DEDICATION

The occasion of a Hartmann Lecture, the last of the century, led me to some reflections on Hartmann’s place in the history of psychoanalysis, as a way of thinking about the history of psychoanalytic ideas. Lester Schwartz, my friend since the time of my residency in psychiatry, had a lively and sensitive interest in various aspects of the history of psychoanalysis. He encouraged me to write this elaboration and continuation of an earlier paper, and I am pleased to offer it in this volume honoring his memory. Lester was a good friend and a good teacher to many people, contributing in many personal and professional ways to the life of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and Society.

INTRODUCTION

Heinz Hartmann contributed to and stimulated changes in psychoanalytic thought in a century that has changed the way people think about the mind and its creations. The range of his ideas touched most of the important issues in psychoanalysis in his time, gaining supporters and opponents at the mid-point of the century, leading to productive assent and disagreement. His impact, along with changes in the sciences and the humanities, has helped to inspire both an evolution and a diversity in the ways analysts view analysis.

1 This paper was presented in a somewhat different version as The Heinz Hartmann Award Lecture 26 Oct 99.

Parts of the paper have been modified from Grossman (2000). The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Roy Schafer for his many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
In discussing Hartmann’s place in the evolution of analytic ideas, I will not be trying to review all of Hartmann’s contributions and their value, flaws and liabilities. Three remarkable papers by Roy Schafer (1970, 1992, 1997) review Hartmann’s development of ego psychology and its subsequent vicissitudes. Martin Bergmann’s paper on the “Hartmann Era” (Bergmann, 2000) offers a perspective on the intellectual and personal relationships of Hartmann and some of his contemporaries.

The extent and variety of the modifications in psychoanalytic thinking and the discourse among analysts seem to me to make the discussion of psychoanalytic history a matter of great importance. Although I believe that social forces, such as World War II and social pressures on practice, have affected the way psychoanalytic ideas have developed, I will be considering Hartmann particularly in relation to diverse points of view in our field, and in its contact with influences in other disciplines. This discussion of some selected issues in Hartmann’s work serves as an illustration of the way psychoanalytic ideas evolve, and how we may approach their history. I shall talk about Hartmann’s ideas of primary and secondary ego autonomy and adaptation as concepts used to build bridges between different ways of thinking. I shall point out some other ways that he was concerned with integrating different kinds of ideas. His efforts involved examining the connections between theory and technique, between science and hermeneutics, between psychoanalysis and other fields studying mental function, and between ego-psychology and other psychoanalytic viewpoints. These issues are related by their common involvement in conflicts of different ways of thinking as factors promoting the evolution of ideas in our field.
COMMENTS ON THE VALUE OF CONSIDERING THE HISTORY OF IDEAS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

First, why should we discuss history in psychoanalysis? Freud (1929) pointed out that the stories various religions tell about their origins are a part of the systems of belief. Our accounts of psychoanalytic history, too, are a way of expressing our beliefs, and various versions are often arguments to support or reject the introduction of innovations. Consequently, multiple and competing revisions in theory and technique have generated many versions of the way the ideas in the field have developed.

Often, old ideas and formulations are forgotten and rediscovered. In the same way, every clinical analyst has had the experience of rediscovering interpretations made and forgotten. Sometimes, in both cases, this rediscovery takes place through a belated recognition of the implications of old ideas, but the relationship of ideas and implications is often not recognized.

I am suggesting that we look at analytic history in a psychoanalytic way. This means considering ideas in the perspectives of their time as well as in ours. The contexts of psychoanalytic ideas have always been contexts of controversy among analysts. Considering these controversies helps to examine psychoanalytic ideas from a number of different perspectives that are supplementary as well as competing (see Grossman, 1976, 1986). Since this is an important part of clarifying and refining our ideas, we need multiple readings of both present and past formulations of psychoanalytic theories. We need readings at different times as perspectives and controversies change. In this way, we can confront the origins of our ideas in a new way so that we can be more
aware of how our own points of view are context-bound. Without these multiple historical readings, discussions of contributions and limitations of important thinkers are confusing and contradictory. Are they mired in their pasts, carrying over outmoded ideas, or are they instead totally divorced from their origins? Freud is either stuck in 19th century neurology or has a purely psychological theory. Hartmann has subtly abandoned Freudian thought, or has added nothing new. Of course, they were both innovators in their times, and as such people usually are, they were absorbed in and responded to the knowledge of the time, transforming that knowledge in any of a number of ways.

