the boy's disgust with the male role. The boy withdraws his libido from his mother and "concentrates it on himself and his genital." This is, then, Horney's derivation of the phallic phase, an intensification of phallic narcissism. The boy is left with a "narcissistic scar" and a denial of the vagina. For Horney, the fact that this phase is narcissistic implies an earlier object orientation (p. 139) and an anxious retreat from it. (p. 144)

Two other reversals follow from this. First, the feelings of inferiority in the girl are secondary to her escape into the "fiction of maleness" (p. 67) and her castration fantasies derive from this defensive position, as well. The second reversal is that the castration anxiety of the boy is secondary to his anger at being frustrated, the wound to his self-regard, and his compensatory wish to be a woman. Horney remarked that analysis with a woman analyst brings out the man's fear of being rejected and derided. "The specific basis of this attitude is hard to detect, because in analysis it is generally concealed by a (unconscious) feminine orientation ..." (1967, p. 144).

Horney's reevaluation of female sexuality had led her to the view that Freud's and Abraham's formulations — and later those of Deutsch and others — had created a male-biased theory, specifically, that it was a male view of women and that it was defensive. She therefore reversed the point of view and treated as defensive those attitudes that had been considered primary by Freud, and the reverse. In doing so, she called attention to features of both masculine and feminine conflicts that had been neglected.

Her interpretations point to a wider range of variations in the development, fantasies, and conflicts of both women and men. Unfortunately, her ideas were presented as a reversed theoretical alternative rather than as a supplement. Her point of view and Freud's both became fixed as they polarized.

Horney freely admitted a number of times that some of her reconstructions were conjecture. However, she had made the point and demonstrated that initial assumptions different from Freud's could alter the reconstruction of childhood from clinical data. She saw, as well, that the reconstruction of normal childhood from analyses of neurotics had problems of its own. She thought that the way to solve these problems was to observe normal children and other cultures. However, having correctly perceived that the basic Freudian conception of psychobiology and developmental conflict had been misused, she tried to overcome the difficulty by a misapprehension of her own. She went on to set up the dichotomy of culture on the one side, and anatomical, physiological, personal, and psychic development on the other. Her explanations tended to take a form that pitted natural impulses against culture. Where Freud and others had tried, at times, to make intrapsychic development a simple rationalization of biologic necessity, Horney made personal development an expression of natural growth blocked by culture. The same current can be shown to be a subsidiary one in Freud's work. It is also present in the work of others, notably Wilhelm Reich. Both Reich and Horney
emphasized the "blockage" of naturally healthy impulses by the culture, although their conceptions of "natural" impulses were different from one another's and from Freud's. For Horney, the biological premises I have noted led her to minimize the importance of sexuality as a motive and to see aggression as a response only to frustration. As in a variety of post-Freudian schools, the rejections of biological factors, of infantile sexuality and the genetic approach go together — as a matter, not of theoretical necessity, but of history.

**DISCUSSION**

The models and formulations of Freud and Horney deserve a far more detailed comparison and analysis than is possible here. The outstanding aspect is their radically different conceptions of development. For Freud, normality needed to be explained because it was guaranteed neither by nature nor culture. Heterosexuality was not guaranteed by phylogenesis, but had to be achieved by each individual in the course of development via intrapsychic conflict. Both normal and pathological development were possible outcomes of typical developmental conflicts. Drives, ego factors, and environmental events contributed to the instigation and resolution of mental conflict. The genetic approach documents the unfolding and resolution of conflicts throughout development. For Freud (1930), a psychoanalytic explanation is genetic.

The genetic approach in psychoanalysis is easily, and often unwittingly, evaded by developmental approaches in which child behavior, the events of childhood, or biological and social forces are substituted for mental conflict and its resolution as the generator of mental development. Freud easily slipped, for instance, from speaking about sexual fantasies to speaking of the biological forces propelling them, as though they were identical or otherwise interchangeable. In his best moments, he could be very clear about the distinction.

