Since Leo Rangell entered the field of psychoanalysis six decades ago, he has written six books and more than 450 articles. *The Road to Unity in Psychoanalytic Theory* is published only three years after his last book, *My Life in Theory*. This latter ranged widely over many aspects of the scientific and organizational life of psychoanalysis. The new book has a much narrower focus: the developing psychoanalytic theory of mind, and Rangell's plea for the acceptance of what he calls “total composite theory” as the preferred theoretical model for psychoanalysis.

In a paper published in 1999, “A.A. Brill and the Politics of Exclusion,” I outlined four approaches to a psychoanalytic metatheory, or theory about theories: the drive theory; the relational theory of Mitchell and Greenberg; the four psychologies theory of Fred Pine; and the accumulative theory, advanced in Robert Wallerstein’s notion of common ground and by Rangell in his total composite theory. I wrote in that paper that “Rangell’s forthright defense of classical principles” was “closest to my own,” and I still hold to that point of view eight years later, even though I value psychoanalytic ecumenicism and have organized many conferences in order to give contributors of different persuasions a platform to present for their views.

Rangell’s position is that the new “alternative” schools—object relations, self psychology, intersubjectivity; interpersonal psychoanalysis, relational psychoanalysis; Kleinian, Kohutian, Stolorovian psychoanalysis—all add to our theoretical edifice and our therapeutic armamentarium. He faults them, however, for what they leave out, and for what he sees as a *pars pro toto* logical fallacy.
He argues against the false dichotomies that are so much a part of our current psychoanalytic discourse—nature vs. nurture, intrapsychic vs. interpersonal, psychology vs. biology, drive vs. relational, science vs. humanism. Rangell thinks of himself not as an ego psychologist, but as an id-ego-superego psychoanalyst, and as both a “scientific humanist” and a “humanistic scientist.”

To make his case, he presents a short overview of the development of the field. He starts with Freud’s shift on the seduction hypothesis and the early discoveries and defections that took psychoanalysis into the 1930s. Then he moves on through the second series of splits (Sullivan/Horney) in the 40s, and the “good splits” of the 50s - New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Baltimore-Washington. He describes the Golden Era of psychoanalysis in the United States which began in the 50s and crested at the end of the 60s, and then the Downward Turn that followed it. In this he includes the revolt of George Klein, Robert Holt, and their colleagues against Rapaport’s metapsychology (two theories, not one), the Kleinian invasion in Los Angeles, the rise of Kohut, and finally the ascent of pluralism—Wallerstein at the 1987 Montreal Congress.

Rangell explores at some length the problem of lay analysis and the medical identity of what some refer to as the Bad American (APsaA). He acknowledges that there was more consensus in the medical APsaA than in the theoretically more pluralistic IPA—which, following Freud, included lay analysts among its members. But, he points out, there were also lay analysts -- Waelder, Kris, Bernfield, and Anna Freud among them -- who contributed to a unitary Freudian stance, and physicians -- Harry Stack Sullivan, Karen Horney, and
Heinz Kohut, for example -- who developed alternative theories. Rangell does not agree with Wallerstein that the policy of the American to exclude lay analysts led to the “hegemony” of American ego psychology and the inhibition of the promotion of alternative theories. Nor does he accept my view that the American’s exclusionary policies led to the array of theories we see today. He defends A.A. Brill, whom I see as the architect of the American politics of exclusion, maintaining that psychoanalysis had to tie itself to medicine, given the dangers of therapeutic quackery that culminated in the 1910 Flexner report. I agree with Rangell that psychoanalysis would not have achieved the success and prestige that it experienced through the 60s if it had not tied itself to medicine and psychiatry. But, as Paul Mosher and I have recounted [2004], from the late twenties on, quackery was no longer a legitimate concern; by the 30s it was competitive guild issues that were at work. Brill is supposed to have cited an anti-quackery law passed by the New York State Legislature to buttress his argument against lay analysis, when, in fact, no such law was ever enacted. Mosher (2006) feels that this may have been the result of a typographic error in an article in the New York Times (New York Times 1929) about a medical quackery bill which had passed the New York State Assembly. The article mistakenly refers to the practitioners who used non invasive physical means to treat patients with physical disorders as “psychotherapists” although in fact the law does not refer to psychotherapy in any form. And in fact the strong push against lay analysis came not only from the American Psychoanalytic Association but from the American Psychiatric Association which was
concerned, particularly during the depression years of the 30s, that psychologists might enter the psychotherapeutic arena through psychoanalysis, and overpopulate the field [citation].

