Psychoanalysis as a Vocation

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Psychoanalysis may be seen as caught between two different trends of disenchanted modernity: rationalization, which leads to the flaming of our work as a professional discipline subordinate to the dictates of instrumental rationality, and self-analysis, which frees us from the dictates of orthodoxy, inequality, and authority. But a further difficulty lies within the aspect of enlightenment, which has not only provided a greater role for our subjectivity but disguised relations of authority, conformity, and objectification in our work. Psychoanalysis has objectified the other while idealizing its knowledge as objective, has paradoxically denied the very subjectivity that must serve as the source of the analyst's knowledge. However, the reaction against this condition, which may tend to produce counter-ideals of not-knowing and mutuality, must also be carefully deconstructed. Differences in the meaning given by different schools to the use of the analyses subjectivity suggest that pluralism will make new knowledge demands on psychoanalysts. Analytic training should include the development of critical abilities that help to meet these demands within a context of education as a collaborative, democratic process. Knowledge itself can be used homeopathically as an antidote to the old ideal of the knowing authority.

Writing to Oskar Pfister in 1910, Freud said

Discretion is incompatible with a good presentation of psychoanalysis. One must become a bad character, disregard the rules, sacrifice oneself, betray, behave like an artist who buys paints with his wife's household money or bums the furniture to heat the studio for his model. Without such a bit of criminality there is no real achievement [cited in Loewenberg, 1994, p. 61].

This statement, notably to a nonanalyst, reminds us how, despite its present appearance of orthodoxy and reverence for the founder, psychoanalysis began as a marginal, radical enterprise. From its inception, psychoanalysis took up a quietly critical stance toward authority, bourgeois conventional norms, and what were then the certainties of conscious knowledge. Still, it has often been observed that precisely because of Freud's outsider status, his writings took great pains to demonstrate that his undertaking was a legitimate discipline based on scientific principles.

This tension between disregard and compliance toward the rules of professional and scientific legitimation remains with us today. Given the uncertainties, the sacrifice, the necessity of breaking the rules and sacrificing bourgeois civility, it would have been improbable for anyone in the heroic era of psychoanalysis to imagine they were taking it up as a member of a staid profession. And now, once again, conditions conspire to make ours a most uncertain business. But even in the intervening period of stability, when the profession of psychoanalysis took its place as a solid citizen, apparently at home in the social world, didn't the practice of psychoanalysis, with its passions and its demands, always require a more devotional attitude-has not this devotion always made it not so much a profession but a calling, a vocation?

These remarks on the psychoanalytic vocation were originally conceived in response to
several papers by Jonathan Slavin (1990, 1992, 1994) on issues that concern institutes of psychoanalytic training and practice. Slavin, who was involved in the setting up of many new institutes in the United States, had previously addressed the issue of the need psychoanalysts seemed to have for a source of legitimacy - specifically as seen in the wish to join the International Psycho-Analytical Association - which could "ease the anxiety of an undertaking that is experienced on many levels as unauthorized, illegitimate, rebellious and fraught with grave uncertainty." Slavin (1990) was here referring to the establishment of new institutes, but in a more general way, as he expresses in this issue, he was pointing to the sense of uncertainty and danger within the practice of psychoanalysis itself. So I began my thoughts on this subject by asking, whence do we derive our authority, our stability, in this uncertain project? If psychoanalysts are more often than not out on a limb, what branch above do they grasp, or should I say clutch, to steady themselves? What identifications, idealized and otherwise, have they used to authorize themselves, and what can we learn from investigating them?

Both the vocational stance and the question of legitimacy led me to turn to the social thinker Max Weber, from whom I have borrowed my title, "Psychoanalysis as a Vocation." (In German, *Beruf*, "vocation", is also a calling, from the verb *rufen*.) In the final year of World War 1, Weber gave two important addresses, "Politics as a Vocation" and "Science as a Vocation" (Weber, 1919, cited in Gerth and Mills, 1958); the latter essay is of particular relevance. Weber (1919) was concerned with the way organizations, governments, and professions established their legitimacy now that the world is "disenchanted"-that is, rationalized and intellectualized. Disenchantment means that the modern condition allows us no longer to call upon religious, mysterious, and awe-inspiring forms of truth, upon authority founded in such revealed truth. Speaking about the aesthetic consequences of disenchantment, Weber wrote - and I find this an apt explanation of the appeal of psychoanalysis - that the "ultimate and most sublime values have retired from public life, either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or the brotherliness of immediate personal relationships" (Gerth and Mills, 1952, p. 155). Indeed, he continued, only in the smallest circles, "from person to person, in pianissimo, does that something pulsate which corresponds to the prophetic pneuma, which in former times like a firebrand swept through our communities, welding them together" (p. 155). Lacking that impulse, modern science calls on a very different source for truth than did religiously organized knowledge, Weber said, and we are required to suffer a great deal more uncertainty. Those who find this condition too difficult to bear, he counseled, should return quietly to the "arms of the old churches which are opened widely and compassionately" (p. 155) to them.

