Notes on Masochism: A Discussion of the History and Development of a Psychoanalytic Concept

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ABSTRACT

The concept of masochism is used in both descriptive and explanatory ways to cover a wide variety of clinical phenomena. Although the concept has been thought to refer to a ubiquitous, fundamental, and paradoxical phenomenon, recent discussions reveal growing uncertainty about the clinical value of the term. The origins of the problem are traced here to Freud's early reliance on concepts borrowed from Krafft-Ebing's sexology. Freud later emphasized structural and object-relations issues. This shift of emphasis was associated with the use of child behavior rather than perversion as the prototype of mental function.

INTRODUCTION

Psychoanalysis as a method of investigation and masochism as a subject of research came into existence at about the same time. The designation of masochism is about ten years older, depending upon the date one chooses for the beginning of psychoanalysis. As a result, the ideas about the special place of the newly defined perversion in sexuality and mental life exerted an influence on the development of psychoanalysis. There were many disagreements among Freud's contemporaries in their efforts to delineate and define a syndrome named masochism, and to discover its broader significance in the lives of men and of animals. These conflicts reflected diverse ways of thinking about scientific problems. Havelock Ellis (1903), for example, offered a combination of romanticized and naturalistic descriptions of animal behavior in an effort to demonstrate the biological roots of sadism in the animal kingdom. Ellis spoke of the "thin veil that divides love and death" (p. 127) throughout nature, thus blending dramatically the psychological and phylogenetic aspects of the sexual function. In particular, the association between the sexual act and cannibalism among some organisms seemed to some authors of the time to be the primitive source of sadism. Ellis added, however, that de Gourmont said that "this sexual cannibalism exerted by the female may have, primarily, no erotic significance: 'She eats him because she is hungry and because when exhausted he is an easy prey'" (p. 128). This pair of formulations evidently indicates a conflict between tragic interpretation and mechanistic explanation.

In Freud's writings, we find efforts to combine and reconcile these ways of thinking that were, at the same time, dramatic, teleological, and mechanistic. He hoped to use his new methods, discoveries, and concepts to solve the problems posed by his contemporaries. In fact, he contributed to a radical change in the way of formulating those problems, which changed the meaning of important new ideas such as masochism.
The term masochism, however, never did have a precise meaning or one that was generally accepted. It was a controversial term except as a literary designation for any phenomenon in which sexual pleasure and physical or mental pain were associated. The writings of Sacher-Masoch, which have been examined in an excellent literary and psychoanalytic study by Lenzer (1975), provided a prototype for all masochistic perversions. As Freud's concept of masochism evolved, the relation of partners in the masochistic perversion became the model for the relation between intrapsychic agencies, and masochism became a fundamental theoretical concept of drives and structure. (Freud made similar theoretical use of the narcissistic perversion as a model for a set of mental relations.) The development of the concept of masochism in Freud's work provides a case study of the formation of psychoanalytic concepts and of their dissolution, as well.

The goal of this paper is to outline the development of masochism as a psychoanalytic concept from its origins in the sexology of Freud's time through its transformation by psychoanalytic investigation and the concomitant changes in psychoanalytic theory. One thesis of this paper is that the evolution of psychoanalytic theory and technique are to some extent the result of the effort to use ideas like masochism as theoretical concepts. As a consequence, new observations became possible, and these, in turn, altered our ways of thinking about old problems. At present, it has become evident that masochism is a term of little precision and that its value is descriptive and evocative. While it is not my intention to offer a theory of masochism, this paper suggests that the term masochism is best used to refer to fantasies in which the association of pleasure and unpleasure is motivated and obligatory, and for perversions that are enactments of such fantasies.

It is true that many people today conclude, as did Freud and his contemporaries, that the extensive use of the term "masochism" to allude to many kinds of phenomena is not merely an indication of casual usage. Instead, they believe that this wide application of the word is evidence that something called "masochism" has a fundamental importance as a concept or phenomenon. However, a careful review of the concept and its usage does not support this view. As demonstrated by panel discussions on problems of masochism relating to theory and technique (Panel, 1956), to narcissism (Panel, 1981), and to depression (Panel, 1983), the seeking for painful experience may be a central or a peripheral but significant factor in many types of clinical situations. Masochism cannot be usefully invoked to explain complex clinical phenomena. It is an aspect of various kinds of pathology that also requires explanation. A further aim of this paper is to explore to some extent the kinds of issues that are referred to when people speak about masochism. Since the main focus is an examination of broad historical and conceptual issues, specific clinical material is not discussed. However, this clarification of concepts has clinical implications and offers an orientation to clinical material.

In Part I of this paper, I shall briefly consider the problem of defining masochism and its usefulness as a concept. Part II presents one of a number of ways in which Freud took Krafft-Ebing's ideas about masochism and gave them a psychoanalytic shape. This combination conserved Krafft-Ebing's outlook to some extent, but it burdened psychoanalysis. In Part III, I shall briefly indicate some aspects of the changed concept of mental function implied in Beyond the Pleasure Principle which led to a diffusion of the concept of masochism into issues of aggression and structure.\[1\]

I

Problems of Usage, Definition, and Nosology

At present, there is general agreement that there are phenomena deserving to be called masochism or masochistic to be found in normal people as well as in people with a variety of pathological
syndromes. This agreement is based on the acceptance of a combination of pain or suffering with sexual pleasure or its derivatives as the defining characteristic of masochism. However, in practice, when considering particular instances of clinically observed behavior, it may be difficult to distinguish between realistically endured suffering and covertly sought pain, or between deliberate self-injury and poor judgment. The nature of the satisfaction, as well as the vicissitudes of libido and aggression, may be equally ambiguous. Clearly, much depends on what is conscious and what is unconscious, and also on whether we are talking about character, perversion, neurosis, or psychosis. Current usage varies according to whether the emphasis is on sexual satisfaction accompanying suffering as a criterion or on self-directed or self-provoked aggression with minimal requirement for sexual satisfaction.

Reporting on the Kris Study Group's examination of the problems of definition and usage with respect to masochism, Nersessian (1983) noted the confusion that arises when a term is used to refer indiscriminately to perversion, behavior, character trait, and instinctual drive. He added an interesting observation: "Not only did we find that not everyone agreed that a particular behavior was masochistic, but also that … it was often very difficult to maintain that view once it was challenged" (p. 3). This observation suggests that multiple viewpoints are possible: from one perspective, behavior may be masochistic, and from another, not.

