Perhaps one of the most complex socio-cultural phenomena in the history of Western civilization is the mysterious symbiosis between the Jews and the Germans. The national German poet of Jewish origin, Heinrich Heine and the German judge, Daniel Paul Schreber, both underscored this fact. In 1838 Heine wrote of the “‘deep affinity that prevails between these two ethical nations, Jews and Germans’ who were jointly destined to create a new Jerusalem in Germany, ‘a modern Palestine,’ which would emerge as ‘the home of philosophy, the mother soil of prophecy, and the citadel of pure spirituality.’” According to Paul Schreber’s religious system as described in his immortal Memoirs, “the Germans, possibly since the Reformation, were God’s chosen people whose language God preferred to use,” a people chosen “as the most moral,” for example, “the old Jews” (Schreber, 1903, original pp. 14—15). Heine who died in 1856, the year Freud was born, could not foresee how the New Palestine would materialize in the figures of Sigmund Freud, whose brain-child, Freudism, would become a defining ideology of the twentieth century alongside Marxism, created by the other, converted, Jew that disturbed the peace of the world, Karl Marx. In their scariest dreams, none of these men could have imagined the Nazi Holocaust or Europe lying in ruins at the end of
World War II. And yet those two cataclysms half a century away are intertwined with the pre-war, wartime and post-war history of psychoanalysis, now a century old, on both sides of the Atlantic, and particularly in Germany.

Freud was a proud secular Jew, a child of the Enlightenment and its philosophy of humanism and rationalism. But having grown up in anti-Semitic Austria, and having been surrounded mostly by Jewish followers since the inception of the psychoanalytic movement, he was forever self-conscious about psychoanalysis being branded as a Jewish science and therefore repeatedly sought a Gentile presence as stamp of respectability. In his attempts to find such Gentile imprimaturs and apostles, Freud got tragically embroiled with C. G. Jung (Lothane, 1997b), followed by the imbroglio with Horace Frink (Warner, 1994), and eventually with Ernest Jones, as will be shown below, and each time there was a price to pay. Marx did not have had such a problem.

All the imaginary evils that have been attributed to psychoanalysis by Freud’s early critics starting in the first decade of this century, or branded as “mind-poisoning,” “Jewish science,” or as “Jewish-Marxist filth,” mouthed by in the 1930-1940’s (by rabid Jew haters such as Julius Streicher and others), or denounced lately as a pseudo-science and a pseudo-therapy by various Freud bashers with arguments scaling new heights of absurdity (Lothane, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998a), pale in comparison with the real evils that were perpetrated in the name of Marx in Communist Russia, China, or in South East Asia. By 1933 two evil dictators of the 20th century, Stalin and Hitler, were in control of their countries, and only 8 years away from a titanic war between two totalitarian ideologies, adding some 45 million dead in WW II to the 45 murdered by Stalin in Russia before and after 1941. Freud was resolutely anti-Marxist and anti-Bolshevik but Marxism
was a tidal wave among intellectuals, becoming a major unifying and polarizing force in Europe and America, among Jews and Gentiles alike. While Freud opposed to the Marxist leanings of his followers, the hydra of Freudo-Marxism was rearing its many heads in the work of such creative people as Wilhelm Reich, Otto Fenichel, Erich Fromm, viewed as a contaminant of traditional psychoanalysis by the purist, or “orthodox” Freudsians in Austria and Germany. On the other hand, while in the pre-war societies of Germany and Austria the young were powerfully drawn to both left and right totalitarian ideologies, for most of them it was Hitler who became the proverbial Pied Piper. This fatal attraction became reinforced by the Nazi dictatorship and its tight police control that actually coerced German youth, including a small number of Jews, into becoming members of the Hitler Jugend, the official Nazi youth organization.

Freud’s other problem was within the body of organized psychoanalysis: confronting a long line of dissidents and deviants from his doctrinal orthodoxy. The issue of orthodoxy and dissidence, as well as left-wing vs. right-wing affiliations, runs like a crimson thread in the history of psychoanalysis as an establishment and movement and still echoes in ongoing debates between various groups. In that history a very special focal role was enacted by Freud’s most controversial and troublesome follower: enfant terrible Wilhelm Reich. Of all Freud’s sons and disciples (Adler, Ferenczi, Jung, Rank, Stekel, and Tausk), none has provoked more demonization and persecution down the decades than Reich. Made notorious in Europe as a Communist and in the United States as a quack who manufactured and peddled a fraudulent cure, the “orgone accumulator” across state lines, placed under FBI surveillance, sued by the Food and Drug Administration, tried and sentenced by a Federal court to die a martyr’s death in a federal
prison weeks before his parole, his books ordered burned in the United States in 1956, Reich has been revived as a culture hero in the 1970’s and reviewed in a number of biographies (Boadella, D., 1973; Cattier, 1971; Fallend, 1988; Greenfield, 1974; Mann, 1973; Ollendorf Reich, 1969; Sharaf, 1983; Wilson, 1973) and his books were reissued in paperbacks, thus sparking continuous interest and debate. In this short list the two outstanding books on Reich are Sharaf’s comprehensive biography and Fallend’s work on Reich during his Vienna period.

The most recent and eloquent debate about Reich is presented in the new anthology, *The ‘Case’ of Wilhelm Contributions to the Relationship between Psychoanalysis and Politics*, edited by two sons of the post-war generation, the Austrian Karl Fallend and the German Bernd Nitzschke (Fallend & Nitzschke, 1997), both eminent scholars of Freud and psychoanalysis, marks the centenary of the birth of Wilhelm Reich and another great psychoanalyst with Marxist leanings, Otto Fenichel, both two years younger than Freud’s daughter Anna. Fenichel and Reich are the subject of fascinating narratives crafted by Fallend, about the Reich-Fenichel friendship and betrayal, and Nitzschke, about the scapegoating of Reich by Freud and psychoanalysts after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. Fallend began writing on these subjects in 1988, Nitschke in 1991. Fortunately, Nitzschke on Reich is now available in English (Nitzschke, 1999). The other contributors offer a sympathetic revisiting of Reich’s confirmed and contested contributions, such as bioenergetic body therapy and sexual enlightenment. Fallend and Nitzscke’s contributions should be placed in a long series of the conflict between received vs. revisionist histories of Freud and the psychoanalysis. So-called orthodox Freudians, as exemplified in the debate years ago between Paul
Roazen and Kurt Eissler regarding the truth about Freud’s relationship with Viktor Tausk, have tended to close the wagons around received historiography; revisionist accounts have been viewed with suspicion as subversive to psychoanalysis. The principle of conflict resolution should lead us to give equal attention to all available accounts: no psychoanalyst should shy away from looking at all the relevant facts. We expect no less from our analysands. Thus revisionist history should be seen under the rubric of revisitings and reappraisals, of unearthing hitherto unknown or hidden historical documents and facts due to individual and group concealment or repression. It is not just satisfying a yen for conspiracy theories, or ferreting out secrets from the closet or the marriage bed, but telling facts about censored political, e.g., declassified secrets of governments, or institutional histories, e.g. the whitewashed history of the analytic establishment (Kirsner, 2000), or the vagaries of the seduction theory (Masson, 1984; Lothane, 1987).