In what follows, I attempt to show how relevant Weber's remarks are to our own vocation. In particular, because the charismatic force, the prophetic pneuma (breath) known to us as transference, did continue to pulsate in psychoanalysis; it did so not only in the psychoanalytic consulting room, but also in the relationship to authority in our psychoanalytic culture and organization. And the gradual subsiding of this charismatic form of authority has left us with a choice of visions: psychoanalysis as an established orthodoxy (a church, if not an open-armed one) or a vocation that embraces uncertainty,
which sees in the possibility of pursuing truth in another way. This other way, Weber advised in a moving reference to Isaiah, requires us to give up the waiting and hoping for revelation, which was the fate of the Israelites in exile, longing for their messiah to bring about a transparent world. Instead, we may choose to pursue truth by meeting the demands of the day, a task that "is plain and simple if each of us finds and follows the Demon who holds the threads of our lives" (p. 156). In his final words, then, Weber advised that the scientific pursuit of truth is linked to the acknowledgment and discovery of our own subjectivity.

From this perspective one may view more positively, or at least ambivalently, the loss of a normative, objective basis for truth claims and ethical decisions that characterizes the condition of modernity. One can understand this condition as the very basis for the formation of the psychoanalytic world view, which founds itself in the subjective, which questions what lies behind knowledge and values and relativizes truth claims in light of psychic motives. However, the danger of this condition, as Weber saw, is the emergence of a new and limited form of objectivity based only on what works, regardless of the values served. The danger is that only instrumental goals, like profit or efficiency, are legitimated by the bureaucratic organizations of our social world; ends are subordinated to means, such that finally the means become the ends. The thinkers of the Frankfurt School of Critical Social Theory, writing in mid-century, argued that instrumental rationality replaces reason in both science and politics (Horkheimer, 1947; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1947). Their belief was that reason had finally undone itself and that the enlightenment, which had intended to liberate us from religion and superstition, had produced a mythology of science, founded in omnipotence, that brought about reason's own demise (Horkheinier and Adomo, 1947). Still, in their view, psychoanalysis was, like critical social theory itself, in a position to transcend instrumental rationality and critique its origins. Roughly, their critique represents what can be called the modernist view of society, dominant up until the 1960s.

Beginning with the 1970s, a position emerged that is usually referred to as postmodernism, which more profoundly embraced the idea of uncertainty, exempting no theory from the influence of power. This position stressed the continuity between old and new forms of reason, arguing that authority and moral judgment were simply displaced from religion into new practices of social control, new paradigms of condemnation and exclusion: from sin to sickness. From this perspective, psychoanalysis has no privileged position from which to analyze the operations of power and authority, but rather participates in it. These arguments are usually associated with the poststructuratist theory of Foucault (1965; 1978), although they derive much from modernist theories, like the Frankfurt school. The latter had already pointed to the danger that psychoanalysis might displace and reencode authority in the obeisance to instrumental goals like success and conformity - in short, the performance principle (see Jacoby, 1975). On that way of thinking, which I am partial to, we both participate in and analyze power, as in the psychoanalytic situation itself. By contrast, the postmodernist critique is more skeptical that theory can transcend the problem that Foucault called power/knowledge, the reinstituting of domination through new discursive regulatory practices, which included psychology and psychoanalysis.
The analysis of power as knowledge pointed to the ways in which a nominally liberating practice like psychoanalysis can simultaneously create categories that normalize some behaviors and exclude or pathologize others. Such practices begin to shape our experience by defining it, creeping invasively into the body through the mind, in effect telling us what we feel. In this sense, psychoanalysis might be compromised not by openly advocating a politics of conformity and control but above all by a self-deceptive denial of its role in elaborating what is normalcy or health. From this perspective, the question of our relation to politics is always a question of our internal relations of power and knowledge. Here Foucault's perspective differed sharply from earlier critical theory, which thought psychoanalysis held the potential to inform a different kind of knowledge or a different social order (Marcuse, 1954, 1970; Adomo, 1967-68). In that perspective, psychoanalysis could be a force of radical social critique. And in the first half of this century, many exponents of psychoanalysis, including most of the analysts close to Freud in the Vienna circle, embraced socialist political ideals and envisaged such a role for psychoanalysis.

