Reflections on the Relationships of Introspection and Psycho-Analysis

William I. Grossman

(Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Yeshiva University and Adjunct Attending Psychiatrist, Montefiore Hospital and Medical Center, Bronx, N.Y.)

I wish to express my gratitude to my friends and colleagues who read and commented on earlier drafts of this paper. Particular thanks are due Dr H. Weiner and Dr L. Spiegel for their thorough and searching discussions.

Introduction

Psycho-analysis was developing as a method of treatment and investigation utilizing introspection at the same time as many academic psychologists in the United States were becoming disillusioned with introspection as a method of observation in research. While analysts hoped to build a general psychology on findings derived from the special kind of introspection involved in "free association", behaviourists felt that only by replacing the study of experiential events with the study of overt behaviour could they hope to establish a scientific psychology. The recent developments in both academic psychology and ego psychology have tended to promote a convergence of interests, if not of concepts. This is particularly evident in the areas of verbal behaviour and the influences of awareness on conditioning. Psycho-analysts, on the other hand, have always been concerned, as well, with overt behaviour. They have also viewed verbal activity as a category of behaviour among others, and not simply as a report based on "privileged access" to inner experience.

While the central position of introspection in psycho-analysis would seem at first to require little emphasis, a number of considerations make a detailed re-examination of its role desirable. In the first place, continuing efforts to clarify psycho-analytic theory require an examination of the fundamental concepts and their relationship to methods of observation. Secondly, observation and concepts from other disciplines are increasingly employed either as models for reformulation of theory, or as one aspect of the widening exploration of ego functions by analysts. This fact, coupled with the existence of multiple theoretical levels in psycho-analysis (Rapaport, 1960); (Waelder, 1962), tends to complicate excessively questions of validation, requiring that the relationship of concepts to observations be specifiable. Finally, though not unrelated to the foregoing, psycho-analytic concepts are applied in research which is not conducted within the framework of psycho-analytic method. This combination is facilitated when the basis for the psycho-analytic concepts used is understood.

A comprehensive discussion of introspection would not be possible within the framework of a single paper, and certain aspects have been well discussed elsewhere (Boring, 1953), (1957); (Hochberg, 1962); (James, 1890); (Kohut, 1959); (Miller, Isaacs and Haggard, 1965). This study will focus instead on those aspects of the role of
introspection in psycho-analysis which may elucidate the nature of the clinical data and judgements. The psycho-analytic method provides a unique opportunity for investigating introspection as one kind of behaviour in its relationship to other aspects of behaviour. Likewise, psycho-analytic theory has a broad enough framework for a general psychology, incorporating both introspectionally derived and observationally derived concepts.

In the background of this inquiry into various aspects of introspection are two questions, which, though unanswered, serve as guides to the discussion. First, what are we doing when we assume attitudes of introspection, or of self-observation? Second, in what ways does our implicit conception of introspection contribute to the structure of psycho-analytic theory? The approach offered here is to consider a number of related problems in the hope that they may ultimately illuminate these basic issues.

The introspective methods of psycho-analysis and nineteenth century psychophysical experiments are compared briefly with respect to the assumptions they make regarding what can be observed in introspection. The relation of the observer to the observed is also considered. The content of introspection is seen to reflect the motives for undertaking it, and the introspective report to bear a complex relationship to the introspection.

The next area of consideration is the conception of inner experience which has evolved with the development of psycho-analysis. Although as analysts, we speak of the "mental apparatus" and use the metaphors of a rather concrete inner experience, a relationship to current behavioural thinking may be seen. This relationship derives, to some extent, from the psycho-analytic emphasis on the non-introspectable determinants of awareness and the overdetermination of verbal behaviour. Both of these features are currently of importance in "behaviouristic" research. Conceptualizing such problems in ego psychological terms has broadened the psycho-analytic view of inner experience.

With recognition of the modified ideas of inner experience in psycho-analysis, it seems natural to examine the relationships between subjective reports, clinical inference, and theory. The scope of that problem permits only a beginning here, but it is possible to note the way in which some concepts are used to transform introspective reports into theory. In this connexion, a point regarding psycho-analytic explanation is considered.

Finally, with the perspectives afforded by this review, suggestions are offered as to how the implicit psycho-analytic views of introspection and self-observation may eventually be specified and perhaps elaborated. The emphasis throughout is on the ego aspects of introspection. This is not intended to minimize the importance of the drive factors which are so striking in clinical work. It simply stems from a concern with the forms given to introspection and introspection as a patterned activity. This survey would appear to lend support to the view that introspection as an activity contributes to the structuring of the introspectable world.

**Introspectionist Psychology, and Psycho-analysis**

In this section, the contrast between the introspective methods of the nineteenth century psychologists and psycho-analysis is intended to highlight the intimate relationships between methodological and theoretical issues when introspection is the
method of observation. The old introspectionist position treated the sensations observed in a rather concrete way. The observing subject and his observing function stood to one side, as it were, and observed. In some respects, psycho-analytic theory and practice retain this model too. However, in psychoanalysis, the process of introspection is itself a constant object of study, rather than merely a tool for study.

In his "History of Introspection" (1953), Boring noted that twentieth century clinical psychology and psychiatry were the heirs to the introspection of the nineteenth century psychologists. The ways in which it is used underwent significant change. The old psychology had hoped to dissect the elements of subjective experience, and introspection was a method whereby one could examine sensations. The good subject was a trained observer who could report his sensations fully and accurately. He was to describe only the sensations themselves, and to make no reference to their sources. Based on these observations, a voluminous literature and considerable disappointment developed. This no doubt played a role in the development of behaviourism in the United States.

The introspective method of psycho-analysis followed a different course. Interest was centred on thoughts which came more or less spontaneously to mind. Alternatively, a dream element, slip or symptom formation might be the starting point. The goal was not elements, but content, and through content, the discovery of motives, meanings and origins. Freud (1900), (1920) has discussed the relationship of his method to poetic creativity, while noting that its use resulted from his belief in psychic determinism. The contrast between classical introspection and psycho-analysis as means of searching out what is in one's mind implies a wide divergence as to what one expects to learn by each method. It offers, too, a suggestion as to what the range of possible attitudes to introspection might be. This could be seen as well in Galton's (1879) study of his spontaneous thoughts, and James's (1890) discussion of the "stream of thought". Galton, being interested in the content of his associations to stimulus words, was impressed by the relatively repetitive nature of his associations and the frequent appearance of early memories. On the other hand, James often stressed the constantly changing character of a single thought when repeated. While such a brief comment conveys nothing of the richness of their descriptions, it indicates that contrasting conditions in the exploration of one's mind yield both contrasting content and form.