In revisiting Reich, Fallend and Nitzschke offer an important rehabilitation of Reich in the context of a question of a principle epitomized by Reich’s life and writings. First, they steer clear of any imputation, that has died hard through countless and senseless repetition, that Reich was schizophrenic or paranoid. Second, they raise a question of principle: is it legitimate to mix psychoanalysis as science with psychoanalysis as politics, thus making it value-laden rather than value-neutral, as Freud claimed psychoanalysis to be. They argue and show convincingly, based on fascinating and meticulous historical research, that values, politics, and psychoanalysis are inseparable. Fallend’s account presents a hitherto unknown Fenichel, for example, Fenichel’s leading a sexology seminar at Vienna University in 1919, whose most famous
early participant was none other than Wilhelm Reich, while Nitzschke’s reappraisal explodes a bombshell: Heretofore we have accepted the version that the falling out between Reich and Freud and his circle and Reich’s expulsion in 1934 from the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) had to do with Reich’s “heretical” views about psychoanalysis, or because he allegedly was mentally ill already in 1933–1934.

The new data and interpretations provided by Fallend, Nitzschke and other authors in the book show that, after Freud turned hostile towards Reich by 1932, Reich was kicked out from the IPA in 1934 as an undesirable because of his politically embarrassing anti-Nazi activities, much more so than as a result of his heresy from orthodox psychoanalysis.

Reich’s expulsion occurred against a most significant development. In the spring of 1933, IPA president Ernest Jones, Anna Freud and Sigmund Freud started a series of negotiations with two emissaries of the German Psychoanalytic Association (Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft, or DPG, founded in 1910 by Karl Abraham), training analysts from the component Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, Felix Boehm and Carl Müller-Braunschweig, about the future relations between the IPA and DPG following Hitler’s seizure of power in January of 1933. In the 1920’s and 1930’s both these men published extensively in psychoanalytic journals, Müller-Braunschweig the more prolific of the two, and with a special interest in child analysis, as listed in Grinstein’s _The Index of Psychoanalytic Writings_. In the 1930’s the Berlin society and institute were increasingly outshining the rival of the mother society in Vienna.

The first to come to Vienna was Boehm in 1933, the last to visit was Müller-Braunschweig in 1938, when Vienna was already controlled by the Nazis. These emissaries, with proven Nazi affiliations and connections, came to advocate for the anti-
Jewish policies of the Nazi regime whose aim it was to “aryanize” the DPG by cleansing it of all its Jewish members, resulting in an ill-fated policy of placation and appeasement towards the Nazi in an effort to “save” psychoanalysis in Germany. In keeping with this spirit, Jones showed outright hypocrisy, as in a telegram sent to Therese Benedek (later a prominent member of the Chicago Institute and Society): “Urgently advise voluntary resignation,” from the DPG, when he was clearly bucking under the Nazi pressure, to which another analyst, Eva Rosenfeld, would react as follows: “they could not resign voluntarily because too high a degree of masochism would be involved, as though they had voluntarily to become their own executioners” (Loewenberg, 1998).

The first step in the process of the disenfranchisement of the Jewish analysts was their removal from the DPG Executive in the Fall of 1933, followed by the exclusion of all Jews from membership in the DPG in 1935. By 1936, when the DPG became incorporated into the Nazi-controlled German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy, or the Göring Institute (so named after its director, Matthias Heinrich Göring, a cousin of his more sinister namesake, the Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, tried and sentenced to death as a war criminal at Nuremberg), Jones complied with M. Göring’s wish for the DPG to remain a component society of the IPA, and it did so, until it was formally dissolved in 1938. However, psychoanalysis per se was never formally forbidden in the Nazi state. As late as 1938, Oswald Bumke, the successor of Paul Flechsig as director of the Psychiatric Hospital at Leipzig University, published the second edition of his 1931 book, Die Psychoanalyse, with the new title of Die Psychoanalyse und ihre Kinder (psychoanalysis and its children), a serious discussion of Freud and his major disciples (cited in Lothane, 1992), where Bumke complained that...
Freud was too materialistic, too organically minded, and not spiritual enough. This publication in 1938 was in stark contrast to the fact that in 1933 Freud’s books were burned in the streets of Berlin as containing material “soul-destroying exaggerations of instinctual drives,” thus filled with an “un-German spirit” (Nitzschke, in Fallend & Nitzschke, 1997). Jones’ friendship with Müller-Braunschweig would weigh in the fate of orthodox psychoanalysis in Germany after the war. And here is the irony of fate: the once proud DPG, incorporated in the Göring Institute as Arbeits Gruppe (working group) A, would after World War II be declared as deviant, denied membership in the IPA, to be replaced, following behind-the-scenes maneuvers of the IPA-leadership, by a reconstituted orthodox-Freudian German Psychoanalytical Association (Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung, or DPV), with lots of bad blood to flow between the DPG and the DPV for many years. It should be noted that the members and the people trained by the Göring Institute were mostly psychologists, not psychiatrists, the latter allied with medicine and largely organicist in their orientation.

Echoing Reich’s and Fenichel’s judgment on the matter, Nitzschke is emphatic that this expulsion of Reich was a moral scandal and that the doomed Jewish analysts were not resigning from the DPG voluntarily but were being forced to leave under duress, whereas Reich, prescient about the Nazi menace, was among the few leftist Freudians, the so-called *Linksfriedianer*, who were vigorously opposed to Jones’ policy of appeasement, and that it was this opposition that in 1934 would cause Reich’s expulsion from the IPA. Were Jones and Anna Freud rational or deluded? Should they have negotiated with the Nazis to “save” psychoanalysis or should they have acted like
psychoanalysts in other places: dissolved the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association in protest, gone underground and reorganized at war’s end?

By the way, 1997 also marks the 20th anniversary of Geoffrey Cocks’ doctoral dissertation on the history of the Göring Institute. Its publication as Psychotherapy in the Third Reich in 1985 coincided with the historical IPA congress in Hamburg that year and it was Cocks’s presence and thesis that stirred emotional discussions on such topics at the congress, including moving contacts between German and Israeli analysts. Cock’s 1985 book is now available in the expanded second edition (Cocks, 1997), followed by another book a year later (Cocks, 1998), with a “Foreword” by Peter Loewenberg (1998). Loewenberg recalled the memorable 1985 Opening Address of Hamburg's Lord-Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi, describing the psychoanalysts' expedient loss of principle: “‘Every step rational and yet in a false direction. Here a compromise with individuals, there with substance: always in the vain hope to preserve the whole—which had ceased to exist....In most cases freedom is lost in tiny steps’” (Loewenberg, 1998, p. vii); and he noted: “Following Hitler’s seizure of power the major issue in German psychoanalysis was whether to close up shop or to try to insure its institutional survival by coercing the Jewish members of the German Psychoanalytic Society (DPG) or the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute (BPI) … to ‘voluntarily’ resign” (p. viii).