In the final chapters of his book, Rangell presents his solution to the problem of pluralism and alternative theories: one theory, “total, composite, unified, and cumulative: total because it is a blend of the old and all new concepts and discoveries, and psychoanalytic as fulfilling the criteria for what is psychoanalysis.” He writes: “Throughout the various phases of changing theories during the last thirty years, I have favored one integrated unitary theory, containing all new advances that are generally considered valid, while retaining all previous discoveries that are not expendable and have endured.” He provides us with a long list of viable contributions, including all five of Freud’s metapsychological points of view and Rapaport and Gill’s addition of a sixth, the adaptive view. Within his composite theory he finds a place for drive and object, for conflict and deficit, for historical truth and narrative truth. He acknowledges the importance of the pre oedipal as well as the oedipal, and of the affective as well as the cognitive. He makes room for Bowlby and Fonagy as well as for Spitz and Escalona, for Mahler as well as for Stern.

What he does not include in his “total theory” are “idiosyncratic constructions that have served to separate split off advocacy groups that are either not new or not significant additions.” In this regard, for instance, he cites the idea of the selfobject -- which is not an idea, he says, “that can characterize an entire system or justify a delineation of a separate overarching total theory.”
He rejects Koutian self psychology as a overarching superordinate theory. This is a position with which I very much agree, and which I have elaborated in two published papers, “Self theory, Conflict Theory, and the Problem of Hypochondriasis,” (Richards 1981 ) and “The Superordinate Self in Self Psychology and Psychoanalytic Theory,” (Richards 1982) (neither cited by Rangell) and in a not yet published paper, “The Many Faces of the Theory of Narcissism: A Personal Journey.” [In Press]

Rangell acknowledges that his approach, with its emphasis on selective inclusion and exclusion, raises an important issue -- who decides? “Who decides what is right or rational or acceptable with respect to any other aspect of the theoretical question?” he asks, and then answers his own question: “The collective consensus for the generally held theoretical system, each analyst for his individual preferences.”

Rangell cites Bergmann(2004) and Richards (1998) who describe “the simultaneous need to establish a logically coherent unified theory, and at the same time to honor the convictions of those who oppose it.” In my view, the problem is sociological rather than scientific; that is, it has more to do with the sociology of scientific knowledge than with psychoanalytic science itself (Fleck, Richards). Within the psychoanalytic thought collective as a whole there are many subcollectives, each with their own idiosyncratic thought styles. According to sociologist of science Ludwik Fleck, all science works this way—cultural, historical, personal, and psychological factors contribute to the acceptance of a "scientific fact," and psychoanalysis is no exception. (Rangell’s connection of the
origins of self psychology with events at the 1969 Rome IPA Congress is in accord with the Fleckian point of view.) Fleck also asserts that every member of any thought collective believes that everyone who doesn’t belong to it is incompetent—an extreme statement, but that conviction drives the establishment of alternative advocacy groups.

I believe that we have to accept our pluralistic state of affairs, and I suspect that I am not alone in this. Rangell’s book may convince some that pluralism should be replaced by a unitary composite theory, but many will remain unpersuaded. We will continue to have separate advocacy groups with their own organizations, their own journals, and their own meetings. The challenge for us is to accept that this is the current reality of our psychoanalytic landscape, and to develop ways and means, places and platforms, so that we can all talk to each other. Productive communication and discourse -- and any chance at increasing integration requires that every advocate be able to present his or her position as clearly and forcefully as possible, to the widest possible audience. This is what Rangell has done in this book.


New York Times (1926) Medical Quack Bill Bill Passes Assembly. April 7, 926. p.4