The act of attention in classical introspection limits the field of observation, as attention always does. This was in keeping with the "elementary" nature of what was sought. The subject was trained to abstract sensations from the complexity of experience, excluding inferences about, and relationships in, his perceptual experience. Critics of the psychophysical method often noted that the description was always retrospective, because the descriptions of sensations took so much longer than the actual experiences. The meaning of a particular perceptual experience for the subject was excluded in the search for mental elements. However, introspection itself, and arguments based on it, seemed to show that it did not permit the observation of mental elements (Hochberg, 1962).

One of the factors which led to the discarding of introspection as a primary research tool in academic psychology, was the fact that subjects carefully trained in different laboratories tended to observe the phenomena of sensation in accordance with
the theories of the laboratories in which they worked. These psychologists had believed that what training produced was a heightened capacity for these observations. We must conclude, however, that what was perceived was equally a product of the training. The factor of theoretically biased expectation in introspection is noted by Hebb (1954), who comments that

One of the most striking features of the history of psychology is the difference between introspective reports at different stages of theoretical development. The introspections of James Mill about 1850 bear no faintest resemblance to those of William James sixty years later, but they do bear a very nice relationship to the fact that Mill had only the crudest sort of conception of sensory function to work with. The a priori theoretical proposal of John Stewart (sic) Mill, his son, that there might be a "mental chemistry" among sensations and ideas, fusing the elements of thought into qualitatively different simple compounds instead of aggregations, appears to have permanently modified subsequent introspective reports. It seems that introspectors have always been able to find what they were looking for or not to find it, but in general did not make observations unrelated to their theoretical conceptions of the human machine.

To some the preceding quotation may have a ring which is similar to the often stated criticism of psycho-analysis, that patients produce what the doctor wants to hear. The similarity is superficial, however, owing both to the conditions of introspection and the use to which it was put in each case. In the introspection experiment, the character of the report was limited to elements expected by theory. As Hebb says, they could be found or not found. Thus, the introspector by his act was directly testing theory and observing the activity of the mind. In psycho-analysis, however, the subject's report is prescribed with respect neither to form nor content. His report does not describe the workings of his mind, nor is he required to decide what is most elementary in his experience. His report is the basis for inferences about relationships unwittingly expressed in it. Where the patient offers theories, his theories are not a part of science for the analyst, but a part of the patient's mental life. Of course, it is well known that patients may assimilate some of the technical language of analysis, and this too, has been mistaken for producing to support theory. This criticism can readily be recognized as analogous to the one discussed by Freud (1916–1917) regarding patients whose dreams conform to the tenets of their analysts' schools. Bias may, of course, operate in the application of psycho-analytic technique, as in any method of investigation (cf. Rosenthal, 1963a), (1963b, who discusses its operation in behavioural research). However, in such an instance, one is dealing with an error in technique and not a factor inherent in the method.

With a complex situation, which every experiment is, "sensations" may be observed only by an act of attention which seeks "sensations" and excludes what seems irrelevant. Other facets of this problem have been discussed by Gibson (1963), who comments on the way experiments which limit sensory input create special perceptual situations rather than studying elementary sensations. It should be mentioned that the conflict between psychological schools, which threw the introspective method into discredit, were not themselves taken as phenomena to be studied in their own right. It is of interest to analysts that the intent or the goals of the individual who observed his own
sensations should exert such a profound effect upon what he actually observed. This observation would seem to emphasize the fact that the scope and nature of introspection are highly dependent on the conditions under which it occurs, and its role in the mental life of the individual at that time. One factor involved here is the degree to which the subject is directed to "inner" rather than "outer" events. Introspection for the benefit of an experiment, for the purpose of literary creation, and on the analyst's couch are quite different situations. Formal similarities in the productions obtained under these various circumstances may tend to obscure important differences in the states of the subjects, and disguise the significance of context for the meaning of such communication. Moreover, the differential effects of the conditions on the introspection and on the report may not be readily inferred.

While psycho-analysis does not seek sensations, they are studied when they appear in free association. When they are viewed from the psycho-analytic perspective, they take their place with other associations, whether as symptoms "joining in the conversation" (Breuer and Freud, 1895), as "screen sensations" (Anthony, 1961), or as in the Isakower phenomenon (1938). One object is to discover the original sensory and ideational setting of these emerging sensations. In a way, though, psycho-analysis does require a kind of training in its own type of introspection having a particular deployment of attention. That is, the analysis of defences and working through may be compared with a training process which facilitates self-observation. This comparison highlights the possibility that where examination of inner experience is concerned, training means developing a new capacity for experience. The analytic method, of course, fosters regression which favours the emergence of special kinds of introspective data. Regression leads to the appearance of those infantile modes of behaviour and thinking which have been excluded from consciousness and from the scope of self-conscious reflection. Our interpretations highlight, among other things, behaviour which is unobserved by the patient, or unrelated by him to other experience. This behaviour and its connexions are thus brought into his awareness, as well. The unfolding of regressive material is also assisted by our reconstructive and interpretive methods, which link infantile material with its origins in the past. With the revival and intensification of infantile attitudes, there is also a change in the conditions of their perception. The tendency to repeat, as a step in the process of recollection, is implied here, as well as a regression of the self-evaluating functions.

The relationship of patient and analyst, too, has an important influence on the nature and production of associations. As Loewenstein (1963) has noted, this distinguishes free association from other kinds of introspection. Obviously, introspective processes occur which are not necessarily reported, and can only be partly inferred within the analytic setting. These introspections are, no doubt, equally influenced by the relationship with the analyst. However, introspection always occurs within some framework which must exert a corresponding, though different, influence on its course. One might say that free association refers to the adherence to the fundamental rule. The problem of introspection, however, deals with an attitude of attention to inner experience on the part of the patient, and the extent to which this is possible in the presence of another individual. This is one facet of the problem of how verbalization within the analytic situation reflects conscious and inner experience, unconscious processes, and processes which may not have at all the potential for introspectability. Further effort to
distinguish between free associations and other reports of introspections might stress the possibility of variations in the relationships of report and awareness of report. Caution in such clarifications may be desirable, for the precision of observable differences does not always match the exactness of linguistic distinctions. The conception of introspection implies an observer observing himself. In discussing introspection, therefore, one is implying a certain autonomy of the observer and his awareness of inner events. The free association concept stresses the abandonment of conscious restraints on the flow of thought. This tends to emphasize the impulse-dominated character of thought and speech, and the unconscious impediments to their flow. The analyst takes the autonomous observing role, but at times invites the patient to do so as well (Loewenstein, 1963). It is this contrast of emphasis which has led to a greater concern in this paper with the ego aspects of introspection.