In an attempt to integrate a recent panel discussion Fischer (Panel, 1981) wondered "whether the concept of masochism, as we think about it … describes primarily a type of behavior, or … is associated with and defined by a certain cluster of metapsychological factors and a certain level of development" (p. 684). More generally, Brenman (1952) indicated the tendency to "confuse the observable behavior with the inferred unconscious operations and their corresponding metapsychological abstractions" (p. 264). It is frequently true, as Rubinstein (1965) noted, that psychoanalytic theoretical terms have more than one level of meaning. In the case of masochism, this multilevel complexity is a property not only of the term itself, but also of the very terms in which it is usually defined: pleasure, sexuality, pain or unpleasure, and aggression.

It seems, then, that a part of what is often dubbed the "puzzle of masochism" concerns some general problems of how we explain things in psychoanalysis. In general, the use of masochism as a label depends on the evocation of the idea of its prototype. It depends on an analogy drawn to the masochistic perversions whose striking and paradoxical characteristic is the combination of sexual pleasure with pain, subjugation, or suffering. When this essential characteristic, loosely ascribed in usage to a wide range of behavior, is refined into a definition to be applied with precision as a diagnosis, we encounter the problems noted. The fact that pleasure and unpleasure are the "essence" in masochism, as they are in our theory, derives in part from Freud's effort to extract essential qualities from behavior and to give them a theoretical status. The idea of a masochistic perversion was the prototype for a masochistic impulse, that is, a component instinctual drive, in the mind. The impulse was hidden in the normal, obvious in pathology. This is the process of reasoning that converts psychology into metapsychology, but it leaves us with the problem of deciding whether a particular kind of suffering qualifies as masochism.

**The Use of Masochism as a Term Describing Behavior**

A major source of confusion in discussions of masochism results from using the term to characterize behavior. In both the psychoanalytic literature and the sexology literature that preceded it, examples of animal behavior combining sexual activity and pain have been cited in an effort to find animal prototypes for human masochism. The methodological problems associated with using such animal analogues are well known. Using behavioral descriptions of people to provide examples of masochism may involve similar issues and are nearly as problematic. In an
extensive review of the literature on biology, psychoanalysis, interpersonal psychology, and social learning theory, Sack and Miller (1975) confirmed the vagueness of the term masochism when it is used descriptively for behavior, except in describing perversion (see also, Shore, et al., 1971). From a psychoanalytic view this is not surprising, since any behavior has a multiplicity of conscious and unconscious meanings. Consequently, if the behavior is to be characterized at all, a dominant organizing fantasy modeled on a masochistic perversion is required. Masochistic fantasies, in turn, may be traceable to genetically older versions of masochistic fantasies, as well as being analyzable into specific conflicts underlying these fantasies.

One problem of applying a diagnosis of masochism to behavior other than perversion is the complex meaning of behavior that is to be characterized as pleasurable or unpleasurable. Another barrier to precise usage is the fact that the term masochism is applied to clinical phenomena evident in a variety of personality types and syndromes. The issue then becomes one of deciding whether the characteristics in question are best thought of as a consequence of something called "masochism," or whether they are more usefully considered to be outcomes of specific conflicts and specific personality constellations. Many authors consider their generalizations about masochism to be valid, irrespective of the patient's clinical diagnosis (Reich, 1933); (Reik, 1939), (1941). It is as though something called "masochism" could be considered to be an independent element, emerging in and separable from the rest of the clinical picture and having a uniform meaning and origin. While this may appear to be the case when masochistic fantasies have a central organizing function, the alternative view holds that manifestations of "masochism" are best treated as an aspect or consequence of the pathology. The behavioral combination of pleasure and unpleasure may be the consequence or the concomitant of conflict resolution in various types of personality structures. However, behavior that can be described as masochistic evidently has different significance and consequences when it is found in different character types (Bak, 1956), (1971).

Brenner (1959), (1982), (1982), (1983) has emphasized the universality of masochism, especially as a consequence of superego formation and functioning. He has also stressed the multiplicity of the sources and of the functions of masochistic traits and fantasies and their association with a variety of symptoms and character disturbances. The presence of masochistic character traits, he believes, does not in itself argue for or against analyzability. Therefore, in themselves they are of limited prognostic significance.

Kernberg (1977), (1984) presented a differential diagnostic classification of various types and degrees of masochism. He described a spectrum of constellations from benign to malignant, having to do with the degree to which superego functions and the tripartite intrapsychic structure are well integrated or, on the contrary, have remained in a relatively more primitive and undifferentiated state. This significant effort to treat masochism as a function of personality organization includes an attempt to distinguish systematically among different types of negative therapeutic reactions. Kernberg noted that these reactions may be based on unconscious guilt, unconscious envy of the analyst, or identification with a primitive, sadistic parent image. Still another level of masochistic character pathology is manifested in alternating sadistic and masochistic traits and behaviors, based on the corresponding identifications.

The considerations I have outlined suggest the conclusion that masochism, except when applied to perversion, is not really a diagnosis, nor does it admit of uniform usage with precise clinical or theoretical implications. The idea that it should have great theoretical significance is a historical matter, to be discussed later. The conclusion of my review at this point is that "masochism" designates a type of fantasy and those clinical phenomena based on those fantasies.
Masochism as a Term Referring to Fantasies

The concept of masochism answers to the need to characterize clinical phenomena dominated by conscious or unconscious fantasies having the prototypic form of masochistic perversions. Masochism is, therefore, a generic and not too specific term for those phenomena and fantasies. It is defined by its similarity to its prototype, rather than by any essential characteristics or by its theoretical status. Such fantasies may be conscious, or they may be enacted consciously or unconsciously. Their unconscious meaning, of necessity, is only revealed through analysis. Some of the people with the most clearly manifest masochistic behavior never come to analysis or are not analyzable when they do (Kronengold and Sterba, 1936); (Loewenstein, 1957); (Resnik, 1972). As unsatisfactory as the state of psychiatric nosology is, other diagnoses may tell us more about the overall mental organization of the patient than the attribution of masochism. It seems evident that descriptively defined syndromes have limited value as models for intrapsychic phenomena. It is true that Freud used syndromes in this way, but they served him best as models for fantasies.