Just as Freud can be seen as standing in both the old and the new, his innovations built on persisting older ways of thinking, this is Hartmann’s relationship to Freud. It is also the relationship of present day writers to both of them. When we read Freud today, we do so in a way that is influenced by our own reading of Hartmann, or through the influence of other people who have read Freud under or in opposition to Hartmann’s influence. This dual position of the successor as transmitter of the old as well as the new builds conflict into the creation of new ideas. In one perspective, the implications of the new ideas may contain hidden residues of or references to the old ideas and then may be unrecognized or unacknowledged responses to the old ways of thinking. This is one kind of interplay of different ways of thinking that I allude to in the title of my paper. In the case of Freud, Hartmann and us, we span a century of psychoanalysis which began with Freud’s interdisciplinary orientation, with Hartmann in the middle of the century developing his interdisciplinary framework, while today this interdisciplinary orientation has taken form in
the New York Psychoanalytic Institute as a Center for Neuropsychoanalysis.

A WAY OF THINKING ABOUT CHANGING IDEAS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

The development of ideas through controversy, as I’ve described it, is intended to highlight similarities in the evolution of ideas in individual development, in psychoanalytic process, in group thinking, in theory formation, and in the development of various fields of knowledge. It is useful to describe the development of ideas in these areas similarly, even though the means by which ideas change in each field is unique. In all of these areas, we can follow the freudian model in which infantile modes of thought, however characterized, are transformed by their interaction with systems of language, ideas and fantasies of an adult world. This is a context of conflict and adaptation in Hartmann’s sense of interaction with an environment in which either or both individual and environment may be changed.

Our psychoanalytic picture of mental development is one of continuous change in which the old is retained, sometimes unchanged, sometimes appearing in new forms of expression, sometimes transformed into something new. We are always open to the possibility that the original and its various modifications persist alongside the transformations.
One consequence is that change involves giving new meaning to old terms through uncovering unrecognized implications, supplying new meaning through new uses added to old, adding new terms to cover some part of the old, retained terms. Understanding changes in ideas sometimes requires return to the history of the term to discover its range.

In psychoanalysis, the changes come about by means of changing procedures and changing descriptions of them. Where do the descriptions come from? This is where the interplay of different ways of thinking and different kinds of thought come in. Freud (1915) said that scientific activity does not begin with ideas based on observation alone, but with ideas taken from other sources. He was speaking at that time of his need to borrow the drive concept from biology. He had used the model of mind he worked out in relation to aphasia and the brain joined to mind-body relationships considered in the study of hysteria and sex. His ideas about the ego were taken from his contemporaries in psychiatry, neurology and philosophy. In all cases, he both retained some features of the old concepts while adding to their range and significance. Hartmann introduced biological and at times sociological ideas into the study of the ego. In other words, other areas of study have offered new terminology and models for the interpretation or modification of psychoanalytic concepts. Later, I shall say more about additional sources of the analyst’s ideas.

Freud’s usage of the term “das Ich” to include what we would refer to as both a system and self was the conventional usage of the time, as was it’s
translation into self or ego as occasion seemed to require. Freud’s pre-analytic contemporaries as well as early analysts were apparently not concerned about the mixing of levels because it was assumed that the agency ego was the organization underlying the experience of self. With the elaboration of the picture of the mental apparatus, an expanded consideration of mental representation and the ego-psychological consideration of psychoses, the distinction between self and ego became clinically and theoretically important. The conflict between ego-psychology and self-psychology intensified the significance of the distinction between ego and self. However, Hartmann recognized that the self/ego distinction was important when he examined the contrast between the scientific and the phenomenological orientations to psychology early in his career.

HARTMANN ON THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH: ITS RELEVANCE TODAY

The recent debates placing the hermeneutic and the scientific views of psychoanalysis in opposition are the heir to a longstanding controversy in psychiatry. Dilthey, a spokesman for the phenomenological school of “understanding psychology” offered one version of the challenge to the scientific claims of psychology to explain mind. He said: “We explain nature, but we understand the mind.” In a
discussion of these issues in 1927, Hartmann (1964) quoted this comment and challenged the sharp distinction being drawn between “natural and mental events”. He asserted that, as a natural science, psychology studies mental processes and the laws regulating mental activity. Psychoanalysis explains and constructs hypotheses. Phenomenological research is only one, but essential, condition for fulfilling this task (Hartmann, 1964, pp. 173-174).