While emphasizing the importance of the object relationship on the course of free association, Loewenstein (1963) makes another point of considerable importance for both analysis and the problem of introspection, in general. He states that "action is for many people a more natural way of behaviour than merely to observe their own reaction or reflect upon it and communicate upon it to someone." Furthermore, as Kris (1956) notes in commenting on the pathology of self-observation, there is a difference in the functioning of self-observation when it is distorted by aggressive or libidinal investments, or, as he says, "tinged by self-critical and self-loving components." Thus, we can see that the attitude towards self-observation and the role of the listener and setting are stressed in psycho-analysis. The latter particularly were neglected by the earlier approaches, at least in the way in which we consider them essential for the understanding of introspective processes. In addition, these observations of Kris and Loewenstein point to characteristic differences among individuals with regard to the capacity for introspection, and perhaps, to the existence of characteristic styles of self-observation.

The clinically observed distortions and exaggerations of introspection await systematic study. The influence of the instinctual drives on the nature of introspectable contents, and the degree to which self-observation itself can become a source of gratification, have been long appreciated. More recently, there has been an increasing emphasis on the role of superego functions influencing the ego's self-observation and self-perception (Hartmann, 1950); Hartmann and Loewenstein, 1962; (Jacobson, 1954), (1964). It seems likely that the characterology and pathology of self-observation would be further clarified by a consideration of its relation to moral self-criticism. Whereas self-observation may readily be thought of as an ego function, narcissistic conflicts seem to result in replacement of this function by self-criticism, at least within the therapeutic setting. Under these circumstances, the nature of the object relationship is decisive for self-observation. In those patients who alternate between paranoid and depressive states, one can readily observe the swings from self-criticism to hyperattention to, and criticism of, other people. Freud (1914), in discussing the regressive externalization of the self-critical function in paranoia, speaks of "… this critically observing agency—which becomes heightened into conscience and philosophic introspection …"

In this formulation, prior to the introduction of the superego concept, Freud notes a close relationship between self-observation and self-criticism. Freud argues that self-criticism requires a self-observing function. However, we must consider the possibility
that at an early stage of development, these two functions are not separable. In other words, that the earliest self-observations may occur only in conjunction with self-criticisms. This question would have to be considered in connexion with the discussion of the varieties of observing functions to be presented later.

**Introspection and the Concept of Inner Experience in Psycho-analysis**

In the classical introspection experiment, the subject was the real observer. It was to this use of the inner experience of the observer as data, that the objections of the behaviourists were directed. This did not exclude the use of verbal reports by subjects, provided that they were not treated as accurate reports of "inner experience". They could be regarded instead as behaviour on a par with any other behaviour (Spence 1948). Psycho-analysis does, of course, utilize speech as report, but the consideration of the therapeutic context, concepts of the unconscious, transference, regression, and so on, involve the recognition of other meanings to verbalization as well. This fact suggests something more of a relationship between these two approaches than is generally emphasized. This convergence and an important difference are indicated by Mandler and Kessen (1959, p. 33–4), who state that

... the behaviorist dicta concerning the uselessness of introspection were slowly abandoned, but the return of the introspective report did not bring with it the implication that its vocabulary describes psychological variables. Rather, the introspective report of the human subject was part of the data of psychology, about which generalizations were to be developed. More recent methods, such as content analysis, in both academic psychology and in the psycho-analytic movement, have regarded introspection and the data of consciousness as something to be observed and to be described in another language, the system language of psychology.

The system language of psycho-analysis is the language of ego psychology and metapsychology. It need not be emphasized here that analysts consider themselves to be studying inner experience and psychological variables. In doing so, we tend to take for granted a number of relations between self-report and self-experience. It should be noted, however, that there is a difference between asking what self-report reflects, and asking to what statements about inner experience refer. The first question implies a search for the determinants of self-report, and these transcend the translation of experience into words. The referents of statements about inner experience are presumably the "objects" of some sort of inner awareness or scrutiny. The recurrent problem is, however, the extent to which these "objects" derive their character from the effort to describe them.

The role of speech in psycho-analysis and its part in objectivation, reality testing and insight have been extensively discussed (Loewenstein, 1951), (1956); (Klein, 1965). In the present context it is necessary to mention only the relationship between the functions of speech and the concept of inner experience in psycho-analysis. For this purpose, the overdetermination of verbal behaviour is the essential point. Overdetermination and multiple function (Waelder, 1936) refer to the fact that motivations cannot be inferred from individual acts without considering their contexts. Single items of behaviour may serve a number of functions, simultaneously or
successively, and single motives may find a variety of modes of expression. The concepts of libidinization of primarily autonomous functions and of secondary autonomy (Hartmann, 1939) are genetic references to the changing functions of behaviour. This point of view strictly applied excludes the possibility of a simple correspondence theory. Exploring the puzzle of verbal reports as evidence in perceptual research leads Buchwald (1961) to a similar conclusion. While not using the concept of overdetermination, he refers to data which are relevant. These data illustrate that non-sensory variables affect verbally indicated visual thresholds. Furthermore, the wording of questions may alter the verbal response tendencies in self-description.

Examination of the concept of inner experience in psycho-analysis is an undertaking which could easily involve a study of the evolution of psycho-analysis. In Freud's writings alone, the shift from the topographic to the structural theory implied a changing theoretical view of inner experience and introspection. The integrative role assigned to the system Cs in topographical theory produced a theory organized around the viewpoint of a self-observer. The combining of the systematic and the phenomenological in a single system Cs was consistent with the goal of making conscious the unconscious, and filling in the gaps of consciousness. The establishment of a system whose major defining characteristic was phenomenological was an effort to construct a link between observation language and theory language. Clinically, we are still concerned with these concepts because of their closeness to the self-observing processes of analysis. A drive theory which takes into account organic sources, and hopes to encompass processes never achieving direct representation in awareness, must accord to consciousness a lesser role. With the conception of the ego as an integrative organization, the point of view can no longer be that of a self-observer, and the contents of conscious experience must be viewed differently. Interest shifts from the controlling functions of consciousness, to the representational processes of the ego, and the relationship, or orientation, to objects. This is of course but one aspect of the divergent theoretical trends within psycho-analytic theory which await resolution and integration. Recent discussions of the role of consciousness in psycho-analytic theory (Arlow and Brenner, 1964); (Gill, 1963) highlight the problems of combining topographical and structural approaches. Freud's "Project" bears witness to his early effort to account for consciousness by reduction to neurophysiology, and his abandonment of that effort. The seventh chapter of the Interpretation of Dreams in turn provides the substitution of a neurophysiological model for the actual reduction. The objective was, however, still to account for consciousness, and to offer a theory of how ideas and images become conscious. We still have these questions with us, and it is unlikely that clinical investigation offers the route to their solution. This area of consideration is closely tied to the philosophical problems of the mind-body problem, on the one hand, and the empirical problems of correlation of phenomenal and neurophysiological events on, the other. The relationships between psycho-analysis and various mind-body theories have been extensively discussed by Rubinstein (1965) and will not be considered here.