The view that masochism is best understood as applied to fantasy emphasizes the issue of "complex configurations of psychological functioning" (Brenman, 1952) and suggests that in this case the complexity is part of the meaning of the term itself. Masochism is most usefully characterized by a fantasy of a certain kind rather than by behavior leading to pain or the combination of pleasure and unpleasure. Masochistic fantasies are recognized by a preoccupation with combining something the subject regards as pleasurable with something he regards as unpleasurable. The combination points to a set of relations, between affects and between people. The preoccupation with the relations between pleasure and unpleasure that characterizes the fantasies is expressed in the aims, that is, the acts imagined, and the relations between the people involved. While it has sometimes been said that, in masochism, pain is only a condition of pleasure, or that pain is or is not sought for itself, the essential point is that in the fantasy the combination is obligatory. In any particular instance of behavior, only a consideration of the relevant and dominant organizing fantasy, or fantasies, can decide whether the acceptance of unpleasure is a matter of a realistic endurance of suffering, or of a masochistic interpretation of necessity. The interchangeability of roles between subject and object is also characteristic of such fantasies, as is the attachment to objects that are loved ambivalently or hated, but cannot be given up. Of course, in saying that, it is understood that all, or parts, of these fantasies may be unconscious so that the complete fantasy will of necessity involve another person, whereas the manifest part of the fantasy may not. A solitary enactment of a masochistic fantasy may unconsciously represent more than one person as a participant or as an anonymous spectator (McDougall, 1980).

Masochism as a Term Referring to Relations

If we understand masochism to be a relational term that refers to relations between pleasure and unpleasure, and between libido and aggression, as these factors are embodied in relations between objects, then we must emphasize that we are referring to a preoccupation of the masochist with these relations. This understanding is to be distinguished from those principles of explanation in psychoanalytic theory according to which everything is ultimately to be explained in terms of relations between pleasure and unpleasure, and libido and aggression. This is another way of stating the difference between the theoretical and clinical use of terms mentioned earlier. It is the difference between the theoretical explanation of motives and the use of motives as a clinical explanation. The conjunction of pleasure and unpleasure in masochism is motivated.
This restatement of what is generally well known is necessitated by the easy slippage that occurs between metapsychological and clinical explanation. This slippage also confuses efforts to arrive at precision of usage in distinguishing problems of masochism from problems of self-directed aggression. However, hopes for precision at the clinical level are bound to be disappointed for another reason as well; that is, by the fact that issues of unpleasure inevitably involve vicissitudes of aggression. A number of emphases are possible, depending on whether the fantasy is organized around some version of a need for unpleasure (punishment, magical propitiation, or pain), a need to extract pleasure from adversity, the need to deflect or overcome aggression toward a loved, needed, or feared object, or a need to obtain satisfactions in a passive mode, enforced or voluntary. The attachment to the painful aspects of the relationships, the equating of passivity with victimization, and the confusion of activity with aggression are emphases common to masochistic fantasies.

The issues outlined are relevant in some fashion to every stage of development. Clinically observable masochistic organizations, manifest or latent, may take as their starting point painful experiences and disturbances in object relations at any period of childhood, preserving the struggle to balance pleasure and unpleasure and to control and express the attendant aggression in an endlessly repeated scenario.

The multiplicity of issues and emphases giving rise to masochistic resolutions makes it unnecessary to decide whether it is "really" pain that masochists want, a debate that has accompanied the idea of masochism since its inception. The unpleasure or pain always has some value and interpretable meaning to the masochist, and is sought for this reason, whether the reason is excitement (Freud, 1915), a relief from the tension of the excitement (Reich, 1933), an avoidance of some other pain (Eidelberg, 1934), a different kind of satisfaction (Horney, 1939), or an avoidance of "real" pain and passivity (Keiser, 1949). Any of these reasons for coupling pleasure and unpleasure may be relevant in a particular case. I believe that these authors need to insist that masochists do not "really" want pain because of their belief that striving for unpleasure goes against the pleasure principle. Their reasoning provides another example of the slippage between levels of explanation.

In summary, some of the difficulties of usage, definition, and nosology associated with the concept of masochism result from the effort to get at the "essence" of a clinical concept, that is, a single distinguishing characteristic, factor, or cause. I have suggested instead that masochism is a concept belonging to a certain level of complexity and is not reducible without loss of meaning. It is a clinical concept having to do with a group of fantasies. The masochistic perversions are concrete enactments of such fantasies and serve as prototypes for clinical interpretation. With any effort to dissect masochism conceptually or to find an essential universal function for it, masochism dissolves into the specific issues that go into its composition: vicissitudes of pleasure and unpleasure, of aggression, of activity and passivity in relation to authority, of significant identifications, and of impulse control and reality testing. Historically, the relations between these concepts and masochism gave masochism a special significance in Freud's theoretical formulations as a basic mental force, that is, as a component of the sexual instinct and then as an expression of the death instinct.

II

The Origins and Problems of the Concept of Masochism in Freud's Work

Freud's sexual theories amalgamated the teachings of the sexologists who were his contemporaries with ideas about the neuroses and the unconscious, developed in association with his emerging
psychoanalytic method. The extraordinary originality of Freud's theory of neurosis, starting with
the idea of hysteria as the negative of an unconscious perversion (1896), tends to obscure the
extent to which Freud's ideas about sexuality and the perversions were taken over from his
contemporaries, especially Krafft-Ebing. In one sense, the development of the concepts of sadism
and masochism in Freud's work can be seen as an analogue of the processes in mental
development in which the early stages are preserved alongside their transformations. In the case
of sadomasochism, some general ideas, as well as specific issues, can be traced from Krafft-Ebing
through "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (Freud, 1924). Freud's continued involvement
with the work of Krafft-Ebing, acknowledged in the first of the Three Essays (1905), has helped to
keep alive the view that masochism is a puzzling force in mental life. The importance that Krafft-
Ebing ascribed to masochism probably contributed as well to the later diffusion of the concept to
cover a variety of issues more usefully considered as vicissitudes of aggression (cf., Glover,
1933).

It is not possible to present here a detailed account of Freud's efforts to establish sadism and
masochism as fundamental instinctual components of the libido. In his concept of the instinctual
drives associated with the oral, anal, and genital zones, the component drives had both sexual and
self-preservative aspects. Consistency required that he find both sexual and self-preservative
components for sadism and masochism as well. In addition, he had to account for his belief that
sadism and masochism were special because they were directed at objects from the very first.
Since they occurred as a pair of instinctual drive components, he thought one of them had to be
primary. Finally, he had to account for the relation of sadism and masochism to bisexuality, so that
their developmental transformations led to normal masculinity and femininity or to sadistic and
masochistic perversions.

