

It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is most adaptable to change. (Megginson, 1964)

Psychoanalytic education, transmission, training, and pedagogy mean different things to different segments of the psychoanalytic universe. Even Freud's psychoanalysis means different things to different schools, so here we all are, situated in the now 21st century, over 100 years since Freud's paper "On Narcissism". I mention this one particular paper because it foreshadowed almost all of the ongoing difficulties that all analysts are contending with when they address psychoanalytic education, transmission, training, and pedagogy.

There are now three officially accepted models of psychoanalytic education, each of which contains the roots of intergenerational oppositionality. There are the Berlin/Eitingon, the French, and the Uruguayan models, all of which are based on the classically pedagogical structure of analysis, supervision, and seminar. Whether competency is decided by potential, or by finishing an analysis before one embarks on further training, or some combination of the vagaries of both, as in the Uruguayan model, the point is that analytic institutions, even as they attempt to modify tradition, seem to fall prey to repeating those very issues that they originally opposed. The intergenerational insights of both psychoanalytic pleasures and unpleasures, which can be seen in terms of a range of narcissistic manifestations, become the essence of what is institutionalized unconsciously within all psychoanalytic institutions. And so it is my contention that this institutionalization and intergenerational oppositionality have become the dual hallmarks of the near impossibility of any sort of rational resolution to the difficulties faced by psychoanalysis in this 21st century.

While some schools eschew the very concept of science, others have embraced its benefits without adhering to its rigorous principles. The new field of neuropsychanalysis has elevated many principles of affective neuroscience to a level at which it can now come to grips with the cognitive paradigm, which has dominated research for at least the past fifty years. Affective neuroscience has already contributed much to the evolutionary development of psychoanalytic developmental theory, in that it has shown the presence of affect as a primary motivational system in all mammals. In conjunction with "top-down social cognition" (Panksepp, 2008), the affective systems delineated by Jaak Panksepp (1998) add much neurobiological information to the structure of the development of the infant's psyche. Its implications for attachment theories, when integrated, will then be able to further advance concepts of separation-individuation and re-order our understanding of how developmental theory need not negate an Oedipal paradigm, but may correct our misunderstandings that have developed over a century of seeing all analysts thru a singular Oedipal lens. The works of Alan Schore (2012) and Antonio Damasio (2010), along with that of Jaak Panksepp (2012), allow analysts to finally come to grips with the single topic that has contributed most to the fragmentation of the field. That topic is narcissism, in all its pathological extremes, as well as what will come to be recognized as normal evolutionary strivings,

which equate to various affects interacting in infinite ways, what Panksepp has called the SEEKING system (i.e., a supraordinate system that embodies enthusiasm for life forces). Kohut (1977) tried to address healthy strivings, but his own narcissism kept him from linking his ideas to those of past contributors, as did the emerging affective neuroscientific contributions of his time. By linking the latter work of Paul Federn on libidinal cathexis (1952) with the scientifically demonstrated work of Panksepp and his colleagues, it will become possible to redefine what is meant by “narcissism” in a “post-cultural narcissistic age.” I believe it must be in this direction that we find the emergent property that will finally help to bring divergent schools together in an understanding of how our human consciousness manifests itself within the strictures of a therapeutic group, which would include more than just a dyad.

Most recently, it has become clear that the “training analyst” system is at the very heart of much of the problematic developments in the field at large, and even within the individual structures of our institutions. Much of this awareness has come from the courageous efforts of Otto Kernberg, who has delineated at least thirty ways that analytic institutions destroy the creativity of their candidates (1996), and has suggested detailed ways to begin the heavy lifting that will be required to modify these problems (2014). On the other hand, as Dany Nobus pointed out in his essay (this issue) the Lacanian tradition, which is certainly not free of ongoing difficulties, has also run amok in determining how to extend psychoanalysis into the future. As an extension of the academy, with all its varied discourses, psychoanalysis may survive as an intellectual discipline, which might help to integrate the political, sociological, literary, historical, and economic manifestations of structural, modern, and post-modern thought and development. This is all well and good, but what of the candidate today, and how will the problems that he/she will encounter affect the very nature of the field in the future? It has always been my assumption that one’s personal analysis is at the heart of learning what psychoanalysis actually is and what one has to offer others, and as long as that analysis is coined a “training analysis”, then the heart and soul of it will be lost. No one really knows where exactly the “training analyst” system began, only that it started in the 1920s. This was a time of great change to Freud’s science, as his closest colleagues were not only struggling with new ideas about the direction of the movement, but they were also engaged in bitter rivalries for the attention of the professor. Abraham and Jones in the north would become the adversaries of Rank and Ferenczi to the south. And as we all know, it would be Rank and Ferenczi who would join Jung and Adler as the excommunicated. Then, Abraham would die suddenly, and Freud would be left without a secret committee. The “training analyst” system would now become official, and the narcissistic vagaries of all succeeding generations of analysts would come to fall as shadows upon their analysands. Some would rebel and form new schools, some by elevating a single idea into a *pars pro toto* encompassing psychology, while other scholars, like Lacan, would create approaches to Freud, that in effect would usurp Freud’s opus as if in an Oedipal victory. Using the vagaries of language and thought, the illusion of a return to Freud became an attempt to replace him, so that every public intellectual coming out of continental philosophy would now have to get through Lacan to get to or around Freud.