Within the genetically oriented drive-structure conflict theory of psycho-analysis, inner experience is thought to develop as a series of conflict solutions, broadly conceived. Experiences of satisfaction and frustration provide the context in which attention is directed to the outer world, and constitute the earliest contents of inner experience. The development of the introspectable world is seen in a framework of drive development,
evolution of object relations, and reality testing. Indeed, the experience of an inner world develops concomitantly with the development of the experience of an outer world, and they are interdependent (Freud, 1911), (1915); (also Werner and Kaplan, 1963).

When behaviour and experience are considered in this latter framework, questions regarding the mechanism by which consciousness arises are not of immediate importance. Rather, we are concerned with the relationships between conscious experience and other aspects of behaviour. There can be little doubt that a potentially fruitful area of research exists for the correlation of behaviour and phenomenal events with neurophysiological events. It is equally clear that this requires some adequate means of conceptualizing the relationships between phenomenal and overt behavioural events. We should not expect that the discovery of such relationships will provide clues to the nature of the underlying mechanism, any more than the fact that a machine does arithmetic, tells whether the mechanism is electronic or mechanical. On the level of clinical theory, psycho-analytic terms are best thought of as referring to the relationships between observable behaviours, personal history, and environmental events. The conceptualization of unconscious, internal condition of the individual, as well as his inner conscious experience in terms of motive, constraint and conflict, offers the possibility of integrating the viewpoint of the experiencing individual with the viewpoint of the observer. The formulations of ego psychology are in part an effort of this kind. With these considerations are associated the problems of how the inner experience of others may be known, that is, the philosophical problem of solipsism vs. other minds, and the empirical problems of clinical inference.

The rules of inference relating language, behaviour and inner experience in psychoanalysis have never received a precise statement. We find it much easier, as did Freud (1937), to enumerate the factors governing the production of behaviour including speech, than to describe how we arrive at correct inferences about silent thoughts, and even history, from our observations of patients. It may be that divergent trends in analytic thought obscure our view of our own inferential activities. The divergence here seems to arise from the effort to formulate theory and the system of inference based on it in linear (serial) causal terms, while the complexities of the clinical observations showing multiple causation, force awkward qualification of these formulations. The concepts of multiple function and over-determination, of course, attempt to avoid the pitfalls of simple linear causal formulations.

What might be called the linear formulation is, in essence, a formulation in terms of mental elements, whether they are pathogenic ideas, impulses, the unconscious wish, the meaning of a symptom, the traumatic experience. While most analysts would not defend theories based on single causes of these types, their formulations often reflect such conceptualization. It is a concomitant of such conceptions that motives tend to be thought of in a somewhat concrete way, almost as though they would eventuate in specific actions. Yet we know that a given motive, or given set of dynamics are compatible with a variety of behaviours, and are not adequate predictors. Thus, we do not know in formulations of the development of particular behaviours either the necessary or the sufficient conditions for particular outcomes. Neither do we know the conditions which convert particular experiences into other significant outcomes. Stated in this general way, the point hardly seems to require emphasis. However, one need only recall
the efforts to formulate predictions in the early longitudinal studies, to realize how much we tend to oversimplify our understanding of the interacting variables, in actual practice.

A second mode of conceptualization within psycho-analysis, treats drives and motives, as well as the tripartite personality structure, as organizing principles, which orient behaviour towards certain possibilities for satisfaction. The psychic substructures, for instance, have been designated as "three centres of psychic functioning" which are "defined by the functions attributed to them." (Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, 1946, p. 14). The pure drive organization would be thought of as operating according to primary process, and would therefore be non-serial in its organization. Hence, our clinical inferences refer to the way in which the patient classifies his experiences, for instance, with respect to their pleasure-pain potentialities. We are thus interested in determining what groups of inner and outer experiences form "sets". Within these organizations, we deal with logical processes which have to do with the means-end aspect of gratification. This I take to be the meaning of Freud's view that the reality principle ultimately serves the pleasure principle.

According to this view, the organization of inner experience is not a linear-causal one. Therefore, from the theoretical point of view, we look for combinations of conditions, predisposing factors and so on, to explain a particular motive, which in turn accounts for the behavioural outcome. Context assumes great importance because it determines the changing meaning of stimuli or impulses, or of given actions, as well. From the point of view of clinical inference, we regard the patient as behaving from particular motives in relation to a particular view of his situation. We attempt to understand his view of his situation, and to relate this view to his motives and behaviour. In utilizing a genetic approach, we pursue a similar method through time. We thus see a particular transference situation as belonging to a group of relationships, characterized by particular orientations to an object, and having associated groups of conflicts and fantasies. We may isolate a particular "developmental line" for certain behaviour which gives continuity, but not simple causality. The importance of lawful and causal relationships for genetic propositions (Hartmann, 1927b); (Hartmann and Kris, 1945), is, of course, not at issue. What we suggest is that caution is required in deciding at what level of observation and formulation causal connexions are really specifiable. We are describing a changing resultant shaped by changing forces. Present mental content and its forerunners are related by virtue of the classification of experience according to emotional meaning and value.

While inner experience lacks linear structure, the verbal language, in which it must be described, is clearly serial. This makes it difficult to render in verbal description the immediacy and the simultaneities of inner experience. This may be contrasted with the intimate relationship between language and conceptual thinking, such that each shapes the other. Richness of connotation in language comes closer to the rendering of inner experience, but then denotative precision is lost. These facts would seem to imply, then, that the more one attempts to conceptualize inner experience precisely, the more one imparts to it the shape of the language used to describe it. The method of free association, and the way in which we listen to it, attempts to undo this organization to some extent. It does not lead us back in a serial manner to the underlying impulses, however. Rather, it permits us to see the functional grouping of thoughts and feelings
which are expressed in serial form. In this way, we are able to infer the fantasies which characterize the entire set ("complex"), and to relate the current behaviour to other past and present behaviour, feelings, and environmental events. Thus, we can see how an individual relates his inner experiences to his environmental events. However, to the extent that the dimensions of inner experience and language are different, there must remain aspects of inner experience which are poorly rendered, if at all, by ordinary language.

These considerations illustrate the complexity of the language function as seen through psycho-analytic theory. While we often speak as though language provided a means of presenting publicly inner experiences which occur as though on an inner stage, this can be true only in a rather limited sense. Furthermore, we must recognize that the "inner stage" concept of inner experience, and the idea of consciousness as a face that looks in two directions, are in themselves products of our way of classifying inner and outer experience. Just as sensations tended to be concretized by the introspectionists, the "inner stage" metaphor concretizes ideas.

Hering (1870) wrote,

Our ideas tread but for a moment upon the stage of consciousness and then go back again behind the scenes, to make way for others in their place. As the player is only a king when he is on the stage, so they too exist as ideas so long only as they are recognized.