However, as we know, historically these tendencies did not win out in the psychoanalytic movement Jacoby, 1983), owing not only to Freud's conservatism perhaps but (as described by Slavin) to the protective attitude toward the fledgling, heretical movement that was always to be protected from outsiders at any cost. Rather than seeing psychoanalysis as serving a larger political goal, psychoanalysis itself was seen as a kind of pure expression of truth, the ideal itself, a replacement for a social movement. The well-documented depoliticization of psychoanalysis in post-war America -- its compromises with professionalism, particularly medical professionalism, already deeply advanced in American society -- thus has roots in the protective stance toward psychoanalysis as an ideal object, despite the fact that the political stance of many individual analysts remained radical. This might be the point of Alfred Kazin's famous quip: "What's the difference between the ILGWU and the American Psychoanalytic Association? One generation."

The self-protectiveness of psychoanalysis and its problematic relation to politics was well illustrated in a recent exhibit on the history of the psychoanalytic movement in Germany (Brecht et al. 1985), especially by one striking revelation in the correspondence of Ernest Jones relating to Edith Jacobsen, at that time a member of the Berlin Institute, who was arrested by the Gestapo for participating in a resistance group in 1934. In the correspondence it is revealed that Anna Freud's response to this was concern that Jacobsen had jeopardized the psychoanalytic movement in Berlin, which had hoped to preserve the institute and continue treating patients without interference, by complying with the authorities, accepting the resignation of its Jewish members, and generally being on best behavior. Jacobsen was sentenced and held for 2 1/2 years in Gestapo prison until she was finally released due to illness and managed to escape. Jones's letter from Berlin to a concerned colleague in England states that things were not so bad for Jacobsen in the Gestapo prison because she was being allowed to order her meals from a local restaurant and receive visitors (Brecht et al., 1985).

To be sure, if Jacobsen, like all the other analysts who came to America, eventually
relinquished the larger political project and devoted herself to the psychoanalytic movement Jacoby, 1983), this was not merely the result of Jones's and Freud's decisions or even the nature of psychoanalysis as an institution. Events themselves failed to bear out the hopes of those who fought against fascism, either for socialism or the role of psychoanalysis. This disillusionment has been little discussed in our field, though it surely has affected us. But outside our field, it is these events most of all that influenced the postmortem turn in theory. Contemporary theory has taken these failures as an opportunity for considerable reflection on the danger of liberatory ideals. Indeed, the attitude underlying deconstruction can be seen as primarily a rejection of all forms of idealism: a commitment to under, mining the norms and foundations of knowledge as a way to subvert power relations—furthermore, to avoid appealing to scientific materialism, whether Marxist or Freudian, which in its own way is equally normative and ideal-driven. Ideals become involved in bringing into existence new systems of oppression while denying them, thus generating the hubris of a commanding system of knowledge that always creates and excludes some other.

Owing to the North American psychoanalytic community's separation from politics and public intellectual life, and the insularity of its internal system, it has until very recently protected the existing relations of authority in psychology and psychoanalysis and left largely unquestioned the deployment of power as knowledge or the role of psychology as normative regulation. Psychoanalytic theory here (apart from the academically based Lacanians, especially the Lacanian feminists, inspired by the British and French, see Mitchell and Rose, 1982; Brennan, 1989) only very recently has taken up the postmortem challenge to identity (see Rivera, 1989; Barratt, 1993; Bromberg, 1993; Davies, 1996; Pizer, 1996; Mitchell, 1993). It therefore has not considered how, like any other identity, the professional identity can serve to exclude some Other - for instance, those we diagnose, treat, and define according to their psychopathology.

However, precisely the relation between identity and power is relevant to the way our discipline is organized, as well as the most intimate moments of our practice, when all of us are subject to the sudden and startling possibilities of unconscious revelation that may unseat our authority as the one who knows. Both of these levels of experience meet in the issue of power and identity, which might crudely be called the experience of Them and Us. Historically, psychoanalysis has moved ever farther from the crude psychiatric notions of sick and well, beginning with Freud's abandonment of hypnosis, which he justified in the name of an ethos of instigating a collaborative search for knowledge (Breuer and Freud, 1895). From Charcot's public parading of hysterics on the stage at Salpêtrière to the psychoanalytic couch is indeed a monumental step. Nonetheless, is there grounds for taking seriously the Foucaultian (1978) critique, which questions whether the psychoanalytic endeavor ever was or could be separated from the confessional mode of moralizing discourse that predated it, whether neutrality and abstinence did not serve to encode rather than dissolve authority and normative prescriptions? (n.b. here normative is distinct from, not equated with, ethics)

Because psychoanalysis is itself the mode of training as well as the practice, the danger always existed that the confessional mode might continue within the ranks of
practitioners as an insidious form of normative injunction, stimulating the analytic superego. The constraint on the analyst's use of emotionally heating responses that Slavin described would be one effect among many that this superego formation dictates. More accurately, the monitoring of one's own responses, which is essential to the psychoanalytic enterprise, could be reduced to intellectually vigilant inhibition of responses. We might want to consider how this effect is supported by the binary opposition of the healers and the sick and how this in turn shapes the conflicts of the would-be healers as well as their practice. In effect, "Physician heat thyself!" could become a moral injunction functioning to produce not self-heating but concealing.