Only a part of Horney's criticisms offered a challenge to the basic Freudian model presented earlier. Where she reversed the formulations for males and females, the model itself is unchanged. All that has taken place is a kind of role reversal. That is, the males have narcissistic injury before castration anxiety, and the women, anxiety before narcissistic injury, instead of the reverse, as Freud had said. The decision between the two formulations must rest on observation, provided that there is agreement on the conceptual framework and on the observations to be considered relevant.

On the other hand, Horney's insistence on primary feminine impulses as the main motivating force was the beginning of her abandonment of the epigenetic model and the genetic point of view. Primary femininity and the unconscious, inborn knowledge of the genital difference and function made heterosexuality a matter of phylogenetic inheritance. In this way, she could bypass the psychological mechanisms that, for Freud, constituted a kind of recapitulation of phylogenetic sexual differentiation ("the great riddle of sex") in the life of each individual.

Although an epigenetic model could be constructed including some kind of "primary" masculinity and femininity, Horney had other objectives. In the first place, she wanted to refute the designation of the earlier phases as "masculine." Second, she began to develop a new perspective based on Simmel's ideas. This led her to emphasize the influence of ideology permeating society, affecting psychological development from birth.

In Freud's conceptualization of his developmental model, phallic narcissism played an important part and provided motivational force in normal development. At the same time, narcissistic injury could play a role in both normal and pathological development, providing for the closeness of the normal and abnormal. Both Horney (1967) and Jones (1927, 1933), however, argued that the phallic phase was not a developmental phase, because they considered narcissistic defenses and conflict to be evidence of pathology. Horney went still further, attacking Freud's idea that the normal and the pathological were not sharply distinguished. To both Horney and Jones, it seemed implausible that nature would accomplish its purpose of creating femininity by means of penis envy. The idea that femininity should depend on the sight of a penis, or that nature would entrust
the development of femininity to a "chance occurrence" seemed absurd. Jones appears to have mistaken some conventional idea of femininity based on behavior, anatomy and physiology for a psychosexual concept. From a psychosexual, psychoanalytic perspective on gender, a person's ideas about femininity necessarily include an idea of some masculine counterpart, and the reverse. That is, mental representations of gender depend on comparisons between the sexes.

To Horney, the difficulty women had with being feminine needed an explanation. That is, being satisfied with femininity would seem "natural" and being dissatisfied "unnatural" — and therefore in need of explanation. The answer, provided by her sociopolitical critique, was that culture could interfere with natural and spontaneous heterosexuality by the devaluation of women. However, the idea that the cultural devaluation of women contributes to women's conflicts with their femininity fits easily into the Freudian model. Horney's reasons for changing the entire model must go unexplored here, but they seem to be related to her ideas about health and pathology. Possibly her reasons were of a more personal nature as well.

As we have seen, Freud, Horney, and Jones differed on the role of narcissism as a normal factor in the sexual development of boys and girls. Horney added that the important role assigned to penis envy in the psychoanalytic formulations of female sexuality was itself an affront to feminine narcissism, an opinion widely echoed in recent feminist critiques of psychoanalysis. This aspect of the controversy draws our attention to the role of narcissism in both theory formation and in gender development.

Both Horney and Jones pointed to biology to support the idea that both masculinity and femininity develop along independent, "natural" lines, rather than one differentiating from the other. Today too the contributions of various factors to the development of gender differences, beginning early in infancy, are taken to support the idea of "primary" masculinity and femininity.

Much of what is called "primary femininity" (Stoller, 1976) today involves the narcissistically invested aspects of biological, social, and psychological makeup that are readily observable outwardly and are conventionally recognized. The psychoanalytic contribution to the study of gender, however, has been the exploration of fantasies revealing the meaning of these differences throughout development. From this point of view, the narcissistic value of these characteristics distinguishing the is of particular interest to a psychoanalytic understanding of gender.

Freud considered the narcissistic investment of the genitals the cornerstone of gender development beginning with the recognition of the anatomical distinction. However, the infantile mental life already recognizes other differences between people before the difference of the genitals attains significance. The narcissistic value placed on masculinity and femininity would therefore seem to be a stage in the transformation of the narcissism attached to all kinds of differences throughout development. In this case, it is a "narcissism of not-so-small differences," to paraphrase Freud.