Freud (1900) uses this same metaphor, and his concept of consciousness as a sense organ carries similar implications. The latter usage, however, reflects the way in which the apparently apt metaphorical description of experience was converted to the terminology of theory. In keeping with the theoretical shift noted earlier, Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962) compare the representational world, rather than consciousness, to a stage setting or TV screen. In this simile, it is not ideas, but object representations which occupy the stage. So much has this sort of image traditionally become a part of our thinking, that the adult's experience of fitting words to thoughts was taken as the model of the relationship between thought and language. A growing body of psychological and philosophical thought, however, recognizes that the concomitant development of language and the inner experience it designates makes the latter intersubjective from the beginning of its development. (See for example: Mead, 1934); (Sapir, 1933); (Sellars, 1956.)

Freud noted that the awareness of an outside world and the function of reality testing derive from experiences of frustration, and from the possibility of turning away from external stimuli. This may be readily elaborated in a manner accounting for the processing of somatic and environmentally produced stimuli. It is important to keep in mind in so doing, that with the development of psychic structure, the world consists of meaningful stimuli, with meanings being acquired in a complex way. One aspect of this acquisition is the internalization of the manner of designating experience, and the selection of experiences worthy of designation. The distinction between inside and outside appears, thus, to be learned in part by the internalization of the parental attitude to this distinction. Furthermore, it is obviously not simply a question of learning a designation of sensations or objects. Our inner life develops partly as a function of the
communication and of the understanding of other people's meanings. Thus, in learning the distinction of self from object, the child learns that the object distinguishes itself from the child. Clinically, we observe that the failure of the object to make such a distinction, severely impairs the development of this differentiation in the child. In addition, the child does not distinguish between its knowledge about objective reality, and its knowledge of parental belief in values, custom, and so on. This problem has been discussed by Hartmann (1956), and from a somewhat different point of view, by Popper (1960). It is this inherently intersubjective nature of the development of language, inner experience and the knowledge of objective reality which makes clinical inference and the use of empathy possible.

While introspection and other behaviour arise as responses within an interpersonal setting, their integration modulates the responses of the milieu. Behaviour in its social aspect is to be understood, in some sense, by others and is maintained, or abandoned, in a social context partly as a function of the reinforcing or inhibiting responses which it elicits. The socialization of behaviour is what makes it intelligible to others, while the evocation of customary responses helps to confirm one's view of reality. Thus, when the analyst utilizes his own empathic and other responses to patients in his effort to understand them, he utilizes common elements of experience in the development of shared meanings, the system linking inner experience with behaviour. Obviously, divergences in experience, particularly in basic early experiences, will impose limits on empathic response and on the communication of inner experience. On the other hand, a great deal of information about the patient's mode of organizing his experience enables one to see things to some extent from the patient's point of view. It is well known, but perhaps not really understood, that the analyst's associations are thereby modified and, hence, also are his introspections.

We observe that introspective experiences are in many ways like the unsystematic observations of daily life. Commonly shared inner experiences and associations, like consensually valid observations of "objective reality" show many highly individual features. Yet it is the great similarity in the introspections of people of widely differing experience which makes possible the study of the organization of inner experience. The problem of how this organization comes about seems to be related to the questions concerning apparently universal symbolism and dynamics. Premature reduction readily finds an explanation in neural organization, seeking an exact parallel between the two. Culturalist bias naturally sees the organization of inner experience taking on culturally given forms. It seems likely that the essential questions have to do with: what kinds of organization do we find in inner experience, and from what level of complexity in the integration of biological and social factors do the various organizations arise? Weiner (1965), writing in a somewhat different context, emphasizes the need for more refined behavioural observations, so that the inherent properties of the behaviour may be learned, and the functional and organizational properties which might account for them, specified. One might then look for neural organizations having those properties. This is consistent with the view presented here regarding introspection. It must be emphasized, however, that some aspects of inner experience reflect the internalization of patterns deriving their organization from the environmental circumstances, or persons who impose them. Such an emphasis, while perhaps banal, points to the subtleties of the relationships to be sought. An important feature of Freud's contribution to the understanding of inner
experience, is his emphasis on the child's "activity" in the acquisition of such environmentally derived patterns. This is exemplified by the fact that children do not merely take over parental rules, but rather an interpretation of them as they apply to the child's current inner situation. It is this conception which accounts for the interlocking of organizations derivable from all sources, e.g., neural organization, conditioned reflexes, learned patterns and so on. Our psycho-analytic theoretical terms bridge these various levels of organization. I believe it is this fact which gives them the double usage noted by Rubinstein (1965). Although inner experience as reported in the analytic situation clearly reflects contributions from all levels of organization, these sources are only partly distinguishable. The question regarding the extent to which causes are inferable from behaviour will not be discussed here.

Since the introspectable is, no doubt, a kind of final common path, the emergence of a particular state of content and organization may be produced by a variety of circumstances. In discussing the ego's "observing function", Miller, Isaacs and Haggard (1965) have cited the distinction between the motives, processes and utility of observing, and those of "informing". Thus, they indicate the need for the distinction between self-observation and self-report and their separate determinants. The influence of the act of self-observation on the nature of the observed might be mentioned as well. Clinically, these considerations are related to our primary interests. We are also concerned with the degree to which there is concordance between the report of inner experience and the aspects of behaviour. Where there appears to be a congruence between introspections and behaviour, we take the statements as "being about" the "actual" inner experiences. Discord between the report of inner experience and the external behaviour points to conflicts or dissimulation, and does not permit a naive view of the relationship between inner experience and report. It should be noted, however, that the common-sense view of simple correspondence is based on such congruence. The fact that clinical inferences about inner experience are often as good as they are still requires explanation.

The Subjective Viewpoint in Psycho-analysis

Thus far, a number of facets of introspection have been considered. It was noted that, in the nineteenth century, introspectionists regarded introspection as a process whereby incoming sensations could be observed and their composition analysed into elements. For them, the mental was synonymous with the conscious, and the study of the conscious was psychology. The behaviouristic reaction rejected the study of the mental as being unserviceable for a scientific psychology. The behaviourists, therefore, devoted their attention to the publicly observable, describable and, hopefully, measurable aspects of behaviour. The subjects' introspections were not of interest to them, and the experimenter was the only observer. For Freud, concerned with the spontaneously produced associations of his patients, the mental was indeed the subject of psychology. As he often said, however, the mental life included more than consciousness. Formidable as the gulf between these two points of view might appear, developments in both fields make the separation seem less. As Boring (1953) observed, introspection found its way back into behaviourism as verbal report. On the other hand, behaviouristic elements in psycho-analytic observation have become more apparent. Psycho-analytic theory, through the concepts of autonomous ego functions and conflict-free functioning
In the preceding sections, the changing concept of inner experience in psychoanalysis has been sketched and related, to some extent, to developments in theory. The fusion of behaviouristic and introspectional approaches to observation in psychoanalysis has been stressed so that the consequences for theory of such a combined approach may be discussed. The aspect which is to be considered is the position of the observer which is implied by these two aspects of analytic observation. Also of concern is the way in which clinical formulations and more general theoretical formulations reflect different positions of the observer. What is at issue is whether the one who formulates takes the point of view of a spectator, or the point of view of the subject. For the introspectionist, the distinction was unimportant because a trained subject was an objective spectator watching inner events. The behaviourist discarded the idea of a concrete and immediately knowable inner experience. With it, he discarded too, the subject observer and became a spectator of events. What then of the psycho-analyst?