To provide some background, I shall outline briefly some of Krafft-Ebing's views on sadism and
masochism that Freud accepted and then modified in fitting them to his own ideas about mental
function derived from psychoanalysis. In particular, I shall discuss Krafft-Ebing's ideas about a
triad consisting of (1) erotogenic pain, (2) idealization in the form of subjugation to an object
providing sexual gratification, and (3) sexual activity. After undergoing psychoanalytic
transformation, these elements reappeared in Freud's work on masochism.

From a psychoanalyst's point of view, Krafft-Ebing's great book opens like an overture in which
themes are found that became leitmotivs in Freud's ideas on sex. At the same time, the first of the
Three Essays contains many passages that paraphrase Krafft-Ebing's aphoristic generalizations
and those of other contemporaries. Ideas that we associate with Freud, such as the ubiquitous
influence of sexuality in all areas of human thought, feeling, and culture; the meeting of the
highest and lowest in sexuality; the continuity of the normal and the abnormal, of the animal and
the human; the psychic nature of perversions; the rule of "Hunger and Love" that Schiller's poem
portrays, all are brought to us by Freud from Krafft-Ebing and others. It seems likely that any
sophisticated reader of the Three Essays in 1905 would have recognized familiar echoes and
shared with Freud a familiar context, even as he was being jarred by what was shockingly new.

Some of Krafft-Ebing's Ideas on Masochism

In the successive editions of Krafft-Ebing's influential book that Freud received from the author
and underlined as he read (Sulloway, 1979), the following ideas on masochism can be found:

Sadism and masochism frequently, if not always, occur together. One may
predominate, the other may be latent. Pleasure in pain and suffering, as well as in
causing them, may be normal, particularly in women, and are to some extent a
matter of custom, even when of marked intensity. Sadism is an extension and exaggeration of normal activity and aggressiveness associated with masculinity. Masochism extends and exaggerates the passivity and submissiveness associated with femininity. Masochism in men is a feminine factor but is not homosexuality, or only incompletely so. Being flagellated is normally sexually exciting and operates through a spinal reflex. This is not masochism. In any case, said Krafft-Ebing, pain and the idea of pain are not the essential thing in masochism, although many people say they are. Masochism is a psychic disorder, he argued. The essential feature is sexual excitement accompanying subjugation and humiliation. Pain through whipping is only an extreme form of subjugation, and it profits, in addition, from the erotogenic factor. Krafft-Ebing believed that sadism and masochism were the most fundamental perversions. It is surprising to learn that he thought masochism was an "unconscious motive" for foot fetishism and that unconscious sadism was connected with an interest in death. While Krafft-Ebing considered pain to be one normal contributing, though subsidiary, factor in masochism, the main normal root was dependence on, and submission to, a love object, exaggerated into a condition he called "sexual bondage." Those people who became perverts were alleged to be sexually hyperexcitable. Masochists had a "disposition to sexual ecstasy" that led them to respond to maltreatment with "lustful emotion." The impulse in masochism is directed to the acts expressing the tyranny and not to the object. The factors of erotogenic pain and bondage to a sexual object might be abnormally developed in some people and serve their sexual activity without constituting a perversion.

This brief account does not do justice to the complexity of Krafft-Ebing's formulations or to the many affiliations with ideas that Freud seems to have taken for granted. In Krafft-Ebing's views, as I've outlined them, we find a triad of allegedly normal or abnormally exaggerated phenomena: erotogenic pain, sexual bondage, and sexual activity in which both pain and emotional bondage may play a variable role. These three elements became masochism, a perversion, when the psychopathic disposition to "sexual ecstasy" was awakened, perhaps by a chance occurrence in childhood, although this was not necessary. Krafft-Ebing believed that childhood events, such as the legendary beating of Rousseau (cited subsequently by Freud, too), were at most subsidiary factors in the etiology of masochism, occasions for its emergence rather than its cause.

**Freud's Early Views on Masochism**

Before the *Three Essays* appeared, the definition, essence, and boundaries of masochism were already a subject of some controversy, as they are today. These uncertainties are to some extent reflected in Freud's early ideas.

Freud pointed to this controversy in 1905. He remarked that Krafft-Ebing's use of the terms sadism and masochism emphasized the "pleasure in any form of humiliation or subjection" while Schrenk-Notzing's term "algolagnia" emphasized the factors of pain and cruelty (Freud, 1905, p. 157). Some of the turnings in the development of Freud's ideas on sadomasochism can be read as his effort to integrate these two views, one emphasizing the interpersonal and object-relationship factors, the other the erotogenic factor.

In view of the emphasis Krafft-Ebing placed on "sexual bondage," it is not surprising that in 1905, Freud wrote (p. 158, n.) that masochism "arises from sexual overvaluation as a necessary psychical consequence of the choice of a sexual object." He suggested, in addition, that the "credulity of love" associated with the overvaluation of the object was "the … fundamental source
of authority" (p. 150) and was related to suggestibility. This is entirely in keeping with his adherence to Krafft-Ebing's views. The further elaboration of this close association between masochism, authority, and idealization appeared later in the superego concept. This is one aspect of the relation between the object-related and erotogenic roots of masochism under discussion.

**Freud's Later Views on Masochism**

In "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (1924), the factors of erotogenic pain, subjugation to a sexual object, and sexual activity in which the other factors played a part had acquired a developmental and structural significance in Freud's theory. There the triad became three observable forms of masochism: the erotogenic, the moral, and the feminine. The erotogenic, Freud said, underlies the other two, and its "basis must be sought along biological and constitutional lines …" (p. 161). In other words, it is developmentally the oldest and belongs to the id. Moral masochism, like "sexual bondage," is a sexualized submission to a loved object, who, in this case, is enshrined uneasily in the superego. Feminine masochism refers to the perversion and is an infantile sexual development belonging to the ego. A peculiarity of Freud's introduction to his three types of masochism creates an ambiguity about the relations among erotogenic masochism, feminine masochism, and the masochistic perversion, so that some authors equate the perversion with erotogenic masochism, others with feminine masochism. This results from Freud's (1924, p. 161) writing that "masochism comes under our observation in three forms: as a condition imposed on sexual excitation, as an expression of the feminine nature, and as a norm of behaviour." It sounds as though the "condition imposed on sexual excitation" describes masochistic perversion, since the perversion is often defined in this way, and as though "an expression of the feminine nature" describes women. Certainly much of the literature on femininity and female sexuality cites the passage in this sense. However, it is clear in what follows immediately that feminine masochism is the perversion and that erotogenic masochism is independent of gender. "Feminine nature," in this context, would seem to refer to femininity as an element of bisexuality (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967). This conception is very likely a derivative of the ideas considered by Krafft-Ebing to the effect that masochism in men involves a feminine inheritance and might be a "rudimentary contrary sexual instinct," that is, a homosexual impulse.