The apostolic progression beginning with Freud has ended. We now exist in a time when no one knew Freud personally. Only now can we know from our literature, which is inflated beyond the capacity for any single individual to claim absolute hegemony over our accumulated knowledge base, the essence of what psychoanalysis is. And after what appears as four to five generations of analytic inheritance, we can as individuals know how our analysts' analysts' analyst came to his or her understanding of their own unconscious narcissistic strivings. I refer to this because our field has never resolved certain ongoing controversies, but rather has reinvented them over and over in different guises and under different arguments. Hermeneutics versus science, psychoanalysis versus psychotherapy, and art versus science are all versions, in one degree or another, of the impossibility of defining a single version of psychoanalysis that could then be taught or transmitted to that candidate in psychoanalysis at an institution which has formally constructed itself to do just that. In the past I have written (2011) of the absolute need of teaching opposing views at all levels of institutional training facilities, but I am coming to understand that even if that were to be implemented, it would fall far short of its desired effect. Nothing less than the complete de-institutionalization of our institutions will suffice to begin to correct the intergenerational antagonisms and the inextricably linked problematic forces that have brought psychoanalysis to its current state.

This new century has brought a concerted effort to integrate diverse theoretical formulations. After Kernberg had assimilated crucial aspects of both Kleinian and ego psychological concepts into a well-constructed internalized object relational theory, he and his colleagues dedicated many years to researching how mainstream psychoanalytic thought and praxis can be manualized, and therefore taught or transmitted to the next generations of analysts. Kernberg has told me (O. F. Kernberg, personal communication) that it is called transference focused psychotherapy, because if he had called it psychoanalysis, the opportunity to have accomplished this would have been lost. Such is the absurd necessity in having to deal with a hierarchical structure of analysts, who have gained their own sense of worth based upon not their own analysis, but through institutional structures that have been formed based upon the very hierarchical structure of who has analyzed whom, albeit unconsciously. The analytic communities have long used their own clinical treatments to diminish the very intellectualized versions of psychoanalysis that have thrived and continue to flourish in our academic institutions of higher learning. The rejoinder, to intellectuals such as Zizek and Badiou, have been that while the former has never seen patients, the latter has never been analyzed.

The distinction between theory and practice may have some sort of validity in a world of mediated environments in which information technologies are coming to be usurped by a cultural need for ever more entertainment valuations — the world of “infotainment”, which mirrors the distinction between the public intellectual culture of France and continental philosophy in contrast to the privacy of the Anglo/American cultures. In the third region of Latin America, we see this as a split between the growth of Lacanian versus Kleinian positions. Our current literature has produced more than a few integrated works that would have been impossible to publish only a few short years ago. Fred Busch's *Creating a Psychoanalytic Mind* (2014) and