The analyst-as-clinician must formulate an interpretation from his observations, and an interpretation is formulated from the patient's viewpoint. An interpretation brings to light what a patient experiences, has experienced, or, in the case of a reconstruction, probably experienced. This is consistent with our view of our patients as active agents who integrate experiences, interpret them, respond to them, and are in conflict about them. As A. Freud (1936) said, we relate to the patient via his ego. The intervention of the analyst may refer to behaviour he observes, but it is behaviour which is presumably also observable by the patient. In this way, we attempt to broaden the patient's awareness, at times establishing new connexions (Hartmann, 1939), eventually explaining the patient's behaviour and introspections to him. However, in saying that we explain the patient's experience to him, we do not mean that we point out to him its causes. In fact, we regard patient's talking about the causes of their behaviour as a disclaimer of responsibility. Our explanations give the patient's reasons for behaving as he does. We attempt to make his behaviour intelligible to him.

To embark on a thoroughgoing analysis of this issue would be beyond the scope of a paper on introspection, involving as it must, a discussion of the freedom vs. determinism problem and the mind-body problem. Certain comments must be made, however, in order to consider, at least tentatively, the different influences of an introspective method on the clinical interpretation, and more general theoretical formulations of psycho-analysis. The unconscious idea, and particularly the repressed idea, is in principle knowable, and, when made conscious, it fills a gap in consciousness. This refers to the conceptual status of the unconscious idea and is not meant to imply anything about its special properties. Flew's (1956) analysis considers how unconscious ideas may be treated conceptually in the same way as conscious ideation. In discussing dreams, parapraxes and symptoms, Freud (1900), (1901), (1916-1917) repeatedly emphasizes that he intends to explain these psychical products by showing that they have a meaning, and that they fit into a nexus of psychical structures (e.g., 1900, pp. 96, 569). Freud stresses the fact that dreams, slips and symptoms have a sense, although they appear to be inexplicable. Consequently, his interpretation of these apparently meaningless phenomena makes them intelligible. What unites seemingly disparate
behaviour is "psychic determinism", and the directedness of behaviour. It was precisely the requirement for intelligibility in his "purely psychological" theory which led Freud to reject physiological theories of dreams and slips. It would thus appear that for Freud, a psychological explanation must provide intelligibility, and it is an intelligibility from the viewpoint of the subject and his unconscious wishes.

A recent and significant discussion by Mischel (1964) is concerned with the logic of explanation, prediction and clinical activity. Although his analysis deals with a clinical orientation somewhat different from psycho-analysis, this paper has important implications for psycho-analysis. He notes that many psychologists use a model of clinical explanation based on the model of explanation used in physical science. Some analysts do as well. However, citing the S-R model as an example, Mischel points out that behaviour is seen in terms of events, and, thus, from the viewpoint of a spectator. Furthermore, it is the observer who sets up the defining conditions for the S or R classes. On the other hand, in the clinical model of psycho-analysis outlined above, it is the subject's (patient's) viewpoint which is of concern. For the subject, behavioural events, as Mischel observes, are actions. In addition, our efforts to make the patient's behaviour intelligible, are efforts to clarify the way the subject defines situations, what meaning they have for him, and what unexpressed (unconscious) ideas make them fit together. While not speaking of psycho-analysis, Mischel sees in this type of situation concern with content, rather than process, and with rules of classification, rather than laws of behaviour. Mischel elaborates the distinctions between the logic of explanation according to rules and according to laws. The significant point here is that when we speak of a patient's idiosynratic way of perceiving other people, or his particular response to his own impulses, we are discussing, not the laws of his behaviour, but the rules he follows in classifying experience. It is perhaps worth reiterating that these rules are not socially prescribed, and not the dictates of authority. They are idiosyncratic prescriptions, constraints and directives for the organization of experience which arise in the course of individual experience and therefore, reflect it.

We may consider by way of illustration, Freud's (1900) well-known example of hysterical identification (pp. 149–50). Freud tells us that hysterical identification does something for patients, in that it enables them to express in their symptoms their own experiences and those of others. It enables them "to suffer on behalf of a whole crowd of people." It involves a "mental act" which consists in "the unconscious drawing of an inference." The patients in his example may have the same hysterical attack because they "have the same grounds for having it." The identification "expresses a resemblance and is derived from a common element which remains in the unconscious." Freud notes, in passing, that if the inference were conscious, "it might possibly give rise to a fear of having the same attack." In either the case of the contagious hysterical attack, or the fear of an attack, the patient first sees herself as having (or wishing to have) an experience similar to the person having the attack. Secondly, the patient sees (recognizes) that experience, in Freud's example, an unhappy love affair, as grounds for having an attack. Thus, if we know the patient sees things in this way here attack makes sense in terms of this way of seeing things. The rules of clinical inference enable us to guess that she thinks this way if she has an attack under the circumstances described by Freud. In practice we learn our patients' rules by listening for the things that go together in their associations.
This discussion, like Mischel's is intended to highlight the difference between, and independence of, the use of rules and of laws in the explanation of behaviour. Obviously, it is not a case of expressing a preference for one or the other kind of explanation. The point is that we do different things by the use of each of these modes of explanation. If my sketchy attempt to relate this distinction to the clinical formulations of psycho-analysis is correct, it has some significance for psycho-analysis. It means that such subject-oriented formulations deal with the analysis of rules of classification of experience to an important extent. Even genetically oriented interpretations, which see the past behaviour and experiences as providing reasons for subsequent behaviour, would involve the analysis and clarification of rules. Since, at the same time, there can be little doubt that at some level of behavioural organization, laws can be formulated, what kind of relationship between the two kinds of organization can there be? This is an empirical question which can be studied, despite the metatheoretical independence of the two kinds of explanation. It remains to be seen to what extent this is possible in a clinical setting, and to what extent the relationships between rule hierarchies and more general laws of behaviour are deducible from clinical observation. Analytically informed infant observations and laboratory studies of learning can contribute a good deal to our understanding in this area. Perhaps the preceding discussion indicates the lines along which these kinds of observations can be integrated with psycho-analytic observations.