While the triad of erotogenic masochism, feminine masochism, and moral masochism is found in a primitive form in Krafft-Ebing and in the Three Essays, its final form is an expression of Freud's theory of psychosexual development, his concept of narcissism, the structural model, and the dual instinctual drive theory. Freud's equation of erotogenic masochism with a primary masochism derived from libidinally bound destructive instinct finally provided an elegant, if unsatisfactory, solution to a number of the old problems that Freud was trying to solve. Primary masochism, a representative of the destructive drive within the organism, was consistent with, and was an analogue of, primary narcissism. It was also the unitary origin of masochism and sadism that Freud wanted. However, while masochism was primary on the metapsychological level, it was secondary on the clinical level. That is, Freud had long held that clinically observed masochism had its origin in a turning of sadism against the self. This idea was retained as the concept of secondary masochism. Freud's models of development and neurogenesis could still be used to account for the persistence of erotogenic masochism throughout development under "changing psychical coatings."

It may be of some significance, too, that in this transformation of pre-Freudian concepts into their new theoretical context, Freud asserted the primacy of erotogenic masochism, in contradiction to the view that Krafft-Ebing vigorously defended. Of course, Freud's was no longer really the old erotogenic masochism but a new theoretical concept equated with the old. That is, the derivation of primary masochism from a combination of life and death instincts in the organism was the
metapsychological counterpart of the "biological and constitutional lines" mentioned above. The two could then be bridged by definition, equating primary masochism with erotogenic masochism. This was the solution to the "economic problem of masochism," the problem of how pain and unpleasure can become aims.

In "A Child is Being Beaten," Freud (1919) had tried to approach the economic problem of how pleasure arose from unpleasure in masochism. In that paper, he demonstrated that the infantile beating fantasy, called a "primary trait of perversion" by the sexologists, had its origin in oedipal conflict. He did this in the context of a contrast between the old way of thinking about perversions, that is, "primary trait of perversion," and his new way of thinking, derived from psychoanalysis. He believed that the unpleasure came from the guilt associated with the oedipal fantasy, but this was not yet an economic solution. However, his discussion of beating fantasies contributed to his developing ideas on the object relationship pole of the masochism concept. This aspect of the problem was already an important part of Freud's discussion of instinctual vicissitudes in 1915. After that more theoretical formulation, Freud (1919) then illustrated some important points in the context of fantasy development. First, the "premature growth of a single sexual component" (p. 192) that characterized the perversion was seen as emerging in connection with the oedipus complex. Second, the fantasy was a representation of an imagined sexual relation between father and child. Third, the person having the fantasy might play one role consciously, another unconsciously. Fourth, in male perverts the "masochistic attitude coincides with a feminine one" (p. 197), and may already do so in childhood. (In this connection, it should be remembered that "A Child is Being Beaten" concerns infantile perversion as discovered in neurotics. Most of Freud's patients were women. "The Economic Problem of Masochism" deals with feminine masochism in adult male perverts.) Finally, the role of the sense of guilt achieves special importance. It attests to the unconscious persistence of incestuous desires that find expression in the masochistic fantasies. The presence of unconscious masochistic fantasies leads to a propensity for the enactments of beating equivalents with people "in the class of fathers."

While the 1919 paper established an origin in object-related conflict for the perversions, or at least for masochism, the question as to why one oedipus complex would lead to a neurosis, another to perversion remained unexplained, except by constitution. An explanation in terms of preoedipal conflict as the source of the disposition to perversion was still to be formulated.

The central position accorded to guilt and to the tendency to re-enactment of the disguised beating fantasies opened the way to the discussion of "moral masochism" in 1924. The relations between this concept, the repetition compulsion, the destructive instinct, and the structural theory is one of the most interesting chapters in the development of psychoanalytic theory. Of this complex and intriguing story, I shall mention only two points.

The first point is that with the conceptualization of moral masochism, Krafft-Ebing's requirement of a conscious link with sexuality was discarded, as was a requirement that suffering should come from a love object. In moral masochism, the important thing was that unconscious guilt required punishment. In this way, Freud's formulation of moral masochism radically changed the concept of masochism that he had inherited. Gone was the special significance of masochism as a perversion that was supposed to have a fundamental link to activity-passivity and to masculinity-femininity in human nature. Masochism was either a fundamental metapsychological principle exemplifying drive fusion, or, like any other pathological syndrome, it was a possible structuralized outcome of the oedipus complex. The second point is that Freud's first formulation of the problem of moral masochism permits us to regard it as either a defect in superego formation, or as a regression to superego precursors. In these reformulations, Freud shifted his model to one in which structure and object relations were emphasized more than formerly, while genetic and economic considerations retained great importance.
An interesting outcome of these developments is that, in the current literature, moral masochism has in a sense become the new prototype for masochism, and there has been a concomitant tendency to desexualize masochism in common usage. Consequently, the exploration of problems of guilt and suffering is generally classified as a problem of understanding masochism, as though masochism were the superordinate concept. This reminds us that the perversion "masochism" was at one time a model of the mental life and "masochism" a force in the mind. On the other hand, any effort to understand the perversions requires an examination of narcissism, guilt, and aggression, which are regarded as more fundamental issues. While I believe this major shift in conceptualization contributed to the confusion associated today with the term masochism, the problems of superego formation, aggression, and object relations associated with the shift have been central to recent developments in psychoanalysis. They can therefore be recognized as the continuation and elaboration of the concepts related to overvaluation, idealization, identification, and authority which were originally subordinated to the problem of masochism.

III

Changing Prototypes for Psychoanalytic Concepts

In the Three Essays, the perversions became the prototypes for the mental life of childhood. Then, the many similarities between normal and pathological sexual types, and their diversity, as described by the sexologists, could be arranged in developmental series and explained as prematurely developed and fixated instinctual components. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the child's game was offered as the normal prototype of pathological repetition. In his famous example of the child throwing its spool from the crib and retrieving it, Freud revived the idea of non-erotic mastery over trauma. He had originally suggested that a drive for mastery was one of the non-erotic roots of sadism. He now proposed that the child was mastering the pain of separation by controlling the object through a fantasy enacted in play. Thus, the prototype was now a complex and motivated behavior of infancy expressing aggression. Freud also described the mechanism of "identification with the aggressor" in this context, although he did not name it.