Hartmann’s critics overlook the fact that Hartmann was rejecting the dichotomy of scientific and hermeneutic/phenomenological. Instead, he was including the latter as a part of what was to be treated scientifically. His view of psychoanalysis was, therefore, inclusive in a special way.

The conflict between the biological and the humanistic constructions of psychiatry and psychoanalysis is another version of the same fundamental issue. Not long after Hartmann’s response to Dilthey, Binswanger (1936) offered a critique of the biological foundations of Freud’s theories. He recognized the importance of Freud’s aphasia book (1891) for the development of Freud’s theories, and was aware that biological concepts of development have a historical dimension, too. However, he thought that Freud reduced the existential dimension in human experience to biological origins. In his view, the
theory reduced the ego to mechanism, depersonalizing man. Moreover, Freud lacked a phenomenological description of love and had no “interpretation and description of what he understands by ‘self’.” (p. 200) He said that Freud did recognize the “dialogical character” of conflict, but that when he wants to present the dialogical character of conflict, he leaves theory and tells a fairy tale to illustrate it. Binswanger criticized Freud for seeing only the regressive repetition of psychobiologically earlier parental ‘object-cathexes’ in the attitude of the patient to the analyst, and missing what was “new in the patient’s encounter with him.” This kept the physician as a person in the background, pursuing his technical role unencumbered by personal influences. (p. 202) In Binswanger’s critique he is at times our contemporary. His criticism of Freud’s medical-plus-research account of the psychoanalytic process is remarkably like the criticisms today that challenge the objectivity of the analyst and Hartmann’s ideas on technique as technology (see Schafer, 1997, pp. 204-206).

At the same time, Binswanger did understand the origin, dimensions and value of Freud’s biological orientation. However, it appears that he thought that the orientation was incomplete and one-sided, rather than wrong. What it lacked for him was an existential view rooted in an “understanding psychology” dealing with “matrices of meaning”. (See also Schafer, 1970 on Binswanger.) Hartmann’s repeated defense of the scientific status of psychoanalysis was a response to these criticisms, if only implicitly.

AUTONOMY AND THE CONFLICT-FREE SPHERE IN INTERDISCIPLINARY THINKING
The problems addressed by phenomenological and existential schools presented psychoanalysis with the challenge to reconcile the idea of an ego organization, modeled on biological functions, with the understanding of the human subject encountered in analysis, a person facing existential dilemmas. The story of Freud’s efforts to deal with the duality of the person as a biological organism and as an experiencing social subject is a study in ingenuity. However, his efforts to include both within the same framework could provide only parallel, but somehow interacting, systems of biological and mental functions. This approach echoed his ideas about “dependent concomitance” in the aphasia book.

The topographical model retained this division since the memory elements were outside of the systems conscious, preconscious and unconscious. Functions like memory and perception were later considered to be inborn ego functions. However, Freud did not discuss the significance of this fact for the development of such inborn biological functions in relation to experiences of conflict. Binswanger pointed out that the fundamental ambiguities remained while Dilthey’s comments addressed what Ricoeur later called the disjunction of force and meaning.

Frequently, psychoanalytic clinicians ignored the theoretical problems and became interested in ego
functioning, other than defense, only when it was involved in conflict. This was consistent with the idea that psychoanalysis was a theory concerned mainly with studying pathology. Normal memory and perceptual functions were often taken for granted as a matter of common sense, left to be studied by other disciplines whose data might be useful for some purposes.

Hartmann expanded his range of interest to address the role of inborn normal functions by considering problems of adaptation and of health. His ideas of autonomous ego functions and the conflict-free sphere made the issues of normal function explicit while offering a vocabulary for discussing it. Particularly important was secondary autonomy, the idea that resolving conflicts might lead to ways of thinking and acting having value apart from their role in conflict resolution. Autonomy is relative and depends on the degree to which unconscious meaning, ever present, is relevant to the exercise of function.

In Hartmann’s formulation of primary autonomy, organismic functions serving adaptation, like memory and perception provide mental contents playing a role in the development of the mind. The functions may become involved in conflict, as in motivated forgetting and hysterical blindness, but conflict may not be relevant to all their activities. We take it for granted that much of memory and perception is reliable
for practical use if nothing interferes with their development and functioning. These mental functions are independent variables in conflict (Hartmann, 1964, p. 119). As Hartmann noted, this does not mean that the functions and the contents produced by these functions do not have unconscious meanings. It is simply that examining those unconscious meanings is not relevant in some circumstances. When people are behaving rationally, he says, their behavior is predictable. This predictability depends not on unconscious meaning for its explanation, but on its rationality. Of course, he also notes that, for this reason, such behavior may be of more interest to other psychologies or to sociology than it is to psychoanalysis. On the other hand, the unconscious meaning may at times be of no help to sociology and other kinds of studies. The interests of these different fields are centered differently. For the areas where the interests of different fields overlap, the development of a common language may be desirable.