Equally important to note is the tendency of binary oppositions to produce reversal, reactions in favor of the disparaged side of the hierarchy. In our field, for instance, the earlier antipsychiatry movement that at its extreme obliterated real differences and reduced the radical core of psychoanalysis -- its focus on the unconscious (J. Mitchell, 1974) -- as if to say, craziness is too ubiquitous to require analytic understanding. Such abdication should not be confused with the necessary self-analysis in which we turn the beam on our own strategies, practices, and ideals, questioning our focus on the development of technique, rules, and regulations, asking how and what they protect us from.

I share the view of those who situate the questioning of analytic objectivity and use of our own subjectivity in terms explicitly or implicitly parallel to those developed by postmodern theory (Stern, 1992; Mitchell, 1993; Renik, 1993; Hoffman, 1994; Elliot and Spezzano, 1995; Aron, 1996). For instance, we can locate the effort to examine and deconstruct the doctor-patient hierarchy, which was the historical basis for the analytic relationship in relation to Foucault's theory of a regulatory discipline. Can we apply to ourselves his argument that such disciplines pathologize individual beings, for instance, in a way that sets them up as less (developed, healthy, genital, oedipal, depressive, etc.) or sees them as being in need of conversion (Domenici and Lesser, 1995)? I do not think it hyperbolic to say that this is precisely the stance many psychoanalysts took and still take toward homosexuality, a matter central to Foucault's own concerns. But when I make reference to his identity, it immediately becomes a reminder of the problem at hand: the way in which traditionally psychoanalysts have warded off and depreciated such insight, because an objection raised by the outcast Other always bears the stigma of rebellion, can always be delegitimated by a perspective that sees it as an expression of envy, resentment, subjugation-as when feminists were accused of penis envy. And indeed, in no instance has the institution of psychoanalysis been so publicly righteous about health and illness as in its stigmatizing of homosexuality, as if the enjoyment of the heterosexual position were the one piece of self-congratulation a psychoanalyst did not have to deny himself or herself.

Now, to switch sides and argue against a reduced understanding of psychoanalysis as merely a regulatory discipline, I would object that this is only one of our many faces. It turns out that a more consistent commitment to the analytic stance demands awareness of an investment in the position of health and self-knowledge. However, such awareness can actually only occur when the subject in power is confronted by such an other who has
become articulate within the terms of that subject's discourse. Another way to think about this confrontation would be the following: The oppositional relationship between subject and other was predicated on an epistemological system in which the object of knowledge does not talk back. The important question is, what happens to relations of power when the other does talk back and is, however imperfectly, heard? Once we recognize the possible validity of the other's reflection of ourselves, what changes? When we attend, for instance, to the reality basis of the transference (true, we are prone to interpret the meaning in light of our own understanding of the unconscious and thus to some degree assimilate the other's reflection to our own understanding), we situate ourselves within a working model in which both sides have access (if not always equal access) to truth, knowledge, and relevant reflections.

Then again, the postmodern view emphasizes that we cannot know the other, that to think we know them is a fantasy of making them into our transparent object (Cornell, 1992; Benjamin, 1991). But this caveat only begins to take up the problematic of knowing, for not, knowing is also not absolute. Rather we are seeking a relationship between knowing and not knowing, which has to include self-consciously evolving our stance of not-knowing.

It can now be stated, and often is, that resistance to our knowledge claims can be a great impetus to the pursuit of truth, even when it is very troublesome to experience it so very much in our own person, as we do in our consulting rooms. But what does it signify to us, "unconsciously," to acknowledge not-knowing? What do we imagine we are giving up? To simultaneously accept lack of knowledge and retain an ideal of healing, as Slavin did, almost seems a simple reversal of the classical notion that the analyst should reveal the truth of the patient's unconscious but resist the temptation to play healer (Freud, 1923). And wasn't that configuration itself paradoxical, an invitation to conceal the effects of abstinence in creating the image of authority (see Benjamin, 1995; Renik, 1995)? I address this paradox first, and then I explore the consequences of its reversal in current thinking.

When we take up the question, what and how does the analyst know about the patient? The most complex questions of epistemology reverberate in the anxious inner world of the beginning practitioner (see Mitchell, 1993). If learning to tolerate not-knowing is one of the hardest tasks in learning psychoanalysis, then this is particularly true insofar as it occurs in a context in which the tradition of authorized analysts happily claimed, in some cases still claim, to know exactly what a good analysis looks like (Spezzano, 1996). The old analytic ideal of authority posited an analyst with the power to know what is right to do because one can and should know what is in the mind of the other. Yet, oddly, one is supposed to know this because one has put aside one's own subjectivity, which is the main source of this knowledge. Here is an ideal that, unaware of its own paradox, unequivocally invokes the looming presence of knowledge as power, omnipotence as omniscience (Eigen, 1993), the specter of mastery, the illusion Lacan (1958) called "the subject supposed to know."