Lawrence Brown's *Intersubjective Process and the Unconscious* (2011) are both works of what Kernberg has defined as mainstream. While Busch integrates ego psychology with Kleinian understandings based on the clinical necessity of integrating theory and practice, Brown integrates Freud, Klein, and Bion through an understanding of the theoretical beginnings of intersubjective systems theory, a short step to the integration of these ideas with self psychology and the relational turn, as well as interpersonal schools. We have also seen the rise of a general psychoanalytic field theory, integrating the pioneering work of the Barrangers from Latin America with Italian versions from both Ferro and Civitarese, which integrates with the relational, intersubjective and interpersonal traditions of North America. As the Lacanian schools expand, more and more articles in the literature are attempting to understand how Lacan's thought can be integrated into what has been termed the main body of psychoanalytic knowledge. To some, Lacan's difference is not so much based on his public opposition to ego psychology proper, which can readily be explained by generational oppositionality or his need to overthrow his own analytic heritage in order to satisfy his narcissistic aspirations, but rather, his critique of Freud's shift to the second topographic model and the defensive aspects of the functioning of the ego, as well as his different views on primary repression and its manifestations. While this may be at the heart of our difficulties, it is my belief that Freud's rejection of Rank's ideas concerning the birth trauma was a political decision, which may have been unavoidable, since it touched upon the theoretical pivot point concerning the clinical treatment of what Freud had termed "the narcissistic neuroses". Rank's ideas were dealt with, rather than integrated into the opus we know as psychoanalysis, leaving a distinction between the gold standard of psychoanalysis and the clinically relevant dynamic psychotherapies. The same occurred with Adler, and it took years before the value of his thought was finally accepted by the mainstream, but by the time Rank's views were accepted, Freud had died, and the free-for-all attitudes of a diverse post-World War II culture had led to the establishment of separate institutional bastions of an order that rivaled the Freud/Marxism debates of the midcentury. Had Rank not been treated as he was, it would have been much easier, for example, for Winnicott to present his original theoretical formulations to the mainstream. To this day, the questions of whether Winnicott has radically altered analytic clinical theory or whether he simply expanded our understanding are debated in the international literature (Blass, 2012). We all had a mother and a father, and to educate psychoanalysts as if we only had one or the other is farcical. The issue of Oedipal versus pre-Oedipal has been debated in reference to the importance and relative order of the parents' impact on the infant's psyche, which is a potential starting point to a curriculum, at a time when the transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge can be disseminated via open, electronically mediated communication technologies. What this mediated space would look like has yet to be determined, but initial efforts are beginning to be recognized by groups of early career analysts and candidates who are at odds with our formal training institutions. One of those groups is called "Das Unbehagen", and its greatest asset is its constant questioning of its own existence. When histories are written, time has already affected the nature of the result, so we look at George Makari's *Revolution in Mind* (2008), and Eli Zaretsky's *The Secrets of the Soul* (2004) from a position in which we can appreciate the problematic

organizational disintegration of our field, while at the same time marveling at how we have all survived, albeit in two distinct manners. The clinical and the theoretical are intertwined in the concept of praxis, whether that be applied to a patient or to another discipline. And so, we cannot continue to keep the concepts of art, science, analysis, therapy, hermeneutics, and research apart, in an age when fragmentation has become a cultural norm. If we continue on this path, then the eventual loss of a deep understanding of consciousness will also be lost.

The concept of the “here and now” versus “there and then” is currently being debated across all platforms of psychoanalytic thinking. How can a right-minded, analyzed, clinical theoretician abide by one or the other perspective in any clinical understanding of a patient? Current life situations as well as reconstructed traumatic past events must constitute the substance of any well-conducted analysis. If both are not considered and only one side is adhered to, then the analysis of the patient will not succeed in giving that patient a sense of a restoration of choice in how they are to proceed with their life. If choice is not restored, then the psychoanalysis will have failed its own goal, and eventually will lead to the conundrum that we all face when coming to grips with a self divided against itself, which can be understood as the distinction between ego and self, or the functioning versus the experiencing self. If, however, we are equipped with the tools to deal with this internal conundrum, then we will have succeeded in our attempt to validate psychoanalysis as a valued example of a human technology that will be able to benefit those who engage in the process both scientifically and artistically. When Dany Nobus (this issue) calls for the Nietzschean concept of a *Gaya Scienza*, he is addressing the need to eschew the science of the modern world so as to deal with the inherent human conundrums, so that the explorations of these conundrums are free from the rigid and sometimes stultifying rules of modern science. That science, specifically, is what Otto Kernberg has called for, in order to guarantee the very existence of our field in a clinical realm. Kernberg, however, does not dismiss the call for a *Gaya Scienza*, in that he proposes the teaching of “an honest, unashamedly subjective and existential exploration of emotional reactions and interactions in the treatment situation.” (current issue of Div Review this issue) This is a radical departure for any psychoanalyst who is considered to occupy a position within what has been called the mainstream of psychoanalytic thinking, and it may harbor the roots of an emergent property that will be necessary if psychoanalysis is to survive into a new paradigm. We must be constantly vigilant of Kuhn’s (1962) specific definition of structures of scientific revolutions, that between paradigms there is an extended time period of competing schools, which will compete until an emergent property is uncovered, ending when the competing schools agree and a new paradigm is formed. I firmly believe that we are in the latter stages of this “in-between time” and that this “in-between time” has been artificially extended due to the political choices Freud was forced to make to preserve the very existence of the psychoanalytic movement beginning with his seminal paper “On Narcissism” (Freud, 1914/1957), in which he refuted both Adler and Jung to preserve the paradigm he felt a need to protect. Subsequent fragmentation followed the publication of both Rank’s *The Trauma of Birth* (1924/1994) and Ferenczi’s “active technique” (1932/1988), since they worked together on a paper concerning the future direction of psychoanalysis, and because we can only now see how this work has

become the root of the controversies within the movement that has manifested itself in the pluralistic, fragmented constructions of our analytic institutions as a whole, an example of which Monroe Pray (2002) has called the classical/relational schism.