In the past, Freud's interest had centered on the turning of activity into passivity that was associated with processes such as object love turning to narcissism, sadism turning to masochism, and masculine aims changing to feminine aims in both boys and girls. Now, in contrast, he turned his attention to the taking over of the object's role, the turning of passivity into activity, which became important in the mastery of trauma, in the development of the ego, and in the formation of the superego. Identification now had the meaning not only of a type of libidinal attachment, but also of the acquisition of the love object's competence, power, and authority. In the case of the ego ideal and the superego, under optimal conditions, this led to independence from the object and to internalization of the object's authority and of narcissistic regulation. In other words, this was self-mastery and also a form of turning passivity, in relation to the object, into activity, toward the drives and either toward the object, or toward a substitute for it.

The child's game as a prototype served to focus on an additional set of factors in psychoanalytic explanation. First, Freud saw the impulse to play as governed by a primitive need for repetition that pleasure-seeking alone could not explain. Therefore, the assumption of an active role was assumed to have a value beyond its economic pleasure value. In addition, taking over the active role in play might be a stage in identification, thus linking the process to narcissism. Finally, Freud's choice of play as a prototype pointed to mechanisms for the patterning of aggression.
It should not be forgotten that these factors did not replace the more familiar concepts relating to conflict, defense, and tension reduction leading to pleasurable repetition. Something had been added that belongs at present to a concept of the patterning of ego organizations modeled on object relations. This renewed emphasis on mastery and adaptation reflected Freud's growing interest in what he had called (Freud, 1915) a polarity of the mental life involving the relations between the ego and the external world. This interest was subsequently developed further in his papers on reality in neurosis and psychosis, on disavowal in fetishism, and on splits in the ego.

A similar prototype derived from children's play was suggested by Loewenstein (1938). In a far-ranging paper on masochism, he suggested that the perversions have playful aspects and are adaptations to danger. The practices of the masochist, he believed, repeat threats of punishment from childhood and, by eroticizing them in perverse acts, turn them into a form of satisfaction. The partner of the masochist is, therefore, a new edition of the dangerous person of childhood who is now forced to participate in the formerly prohibited sexual satisfaction.

The parallels to the play of children are evident in this interpretation of masochistic perversion. Loewenstein then described the mechanism to which in 1957 he gave the name "the seduction of the aggressor." He described the games that adults initiate with children involving threatening, frightening, teasing, and a final reconciliation that shows the child that "it's all in fun." The children, in turn, initiate the games with mixtures of fear and excitement, followed by relief and pleasure. Loewenstein suggested that such games could help to overcome fear and helplessness by controlling the aggression of both the adult and the child. Furthermore, the erotic nuances in the adult's aggression provided the link between sadism and masochism. For Loewenstein, such games are a weapon of the weak, an attempted adaptation to reality. They are a training in bearing frustration and danger from other people, while assuring the child of the love and affection of the adult (cf., Lewinsky, 1944). The perverse practice can also be regarded as a stereotyped and repetitive kind of game resembling the form and function of very young children's play.

Ideas similar to Loewenstein's have been elaborated with respect to masochism by Smirnoff (1969) and with respect to perversions in general by Stoller (1975), with more explicit attention to the role of aggression.

In these children's games and in the pervert's activities, we can recognize a characteristic of masochistic fantasies of all kinds; namely, that sources of frustration are made to yield satisfaction. Necessity becomes not a virtue but a pleasure. (In "moral masochism," on the other hand, it is suffering that may become a virtue providing narcissistic satisfaction.) We can also recognize in Loewenstein's formulation a relation to the screen memories of masochists, like Rousseau, who treat the punishing person of childhood as a seducer, obscuring the victim's own inner conflicts.

According to Loewenstein, the turning back of aggression, and its expression in masochistic games, is to be distinguished from self-directed aggression. The significance of Loewenstein's discussion lies in its provision of a prototype of masochistic fantasy and perverse activity. A prototype is not a cause, and I am not suggesting that such games are the origin of masochism, although they may provide a considerable scope for adult sadism. How real a contribution such games might make to masochism would depend on how real the danger seemed to the child, how much real adaptation and mastery was required. Where danger and excitement are really only play, the games provide a structure for fantasy and an example for the child in the affectionate management of aggression in object relations. However, this is a relatively benign childhood origin for phenomena often considered to be masochism, or for masochistic fantasies, compared to the severe traumatic experiences in childhood, such as genuine mistreatment of a physical kind,
emotional torment, or traumatic abandonment described by a number of authors (Fraiberg, 1982); (Galenson, 1983); (Glenn, 1984); (Herzog, 1983). These qualitatively different interactions provide an example of how the developmental impact of different types of experiences would shape rather different forms of phenomena that, descriptively, could be considered to be masochism.

The significance of the games involving teasing, threats and relief, and so on, is that they provide a model of interaction both for the psychoanalytic theoretician and for the child. The theoretician recognizes in them a form for many fantasies and interactions in which the roles of the participants may be exchanged. We can find in these examples a model of the interactions between parent and child that contribute to the establishment of ego ideal and superego functions. For the child, enactments with adults may well provide a form, derived from a real experience, into which many fantasies may be fitted. That is, any fantasy involving the interchange of roles, such as the initiator of the interaction, the stimulator, the one who is excited, the one who is doing, the one who is done to, and so on, may be fitted into this model so long as the mutual modulation of affect and control of the response is involved.

The game described by Freud was a model of the mastery of aggression associated with object loss in the absence of the object, while the game described by Loewenstein involved the mastery of aggression in the presence of the object. Both descriptions direct our attention to the relation to reality, and to the acquisition of internal regulations of aggression and tension. These two games point, therefore, to an aspect of psychic structure, on the one hand, and to a period of development in childhood, on the other. By this I mean that they refer to the variable interactions in object relations around the issues of the control of the object and control of one's own states of tension and impulse. From the genetic point of view, this is usually referred to as a preoedipal issue, but more significant is its meaning as a prestructural issue. It has to do with the extent to which the locus of control shifts from object to self and the way this is represented in fantasies prior to and during superego and ego ideal formation, as extensively discussed by many writers, especially Jacobson (1964).