This will to knowledge might be seen as the last, perhaps unvanquishable specter facing
us just at the threshold of entry into the promised land of truth, which is why, like Moses, we can never arrive. But perhaps Moses is too serious a figure to represent this form of illusion. Recently, in a paper reflecting on the impossibility of psychoanalysis, as discussed by Freud (1937), the Belgian Lacanian analyst Verhaegen (1996) called on Nemo, a comic character from the Dutch-speaking tradition in his country. Nemo has an old Viking helmet that confers on its wearer the magical ability to elicit in others the belief in his magical powers: Awed by it, they think he can do anything. However, the drawback is that if the wearer should himself fall into this belief even for a moment, the helmet becomes a hundred times heavier and crushes him. Each time Nemo puts on the helmet he assures himself that he will not forget, but each time he is seduced by the adoration of his followers and suffers the consequences.

Psychoanalysis makes axiomatic the lesson that all of us, like Nemo, will certainly fail to keep in mind our limits under such conditions of temptation. Being crushed (providing we recover) may serve to impart the lesson more forcefully, but even then it is likely to be an inconstant achievement. In our current thinking, Freud's proffered solution to the analyst's self-deception was problematic. Freud (1923) thought that the analyst's objective stance would make it less likely for him to "play the part of prophet, savior and redeemer to the patient" (p. 50). The difficulty with Freud's injunctions was that the analyst was to protect himself from such idealization by exercising objectivity, rather than by bearing in mind and making use of his own imperfect subjectivity. This led, as I said, to a self-contradictory ideal of the analyst who removes himself or herself in order to know what in fact could only be known through a form of identification, accessing his or her own common subjectivity. This uncomfortable contradiction inevitably tempted analysts to establish rigid defenses, to wear a mask of objective knowledge too closely resembling the helmet, rather than to accept bare-headed openness to the disrupting forces of opposing truths. As might be expected, for this openness to occur also required the other's opposition, the action of another subject—not adoration but resistance.

Long before the relational challenge to the conventions of analytic authority was a gleam in anyone's eye, Freud (Breuer and Freud, 1895) himself was struggling with his unexpected discovery of the value of resistance in the Studies on Hysteria. There he justified his decision to give up hypnosis in favor of an enterprise involving the patient's willing collaboration by saying it was forced on him by the patient's resistance, her refusal to submit to the hypnotic trance. How else could the value of collaboration be discovered, if not through the patient's (the other's) refusal of submission? Likewise Dora's refusal to be so known and accounted for by Freud's theory provided the spur to his recognition of the transference, indeed perhaps, the countertransference. Freud's account of the evolution of our discipline reveals a central paradox that remained defining of the relationship between knowledge and resistance: Each fresh resistance drives the process of knowing forward (Benjamin, 1997).

Now this relationship to resistance represents a very different ideal of knowing; it runs counter to the idealized sanctification of power/knowledge in our discipline, which lent itself well to the clerical analogy, the pastoral-confessional metaphor that Foucault (1978) saw as the basis for our discipline. There was an idea of sacrifice behind this power: the
long period of probation and apprenticeship, the journey through the confessionally organized procedure of analysis, and finally the sacrifice of subjecting oneself to the arduous rigors of the discipline (a higher calling), which finally resulted in the entitlement to be the subject supposed to know. This discipline was unthinkable without the relationship of discipleship, which is carried by the love of the powerful one.

The ideal love that Freud encountered, which slipped past his admonitions about the illusion of being a personal redeemer and the danger of believing in the magical power of knowledge, was that of his disciples. Here the danger of the transference became acute, especially in the face of possible betrayal or disloyalty by the lover, who has suffered disillusion after putting the beloved in the place of the ego ideal (much as Freud, 1921, wrote in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*). Insofar as this form of idealization remained unrecognized, the seduction by knowledge as power remained the unanalyzed transference in the genealogy of analytic training, the unconscious basis of authority that leads us magically back to our ideal father. And here we see the possibility of a faultline in the transmission of knowledge from one analyst to the other.

However, I have been suggesting that there is a critical tradition as well as a psychoanalytic one that allows us to both analyze and transform our ideals and our relationship to them. The contemporary focus on countertransference might be seen as a form of institutional mutual self-analysis, which serves to make this transformation possible. This focus, currently seen as "the common ground" (Gabbard, 1995) between many analytic positions, marks an end to the unquestioned acceptance of the tradition of subject-object thinking, in which the analytic subject can objectively know the object. This shift toward the realization of the analyst's participation has dramatically moved the idea of intersubjectivity into the center of many psychoanalytic discussions, intensifying the debate about what and how the analyst knows (Mitchell, 1993). This shift had been rumbling just beneath the surface of our thinking long before it was heralded by an explicit theorizing of intersubjectivity.