This question, whether psychoanalysis was saved or whether the Jewish psychoanalysts were cynically sold out has continued to haunt psychoanalysts and others in the postwar period from 1945 to the present, especially the conscience of psychoanalysts in Germany, creating conflicts and acrimonious polemics between the neo-Freudians in the former DPG revived in 1945 and the “orthodox Freudians,” members of the DPV, founded in 1950 as a group that seceded from the formerly orthodox DPG but now excluded form the IPA. The DPG and DPV traded accusations about who was with and who was against the Nazi during the war, even though both contained members that were active as collaborators with the Third Reich. While promoting official and revisionist versions of their war time histories, after the war, DPG people claimed they “saved” psychoanalysis while DPV members held that genuine psychoanalysis was suppressed under the Nazis. But the latter assessment of DPV members was strongly contradicted by the opinion of Ernest Jones himself in 1949 when he spoke enthusiastically how “some analysts have remained [during and after the war, Z. L.] true, real genuine analysts ... Dr. Müller-Braunschweig [is] an excellent example.” 

But who saved what and from whom? Compared to the real and genuine Müller-Braunschweig, or his more influential nemesis, Berlin psychoanalyst Schultz-Henck (later discredited by Jones), it is Hitler, oh cruel irony, who should reckon as the true “savior” of German psychoanalysis. Because of Hitler, more than one hundred Austrian Jewish analysts and more than seventy German Jewish analysts, among them the biggest names in the history of psychoanalysis, were banished by the Nazis and forced to emigrate and it is those émigrés that contributed, especially through their activities in the United States, to psychoanalysis becoming a world movement after the
war. The persecution of Jewish analysts by the Nazis was a part of the persecution of all Jewish doctors in Germany, as poignantly portrayed as “defamed, banished and destroyed” by Eckart (2000). The Nazi racially inspired anti-Semitic defamation of Jewish doctors in Germany, started well before 1933, became policy of the German medical community and then Nazi law, including decrees and ordinances and the various “Aryan paragraphs” of the so-called “coordination” (Gleichschaltung), beginning in March of 1933, e.g., “The Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service” of 7 April, 1933 (Brecht et al., 1985). This resulted in the systematic persecution of Jewish doctors, boycotting of practices and removal from jobs. Eckart narrates how already in February of 1933 provocations began against Jewish medical students who were ordered to sit at the back or lecture halls. In March, at a medical congress, the leaders of medical societies “condemned the Jews and their exponents Marxism and Bolshevism” and passed a resolution for the “removal of Jewish medical experts and treating physicians” and put an end to the “shameful situation where working German girls and women are forced to be examined by those belonging to a foreign race.”

As Nitzschke shows, Reich’s life and career were an integral part of these historic developments within organized psychoanalysis. Therefore, a brief sketch of the evolution of Reich’s ideas should be helpful to follow the lines of this narrative. A related issue is to illustrate the perennial confusion in psychoanalysis between method and theories (Lothane, 1995, 1997b, 1999a). For psychoanalysis is not only a method first and theory second, but it also has a defined role as an ethical system (Lothane, 1998b, 1998b, 1999b) and as a profession devoted to healing individuals in the wider context of contributing to the mental hygiene of society. That wider societal role for psychoanalysis came into
prominence for the first time in 1919 with the emergence of government interest in war neuroses, or shell shock, today called posttraumatic stress disorder, among soldiers in World War One. A similar phenomenon occurred in the United States when there was federal funding of psychoanalysis and psychiatry in return for its effort to rehabilitate the emotional casualties of WW II, until that support was displaced by funding the community psychiatry movement of the 1960’s and now by the funding of psychiatry by the drug industries. Similarly, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy filled a government sponsored need in the Third Reich.

Reich’s was a meteoric rise in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. In 1919, while still a medical student, Reich joined Fenichel’s the “Vienna Student Seminar on Sexology” and barely a year later he became a member of the Society and began to practice psychoanalysis. By 1924 Reich became leader of the “Technical Seminar” at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, which he held until 1930, when he emigrated to Berlin and became member of the already famous Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, part of the DPG. In 1925 and 1927 were published his first and second book on sexuality in psychoanalysis, The Impulsive Character, his first formulation that symptom-analysis should be extended to character analysis, and The Function of the Orgasm (not to be confused with his later book with the same title published in the United States in 1942), both published by the International Psychoanalytic Publishing House. In his elucidation of the importance of the orgasm in health and neurosis, Reich built on Freud’s original sexological interest in inhibited sexual functioning in the adult, as manifested in the so called Aktual-neuroses. But while this interest in Freud was soon overshadowed by Freud’s concern with the psychoneuroses, i.e., to inhibitions caused by sexual traumas
and sexual fantasies harking back to increasing earlier periods of childhood, Reich’s emphasis on orgastic satisfaction pushed him back into sexology and organizing outpatient clinics for sex counseling for adolescents. In these activities and publications Reich campaigned for the sexual enlightenment of youth, information about contraceptives, and promotion of a free sexual life as a program of neurosis prevention. Clearly, Reich saw psychoanalysis as having a social-hygienic mission whose purpose was to heal society as a whole. Such ideas about sexual reform seemed to continue Freud’s ideas about sexuality in 1908 when he inveighed against the hypocritical sexual morality as practiced in the compulsive middle-class marriage. However, as with his views on libido, Freud was much more conservative now than before and Reich’s zeal was out of place. While Reich was brimming with youthful sexual vigor, most of his peers were much older, less vigorous, and both alarmed and envious of the radical Reich. Besides, Freud himself, already sick with jaw cancer, was turning his attention increasingly towards ego psychology, away from libido and the id to the ego, from energy concepts to structural concepts, from sexuality to aggression, from individual psychology to group psychology: one might say that Freud was becoming neo-Freudian without knowing it. Freud’s ego psychology was born in his Schreber analysis of 1911, followed in 1914 by “On Narcissism: an Introduction,” and in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), The Ego and the Id (1923), and leading up to Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), in which he reversed an important formula: repression causes anxiety now reads: anxiety causes repression.

Two other remarkable publishing events of 1927 were landmark books whose importance would become evident much later: Heinz Hartmann’s Die Grundlagen der
Psychoanalyse (the foundations of psychoanalysis) and Harald Schultz-Hencke’s Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (introduction to psychoanalysis). Heinz Hartmann would later become the leading ego psychologist in American psychoanalysis, along with Kris and Loewenstein, while Schultz-Hencke, in a strange twist of history, would become for Freud as much of an anathema as Reich, to be excluded from the IPA after the war.