These issues involving object control, affect control, and impulse control are important in the understanding of character disorders. In the games described above, an intricate set of relations between these factors can be discerned. First, there is the self-control of aggression enforced by the aggression of the adult. Second, there is the control of the adult's aggression by the affective display of the child. Third, this control of the adult serves indirectly as a kind of regulation of the child's affect to the extent that it limits behavior upsetting to the child. Finally, to the extent that the pleasure or discomfort in the game is mutual, we can say that the child is also regulating the affect of the adult. There is in this way a delicate balance of self-control, control by the object, and control of the object for both participants.

The significant point in relation to masochism is that these issues are a central part of the behavior and fantasies of patients who are loosely called masochistic. Since these same issues of control and regulation of aggression are normally associated with superego formation during development, people often speak of masochism when masochistic fantasies are of secondary importance and the problems involve the superego. On the other hand, because of the overlap of issues, masochism is sometimes regarded as primarily a consequence of superego development, ignoring the possibility that early interactions fostering self-injurious behavior may eventually lead simultaneously to masochistic fantasies and behavior (in the sense used in this paper) and to faulty superego development. These considerations account both for the frequency with which severe character disorders are said to be masochistic and for the dissolution of the concept of
masochism. However, in association with superego issues, a stable concept of masochism becomes even more elusive.

Sandler (1960) persuasively discussed "the apparent 'dissolution' of the superego concept, as a result of increased knowledge of its origins and as a consequence of the regressive processes which occur in the course of psychoanalytic work ...(p. 145). Turning to the regression of the superego in the treatment of children, he remarked on the necessity of considering the child's relation to authority without at first taking into account the distinction between inner and outer authority. It was apparently necessary in his work with the Hampstead Index to consider such issues as the types of control, the ways a child gains or loses narcissistic supplies, how the child responds in the face of fear of authority, how he attempts to restore narcissistic equilibrium after conflict with authority, irrespective of whether the authority is the superego or its representatives. In adults with severe character pathology, we may encounter similar issues and, therefore, the ambiguities in the use of the term masochism noted at the beginning of this essay. These ambiguities are associated with the unresolved problems in superego development that lead to self-damaging behavior. The self-harm is not a function only of a sense of guilt, but also of two other factors. First is a need to concretize fantasy and to express it in action, rather than in thoughts alone. The urgency of the push to action forces interactions with other people and leads to familiar difficulties in the course of therapy. Second, there is an associated *primitive conception of reality*, that is, of sources of pleasure and unpleasure. Both of these factors lead to crises in regulating aggression and affect states.

The importance of action in such clinical situations poses considerable methodological difficulty in understanding the relationship of such behavior to masochism. To the extent that a self-injurious behavior is based on infantile perceptions, it may not necessarily be an expression of wishes to suffer or of masochistic fantasies, but rather an unintended consequence of action. To the extent that the forcing of action in treatment occurs, the *unconscious* meaning of even the manifest sexual masochism that may be present in such cases may not be discoverable.

It has been suggested (Panel, 1982) that a developmental line of masochism might be described. However, it seems to me that the foregoing considerations render such an enterprise doubtful, as to both value and success. The reason is that a developmental line requires clearly describable phenomena as an end-point. As we have seen, the term masochism is used to allude to a variety of developmental end-points for which we have no reason to assume a common developmental pathway. What is necessary is a better understanding of the developments of pleasures and sufferings and their relationship to cognitive development, such that what tempts an observer to regard something as obviously unpleasurable or pleasurable can be understood more satisfactorily from the child's point of view or from the patient's point of view.

Freud's use of a new prototype for mental life in 1920 coincided roughly with the beginning of child analysis. The new prototype marked a shift from an emphasis on the impetus and the repressed forces to an emphasis on mental organization. (It comes as a surprise to us when we first learn that Freud did not describe "The Infantile Genital Organization" until 1923, although he was well aware of phallic impulses, castration anxiety, and so on, long before.) So long as impulses were emphasized, the sexual acts of perverts such as narcissists and masochists were suitable models for the mental life. Since the perversions are concrete enactments of sexual fantasies, they are suitable prototypes for fantasy organizations that are the unconscious basis for conscious daydreams or are expressed in actions in disguised ways. In other words, as long as the patient's conflicts are organized by fantasies similar to perverse acts, or can be understood as arising from defenses against the emergence of such fantasies into consciousness, the perversions can, to some extent, serve as a model of mental life. In this way, Freud pointed out that beating
fantasies in childhood could give rise to a variety of later outcomes. A. Freud (1922) then described the evolution of beating fantasies into daydreams, and Arlow (1971) described character traits modeled on perversions.

However, while some aspects of mental organizations may be seen to be similar to or to arise from perverse fantasies, the organization of perversions cannot be explained by such fantasies alone. The multiplicity of unconscious fantasies expressed in perverse acts is an indication of how behavioral organizations, or forms, can accommodate a wide variety of fantasies. At a different level, a particular type of fantasy scenario is a suitable representation for a wide variety of conflicts.

When introducing the child as a model of mental life, Freud was pointing to the fact that behavioral organization depended on more than the ways pleasure came from wish fulfillment. Loewenstein's model pointed to aspects of the organization of masochism that went beyond the content of the masochistic scenario. This step pointed to the fact that while an adult masochistic perversion might be the enactment of a child's sexual fantasy, there were childhood enactments of similar form that did not have the content of perversions. In fact, that form of interaction could be used to represent a number of interpersonal and intrapsychic relations. It is also evident that playful interactions of that type do not end in infancy, but, to paraphrase Freud, persist with "changing psychical coatings" throughout development and give a shape to object relations. Pursuing this line of thought leads into issues of the control of aggression and the relations to authority, which are the intrapsychic developments modeled on such parent-child interactions. However, leaving such considerations on one side, I shall comment only on some implications of the use of child behavior as a model.

The child is in many ways a good model of adult mental life because childlike forms of thought organize fantasies. This promotes the idea that particular infantile motives might be associated with such forms, as in fact they sometimes are when the form itself is used as a representation. However, it is also true that a particular form may be the vehicle of many different motives, a fact that favors displacement, defense, changes of function, and regressions in the course of normal development and in the service of the ego.