This relativity of autonomy in the layered hierarchy that Hartmann described has often been taken erroneously to refer to absolute separation of functions rather than their conceptual delineation. Some of Hartmann’s critical contemporaries believed that “conflict-free” meant “purified of conflict”. Even today, some current theorists, while opposed to Hartmann’s views (Laplanche, 1989) or ignoring them
(Fonagy, 1999) find it necessary to utilize such independent variables. Although Hartmann (1939) took pains to explain the difference between *genesis through conflict* and *involvement in conflict*, these other interpretations persisted.

Hartmann’s autonomy concept provides a link between the psychoanalytic interest in development and other developmental considerations of the same phenomena. Freud, and other observers, noted that independent factors in maturation and aging influence mental functions throughout life. It is obvious that the same considerations apply for many developmental phenomena, such as those having to do with the sexual function, and even brain development, that depend on the development of bodily functions having their own timetable, which, however, may in turn be influenced by psychological factors. Mental functions are one channel for environmental influence on the body and its development.

While the ego-autonomy concept offered a link to biological factors, both Freud and Hartmann were interested in the way that social and cultural factors entered into matters of the mind. Psychoanalytic clinicians have been aware that these apparently abstract issues called “factors” are immediately relevant to the analyst-analysand relationship. Hartmann, therefore, addressed the boundaries between
social sciences and psychoanalysis on a number of occasions. (See Friedman, 1989)

Some of Hartmann’s contemporaries were comfortable enough with applying psychoanalysis to other fields. However, his efforts to clarify issues at the borders of psychoanalysis were not always recognized as a continuation of Freud’s similar aims. Some people thought interdisciplinary studies irrelevant to psychoanalysis, while at the other extreme, some authors attempted to translate psychoanalytic ideas into the language of other fields like ethology, structuralism, information theory, and, recently, chaos theory.

Hartmann attempted to explore the way data from many sources, including clinical psychoanalysis, could be brought together to construct a picture of mind. Since this effort involved bringing together observations obtained by different methods, it also involved trying to assimilate to one another different ways of thinking about any psychological phenomenon that could be observed in different ways. Hartmann’s concepts were an attempt to create a framework permitting a systematic utilization of observations and concepts from both outside and within the psychoanalytic setting.

However, making these issues of integrating different perspectives the focus of attention does not
simplify matters. It brings to light assumptions, problems and difficulties that might go unrecognized. Once the overlapping interests of various disciplines are discussed, the question of confirmations and correlations arise. It is often difficult to know whether analytic concepts studied by methods other than clinical analysis are relevant to analysis, how they fit in and whether they are, in fact, the same as related concepts. Hartmann discussed these problems in terms that were elaborated by others.

Current advances in cognitive and neurosciences, and in infant development studies are relevant to psychoanalysis today, making discussion of all kinds of boundary problems and the clarification of the boundaries of psychoanalysis particularly desirable, if not urgent. The pluralism in current versions of psychoanalysis recurrently raises similar questions of whether some new concept or approach is really psychoanalysis. Sometimes the way that the question is answered rests on a person’s preferences. Analysts choose differently when it comes to deciding what is useful for their work. They may decide that some subjects are not relevant, and this may even include an examination of the basis of the psychoanalytic ideas they hold to be correct or useful.

Hartmann’s choice of both the biological framework and the biological concepts, translated into the terms
of ego psychology, serves, in a sense, to represent biological function in the psychoanalytic picture of the mind. From this point of view, the autonomous ego functions and the conflict-free sphere are borderline concepts. Like the instinctual drives, the autonomous ego functions both represent the body’s functions in mental functions, and create demands for mental activity. At the same time, such concepts provide a bridge to the examination of the influence of fantasy on physiological functions. In a sense, Hartmann, in his integrative efforts, functioned as the ego of psychoanalysis, integrating the various demands on analysis by clarifying the place of their perspectives in a psychoanalytic system.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND INTERDISCIPLINARY THINKING