In fact, if we took at the evolution of the relational position, it becomes evident that the context for developing a relational tendency - and this is particularly apparent in Mitchell's (1988) formulations in *Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis* - was an already existing opposition to "classical" North American theory on the part of object relations and self psychology. The original contesting idea to the analyst as one who knows was the idea of the analyst as "the one who knows me," who empathically understands, is emotionally with me, embracing the maternal ideal of holding or mirroring in contrast to the phallic image of the penetrating knower (Benjamin, 1995). As Hoffinan (1991) and Mitchell (1993) argued, some relational positions may not go as far as the social constructivist viewpoints in explicitly opposing the assumption that the analyst can know. The ideas of optimal or empathic responsiveness derived from roots in Winnicott and Kohut may continue to formulate in terms of knowing rather than not. knowing, albeit with a notion of knowledge as mediated though subjectivity, hermeneutic rather than objective (Benjamin, 1991). Thus even an emphasis on the analyst's subjectivity can have very different consequences, some emphasizing the analyst's contribution through
interaction, others through emotional introspection and identification; some emphasizing containment, others mixing it up with the patient.

Precisely in the context of relational controversies about what constitutes intersubjectivity, each analyst is more than ever compelled to work out her or his own stance rather than rely on received wisdom; experience alone does not suffice. The question of whether and how we can know the patient, and what clinical consequences our answers to this question entail, places a burden on analytic learning that is even greater than in the classical "age of ideology." For this reason I think we should scrutinize more carefully the opposition Slavin sets up between the old ideal of technique and a new idea of method in which principles are derived merely from the phenomenal experience of the relationship led by the goal of healing-one in which "discipline comes not from the technical stance and methods that characterize it, but ... from the reason the two individuals have come together [in which] ... technical parameters ... flow naturally from this understanding" (this journal).

This opposition between inspired healing and professional technique is doubtless of great particular significance as psychoanalysis experiences attacks from those who deny its credibility on empiricist grounds, from educators and health care managers who espouse technical rationality. In this light, the appeal to a position that embraces uncertainty and the unique vicissitudes of individual relationships might in itself seem inherently radical. The bureaucratic rational stance might well be countered by the emphasis on healing that Slavin proposes. But here, too, we may note a problem in the reaction against technical rationality, especially when it takes on the use of maternal metaphors in an increasingly feminized profession (Philipson, 1993). The appeal to an ethos of healing, uncoupled from a body of democratically distributed knowledge, may carry with it the danger of substituting one ideal for another. I have repeatedly talked with female analysts who find them- selves inhibited in pursuing precisely the intellectual, theoretical side of psychoanalysis, although they feel comfortable with their stance as empathic, reparative clinicians-embracing happily the "ethic of care." The aggression, ambition, and grandiosity associated with taking on the responsibility for theoretical legitimation, not to mention a role in the profession as teacher or writer, is problematic for many women. One drawback of this circumstance is that it leaves women enthralled to the old regulatory gender ideals, the identity of being caregivers that trades on feeling oneself to be good precisely for excluding abilities not coded as feminine. It reinforces the gender coding of have/have not in relation to knowledge as power, a coding that is connected to the phallic properties of that ideal.

It is all too likely that this withdrawal from the classical form of knowledge/power converges with, rather than opposes, the ascendancy of the technically rational and pragmatic stance toward our practice in the guise of mental health professionalism. Many students innocently absorb this posture; they simply want to learn how to do it, to be given instrumental know-how. The main intellectual alternative to orthodox psychoanalytic theory, indeed the version of psychology generally offered to students, is antipsychoanalytic, behavioral science. Increasingly, as the insurance industry sets the terms of clinical practice, students are socialized into an anxious compliance. Against the
back-drop of this instrumental rationality, the notion of legitimation based on caregiving can easily foster a naive, compliant stance, accepting rather than analyzing power. This, in turn, makes our field more susceptible to the controlling influences of the economic bureaucracy and the conformist norms of the culture.

My experiences with analytic training suggest that certain models of psychoanalysis have followed the path of reversal and become avoidant toward metapsychology, theoretically informed interpretation, any concept that refers to what is not empirically self-evident, thus rein-stating a form of discourse congenial with positivism and technical rationality. A simple negation of the old ideal of the analyst as knower vitiates recognition of the power of our words to reach the patient, alleviate anxiety, reveal conflict, and bring to light unconscious aspects of the relationship. Teaching the classical interpretive repertoire should be distinguished from adhering to the objectivist assumptions associated with it. The focus on the transferential relationship requires the intrapsychic metaphors that have formed the backbone of interpretation of the transference in classical psychoanalysis, even as we use them to understand the unconscious flow of communication between both participants in the transference.