Since the very nature of the concept of the de-institutionalization of our many institutions is primary, then the second issue I have mentioned becomes much more plausible to address, and that is the issue of generational oppositionality. As our hierarchical leaders become older, it is up to the next generations to confront their elders, much in line with Bob Dylan's song (1964):

*Come mothers and fathers throughout the land
And don't criticize what you can't understand
Your sons and your daughters are beyond your command
Your old road is rapidly agin'
Please get out of the new one if you can't lend your hand
For the times they are a-changin'*

Much of what both Kernberg and Nobus have suggested can be practically implemented if current leadership can control their narcissistic strivings enough to recognize the need for an evolutionary shift in how psychoanalysis is transmitted to future generations.

I would suggest that all psychoanalytic training facilities begin to re-order the way that they approach all forms of psychotherapy. Freud's comment concerning what has over the generations become a distorted "gold standard" concerning psychoanalysis has lost its meaning in a culture that has changed the very fabric of psychoanalysis as a viable clinical entity. We should know by now, after reading the works of Jurgen Reeder (2004) and Douglas Kirsner (2009), that something is deeply amiss within our institutional edifice. Freud created a profession to treat neurotics, while psychoanalysis, according to Freud, could not treat the narcissistic neuroses. However, we have learned over the last 70 years that we can treat the deeper levels of human character structure. So why, at a time when many of our patients fall into this less-than-neurotic category, do we continue to treat candidates as if they must learn psychoanalysis proper first, and then modify it only after they have graduated, joined the fold, and are now deemed capable of instigating modifications to an archaic technique. What if all institutions began training analysts as psychoanalytic psychotherapists, addressing through considered pedagogy that the patients whom they see may need therapeutic interventions more than they need psychoanalytic interpretations. This is not to say that the psychoanalytic interpretation of transference is not a vital tool for the wellbeing of any patient, but it may not be the optimal approach for most patients who are unprepared to engage in a classical analytic treatment, no matter how skilled the analyst. It follows that it would be more sensible to begin teaching some form of psychoanalytic or psychodynamic therapy, while helping the candidate through the supervisory process to recognize differences based upon patient

characteristics and not the analyst's need to dutifully perform some abstract technique. We could call this problem one of a *developmental lag* in the progression of institutional pedagogy. The very debate of psychoanalysis versus psychotherapy has, by virtue of its own existence, caused this developmental lag. The technique of classical analysis has been elevated to such heights that it has become problematic for the average patient, who could benefit greatly even with psychodynamic therapy. The application of psychoanalytic ideas to the treatment of the specific patient who enters our offices is no less a praxis than is psychoanalysis proper. The appropriateness of any treatment must be determined by the specific condition of any particular patient at any particular moment. This determination was never clearer than when Melanie Klein (1935) presented her work in London after her beginnings with Ferenczi and then Abraham. Ms. Klein did not originate object relations, as Freud had already implied the same, but rather she challenged the singular view of a paternally dominated Oedipal paradigm, and that challenge has continued to this day. The shift from a father imbuing a son with the force to form a superego was now to be balanced against the infant's guilt and attempted reparation for the hostile wishes toward the early mother. The impact of this challenge is socially understood alongside the shift from an older masculine-dominated culture to a more maternal understanding. With this shift, our entire field has explored earlier and earlier psychodynamics, which has been to the benefit of all analysts and their patients, but not to present-day analytic candidates of today, schooled using methods incompatible with the presentation of shifts like these, leaving the candidate unsure of what to make of the power dynamics that exist to maintain one or another singular view.

The emergence of some form of a common encyclopedia of psychoanalytic techniques would be a necessary condition to overcome the developmental lag in the progression of analytic candidacy. New thinking must stimulate radical changes to our now stultifying training institutions. Well-regarded analytic thinkers and theoreticians are diminished by the rigidified and entrenched power cliques within and without our institutions, and, most of all, by the obstinacy of the older generations who seek to retain their supremacy. Again, I would stress that teaching new forms of psychoanalytic therapy to deal with the therapeutic needs of the general patient population will lead to the enhanced capacity to teach psychoanalysis proper to a generation of candidates who are already faced with enormous obstacles in maintaining a psychoanalytic practice. Because of the massive evolutionary social changes that have occurred since the inception of psychoanalytic praxis, it is imperative that those who actually teach psychoanalysis be open to the enormous amount of new and valuable information coming from fields in which psychoanalysis is not defined by its clinical applications. In addition, where psychoanalysis is defined by its clinical praxis, these teachers, supervisors, and analysts must incorporate even more understanding into their pedagogical armamentarium to develop future candidates into future analysts who will be capable of maintaining the essence of the art of the science of psychoanalytic thinking, as well as being able to maintain the value that a well-conducted psychoanalytic treatment can offer to any individual human being.

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