The main difference between the ego psychology of Hartmann and Schultz-Hencke in 1927 is that while the former did not challenge Freud’s theories of infantile sexuality, the latter wrote of the “spontaneous extinction of primary infantile wishes” and stressed adult life and the importance of social, cultural, and ethical factors in health and disease, later to become an important influence on another prominent German neo-Freudian analyst (not Jewish) who emigrated to the United States, Karen Horney (1885-1952).

Altogether, it was thus small wonder that in this climate, in the later 1920’s, Freud turned a cold shoulder to Reich’s emphasis on the importance of orgasm and sexual fulfillment. The curious phenomenon is that in his seventies Freud could tolerate neither extreme: Schultz-Hencke’s “neo-Freudian” heresy from the theory of sexuality nor Reich’s “hyper-Freudian” emphasis on sexuality.

While Reich’s sexology may have well been a precursor for Masters and Johnson in our own time, his other original contribution was the ego-psychological technique of therapy of the neuroses set forth his 1933 book Character Analysis that grew out of his work with disturbed patients and of creatively using mistakes and failure in analysis as an important source of learning and teaching in the Technical Seminar. Reich’s character analysis as a technique focused on interpreting the manner, style, and form of the patient’s communications rather than content alone with the view to eliminating
emotional blocks to recollection of past traumatic experiences with full affect, and thereby re-establishing emotional contact with others in the present. These ideas were endorsed in 1936 by Anna Freud in her classic “The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense.” While Reich later transformed character analysis into his own brand of vegetotherapy, as practiced, for instance, by Alexander Lowen and others, his technical ideas still come in useful in negative transference and resistance analysis today.

But these brilliant achievements notwithstanding, there were other reasons for Freud’s and the old guard’s animosity towards Reich: Reich’s radical sexual politics, his opposition in 1932 to Freud’s metaphysical preoccupations with the death instinct, and his involvement with the Communist Party. Freud’s antipathy to socialism went back to the first heretic from orthodoxy, Alfred Adler, who also went through a period of sympathizing with Socialists and Communists in Austria and also lost in Freud’s eyes when he converted to Protestantism. Freud’s death instinct is a good example of a speculative theory that has little to do with the analytic method or therapy. For Reich the death instinct theory was a product of the capitalist system; and since neuroses were due to social repression of sexuality, thus the way to combat it was to combine psychoanalysis with the science of dialectical materialism and use this combination to change the social order. It did not occur to Reich at that time to consider dialectical materialism as much of an ideological aberration as the theory of the death instinct it was supposed to dethrone. But it was Reich’s active role in the Communist Party -- and this fact is duly emphasized by Nitzschke -- that became a thorn in Freud’s side. “Should psychoanalysis be outlawed,” Freud said to his daughter, “it should be outlawed as psychoanalysis and not as a mix of analysis and politics as represented by Reich,” thus,
not on account of it being enmeshed with Communism, and this is understandable. But Reich was not only a misfit with Freud and the Freuds: the socialists and the communists did not want him either. When in 1930, Reich published another book, *Sexual Maturity, Abstinence, and Marital Morals: A Critique of the Bourgeois Sexual Reform*, the first in a series of socio-sexual analyses to be followed in 1932 in *The Sexual Revolution: Towards a History of Sexual Economy* and *The Sexual Struggle of Youth*, his views on sexuality became intolerable to both the Socialists in Austria and the Communists in Germany and he was thrown out of the former in 1930 and the latter in late 1933 or early 1934. However, even as Reich became disillusioned with Communism and abandoned the God that failed, he continued to be branded as Communist by his fellow analysts. But in 1933, when after three years of exile in Berlin Reich returned to Vienna, fleeing from the Nazi Regime now in control of Germany, he once again became persona non grata, but this time not only because of his leftist politics, but because of being an active anti-Fascist! Reich was now in triple jeopardy: The campaign against Reich begins with the ban of his two books of 1933: *Character Analysis, Technique and Basic Principles for Students and Analysts*, privately published, and *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, published in Copenhagen. That year, unbeknownst to Reich, his name was stricken from the membership list of the DPG. A year later, during the International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Lucerne, Reich was finally removed from the membership of the IPA.

It is the political machinations surrounding these two latter expulsions of Reich that are reconstructed and variously denounced by three authors in this anthology: First, and most tellingly, by Nitzschke, and also by Cremerius and Dahmer. Nitzschke is a
practicing psychoanalyst and a training analyst at the Institute for Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy in Düsseldorf, branch of the DGPT (abbreviation for the German Society for Psychoanalysis, Psychotherapy, Psychosomatic Medicine and Depth Psychology, an umbrella organization to which belong both the DPG, the DPV, as well as Adlerian and Jungian and other “free” societies and institutes, united in their mutual policies regarding insurance policies etc, a state of affairs different from the United States where no ecumenical umbrella organization is yet in existence); Cremerius is psychiatrist, medical doctor, and psychoanalyst, member of DPV and IPA; and Dahmer is a sociologist and a former editor of the journal *Psyche*, the “orthodox” Freudian journal published in Frankfurt, from which he was eased out after a palace revolution.

Here is additional background information about what went on in the world of psychoanalysis in pre-war Germany. In 1929 the Frankfurt Psychoanalytical Institute was opened and it collaborated with the neo-Marxist Institute for Social Research among whose luminaries were Fromm, Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer (see Brecht et al., 1985 and Kurzweil, 1989). The other city next to Frakfurt to become a scene of important developments was Heidelberg, where Alexander Mitscherlich spent his war years. A Marxists in his student years, Mitscherlich and his wife Maragarete Nielsen became active after the end of WW II in confronting Germany’s Nazi past, most dramatically with the 1949 documentation of the active participation of German doctors in the Holocaust. In 1946 Mitscherlich founded *Psyche, A Journal for Depth Psychology and Anthropology in Research and Praxis*, which, according to Cocks (1997, p. 353), and in spite of disclaimers of its editors was virtually a continuation of the 1933—1945 *Zentrallblatt für Psychotherapie* (the very same journal that printed Jung’s extolling
Hitler’s views on the Aryan vs. the Jewish soul; Lothane, 1995b), seeing that many of its contributors have been members of the Göring Institute and one was a member of the Nazi party. In 1966 Psyche was redefined A Journal for Psychoanalysis and its Applications, to become an organ of the “orthodox” Freudians and upholding the ideological and organizational splits in post war German psychoanalysis. Prominent among the original co-editors were the aforementioned leftist sociologist Helmut Dahmer, Margarete Mitscherlich-Nielsen, and Lutz Rosenkötter, who was racially persecuted by the Nazis. In his contribution to the present volume Dahmer is critical of Lockot. The palace revolution consisted in the expulsion of Dahmer from the editorial board of Psyche followed by a bitter law suit, and mutual accusations between Dahmer and his successor Hans-Martin Lohmann (e.g., on the pages of the journal Free Associations). Now M. Mitscherlich has been replaced as editor by Werner Bohleber and Lohmann is gone as editorial director and his successor is Bernd Schwibs.