The view offered here, while stressing the organization of content and meaning, should not be construed as implying that psycho-analysis is an "understanding Psychology". Hartmann's critique (1927a) clearly separates the two. In doing so, however, he points to Freud's lack of care in differentiating between "meaningful" and "causally determined". For Freud, Hartmann states, the psychical determinants (causes) were meaningful, and meaningful connexions reached beyond consciousness. To assign a mental product to a meaningful place in the mental life of the patient, was to discover its place among causal relationships. I am suggesting that Freud's use of "meaningful" in fact, does take him beyond experiential description into the realm of explanation. It is not yet, however, an explanation in terms of causes, for the most part. It is, especially on the clinical level, an explanation in terms of rules of classification. It remains for further empirical work to articulate the necessarily content-oriented approach of psycho-analysis (Hartmann, 1927b) with causal explanations. Moreover, further theoretical analysis is required, to determine whether the more "abstract" psycho-analytic terms do, in fact, offer causal explanations.

Even if it is true that clinical interpretations are formulated from the point of view of the subject, the clinical descriptive terminology appears to be formulated "objectively". What sort of status, and what characteristics, do these terms have, then? Rubinstein (1965) states that psycho-analytic theoretical terms have a descriptive and a theoretical meaning, and appears to believe that they are inadequate from a theoretical point of view. Without attempting to resolve such issues, I should like to point out one way in which psycho-analytic theory in Freud's hands attempted to bridge the gap between the introspectable qualities and systematic statements. It has already been noted that the system Cs concept was one such attempt to combine systematic treatment with the self-descriptive quality. There are, in addition, other bridge concepts which, in their definition, link the phenomenal with some statement in systematic language, in "objective" rather than "subjective" terms. One example would be concept of "wish",
which Freud (1900, p. 566) defines as an impulse which seeks to "re-cathect the mnemic image of the perception and to re-evoke the perception itself, that is to say, to re-establish the situation of the original satisfaction." The rest of the passage, and related comments (p. 598), seem to make clear that Freud does not intend it to mean that in the infant the wish in the theoretical sense is experienced as a wish in the phenomenological sense. Yet, it seems equally clear that the two are ultimately the same, in Freud's usage. The utility of this sort of conceptualization is that it retains the functional characteristics of the phenomenological quality and permits it to be treated in a manner similar to other "urges". It is this which permits Freud to speak of day residues as functioning like bodily sensations during sleep.

The experiential qualities of instinctual drives have been discussed by Kohut (1959), who states,

_A drive, then, is an abstraction from innumerable inner experiences; it connotes a psychological quality that cannot be further analysed by introspection; it is the common denominator of sexual and aggressive strivings._ (p. 478)

It has other systematic connotations as well, and as discussed by Freud (1915) was clearly intended to permit correlation of physiological and psychological observation.

A favourite technique of Freud's for enlivening his concepts for his readers, was the use of anthropomorphic or sociomorphic metaphors and analogies. Anthropomorphic metaphors, in particular, served as a bridge between experience and Freud's structural concepts. Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein (1946) have considered the role of metaphor, and its relationship to causal explanation. Metaphorical usage, of course, conveys something of the flavour of immediate experience. However, these authors note, that explanatory concepts must be "at some distance from immediate experience" (cf. Hartmann, 1927b) and that metaphor cannot bring about "the step from empathy to causal explanation." It is not that structural concepts are anthropomorphic, they conclude, but that Freud's concepts lead to an understanding of the role of anthropomorphism in introspective thinking. They offer an example intended to demonstrate that an anthropomorphically described relationship between the ego and superego may be translated into a statement involving "tension" between the two systems. This tension concept appears, again, to imply both experiential and systematic aspects.

**Toward a Psycho-analytic Theory of Introspection**

How then does psycho-analytic theory treat introspection? As has been noted, the points of view of the spectator and the self-observer are in part united by the concept of consciousness as a sense organ for the perception of qualities. In the topographical theory, the conception of consciousness as perceiving the qualities of inner excitation, on the model of external perceptions, did not suffice to describe the varieties of inner scrutiny. Thus, the position of the censorship was variously stated as in Cs, or between systems. In the structural theory, of course, the censorship function is attributed to one agency, the "sense organ" consciousness to another. Still, as is well known, Freud appeared to vacillate in assigning self-observation to the ego or superego. Freud (1933)
noted that the ego can stand aside from itself and take itself as an object. The recognition
of the self and self-representations as not identical with the ego (Hartmann, 1950)
suggests the possibility of some greater precision in the concept of self-observation. The
distinction between the ego's observation of its functioning, and its observation of its
contents, was noted by Sterba (1934). Federn (1952) tried to relate the different facets of
ego function to phenomenological observation through the concept of ego feeling.

It thus becomes clear that we are dealing with a number of "observing functions". Some of
them, e.g., self-observation and introspection, have a phenomenological
aspect—the former at least potentially, the latter by definition. Self-observation, the
observation of the self as currently understood in psycho-analytic theory (Hartmann,
1950); (Jacobson, 1954), (1964); (Lichtenstein, 1965)(Spiegel, 1959), may be conscious
or unconscious. Introspection is always conscious and includes the observation of
everything of which one can be aware, including awareness of experience, contents and
functions of the ego, to the extent that these may be accessible to consciousness. A great
variety of organizations of consciousness (Klein, 1959) of mental activities are covered
by these observing functions. Self-observation, as such, must involve a relatively high
degree of psychic organization, appearing relatively late in development (cf. Jacobson,
1954, p. 87); (Miller, Isaacs and Haggard, 1965). From this, it would follow that
primitive forms of self-other awareness would involve another order of self-scrutiny by
the ego.

It seems clear then, that the ego must in other ways take cognizance of its
functioning in the service of synthetic and integrative functions, regulation of drive
discharge and so on. This idea is already implicit in the concept of the signal affect,
which is a means by which the ego signals itself. These "observations" of ego functioning
by the ego need not, and in some cases, cannot have any phenomenological counterpart.
At this level of conceptualization, we are dealing with a hierarchy of self-regulating
function systems. Although only a small number of these get representation in awareness,
their existence must be postulated on theoretical grounds. In particular, smoothly
integrated functioning of various ego apparatuses, fine regulation of tension and
discharge, the integration of input from somatic sources, and the automatic operation of
defences, require this concept of self-regulation. The failure to distinguish between this
type of the ego's observation of the ego, i.e., automatic self-regulation systems, and the
other varieties of observing function, leads to confusion of conceptual levels. This is then
reflected in impaired understanding of the development of awareness, and, in particular,
the development of self-observation in the stricter sense. I believe, that a similar type of
confusion is possible in Gifford's (1960) discussion of time sense and temporal patterning
in infants. In that discussion, time sense clearly has two kinds of meaning which parallels
a similar dual conception of ego functioning. Explicit recognition of the different levels
and complexity of organizing and regulating, and hence "observing functions", within the
ego, may facilitate our assimilation of such non-analytic observation as direct infant
observation and laboratory studies to clinical observation. It may further clarify the ways
in which certain early-developing autonomous ego functions may be distinguished in
their roles as either precursors, or as primitive organizations which cease to be important
when other types of regulations develop. In the case of self-observation, and the scrutiny
of the inner world of object-representations, a variety of self-regulations are prerequisite.
The functions related to evaluation of inner status are involved in a similar complexity. Some of these "evaluations" would be indistinguishable from the automatic "observations". At the other extreme are the various value systems. Jacobson (1954), (1964) speaks of the self-critical ego which judges ego functions and practical relations to reality in terms of correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate, and so on. She further asserts that mature self-critical ego functions participate in moral self-evaluations.