Hartmann’s effort to place psychoanalytic thought in an interdisciplinary framework expresses the fact that psychoanalysis has been interdisciplinary in its ideas from the beginning. Freud’s book on aphasia, primarily a neurological critique, was also, in some respects, an interdisciplinary work drawing on philosophy of mind and brain, and on theories of language. At that time, Freud was concerned as well with hysteria and affect as psychosomatic problems. While he attempted to separate the purely psychological issues from the others, his attention to the boundaries of psychoanalysis was persistent.
Freud was interested in promoting interdisciplinary studies, both to show the value of psychoanalysis to other fields, and to use the findings of other fields to support psychoanalysis. Consequently, he ranged freely in the material of other fields of inquiry, addressing interdisciplinary problems. *Totem and Taboo* is an important instance of his interdisciplinary efforts. In this work, he used anthropological ideas to elaborate and extend psychoanalytic ideas while trying to resolve a controversy in anthropology. This example illustrates a blend of using psychoanalytic ideas as a system of interpretation to be used on non-clinical material, and the use of observations from other fields to extend psychoanalytic clinical perspectives. Schafer (1992), and more recently Esman (1998) pointed out that Freud’s literary explorations supplied ways of conceptualizing his observations so that applied analysis was a two-way street. In this respect, the mental activities of the psychoanalytic thinker are similar in utilizing clinical and non-clinical observations (Grossman, 1995).

Given Freud’s interest in and reliance on other branches of knowledge, it is not surprising that he and many of those who followed have recognized that the psychoanalyst’s background and preparation should include broad cultural and scientific studies. Freud suggested these studies for what they could bring to an understanding of people, not because this background contributed directly to psychoanalytic theory or technique. The importance of the analyst’s background
to his way of thinking was also mentioned by Ernst Kris. He described the influence of his own background in art on his clinical understanding and his contributions. Hartmann, too, had remarked that such factors were important, and suggested a relationship to countertransference.

These influences of background and interests are sometimes conscious, but are importantly unconscious and unrecognized. They are often subtly interwoven among more rigorously conceived formulations, as Donald Kaplan and I described in a paper on Freud’s views on women (Grossman and Kaplan, 1988). These influences include ideological and other social biases, as described in Schafer’s critique of Freud’s views on women (Schafer, 1974). The ideological critique properly places some ideas in their social context.

The unconscious background interests, the assumptions they generate and the interpretive slant they give to the analyst’s psychoanalytic ideas can account for some of the controversies whose manifest issues appear to be different. Elsewhere, I have discussed this in relation to the controversy between Horney and Freud which expressed the differences in their models of development (Grossman, 1986). Horney’s position was in part stimulated by her sociological readings.
Hartmann’s explorations of the relevance of extra-psychoanalytic sources, and the use of psychoanalytic concepts as a guide to useful research in other fields extended Freud’s example. In doing so, he was extending the common ad hoc and unexamined mingling of ideas from various sources that ordinarily goes on in clinical work and theorizing. In these areas, Weltanschauung, personal background or special interests, and life experience outside psychoanalysis provide the context for the psychoanalytic ideas that guide the psychoanalyst (see also Sandler, 1983; Grossman, 1995). Hartmann’s views thus stand in opposition to those who think that the psychoanalytic situation alone can provide the basis for psychoanalytic knowledge, and to those who think that psychoanalytic thought can be free of other influences.

HARTMANN’S CONTRIBUTION ON THEORY AND TECHNIQUE: THE PROBLEM OF SCOPE AND STYLE

It appears that Hartmann’s emphasis on integrating diverse perspectives and sources of information left many psychoanalysts believing that his work was not relevant to their clinical concerns. Anna Freud (1966) wrote that “extraordinary opposition” met his ideas because he was thought to have turned away from psychopathology and “the clinical concerns of the analyst in practice” in favor of theoretical thinking. She added that many people “feared that the explicit introduction of an ego psychology into psychoanalysis endangered its position as a depth psychology, a
discipline concerned exclusively with the activity of the unconscious mind.” (p. 17)

While Anna Freud was referring to the defenders of the earlier so-called drive-centered id analysis, Greenberg (1991, pp. 140-141) offers a related criticism from a different orientation. He writes that the ideas of autonomous ego functions and the conflict-free sphere had a “seriously detrimental impact on psychoanalytic theory and clinical work” and “drains vitality from psychoanalytic understanding.” He believes that these concepts were needed to patch up a fundamentally incorrect drive theory.

An alternative to the view that Hartmann’s ideas were not psychoanalytic was that they were obvious and had always been known (Benjamin, 1966). Either way, many readers remained, and still remain, unconvinced that those ideas were linked to their work and could help them clinically. Equally problematic was the fact that some therapists and analysts attempted to apply metapsychological formulations directly to interpretation, leading to well-known caricatures of the analytic attitude.