This important step elaborates the meanings attached to differences recognized earlier in development in association with the differentiation of self and object. We have here a counterpart to the transformations of anal fantasies into those of "the infantile genital organization" (Freud, 1916-17, 1971, 1933). The "anatomical distinction between the sexes," once recognized, derives some of its significance from the conflicts that have marked the child's other struggles with the differences between itself and others. Freud noted a kind of re-editing process in development when he wrote that the classification "active" and "passive" in the anal stage looks, from the viewpoint of the genital stage, like masculinity and femininity. In a similar way, we may suppose that the values attaching to differences between self and other, such as big and small, clean and dirty, are assimilated to the meaning of the genital difference. Children's traits that the observing adults conventionally
regard as masculine and feminine take on that meaning and an associated narcissistic value for the child and seem to play a role, as well, in adult antagonisms between the sexes.

In practice, we know that the transformations of pregenital into genital fantasies are achieved slowly and usually incompletely. Instead of this transformation that accompanies optimal oedipal resolution, we often see displacements of pregenital fantasies onto manifestly genital and heterosexual behavior. Similarly, the transformation of narcissism attaching to all kinds of differences is generally incomplete and is reflected in gender stereotypes and other social stereotypes. It is not the process of generalization that points to the persistence of the more primitive attitude towards differences, but rather the stereotyping of the values attached to differences. The fact that masculinity and femininity are generally discussed in terms of paired opposite traits similarly betrays the origin of such classification schemes. Freud's triads of subject-active-masculine and object-passive-feminine is an example of dichotomous grouping that has psychological reality for many people. However, examination of the biology of sex and the psychology and behavior of gender reveals differences rather than opposites.

Our patients' conflicts concerning gender often take the form of treating sexual differences as opposition or of denying differences or their significance. The denial of differences is intended to ward off the potential narcissistic injury of "classification by opposites," which so easily becomes pride or stigma, good or bad, superior or inferior and so on. These dichotomies are important, of course, in the establishment of identity. Their importance for the security of gender identity probably contributes to the persistence of the narcissism attached to sexual differences in our patients, in our theories, and in society at large.

CONCLUSION

Horney's earliest papers on female sexuality were offered as elaborations and corrections of particular ideas on female sexuality and retained, or at least did not openly challenge, the basic model. Soon, however, her criticism became much more extensive. In the end, she systematically rejected a number of basic principles, along with the model discussed, and formulated the theories for which she became famous.

Just as female sexuality is a special case of broader problems of psychoanalytic theory, the controversy between Freud and Horney illustrates how the examination of controversy can increase understanding of basic models. By the choice of a critical moment in the development of psychoanalysis, a point of conflict and divergence in the history of psychoanalytic thought, aspects of the theory are revealed that might not be evident otherwise. Thus, while the subject of the paper has been female sexuality as seen by Horney and Freud, the central issue is: What is essential to psychoanalytic theory? The method of examining a critical moment of controversy, or change, as a prototype has more general applicability and can be used to examine the development of Freud's thought as well. The important point is that the outcome of controversies, and the integration of new ideas and observations into a theory, may depend on how well basic concepts and models are understood. Often controversies and, therefore, the history of psychoanalysis are a blend of theoretical, methodological, and emotional differences. Differences of opinion that appear to involve matters of fact or interpretation may instead be based on entirely different fundamental principles and explanatory models. Such, I believe, was the case of Freud and Horney.

If this controversy led Horney to the formulation of a new theory, what did it do for Freudian theory? One answer is that it revealed a tendency among Horney's contemporaries to be inconsistent in their application of psychological principles in preference to biological explanations, to take too simplified a view of masculine development, and to take for granted that the dissatisfaction of women with their lot was inevitable. Her recourse to sociocultural explanation pointed to the need for a more comprehensive formulation of the way sociocultural factors are involved in intrapsychic conflict. In this way, Horney's critique has led to the enlargement and enrichment of Freudian theory and the fuller realization of the potential embodied in its basic models.
REFERENCES

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