The mental apparatus as conceived by Freud is an instrument for the integration and organization of bodily physiological stimuli, as represented psychologically, with psychological representations of the external world. As development proceeds, a psychic organization is built up having its own internal interrelationships, and which processes incoming stimuli. Incoming stimuli from the external world must be processed in relation to internal bodily stimuli, and the inner state of relationships within the mental apparatus. Such state stimulus patterns to some extent already reflect physiological patterns, as well. The elaboration of the patterns will then include the behavioural response to stimulation and alterations in state. Since external stimulation has meaning, and particularly interpersonal meaning, the mental apparatus must also be processing pre-established patterns of stimuli and meanings. In these ways, meanings are both established and incorporated.

The incorporation of meanings and patterns may involve the internalization of relationships which are either accidental or arbitrary. The former would be exemplified by the interpretation by a child of a parental act in terms of the child's fantasy, where, in fact, the behaviour of the parent is unrelated to the child. The second condition could be illustrated by the enunciation of a parental value derived, say, from tradition. As remarked earlier, the enunciation of such a value has the status both of a prescription and a statement of fact, for the young child. Not only for the young child, however, since even for adults the distinction is not always an easy one. Anyone who doubts this need but consider for a moment how changeable are the fashions in medical treatment.

The preceding formulation regarding the internalization of preformed patterns in the elaboration of complex patterns of experience and behaviour, coupled with the difficulty of the distinction of prescription and fact, have certain implications for self-observation. The suggestion was offered earlier, that the earliest self-observing function operates only in conjunction with self-criticism. This hypothesis would presumably be confirmed by observations of children, demonstrating an incapacity of children to make observations of thoughts and feelings, without simultaneous reference to their being good or bad. In accord with the distinctions in various kinds of observing functions, this would not be inconsistent with the presence of perception of bodily processes and the distinction of inside and outside, relatively free of critical evaluation (Jacobson, 1954), (1964). The extent to which even these functions in the young child would be unencumbered by judgements attaching to fantasy-life remains an interesting problem. It may be added too, that the relatively objective perception of various aspects of one's own psychic functioning, and of oneself as a social being, must develop via the amalgamation of a variety of part observing functions, and via the separation of the critical functions. Introspection, in the broadest sense, would therefore, not be the same as the "mature" or "integrative" self-observation described in the literature (Jacobson, 1964); (Kramer, 1959); (Miller, Isaacs, and Haggard, 1965). Neither does it seem possible to accept some
purely cognitive model of internal observation as was implied in the various nineteenth-century views. Beyond the hierarchy of self-regulations achieving awareness at some level of complexity, the anthropomorphism of introspective thinking (Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, 1946) seems to arise with the development of complex substructures of personality. As regulations performed by environmental objects are taken over by the psychic apparatus, that is, internalized (Hartmann, 1939), some of these relationships remain introspectable as "inner voices" (Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, 1946); (Jacobson, 1964). The superego, most obviously but not exclusively, has this character of being a piece of the external world taken in for purposes of regulation (cf. Isakower, 1939). The complexity of the introspectable world, and the investment of introspection as an activity would, thus, be partly reflections of the building-up of representational structures, and of structural conflict in the broadest sense.

REFERENCES
ANTHONY, E. J. 1961 "A study of 'screen sensations'." *Psychoanal. Study Child* 16
BREUER, J. and FREUD, S. 1895 Studies on Hysteria. S.E. 2
FEDERN, P. 1952 Ego Psychology and the Psychoses (New York: Basic Books.)
FREUD, S. 1900 The Interpretation of Dreams. S.E. 4-5
FREUD, S. 1901 The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. S.E. 6
FREUD, S. 1911 "Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning." S.E. 12
FREUD, S. 1914 "On narcissism: an introduction." S.E. 14
FREUD, S. 1915 "Instincts and their vicissitudes." S.E. 14
FREUD, S. 1916-17 Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. S.E. 15-16
FREUD, S. 1920 "A note on the prehistory of the technique of analysis." S.E. 18
FREUD, S. 1933 New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. S.E. 22
FREUD, S. 1937 "Constructions in analysis." S.E. 23
GALTON, F. 1879 "Psychometric experiments." *Brain* 2
HARTMAN, H. 1956 "Notes on the reality principle." In:Essays on Ego Psychology 1964
HARTMANN, H. and KRIS, E. 1945 "The genetic approach in psychoanalysis." *Psychoanal. Study Child* 1
HARTMANN, H., KRIS, E. and LOEWENSTEIN, R. 1946 "Comments on the formation of psychic structure." *Psychoanal. Study Child* 2
ISAKOWER, O. 1938 "A contribution to the patho-psychology of phenomena associated with falling asleep." *Int. J. Psychoanal.* 19
ISAKOWER, O. 1939 "On the exceptional position of the auditory sphere Int. J. Psychoanal. 20
JACOBSON, E. 1964 The Self and the Object World (New York: Int. Univ. Press.)
JAMES, W. 1890 The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 1950 .)
KRAMER, M. K. 1959 "On the continuation of the analytic process after psycho-analysis. (a self-observation)." *Int. J. Psychoanal.* 40
LICHTENSTEIN, H. 1965 "Towards a metapsychological definition of the concept of self." *Int. J. Psychoanal.* 46
LOEWENSTEIN, R. M. 1951 "The problem of interpretation." *Psychoanal. Q.* 20
MANDLER, G. and KESSEN, W. 1959 The Language of Psychology (New York: Wiley.)
MISCHEL, T. 1964 "Personal constructs, rules, and the logic of clinical activity." Psychol. Rev. 71
ROSENTHAL, R. 1963a "On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: the experimenter's hypothesis as unintended determinant of experimental results." Amer. Scientist 51
ROSENTHAL, R. 1963b "The effect of experimenter outcome-bias and subject set on awareness in verbal conditioning experiments." J. Verb. Learning and Verb. Behav. 2
SANDLER, J. and ROSENBLATT, B. 1962 "The concept of the representational world." *Psychoanal. Study Child* 17

SPIEGEL, L. S. 1959 "The self, the sense of self, and perception." Psychoanal. Study Child 14

STERBA, R. 1934 "The fate of the ego in analytic therapy." Int. J. Psychoanal. 15

WAELDER, R. 1936 "The principle of multiple function: observations on over-determination." Psychoanal. Q. 5


WERNER, H. and KAPLAN, B. 1963 Symbol Formation (New York: Wiley.)