Loewenstein (1970) said that while aware that “clinical observation tacitly includes theoretical assumptions and hypotheses” (p. 14), Hartmann didn't mention the clinical basis for his theoretical ideas. In fact, Hartmann’s comments on technique offered a framework for considering its relationship to theory.
He wrote that: “Theoretical concepts helped ... to facilitate the organization of the data observed (actually also to seeing the facts), and to advance the exactness and effectiveness of technique.” (1964, p. 142) In this comment, Hartmann presented a balanced interactional view and the “modern” view of theory-laden observation in a single sentence. This compression is characteristically Hartmann.

Expanding these remarks, Hartmann considered the varying influences of theory and technique on one another in more detail. He wrote that: “we are ... aware ... that psychoanalytic technique is more than a mere application of psychological theory. ... we know some general technical principles that help us to avoid some typical mistakes, and in the summarized experience of skilled analysts we have ... a huge potential reservoir of specific technical knowledge, which, in the course of training analysis and supervision, is transmitted to students of analysis. ... we are trying to develop some rules somewhere in between the generality of acknowledged technical principles and the specificity of clinical experiences ... we study variations of our technical principles according to each patient’s psychological structure, clinical symptomatology, age level, and so on.” (pp. 143-4) His further discussion considered the interplay of the rational and unconscious elements in our work and the
consequent need for flexibility in technique. These remarks do not seem to reflect Hartmann’s idea of a technology of treatment.

However, the scope of Hartmann’s framework presents a problem in itself. In a sense, a theory can be too big and do too much. Because Hartmann tried to encompass so much, to reorient and reconceptualize the implications of Freud’s framework, his work suffers from considerable compression. Hartmann, like Freud at times, attempts to outline an entire set of hierarchical relationships and its variations in a few paragraphs. For example, in the few remarks just quoted, Hartmann begins with the role of theoretical concepts in organizing observations and in recognizing the data as data – the influence of theory on observation that has become a contemporary slogan. By the end of a couple of paragraphs, he has gone on to include some process variables, the means of teaching the application of technical principles and the role of both rational and inevitable unconscious factors in clinical work. However, he did not deal in detail with the conceptual links between theory and process, except to note that these links are provided by teaching and supervision. Consequently, the effort to describe those links and to conceptualize those processes was left to others. The problem remains.
The range and depth of Hartmann’s theorizing makes systematic discussion difficult. Different readings of his work are possible so that it is difficult to know whether what we say adds something, corrects something, or discovers implications that become clear only when they are spelled out. Different readings are possible also because Hartmann had deep roots in the ideas that he modified. For this reason, he can be read as exemplifying an old-fashioned way of thinking, or as having abandoned the fundamental principles of the past. He, like Freud, can be, and has been, read in both ways.

These difficulties I’ve outlined contribute to the reactions to Hartmann’s work. Nevertheless, Hartmann’s formulations and their limitations stimulated closer attention to the psychoanalytic process and its conceptualization. By the mid 1950s, the treatment of personality disorders provided a stimulus that was evident in Stone’s (1954) paper on the “widening scope” and in 4 panels devoted to borderline patients (Rangell, 1955; Robbins, 1956), variations in analytic technique (Loewenstein, 1958) and ego distortions (Waelder, 1958). By 1970, at the time of Hartmann’s death, Kernberg and Kohut had laid the foundations for theories and treatment of borderline and narcissistic personality disorders. These developments challenged Hartmann’s idea that there had been a lag in the
application of a highly developed theory to technique. They were responses to issues raised by Hartmann’s work, continuing the development of the fundamental conceptions while revising and elaborating them in novel directions. These developments involved important modifications in both theory and technique.

