

Doctrines must take their beginning from that of the matters of which they treat. (Vico, 1744/1948, §314)

Moreover, we can regard a beginning as the point at which, in a given work, the writer departs from all other works; a beginning immediately establishes relationships with work already existing, relationships of either continuity or antagonism or some mixture of both. (Said, 1975, p.3)

Two and a half centuries apart, both Giambattista Vico and Edward Said focused their attention on the conundrum of where one begins the psychoanalytic process, the same conundrum faced by psychoanalysts today. And now, years later, we are beginning to recognize that the therapeutic gains of any analytic encounter may not begin with the patient's present, but with the analyst's past. In this century, psychoanalytic education, pedagogy, formation, transmission, and even the politically incorrect training model have come under such scrutiny that a simple solution has become untenable. It is one thing to offer suggestions to modify our institutions, and another to propose creating new institutions for the purpose of transmitting psychoanalytic knowledge to future generations; but the clinical praxis of psychoanalysis must be de-institutionalized before any proposals, however valid, may become possible.

The ongoing historical conundrum of the relationship between the theory and practice of psychoanalysis has created a biased set of standards at all institutions, has led to a defensive structure that will not allow for the necessary change. This difficulty must be addressed in such a way that an emergent property will manifest itself within the ongoing debates that are, only now, being confronted.

The pedagogical and ethical necessities of teaching opposing theoretical views at all institutions (Jacobs, 2011), while brushing up against imbedded power enclaves which support one theory or another, must be the first step to deinstitutionalizing what has become so rigid and brittle that it threatens the future of psychoanalysis. The power politics that exist within all institutions must be deconstructed if these institutions expect to continue to flourish in the manner they have since the last mid-century. Teaching opposing views does not constitute being in opposition, as being in opposition would limit the evolution of psychoanalytic progress. However, clearly understanding why there is difference will lead to the possibility of evolutionary changes, which in turn, will offer our field an unknown future, but a future nonetheless, and a praxis where appropriate.

Any debate regarding whether psychoanalysis is a science or an art, has already rigidified itself into a conundrum that is unsolvable. Arguments over translation will not resolve the difficulties that are faced by all psychoanalytic institutions. Only heavy lifting and dedicated openness by multiple factions can lead to an evolutionary paradigm shift within and without the cultural structures created by the Freudian opus. We must all—each one of us—confront our contributions to this rigidified and narcissistic character structure of the very institutions that give us our identity, and, if possible, we must embrace the beginnings of this evolutionary change sooner rather than later.

Efforts to integrate theoretical models within and between institutions need to be implemented. Why should Bion's concept of *reverie* be left out of any psychoanalytic understanding of praxis? Why should Lacan's formulation of a *mirror stage* be similarly pushed aside? How can any analyst not recognize Winnicott's *hate in the countertransference*, Klein's *projective identification*, Abraham's *early oral biting stage*, Kohut's *empathic attunement*, or even Jon Mill's explication of the *relational turn*? How, as Rangell has stated, can a patient with one pathology get completely different analyses from each analyst? The question arose when Rangell offered the concept of a *composite unitary theory*, only to have his detractors agree with the premise, but then ask, "whose composite will it be?" He felt that if an analyst had a problem with, for instance, *self-cohesion*, then it would not be helpful to focus on *ego fragmentation* (*personal communication*). We are in the year 2015, and it is time that analysts of all stripes begin to resolve the discrepancies in our field, if only to save psychoanalysis as a praxis. We analysts must recognize the need to help our patients improve self-regulation through enhanced self-observation, which must be based upon the use of evolving skills in acknowledging disguised motivations that can be unmasked and addressed in adaptive self-preservative modes. And of course, this must be shared with all who engage in the process of becoming psychoanalysts.

In October of 2014, at the tectonic fault line between the Eurasian and American plates in Reykjavík, Iceland, a group of international psychoanalysts came together to attempt to find some emergent property that could effectively resolve the myriad problems facing psychoanalysis in this 21st century. One panel at this gathering featured five psychoanalysts from the three diverse structural training models who met to discuss the vagaries of psychoanalytic education, pedagogy, transmission and training. Otto Kernberg, Dany Nobus, Carmen Medici, Joseph Schachter and I presented our ideas in Reykjavík, and here we present three of those essays, titrating the most controversial ideas.

Beyond the distinction between different schools of thought lie deeper misunderstandings regarding the very structure of psychoanalysis in the 21st century. Will we, as a field, be able to come to an agreement as to whether psychoanalysis is an art or a science? It is not as simple as it may appear. Kernberg's main objective is to recognize the scientific and replicable aspects of research, and therefore be able to systematize interactions in the therapeutic environment. However, as one reads more deeply, begins to understand the individually subjective and wide open sense of what must occur in any successful psychoanalytic treatment. And, it should go without saying that this is a principle which needs to be communicated to analytic candidates.

On the apparent other hand, from a Lacanian perspective, Dany Nobus calls for the Nietzschean concept of a *gaya scienza*, which promotes a deeply and singularly subjective position without reference to modern scientific strictures. However, as one reads more closely, it becomes clear that both Nobus and Kernberg are, in their own way, calling for a new understanding of what is needed to transfer the principles of psychoanalysis to a new generation of analysts. Nobus' view that psychoanalysis as we know it has ended in some fashion, is a point that I am not sure Kernberg would challenge. Kernberg's research methodology has been accepted within the scientific communities of both psychiatry and psychoanalysis and is called *transference focused psychotherapy*. We are all, no matter the continent on which we live, a long way from the Victorian enclaves of the early part of the 20th century, when many young acolytes of Freud—who would become the “secret committee”—could not keep themselves from sleeping with their charges, even as they readily recognized what they would call countertransference. If psychoanalysis is to have a future, we all agree that some radical transformation must occur. For Nobus, the recognition signals an end; for Kernberg, it is a continuing battle; and for me, it is a radical transformation that happens with each and every new potential analyst who walks into my consulting room.

References

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