The point is to include the analyst's subjectivity, to turn the lens of our interpretative scrutiny on ourselves, but to do it less pejoratively so that, rather than appearing as impediment or distraction, it becomes a basis for knowledge (Ogden, 1994). I argue that the primary issue here is not whether we disclose this to the patient, but how we think about our use of our felt responses and how we make access to our thinking available to the patient (Bollas, 1987, 1989). In revealing (in whatever varying degrees) our thought process, in abandoning the objectivist hope of dispelling fear through a technical stance, we are emphasizing the importance of thinking (see Spezzano, 1996) as a way to tolerate and work within a situation that, as Bion said, ought to inspire fear. Let us suppose that this fear relates to the real possibility of failing to heal the patient. If so, then giving up the belief in technical expertise as a hedge against failure makes sense not as a renunciation of knowledge but only as the ego-investment in heating. Thus, returning to Freud's (1923; see Benjamin, 1997) notion that we must give up being the heater-redeemer, we do this by removing not our subjectivity but only our investment in justifying ourselves. To move our collective process away from self-justification might form the basis of a different kind of neutrality -- resting on a paradoxical position between (and at our best, transcending) desire and renunciation, healing and not-healing, knowing and not-knowing.

Without the ability to hold in mind our paradoxical position, a belief in mutuality is just as subject as any other to the vicissitudes of idealization and can just as easily be used to recreate oppressive forms of complementarity. Hence, it also has to be subject to analytic interpretation, rather than set up through an act of reversal as a substitute for it. (Here we might follow the deconstructive principle that opposing tendencies be used to interrogate and destabilize each other, rather than to create the same opposition in reverse.) The focus on the analyst's subjectivity and contribution to the relationship therefore not only places a new knowledge demand on the analyst, it also returns us to a new version of the asymmetry (Aron, 1996) between analyst and patient. Why does the tension between
mutuality and unavoidable asymmetry arise precisely at this juncture in our thinking? Because, in fact, an awareness of pluralism, of multiple possibilities, makes clear how much our own subjectivity and our own orientation decisively contribute to the relationship, inevitably shaping and limiting it. Mutuality emphasizes our impact, but asymmetry is the name of a burden we must assume, directing us to our primary responsibility for our inevitable limits and lacks. The burden of knowledge as power is responsibility, and the guilt and anxiety it inspires must now be borne without the reassuring structure of a univocal technique. It cannot be evaded even when we have a more democratic view of mutuality and collaboration in the psychoanalytic process.

So on one hand it is doubtlessly a corrective to the old authority relationships to promote identification with relational ideals of mutuality and uncertainty—that is to say, identification with teachers, supervisors, colleagues, and one's own analysts as collaborators in uncertainty, as individuals expressing their own subjectivity. On the other, those ideals do not resolve the dilemmas that gave rise to the authority position. The temptation of compensating through authority our fundamental lack—we can never know enough—can only be countered by redeploying its tools/knowledge, and interpretation. Otherwise, we will fail to keep the negatives of the old ideals from becoming new counter-ideals, which become regulatory, excluding, and punitive in their own way, which encourage their own version of conformity, masking envy and intolerance of difference.

By now it must be apparent that I have come to a reversal of my argument about the relationship between power and knowing, and have returned, with a difference, to the idea of knowing as a way to achieve freedom from tutelage. As valuable as we have found the stance of tolerating not-knowing, and the reflection on uncertainty, it is unquestionably dangerous to move from that stance into an ideal of not-knowing. Such an ideal would be, I think, equivalent to returning to the arms of the old church. If knowledge is power, it is self-evident that not the abdication of knowledge by those meant to take some responsibility but only the distribution of that knowledge as democratically as possible will be curative.

I have tried to realign the tension between not-knowing and the knowledge that claims certainty by raising some questions about the kind of oppositions that operate in our current discourse. In an effort to evoke the spirit of that intention, if not provide the conclusion to this essay, let me refer to a commentary on revolutionary ideals in the form of a novel, Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose*. Eco presents us with the attractiveness of British empiricism, embodied in the detective monk who is a follower of William of Occam, who stands in contrast to continental orthodoxy and fanaticism—an opposition that clearly refers, in post-68 Europe, to the religious fanaticism of the Jacobins and Bolsheviks. (Unfortunately for us, the situation with which we have to contend is that the American social sciences have turned the inquisitive Holmesian follower of Occam into a number crunching detractor of the unconscious. But we will not dwell on this misfortune here) If we consider the structure of *The Name of the Rose* we immediately are led to consider how much the story depends on the dangerous and thoroughly fanatical defenders of the ideal, the believers in authority, the ones who fear laughter and
skepticism. Haven't they kept the library intact, preserved the books by hiding them? And without them, what adversary would William have had?