Nitzschke formulates two theses to explain the story of Reich’s expulsion from the DPG and the IPA: “1. The chief officers of the IPA, Freud, his daughter Anna, and the President of the Association, Jones, in excluding Reich from both psychoanalytic organizations, were attempting to curry favor with the newly established Nazi regime; 2. Had Freud and the officers of the IPA treated the two main non-Jewish pillars of the then DPG, Felix Boehm and Carl Müller-Braunschweig, with the same opposition that they offered to Reich, the history of organized psychoanalysis in Nazi Germany would have taken a different course” (Nitzschke, in Fallend & Nitzschke, pp. 73, 82). And we should add a third thesis, implicit in Nitzschke’s analysis: the post-war history of psychoanalysis in Germany, and the split between DPV and DPG, with the resulting bitter polarization of
psychoanalysis in Germany, would have also had a different course. Nitzschke thus traces the story of two “scandals”: the expulsion of Reich and trying to “save” psychoanalysis with the help of Boehm and Müller-Braunschweig collaborating with the Nazi-sponsored Göring Institute, a shameful political compromise, and later the manner in which the DPV was established in 1949 by stabbing the old DPG in the back and excluding its members, and among them Schultz-Hencke, from the IPA.

Whereas in the current attacks on psychoanalysis by the Freud bashers, the empty argument that psychoanalysis is not a science, is repeated ad nauseam, it is lost sight of that psychoanalysis is a discipline, a profession, and an establishment, the same way science is both a body of accumulated knowledge and an establishment. The notion of establishment is not meant here in the trendy manner of the sixties’ revolt but that an organization, such as that psychoanalysis, like medical and psychiatric establishments, has social, corporate, economic and political goals in a given society and in relation to its economy and the ruling political system. As such, an established discipline never conforms to the metaphysical ideal of a “pure science” but combines a body of accumulated scientific observation and experimentation with a more or less articulated ideology and a system of ethics. The ethical system may or may not be subject to the reigning political system. All this is most tellingly epitomized in Freud’s 1914 designation of psychoanalysis as a “movement,” a sociopolitical, not a scientific, term.

In the years 1932-1933, Freud gave a negative answer to the question “Does psycho-analysis lead to a particular Weltanschauung”, i.e., ideology, with the argument that psychoanalysis is a science based on reason whereas “demands upon a Weltanschauung are only based on emotion”, usually supplied by philosophy and religion
and thus fruit of “illusions and wishful impulses”. The arch example of a

*Weltanschauung* Freud decried was Marxism that having “mercilessly cleared away all
idealistic systems and illusions,...has itself developed illusions,” versus the

*Weltanschauung* of psychoanalysis “erected upon science [that] has, apart from its
emphasis on the real external world, mainly negative traits, such as submission to the
truth and rejection of illusions.” (Freud, 1933, pp. 158, 159, 180, 182). Whether

Marxism was good social science or a wishful illusion, the fact is that it became an
enormously influential ideology, i.e. *Weltanschauung*, and a political system that has
swept the globe and still survives in China and Cuba, for one. Similarly, whereas

psychoanalysis is clearly a scientific discipline it has also become a birthplace of various
ideologies, not the last of which was the sexual etiology of disorder, the essence of
Freudism, or Freudianism. As with capital, sex is both a fact of life and a theory of life,
that can easily be used in making reductionist formulas: neurosis is nothing but sexual
neurosis.

It was Freud’s theories of infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex as the
bedrock of neurosis that have spawned various forms of dissidence, i.e., heresy, in the
psychoanalytic movement, dividing the establishment into adherents and opponents. In
1914, after the split with Adler, Stekel and Jung, Freud wrote a history of the
psychoanalytic movement, not a history of psychoanalytic science, thus clearly
indicating the real presence and the dynamic role of varieties of ideology, i.e.

*Weltanschauung* within the body of psychoanalysis.

In this historical context Freud’s enmity towards Schultz-Hencke is
understandable and confounding at the same time. Schultz-Hencke, a most prominent
faculty member of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute who married a Jewish woman (Paul Roazen, personal communication), was prophetic in his neo-Freudian views and in his aforementioned book 1927 (Introduction to Psychoanalysis) he still upholds the basic Freudian tenet of the dynamic unconscious while stressing the importance of inhibition, quite in keeping with Freud’s 1926 work Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, in which the former formula, anxiety as effect of repressed libido was replaced by the new formula: anxiety is a signal to set repression of libido in motion. Schultz-Hencke was reverently remembered by one of his most influential students and later the highly influential director of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, Franz Alexander: “With the growth of the student body the need of the students to have their organization appeared. This took the form of the so-called “children’s seminar,” a weekly meeting of the students themselves in which they freely discussed what they wished. NO staff member was admitted. Two students conducted these meetings jointly, Fenichel and Schultz-Hencke. The discussions centered around Fenichel’s exposing the officially accepted, theoretical concepts and Schultz-Hencke in the role of the critic challenging the official doctrine” (Alexander, 1956, p. 175). Alexander’s book is methodologically focused and his discussion of sexuality is brought in line with ego psychological considerations. He discusses Reich’s analytic technique positively but cautions against it being to schematic and too one-sided in it emphasis of resistance and the denial of the importance of what is resisted, i.e., the repressed content as well.

The other good friend of Schultz-Hencke’s was Karen Horney, also a non-Jew, who succeeded from the New York Psychoanalytic Society in 1939 to become, two years later, the founder of the neo-Freudian American Institute of Psychoanalysis (the Karen
Horney Psychoanalytic Clinic), that later became a component of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, founded in 1956 by another group of secessionist analysts. Horney duly acknowledged her debt to Schultz-Hencke: thus, she cites his 1931 work, *Schicksal und Neurose* (destiny and neurosis) in her discussion of narcissistic entitlement, (Horney, 1939, p. 95); again on that topic she cites his *Introduction into Psychoanalysis* (Schultz-Hencke, 1927; Horney, 1950, p. 41); and another citation is Schultz-Hencke’s (1940) *The Inhibited Man* (Horney 1942, p. 67). Another interesting student of Schultz-Hencke to emphasize adult psychology and pathology was Franz Baumeyer who made an abiding contribution to the literature on Paul Schreber: he found and published in 1955 the clinical chart of the most famous patient in psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Horney was also good friends with Müller-Braunschweig and he is mentioned repeatedly in her biography by Jack L. Rubins (1978). Among yet other participants of the “Kinderseminar,” starting in 1924, Fallend lists in his chapter (in Fallend & Nitzschke, 1997) analysts that came to be widely known in the United States: Erich Fromm. Edith Jacobson, Georg Gero, and starting in 1930, Wilhelm and Annie Reich. From 1934 until 1945 Fenichel wrote and circulated among a chosen group of leftist analyst friends his 119 *Rundbriefe*, the legendary “Circular Letters” or newsletters sent to a chosen circle of psychoanalysts, a treasure-trove of the social and political history of psychoanalysis, now published by Johannes Reichmayr and Elke Mühlleitner (Fenichel, 1998, Lothane, 1999c). The most readable source on Fenichel in English is still Russell Jacoby’s 1983 book.