COUNTERCURRENTS IN THE HARTMANN ERA AND AFTER

Throughout his career, Hartmann was aware and responsive to the various intellectual currents even when he didn't address them directly. Earlier, I mentioned Hartmann’s response to Dilthey. He continued that line of discussion in later work on psychoanalysis and science. His introduction of the idea of self-representations in the discussion of narcissism can be seen as one response to issues raised in Binswanger’s critique. It is not possible here to discuss other people whose ideas were significant in the early years in Vienna. The point here is that psychoanalysis was of interdisciplinary interest at that time in the work of child psychologists, political thinkers and culturally oriented psychoanalysts, and Hartmann responded to their different ways of thinking by formulating psychoanalytic theory as best he could in the language of scientific explanation. He later responded to issues raised by the interpersonal school, sociologists and social psychologists. (See some additional details in Grossman, 2000).
In defending the scientific status of psychoanalysis, Hartmann at times implied that it was possible to apply psychoanalytic knowledge to the clinical situation with precision. However, as noted earlier, he also remarked on the limits to precision in the clinical application of his theory. He also discerned the interrelationships of the process of theory formation in psychoanalysis to clinical observation, experimental observation and the use of theory. With this contribution, he stimulated vigorous reconsideration of these issues, as well as greater efforts at clarifying various aspects of the clinical situation. His authoritative and knowledgeable assertions of his positions helped to bring out the assumptions underlying them.

Although Hartmann was recognized internationally, his influence in Europe was considerably less than in the United States. In Europe, other points of view were dominant in analysis, and Hartmann’s ideas were not well known, understood or received. In some cases, there was vigorous opposition that continues today.

The Kleinian influence in this country was not great during Hartmann’s time, but the influence of the British middle school, especially the work of Winnicott, Fairbairn and Guntrip, began to receive considerable recognition. Although rarely cited in this country, Brierley (1951) had addressed the problems of
“Metapsychology and Personology” which were to become the nucleus of the American reaction against Hartmann’s ideas. In reference to the theories of Melanie Klein, Brierley offered a sober understanding of what it means to have a “scientific attitude” rather than a “creed” in regard to new ideas. Her work was in part a commentary on the problems of analysts’ dealing with integrating theory and practice, as well as their difficulties with novelty and dissent. Fairbairn, Guntrip, Rosenfeld and Balint attracted attention at the time that the treatment of borderline patients had become a matter of concern because they suggested major modifications of theory and treatment. These ideas were of interest to psychoanalysts in the U.S. who were, as noted earlier, dealing with these problems. The new ways of looking at patients and the problems of treating severe personality disorders were already leading to revisions of theory that made the ideas from abroad welcome in the U.S.

The ideas imported at that time may be considered as self- rather than ego- oriented. In a sense, then, there was a convergence with Hartmann’s modifications in the ideas of self-representation and narcissism noted earlier. However, it is likely that the necessary correction in ego-psychology to accommodate the growing awareness of problems of narcissistic
patients was already interacting with similar European trends.

The divisiveness involved in the meeting of different ways of thinking here and abroad turned out to be stronger than the convergences. To some extent this aspect was associated with another set of influences developing with the gradual infiltration into American psychoanalysis of European philosophical-psychoanalytic thought along the lines of process- and interpretation-centered theories. Among these influences, Lacan’s work with its emphasis on the role of language in psychoanalysis attracted students of literature for whom the application of analysis to the interpretation of texts and the hermeneutic approach were entirely congenial.

Hartmann’s insistence that psychoanalytic concepts were explanatory and not merely descriptive came to be seen as problematic and increasingly was rejected. It was gradually recognized that the line between explanation and description that Hartmann had been at pains to emphasize might, on principle, not always be as sharp as he had wished.

Investigators in other fields began to question the basis for existing theories of human nature, explicit or implied, and challenged assumptions that their predecessors had accepted as fundamental and even factual. With new perspectives, they began to
accumulate a wealth of new observations. This was in fact, a broad social trend, as well. In other fields, as in psychoanalysis, changed attitudes toward authority in society at large led to reconsideration of all theories, especially those that were perceived as being biased by ideological considerations, such as those relating to women and minorities. Obviously, this interesting subject of changing assumptions and attitudes deserves more elaboration than I can give it here.

An issue specifically related to the interplay of ideas in *our field, and Hartmann’s place in it, concerns what Lacan called a “return to Freud”, or more broadly, to a reconsideration of the basis for psychoanalytic thought and practice. The increased transatlantic exchange revealed a number of points of view that, despite their differences, retained their relationships to Freud as a reference point. Whether they saw themselves as critics or supporters of Freud’s views, they read Freud differently. It wasn’t long before it became evident that whatever point of view a psychoanalyst took regarding Freud, a different Freud could be found in each one’s opinions. During this period, partly in response to Hartmann’s work and the reactions to it here and abroad, the problem of “many Freuds” began to be recognized and discussed.