The well-known problems of using child behavior as a model can be recognized in Freud's example. On the one hand, he gave an empathic interpretation of the infant's behavior, based on the limited free associations available: the infant's distorted utterances of "fort" and "da" coupled with play actions. On the other hand, he interpreted the function of the behavior in terms that were biological—the repetition compulsion—and not psychologically motivational. In general, then, we understand infant behavior in a behavioristic or biological way from its context, even when we interpret that behavior psychoanalytically. Only in a limited sense do we understand its subjective meaning. Here, the understanding does not mean the interpretation of a fantasy, although we cannot rule out the possibility that rudimentary fantasy of some kind guides the infant's actions. Nor does understanding imply the completion of a fragmented narrative or filling in the gaps of consciousness, unless we want to greatly extend the meaning of these ideas. Understanding here means knowing the properties of the system well enough to intervene usefully; to know, for instance, that a loud wail at two o'clock in the morning means that it's time for a feeding. (To use a more mechanical metaphor, the squeaking wheel needs, though it is not crying out for, grease.) The important point is a genetic one that goes beyond our use of the model to formulate ideas about the organization of mental life in the clinical situation. That is, the child is organizing behavior, and he will use that behavior in its affective context as a model for his fantasies. When the child uses behavioral interactions of the type Loewenstein described as a model for his fantasies, the behavior and all the emotional concomitants are the precursors of his
mental life as an older child. When the psychoanalyst uses those behaviors as a model, it is as a precursor to theory. It is important for us to know when we are speaking of our use of child behavior as a model and when we are speaking of the child's use of the model.

Many patients acting self-destructively present similar problems for interpretation. When they are not analyzable, descriptions of their behavior are likely to be taken for dynamics, manifest as identical with unconscious. The problem of understanding such behavior is similar methodologically to the understanding of the self-injuring behavior of some children (Fraiberg, 1982). While management based on understanding of behavior, in the sense indicated above, may be possible, understanding of the mental life is likely to be limited to the grossest manifestations and generalizations, however inspired psychoanalytic speculation may be.

Whereas the widespread appearance of self-injurious behavior was, in Freud's time and before, interpreted as implying the universality of something fundamental called "masochism"—an elementary force, a fundamental fixation, or a central conflict—I am suggesting a somewhat different view. Behaviors that appear self-destructive to an observer may be organized to serve a variety of functions having to do with the regulation of unpleasurable affects, pain, and aggression. The term masochism will be most usefully and understandably applied to those activities organized by fantasies involving the obligatory combination of pleasure and unpleasure, or to the fantasies themselves. This is not to dismiss other observations of organization and function as irrelevant but to emphasize the problems in utilizing them and conceptualizing them along with our analytic data.

**SUMMARY**

Narcissistic, sexualized, and guilt-ridden forms of self-injury are generally associated with the term "moral masochism." While masochistic fantasies, in the restricted sense that I have advocated, may be present and sometimes conscious, such fantasies may not be the main organizing fantasies, but are, at times, themselves derivatives of more fundamental organizers. The more significant issues may then concern problems in the development of the regulation of aggression and the internalization of the authority for its control, based on some form of identification with fantasied controlling objects. Eventually, in the course of development, these became superego issues and are reflected in neurotic versions of masochistic fantasies, as well as in some problems of unconscious guilt. The frequent association of difficulties in this area with disturbances in the judgment of reality accounts for the frequent appearance of what are taken to be masochistic phenomena in severe character disorders. Although the infantile developmental aspects of these problems are usually emphasized, it is possible that the close association of traumatic experience and vicissitudes of aggression may permit the development of guilt syndromes and masochistic fantasies beyond childhood (Blum, 1978).

This survey suggests that masochism is among those psychoanalytic concepts carried over from an earlier period whose purposes it was created to serve and whose preconceptions it was designed to fit. Those purposes and concepts are no longer ours, nor are the earlier modes of investigation and thought that produced the concept of masochism. The fundamental importance ascribed to masochism as a theoretical and clinical concept now seems exaggerated. Psychoanalysis has generated new observations, new problems, and new concepts that render some of the older categories less useful for our purposes. The diffuse and unclear use of the term masochism reflects these changes. It is therefore a term that is useful only when we are working at a level of complexity close to that for which the name was invented.
This should not be taken to mean that there is no meaning to the terms masochism or masochistic character. These terms have a restricted application, more delimited and less diffused than current usage sanctions. Fantasies that can be called masochistic unambiguously may be the consequence of conflict resolution at any point in development. Such fantasies may undergo repression, transformation, and elaboration. They may find expression in symptoms, perversions, and character.

Viewed historically, Freud's use of concepts derived from the sexology literature of his time is readily recognized as different and novel. His focus on mental life and its transformations through conflict turned statically descriptive ideas into a dynamic point of view. Even when Krafft-Ebing wrote of unconscious motives, he was speaking descriptively of hidden connections, not the driving forces of mental life. At the same time, the dichotomy of conceptualizations is by no means absolute. Both Freud's and Krafft-Ebing's concepts were evolving. There were times when Krafft-Ebing's concepts were dynamic, while some of the trouble we have with Freud comes from his mixture of the old and the new ways of thinking.

The great puzzle of masochism, the romantic paradox of the conjunction of pleasure and unpleasure in the same acts, has not been addressed in this essay. Masochism may seem paradoxical if one thinks that pleasure and unpleasure are opposites in an absolute sense, as in the pleasure-unpleasure principle. However, if some degree of this combination is universal, as everyone seems to agree, the principle does not apply to behavior whereas the paradox does. In other words, the principle is a principle concerning the process of resolving mental conflict and is not a term describing the affective characteristics of the outcome. This issue comes close to the fundamental questions of psychoanalytic explanation. The clinical explanations account for the dynamic, genetic, and affective conditions of fantasy formation and integration. The various explanations of masochistic fantasies point to a multiplicity of ways in which divergent motives operate together and find expression so that obligatory combinations of pleasure and unpleasure are the outcome. When complex behavior is under consideration, as it always is clinically, we find that pain may in some cases be the condition of pleasure, and in other cases, that pleasure is a condition under which pain can be accepted. When Freud changed his prototype for the mental life from the perversions to the child, he was expanding the basis for explaining complex motives. Aside from this type of explanation, questions about how pain, or unpleasure, and pleasure can be combined seem to be questions about erotogenic masochism. As Freud suggested, the answers to questions of that kind require either metapsychological explanation or other modes of investigation "along biological and constitutional lines."

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[1] Maleson's (1984) excellent examination of the concept of masochism appeared after the completion of this paper. His discussion is generally consistent with and similar in development to the line of thought presented here, especially in Part I, and to some extent in Part III. However, since specific comparisons of similarities and differences would be cumbersome, they have been omitted.