What galled Freud was the apparent repudiation by Schultz-Hencke’s of the libido theory and the same wrath would later be turned on another neo-Freudian, Erich Fromm.
The story of Fromm’s exclusion from the IPA is in some ways parallel to the political machinations surrounding the expulsion of Reich Fromm’s saga has now been fascinatingly documented and presented by Paul Roazen, this most indefatigable and prolific historian of psychoanalysis for more than four decades (Roazen, in press). But the trend away from the id and towards the ego was a trend started by Freud’s own ego psychology, already foreshadowed in his Schreber analysis of 1911 and firmly launched with *The Ego and the Id* of 1923. It was pursued by Franz Alexander first in Berlin and later in Chicago, profoundly influencing another Chicago-bred ego-psychologist, none other than Heinz Kohut, such that Kohut’s self psychology could be seen as a form of neo-Freudism, or “neo-analysis,” thus a descendant of Schultz-Hencke’s Neo-Analyse that was anathema to Jones. Indeed, Kohut’s replacing the ego with self, on the one hand, and energy with empathy and sex with self, on the other, became his battle cry in the ideological conquest of Freudian ego psychology, wresting the palm of primogeniture from the proud New York psychoanalytic triumvirate of Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein. However, the strict adherence to the libido theory and infantile sexuality was already giving way in the mid-1960’s among the leading New York Freudians themselves, as, for example, in Arlow and Brenner’s break with the mechanistic libido concepts and the growing emphasis on the role of aggression. Freud’s hostility towards Schultz-Hencke was in turn compounded by the envy of his nemesis, Müller-Braunschweig, who was never as popular as Schultz-Hencke’s at the Berlin Institute.

It was easy to pillory Reich and scapegoat him for the other leftist analysts, the Linksfreudianer in Germany and Austria, such as Otto Fenichel and Edith Jacobson, to name a few. However, far from being a dyed-in-the-wool communist or, as derisively
characterized by Freud, Bolschewist (Bolshevik), Reich only temporarily idealized Stalin’s state as having done away with the social repression of sexuality. But Reich’s formula of sexual salvation of the masses turned out to be anathema both to the Soviets and the Nazis, the latter branding it as a Jewish Marxist obscenity. However, the more astounding fact is that it also grated on the ears of Freud himself, at a time when he was turning away from the libido Weltanschauung of the neuroses to ego psychology and to a metaphysical conception of the death instinct as explanatory of human aggression. Freud was stunned by Reich’s criticism of his death instinct theory, insisted that Reich’s paper on masochism should be published with a footnote that Reich was a “Bolschewist,” which was later omitted, while, ironically, entrusting another leftist, Siegfried Bernfeld, to do a hatchet job on Reich in a rebuttal. But such ideological antagonism paled in comparison with Freud’s ire at Reich’s political activities, in the name of psychoanalysis, as a vehement and outspoken anti-Fascist. As Nitzschke clearly shows, it was Reich’s anti-Fascism that made Reich dangerous for Freud and Jones at a time when they were trying hard to negotiate with the Nazis an arrangement that would “save” psychoanalysis in Germany in 1933.

Let us highlight some of the crucial events evoked in Nitzschke’s narrative. Hitler seized power in January 1933 in February the Nazis set the Reichstag on fire, ushering in systematic persecution of socialists and communists. In the wake of these events, and at Freud’s bidding, Reich was forbidden by the then president of the DPG, the Jew Eitingon, “to enter the offices of the [Berlin] Institute in case he would be arrested” (Nitzschke, in Fallend & Nitzschke, p. 69). Indeed, Reich and Fenichel soon fled from Berlin and from the danger of being sent to the recently (March 1933) opened Dachau
concentration camp. In April 1933 Boehm visited Freud in Vienna and told him of the Nazi regimes demand that Jewish analysts should be removed from the DPG -- Freud acquiesced while Schultz-Hencke voted in May, against Boehm and Müller-Braunschweig, in favor of Eitingon staying on. But this was merely delaying the inevitable: by November of 1933 Eitingon, before leaving for Palestine, acted to elect Boehm and Müller-Braunschweig as the new chiefs of the DPG. At the same time, Reich’s name was secretly stricken from membership of the DPG, and the road lay open for the expulsion of red Reich from the IPA at the Lucerne congress in August of 1934, an act that Nitzschke regards as a shameful “intrigue against Reich and as a betrayal of Reich” (Nitzschke, in Fallend & Nitzschke, p. 115). Nitzschke devotes much attention to Müller-Braunschweig’s role in those events and his article in the völkisch, anti-Semitic Nazi-propaganda organ Reichswart, in October of 1933, entitled “‘Psychoanalysis and Weltanschauung,’ that should have been more correctly titled ‘Psychoanalysis and Nazi-Weltanschauung’” (Nitzschke, in Fallend & Nitzschke, p. 97). In the Rundbriefe, Reich decried the publication as a “Schande,” as “a disgrace for the entire science of psychoanalysis,” (Fenichel, 1999, p. 103), this judgment later echoed by Dahmer, who discovered the article in 1983, and by Volker Friedrich. By contrast to Müller-Braunschweig, Schultz-Hencke who married a Jewish woman, as Nitzschke reminds the reader time and again, was neither a party member nor identified with Nazi-ideology but was used after the war as a scape-goat for both Müller-Braunschweig and Boehm. In his article Müller-Braunschweig states that psychoanalysis helps convert “incapable weaklings into fit (lebenstüchtigen) Menschen” (Nitzschke, in Fallend & Nitzschke, footnote 40, p. 98), this notion of “fitness” and “efficiency” having been a buzzword, as
Nitzschke shows, with racial hygiene overtones towards the end of the 19th century and later used by Hitler in *Mein Kampf*. Nitzschke also states that the word was later used in an essay by Schultz-Hencke, “Die Tüchtigkeit als psychotherapeutisches Ziel [fitness as a goal in psychotherapy],” in *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie*, 7:84-97, 1934. Cocks views this as “Schultz-Hencke’s opportunistic paean in 1934 to the human ‘fitness’ *(Tüchtigkeit)* produced by psychoanalytic treatment” and a “rhetorical concession to Nazi aims” (Cocks, G., 1998, p. 12). This might suggest that Cocks sees Müller-Braunschweig and Schultz-Hencke as being of the same ilk; but I still go along with Nitzschke’s assessment.