Of course, everyone knew that the Kleinians read Freud differently than allegedly mainstream Freudians, or that the so-called dissident schools “misread” Freud. Previously, it had seemed reasonable to assume
that there was one correct reading of Freud’s work, and that if there were uncertainties, it might be that Freud was unclear. But even given these possibilities, there was also the growing recognition that the American Freud was different from the English and French Freuds. André Green (1986), among others, referred to this fact, and told of his own discovery that with a “return to Freud” advocated by Lacan, he discovered both that Lacan’s Freud was different from the American Freud, and that the Freud of his own “return to Freud” was different from Lacan’s. So in fact, there were many French Freuds, English Freuds, and American Freuds, and so on. This discovery was a part of the expanding pluralism in psychoanalysis, paralleling similar phenomena in other fields. There was a growing realization that different cultures and different translations were contributing to different interpretations of theory and its conversion into and by practice. Furthermore, this inter-group phenomenon is visible among the members within groups, as I indicated earlier. It is also evident that multiple readings are inevitable for Hartmann and for any thinker of great range or system. This development in psychoanalytic history illustrates the re-editing and recontextualizing of ideas in the evolution of thought processes in individuals and groups.

CONCLUSION
I began by comparing the development of ideas in psychoanalysis to the development of ideas in an individual person. I emphasized that understanding the ideas of thinkers like Hartmann requires understanding their contexts, which means understanding the dialogue between the thinker and the people to whom the work is a response. It is also necessary to understand the way the problems of the period are debated. I described some of the people and ideas with which Hartmann was involved over forty years in which the intellectual climate was changing, some of it in response to his own work.

Hartmann’s elaboration of the economic point of view and his defense of psychoanalysis as science provoked criticism of his theories. These issues stand out because Hartmann attempted to explore them in detail. What is often overlooked is that before he developed these ideas, there had already been significant critiques of energy concepts [Kubie and Lewin] and those critiques continued even as he was elaborating his views, possibly in interaction with those critiques [Kardiner, Karush and Ovesey; Sullivan and others].

However, much of the controversy surrounding Hartmann’s work was in reaction to his efforts to build bridges between psychoanalytic thought and other fields. The idea of psychoanalysis as a “general
psychology” was regarded both as grandiose psychoanalytic imperialism and as a betrayal of true psychoanalysis. These were a heavy burden for a concept that meant simply that psychoanalysis was necessarily concerned with more than psychopathology and the unconscious.

This controversy has a bearing on the claim that Hartmann damaged psychoanalysis. This claim shifts the discussion from a dynamic historical outlook to a linear view of the history of ideas, in this case, explained by a political mythology in which Hartmann was the devil dominating psychoanalytic thought. The germ of truth in this idea is that Hartmann had a respectful audience for his ideas, though a limited and perhaps parochial one. He also had some political power as an officer of psychoanalytic associations. He earned the enmity of some of the French analysts because he had been instrumental in excluding Lacan’s group from the IPA. As a French colleague once remarked, for them Hartmann really was the devil, so they didn't read what he had written. The approach to psychoanalytic history exemplified by this example illustrates the role of political and social attitudes and forces in the evaluation, acceptance and rejection of new ideas in our field.

In its most general sense, this paper continues my exploration of the ways analysts’ personal backgrounds,
interests, and ways of thinking serve to give meaning to their understanding and use of theory. Here and elsewhere I have been emphasizing the way any analyst combines different kinds of thinking and thought, as a matter of course. I have suggested that this is an adaptive process of thought that makes the thinking of the psychoanalyst both systematic and interdisciplinary, and the interdisciplinary often passes unnoticed. This aspect of an analyst’s thinking helps to create a needed link between theory and practice, supplementing the personal contacts of supervision and personal analysis that Hartmann mentioned. The personal value attached to this aspect of thinking provides a framework while lending conviction to the analyst’s interpretation of psychoanalytic theories, reinforced by the other well-known unconscious factors. These special interests of the psychoanalyst also supply the metaphors that help the analyst to concretize theoretical concepts while applying them. They are not to be dismissed.

Hartmann’s own special interests and ideas guided his interdisciplinary interests as he continuously focused on the boundaries within personality, between different aspects of clinical and theoretical psychoanalytic conceptualizations, and between disciplines. Other cultural interests, not deliberately applied to his formulations, no doubt guided his
thinking, as do the similar interests of psychoanalysts whose preferences lead them to discussions of art and literature.

Hartmann’s work attempted to spell out divergent trends throughout the forty or so years during which he worked. He attempted to resolve many of these differences but knew that there were gaps he couldn't bridge. In the end, he had prepared a way for considering interdisciplinary and pluralistic issues that are being confronted today.

References


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