Thus the story puts before us the question, Can there be love with- out idealization and all its concomitant dangers? Can we count on people to give up the excitement of loving the one who knows or, just a step away, fighting with the one who claims to be the one who knows? Slavin has written eloquently about the way that IPA became a love object, perhaps of the selfobject variety, for psychologists who had sought entry into analytic training and had earlier struggled with the American Psychoanalytic Association. Is it possible to do away with such forms of identification? Without the transference love, what would psychoanalysis have to offer?

To continue this line of questioning, Does this mean that there really is nothing but to accept that there will always be someplace that the power-knowledge love affair will be located? That it is, after all, not possible to renounce that aspect of the ideal? Or is the point here that without the preceding terms, that which we negate or react against we cannot constitute ourselves? Does our position regarding the ideal make sense only as opposition? In that case the solution may well be, as Eco suggested, to discover the lost book on comedy--in other words, laughter, humor, irony in relation to ourselves and the ideal.

No matter what we try to do about it, I submit, human beings will seek ideals with which to identify, and knowledge is going to continue to be an ideal object. Thus knowledge, for good and ill, is going to evoke power, and power will be infused with love through identification. I have contended that to defy knowing, defy being the one who knows, only reverses the binary opposition; it will not really work to defuse that idealization, only to evade responsibility for it; indeed, it will merely preserve it in the unconscious along with envy, feelings of exclusion and deprivation. The solution to exclusion, can only be to call for inclusion, (Benjamin, 1997) in this case inclusion in knowledge. And because new, and equally pernicious, ways of fixing identity within "them and us" frames are always liable to be invented, a certain kind of knowledge is indispensable.

Thus if there is one, I think the antidote to the old orthodoxy should be constructed along homeopathic lines, creating immunity by using a parallel substance to stimulate natural resistance. This means strengthening the mind against the knowledge/power complex by giving our students the theoretical sophistication that those in other fields receive to reflect on the creation of identities, teaching them the history of our theory and how it has undertaken such acts of exclusion, helping them to recognize the common forms of idealization in themselves and others, above all providing a frame in which criticism is not defined as destructive but necessary and life-giving. Without the encouragement from their teachers to be critical and self-critical in this way, without treating psychoanalysis as both a critical as well as an emotional discipline, the authority of knowledge can never be broken. But also, in the effort to find more democratic relationships of learning, we may hope to draw on the experiences of mutuality and collaboration that are now articulated in our practice, on the acknowledgment of vulnerability and uncertainty that the contemporary discussion of analytic subjectivity has fostered.
Aspiring to draw equally on both sides of psychoanalytic tradition - the expansion of subjectivity and critical theoretical hermeneutics - it may be possible to transcend the split between intellect and emotion, between subject and object, as Loewald (1980) put it, between "love of the truth of psychic reality" and "love and care for the object whose truth we want to discover" (p. 297). In this spirit we may accept the paradoxical relationship to the truth as an ideal whose very unrealizability protects us, an ideal each of us can only pursue by following our own demon, honoring our own experience, relying on our analysis of ourselves, the subject and object of knowledge. For, as Loewald continued, "Our object, being what it is, is the other in ourselves and our self in the other" (p. 297).
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Foucault's thinking seems to fit in with another loop in Weber's distinction between rational authority and charisma -- namely, the idea of hierarchic authority, which refers to the church in its rational-bureaucratic, post-evangelical institutional form, that incorporates both the confessional mode and the professionalizing demands of objectivity and invested role behaviors model that could well apply to our discipline now.

To simply cast the opposition in terms of those who believe the analyst participates in the relationship and those who strive for analytic objectivity leaves out the equally crucial differences among those who believe in using one's subjectivity. With no claim to be exhaustive, we can delineate a difference between the self psychological use of subjectivity to resonate and create empathic participation, the Kleinian use of subjectivity to receive projective identification and the relational-conflict use of subjectivity to analyze a co-created, relationship of mutual influence. Later Mitchell (1993) usefully suggested that these opposing views could be complementary insofar as "thinking about the analyst's participation serves as a corrective for those ... who believe that they, in fact, know what the patient needs,' whereas in reverse, theories that track the patient's "subjective experience ran provide a useful corrective ... where them is a tendency to drift into a preoccupation with the analyst's participation' (p. 77).

Consider Arlow's statement, cited by Slavin, that psychoanalytic training is the only field where the major textbooks are more than three-quarters of a century old. We can be grateful that psychoanalysis keeps its history intact and that Freud's writings are still fruitful and interesting. But the irony of this statement is that only such an uncritical adherent of orthodoxy as Arlow could imagine that a Freudian case study is a textbook-something comparable to the constantly updated medical books from which students gain information about disease, rather than a text - an object of hermeneutic study like a literary work or historical document. A text such as Freud's is not an authorized source of information, but a writing over which students pour to understand the birth of a tradition or to find points of contradiction, a starting place for critique and renewal.