Was Freud blind? Yes and no. He could not be blind to such events of 1933 and 1934 as the public burning of his books in the streets of Berlin, or the Nazi boycott on Jewish businesses which led to the beginning of acts of violence and terror against Jews and political opponents as the grip of Hitler on Germany was tightening day by day. But during the aforementioned negotiations with Boehm he linked DPG policies with an emphatic demand to be rid of both Reich and Schultz-Hencke, an emotionally-loaded issue. As later recalled by the one time Trotsky sympathizer Ernst Federn, son of Paul Federn, many intellectuals in Vienna, Freud included, arrogantly or naively believed that Hitler’s regime would not last more than one or two years at most, and that the rational policy was to preserve the institutions and keep hoping (Nitzschke, personal communication). Even more telling facts and interpretations have now been presented by Paul Roazen (Roazen, in press), how much power politics were placed before the interests of psychoanalysis as a science. But even as one should not judge people and events from 1933 to 1939 only in the light of the knowledge of later developments, it is
still astounding how much Freud and the others succumbed to their wishful impulses and illusions in striking shady deals with the devil and how much were the Jewish members of the IPA disposed of as demanded by the Nazis. Perhaps Freud was too sick and too old to hear the warnings of Sandor Rado and Max Eitingon in Berlin and leave Vienna. Perhaps he listened more to Ernest Jones, his Gentile advisor mover and shaker, heir to the former Gentile Carl Jung, the conformist Jones who had no problems negotiating with the “Aryan” representatives of German psychoanalysis, Boehm and Müller-Braunschweig. It is not surprising at all that the latter were ready to negotiate, and willing in 1936, the year of the Olympic games in Berlin, to see a DPG cleansed of Jews become part of the IPA and the Göring Institute, only because, as suggested by Nitzschke, they were self-serving opportunists. But they were also supporters of the Nazi regime. What is more troubling to us today is that four years after the end of the war, at the First International Congress of Psychoanalysis held in Zurich in 1949, Ernest Jones praised the two as “real, genuine analysts” (Nitzschke, in Fallend & Nitzschke, p. 103) while denouncing Schultz-Hencke as a renegade fit to be removed from the IPA. In his “Report on the Sixteenth International Congress of Psychoanalysis” (Jones, 1949) refers to “the terrible events that have shaken the world” and “the terrific social and political changes ... of recent years” but nowhere mentions the concentration camps and the Holocaust. Jones praises Müller-Braunschweig’s activity as savior of psychoanalysis both during and after the war, and Boehm speaks there, too. Jones cites Rickman’s report about psychoanalysis in Germany but does not refer to Rickman’s characterization of Müller-Braunschweig as “dark grey” compared to Boehm as “dark grey if not black” and Rickman’s recommendation to exclude both from being officers in the IPA (see Brecht et al., where
Rickman’s report is reproduced). While some analysts expressed support for Schultz-Hencke (Barbara Lantos, Jones, 1949, p. 187), Marie Bonaparte wanted him out, clearly in accord with Jones’ “every sympathy with Dr. M.-B. personally.” In his address to the congress Müller-Braunschweig presented a lengthy assault of Schultz-Hencke’s “Neo-Analyse” (Jones, 1949, p. 187, 204) branding him as anti-Freudian. Schultz.-Hencke vigorously defended himself as a follower of Freud, and his dispute with M.-B. continued in a lively correspondence, reproduced in Brecht et al. (1985). In the end Müller-Braunschweig outmaneouvered Schultz-Hencke and the latter continued to be attacked by Freudians forever after. The stage was set for the subsequent false branding of Schultz-Hencke as a Nazi collaborator, with reciprocal DPG/DPV finger-pointing for years to come.

One needs to understand the official labor of post de-nazification by the West-German Government on the one hand, and the growing awareness of German society of the Holocaust and the painful confrontation with the criminal Nazi past. Psychoanalysts started taking part in this painful soul searching and the watershed was the international psychoanalytic congress in Hamburg in 1985. One of the painful facts that confronted the Germans was that a founding fathers of the DPV, Erhard Scheunert, had been a card-carrying Nazi Party member who for years was listed both on the roster of the DPV and IPA. His cover was blown shortly before the International Psychoanalytic Congress in Hamburg but following the intervention of some powerful people this material was not shown in the Exhibit of the History of Psychoanalysis shown at the congress. In 1994 DPV/IPA member Volker Friedrich discussed the difficulties DPV members had in confronting the history of psychoanalysis during the Nazi period. Indeed the difficulties
were so great that Friedrich did not publish his discussion in Germany but only in Austria (1994), where struggles uncomfortably with denouncing the cover-up.

The reaction to the Fallend and Nitzschke theses came from DPV-allied sociologist and scholar Michael Schröter (1998) in a book review essay entitled “Manichaean construction. Critique of two studies on Wilhelm Reich and his conflicts with DPG/IPV [IPA] (1933/34).” Schröter follows the official party line once again, heaping the customarily pejorative labels on Reich: communist, sexual reformer, originator of the orgasm theory and of a political-revolutionary conception of psychoanalysis, and psychotically-disturbed to boot -- but without trying to understand Reich’s position in these matters. While conceding that Reich was shabbily treated, Schröter also praised Jones as a skillful diplomat (Jones’ “untruth ... was not a lie, merely a form of half-truth or a quarter truth,” argues Schröter). Contrast this with the judgment of Peter Loewenberg: “It is mortifying to read the record of how the leaders of an honored association, in order to secure a presumed temporary benefit which did not last, humiliated and cast out some of its members to accommodate to pragmatic politics. That a professional association would exclude qualified members in agreements for the sake of the questionable interim negotiations whose benefit is is not demonstrated, defies the morality of valuing individuals that is the humane liberal essence of psychoanalysis” (Cocks, 1998, p. x).

But why should analysts not stand for the whole historical truth? One cannot easily forget Jones’ fine art of “diplomacy” he used to such advantage in vilifying Sandor Ferenczi. Why should an IPA analyst be more loyal to Jones than to the memory of the Jewish analysts persecuted by the Nazis? Schröter also gives short shrift to Schultz-
Hencke. Moreover, Schröter, argues it was better not to act self-destructively, as urged by Reich, but to compromise in order to survive. But surely, no self-destruction would have occurred here and the alleged salvation of psychoanalysis was not at stake either; rather, it was a matter of opportunism the more or less comfortable existence of some analysts under the Nazis and how they served Nazi interests by the concessions IPA officers made in 1933-1923: the Göring Institute benefited from the contributions of psychoanalysts to psychotherapy in the Third Reich. How many analysts were actually “saved”? In 1946 the still unified DPG had 34 members and 2 associate members, in 1954 the DPV, by now 3 years old, had 10 members and 3 associate members, none of them Jews. These numbers multiplied miraculously since then, not in the least thanks to support from America, a country Freud once despised.

In their rebuttal, Fallend and Nitzschke (1999) reaffirmed that the interests of the few that survived comfortably under the Nazis were less important than the hypocrisy of supposedly saving psychoanalysis under the Nazis, for as they rightly suggest, psychoanalysis would have survived anyway, as happened, for instance, in Holland and Norway. They also point out that in no way was their contribution a hagiography of Reich, which it was not, and that Schröter still tends to minimize the shameful treatment of Reich. And I would question even more vigorously Schröter’s condemnation of Reich’s 1933 *Mass Psychology of Fascism* as not acceptable to psychoanalysts. That remarkable and prescient book (minus the controversial Reichian phraseology of sex-economy or bions), is enormously indebted, without being mentioned by Reich, to Freud’s insights in his epochal 1921 essay on mass psychology, as it is also crucial in understanding the dynamics between Hitler and the German masses (Lothane, 1997c).
We may disagree with many of Reich’s ideas or political views, but his activism was an understandably impatient reaction to the political inertia of his contemporaries.

Furthermore, I hope I am not misstating anything by saying that in this confrontation the political sympathies of Nitzschke and Fallend are more to the left of the political spectrum as compared to Schröter. When I first read Schröter’s review of Fallend and Nitzschke’s book, I remarked in a letter to Nitzschke that “Schröter... talks like an orthodox Parteigenosse [party member]” which 

Psyche ordered deleted from their response to Schröter (Fallend & Nitschke, 1999). It appears that the locution “Parteigenosse” was used to refer to members of the Nazi Party, thus a bad connotation. This was not my intention: my purpose was to underscore the fact that an analytic society does at times behave like a political party bent on partisanship, censorship, and on rewriting history to justify such policies. But in the pursuit of historical truth requires that questionable behavior, e.g., as that of Ernest Jones, should be made public and debated openly.

Jones’s aforementioned 1949 “Report” is of interest not only as showing a measure of bad faith but also as a document reflecting a special weakness in psychoanalytic thinking. Jones refers to “the terrible events that have shaken the world,” but nowhere mentions the concentration camps. He connects “the terrific social and political changes... of recent years” to the “deeper layers of the mind that are the object of our special study and the powerful ideational and emotional accompaniments of those developments,” and offers this credo: “we have to resist the temptation to be carried away, to adopt emotional short cuts, to follow the way of politicians. ... Our duty is to observe, to study and to try to understand the inner meaning of the extraordinary events around us, and so long as we adhere to the faith of an analyst in personal integrity and
complete honesty we shall be true to our calling. ... The deeper we delve into the mind the less we can perceive any influence of sociological factors on its most primitive layers, those belonging to first year or two of life” (p. 179). Indeed we do, but we lose something important in the process. One can discern here a fundamental difference between a type of psychoanalyst represented by Jones and an adult-person oriented individual and group ego psychology: Jones places inordinate emphasis on the first two years of life as having the explanatory power to account for an entire individual life as well as socio-political events in society. Missing here is the importance of later years, the conception that conduct in health and disease is not merely a monadic activity but an inherently interpersonal reality of adults living in family and in society, and that group dynamics of leaders and masses and their relation to ideology play and important role in socio-political developments. This juxtaposition is also paradigmatic of another polemics that has been endemic all along: the difference between the childhood-regression oriented psychoanalysis and the emphasis on a more active analytic work with adult and present-day conflicts, the very same difference of temperament and orientation that animated Freud in his debates with Jung and Adler back in 1914, the same difference that is evident in the way he managed the Wolf Man. A similar split recurred in the Schultz-Hencke Müller-Braunschweig confrontation in 1949, and it is still with us.

Psychoanalysts who treat other people’s neurotic problems are entitled to share some degree of neuroticism with their patients: it may even increase their ability to empathize with their analysands. But the personal analyses they undergo and the training they receive do not prepare them to be sufficiently aware of group dynamics that play out in the functioning of corporations, movements, organizations and nations, the specific
dynamics of leaders and their followings, and, last but not least, in the group behavior in psychoanalytic societies and institutes. There is a specific corporate group dynamics that plays out in board rooms of societies, institutions, governments in relation to ideological uniformity and dissidence, and on a larger scale in group phenomena within nations, democratic and totalitarian alike (Lothane, 1997c). Such dynamics played their role in the splits Vienna and Berlin, the struggles between the DPG and DPV, and in splits in the history of American psychoanalysis as well, starting with Karen Horney and others in 1946, with parallels suggested between the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Academy of Psychoanalysis established in 1956, as an umbrella for a number of the “deviant” schools and the matters discussed above between the DPG and the DPV. It would seem that an all-embracing ecumenism should be the rallying cry to unify psychoanalysis today rather than to leave it in a condition of disunity.

Perhaps the events and issues raised by the contributors to this volume, as well as the work of Geoffrey Cocks, should become a historical lesson and an stimulus to raise the consciousness of psychoanalysts (and of other intellectuals as well) to the burning questions about the relationship between any science and ethics, and especially between psychoanalysis and ethics (Lothane, 1998b, 1999b). Next time a political crisis or a war should cloud the horizon in any part of the world, we psychoanalysts might ponder whether to become engaged in matters of politics and ethics or merely contemplate the deeper layers of the mind.

In summary: the contributions in this issue present a colorful chapter in the history of orthodoxy and dissidence in psychoanalysis: a quilt of cultural, doctrinal and political confrontations in Europe prior, during, and after the 12 years dark years of the
Third Reich, and in particular in two great psychoanalytic societies and institutes, Vienna and Berlin. In Vienna, the ailing and aging Freud was surrounded by an intellectual “praetorian” guard composed of some first generation Freudians, born in the 1870-1880’s (e.g., Federn) and the most powerful member of the famed but now shrunken Committee, i.e., Ernest Jones, now joined by one of the most important second generation Freudians, born in the 1890’s, Freud’s own daughter Anna. In Berlin, a rival “second city,” after the death of Abraham, Committee member Eitingon was Freud’s orthodox vicar. But it is in Berlin that a new ideas were blowing in the wind and a split would develop between the orthodox and dissident first- and second-generation Freudians. Among the former, we find faithful Boehm vs. dissenters Rado and Horney; among the latter, we see the Viennese imports Reich, Fenichel, and Bernfeld, joining Alexander, Jacobson, and Schultz-Hencke. Of the last six named, all except Bernfeld, Fenichel and Jacobson would later propound neo-analytic ideas; all with the exception of Schultz-Hencke were left-wing Freudians (Linksfreudianer). The neo-analytic pioneers may have viewed themselves as good Freudians and were no heretical firebrands, but were seen as such by Freud and the faithful. The most tragic figure among them was Reich who bore the double cross of doctrinal and political incorrectness and thus a scape-goat for other left-wingers. He also found himself in another cross-fire: the Freuds’ and Jones’ tragic mix-up with the Nazis and their analytic spokesmen to “save” orthodox psychoanalysis vs. his own uncompromising anti-Nazism, with dire results that reverberated for decades. This old strife will now be healed with the imminent historical inclusion of the DPG in the IPA. But since psychoanalysis is defined by its history, this lesson of the past should not be forgotten.
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